Opinion
1:24-CV-00004-SPB-RAL
05-28-2024
SAMUEL E. RICHARDS, Plaintiff v. M.J. EDWARDS, DR. BAIRD, NURSE SUPERVISOR RNS LOCK, AND RNS MONEY, Defendants
SUSAN PARADISE BAXTER JUDGE
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION FOR A PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
ECF NO. 22
RICHARD A. LANZILLO, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff Samuel E. Richards' motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 22) be DENIED.
II. Report
Plaintiff Samuel E. Richards, an individual currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution (“SCI”) at Albion, filed this pro se civil rights action against Defendants Corrections Health Care Administrator M. J. Edwards, Medical Director Dr. Baird, and Nurse Supervisors Money and Lock pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 5. The Complaint concerns the medical care and treatment Richards received for eye issues and his request for accommodations for his visual impairment. See id. Richards asserts claims of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment, equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and “due process of law/access to the courts” under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as claims that his rights have been violated under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., and Pennsylvania's Right-to-Know Law, 65 P.S. § 67.202 et seq. Id. at 3. Richards seeks monetary damages and various forms of equitable relief. Id. at 6.
Pending before the Court is Richards' motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a preliminary injunction. ECF No. 22. Richards has also filed a brief in support of his motion (ECF No. 23) and Exhibits A-Z (ECF Nos. 23-2-23-27). Richards avers in his motion that “by and through [Defendant Dr. Baird's] attorneys, Keanna Seabrook and Samuel H Foreman Esquire['s] ‘improper service,”' Defendant Baird has “jeopardized bis safety