Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BS125310 David Yaffe, Judge.
Sherwana Richardson, pro. per., for Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Leslie P. McElroy and Philip J. Matsumoto, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
MANELLA, J.
INTRODUCTION
Sherwana Richardson appeals from the denial of her petition for a writ of administrative mandate. She contends that she should not have to pay a penalty assessment for making a false statement on her unemployment insurance claim form because she did not make the false statement willfully and with actual knowledge of its falsity. Finding no error, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant, who had been receiving unemployment compensation benefits, was involved in a car accident on December 15, 2008, and was hospitalized from that date until February 13, 2009. She did not apply for unemployment benefits during her weeks in the hospital. After being discharged from the hospital, she sought and received permission to file late claims for unemployment benefits covering the eight weeks she was hospitalized. Appellant received $3,118 in unemployment benefits for those weeks in the hospital.
On June 2, 2009, the Employment Development Department (EDD) interviewed appellant regarding her claims for unemployment benefits during her hospitalization. Under Unemployment Insurance Code section 1253, appellant was eligible for unemployment benefits for any week only if, among other conditions, “she was able to work and available for work for that week.” (Unemp. Ins. Code, § 1253, subd. (c).) EDD found that appellant was not credible when she claimed that she was able and available to work while hospitalized because (1) appellant was unwilling to release any information regarding her medical condition during that time, and (2) appellant could not address why she stayed in the hospital despite being allegedly able and available to work. Based upon the available information, EDD determined that appellant had filed intentionally false statements regarding her availability to work on her claim forms for the weeks of December 20, 2008 through February 14, 2009
All further statutory citations are to the Unemployment Insurance Code, unless stated otherwise.
On July 20, 2009, EDD sent a notice of overpayment to appellant. In the notice, EDD asserted that appellant received an overpayment of $4,053.40 in connection with her unemployment benefits claims. The reason for the overpayment was that “[b]enefits were paid before it was known that you were not able to work.” The overpayment amount included “a penalty added in accordance with section 1375.1, ” in the amount of $935.40. Section 1375.1 provides that, if “an individual has been overpaid unemployment compensation benefits because he or she willfully, for the purpose of obtaining unemployment compensation benefits, either made a false statement or representation, with actual knowledge of the falsity thereof, or withheld a material fact, ” the individual “shall” be assessed “an amount equal to 30 percent of the overpayment amount.”
On September 2, 2009, appellant wrote a letter to EDD asking “if the thirty percent penalty could be waived.” Appellant asserted that “[t]he reason I was late was because I got into a car accident while on unemployment. I was unaware I should have applied for disability. I did not find out until the [latter] part of July.” This letter was construed as an appeal from the notice of overpayment.
In connection with the appeal, appellant received notices of hearing for case Nos. 2949575, 2949576, and 2949577, which informed her of the issues that would be considered at the hearings. Case No. 2949575 involved, among other issues, whether appellant was “able to work and available for work.” Case No. 2949576 involved whether appellant “willfully [made] a false statement or willfully fail[ed] to report a material fact in order to obtain benefits” and whether her appeal was timely. Case No. 2949577 involved (1) whether the appeal was timely, (2) whether appellant was at fault for the overpayment, and (3) whether the overpayment was caused by appellant’s willful false statement. Subsequently, case Nos. 2949575 and 2949576 were dismissed because “appellant subsequently indicated that no appeal was intended.”
On October 27, 2009, a hearing on case No. 2949577 was held before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) M.E. Villanea. During the hearing, appellant sought to appeal the penalty assessment. She testified that she did not receive the notice of overpayment until the latter part of August. She admitted that she filed a false statement with EDD, but stated that she was unaware that she was supposed to file for disability benefits. She subsequently filed for disability benefits, and the “disability office” reimbursed EDD for the overpayments in the amount of $2,983.14. Thus, at the time of the hearing, appellant owed EDD $1,070.26, the majority of which consisted of the penalty assessment.
In a written statement of decision, the ALJ determined that the appeal was timely. The ALJ also found that appellant “did not appeal the false statement disqualification.” Based upon this finding, the ALJ determined that “since the overpayment was the result of a false statement disqualification, it cannot be waived. Accordingly, it is concluded that that portion of the overpayment which the claimant appealed is affirmed. The claimant is liable to repay the penalty assessment under code section 1735.1.”
Appellant filed an appeal with the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board (CUIAB). She asked that the “30% penalty... be waived” because “the funds have been reimbursed.” CUIAB denied the appeal and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. CUIAB adopted the ALJ’s findings of fact, and made additional findings of fact. It found that “[a]fter the claimant was discharged from the hospital, [she] filled out claim forms stating she could work during the eight weeks she was hospitalized. [¶] The claimant declined to provide any information about her medical condition. Later in 2009[, ] the claimant received retroactive disability benefits covering the time she was hospitalized. The claimant agreed she made a false statement.” The CUIAB ruled as follows: “At the time claimant filled out her continued claim forms for the eight weeks she was hospitalized[, ] she knew she was not able to work. She filled out the form[s] reflecting that she was able to work as she intended to collect Unemployment Insurance benefits. The claimant’s actions amount to a false statement for purposes of obtaining benefits. Consequently[, ] we affirm the administrative law judge’s decision.”
Appellant filed a petition for administrative mandate in the Superior Court for Los Angeles County, challenging CUIAB’s decision. After a hearing, on June 8, 2010, the trial court denied the petition after independently examining the administrative record. The court found that “[t]he weight of the evidence is to the effect that petitioner knew very well that she was falsely claiming that she was able and available for work while she was actually hospitalized for injuries received in an automobile accident.” The court rejected appellant’s contention that she was available for work even though she was in the hospital because “she fail[ed] to present any evidence to support such a claim, ” including “refus[ing] to reveal what her actual physical condition was while she was hospitalized.”
On June 8, 2010, appellant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s order denying her petition.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the trial court erred in denying her petition for an administrative writ. The trial court reached its decision by exercising its independent judgment on the weight of the evidence. Accordingly, this court will affirm if there is substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings. (Bixby v. Pierno (1971) 4 Cal.3d 130, 143, fn. 10 [“After the trial court has exercised its independent judgment upon the weight of the evidence, an appellate court need only review the record to determine whether the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence.”].)
Under section 1375.1, appellant must be assessed a 30 percent penalty if “she willfully, for the purpose of obtaining unemployment compensation benefits, ... made a false statement or representation, with actual knowledge of the falsity thereof.” (§ 1375.1.) The trial court found that appellant did willfully make a false statement with actual knowledge of its falsity because appellant “knew very well that she was falsely claiming that she was able and available for work while she was actually hospitalized for injuries received in an automobile accident.” The trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record.
First, appellant admitted that she filed a false statement when she stated on her unemployment insurance claim form she was able and available to work while hospitalized. Second, appellant could not explain to EDD why she thought she was able and available to work during her hospitalization. On appeal, she concedes that the trial court did not err in finding that she was not available to work while hospitalized. Third, although appellant would not explain her medical condition to the ALJ, the fact that she was hospitalized for eight weeks suggests that her injuries were sufficiently serious to preclude her from being able to work during that time. Based upon this evidence, the only reasonable inference is that appellant knew or reasonably should have known that she was making a false statement when she claimed that she was able and available to work during her hospitalization. (See, e.g., Cal. Code Regs., tit. 22, § 1375-1, subd. (c) [“A claimant who receives or retains benefits which he or she knew or reasonably should have known he or she was not lawfully entitled to receive is at fault.”].) Thus, there was substantial evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings.
Appellant’s main argument on appeal is that the trial court’s findings contradict determinations “by the Administrative Law Judge that the appellant[’]s statement was not done willfully and the appellant did not have actual knowledge of the false statement regarding the overpayment.” Appellant cites to the decision of dismissal in case No. 2949576 in support of this assertion. As stated previously, the notice of hearing for case No. 2949576 indicated that an issue to be considered in the case was whether appellant willfully made a false statement to obtain unemployment benefits. That case was dismissed based upon appellant’s indication that no appeal was intended. Thus, the decision of dismissal made no determination of any issue in that case. Stated differently, the decision of dismissal was not a determination that appellant’s false statement was not made willfully or that appellant did not have actual knowledge of the false statement. After reviewing the administrative record, this court can locate no such determination by the ALJ. Thus, we reject appellant’s argument that the trial court’s findings contradict prior administrative determinations.
Appellant’s remaining arguments are irrelevant to this appeal or are unsupported by legal or record citation. For example, appellant does not explain how she was prejudiced or harmed by the ALJ’s alleged oral misstatement of a statute or by CUIAB’s alleged misstatement of the ALJ’s decision. These misstatements were not relied upon by the trial court, and did not impact the trial court’s findings. Accordingly, because the trial court’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not err in denying appellant’s petition for administrative mandate.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P. J., SUZUKAWA, J.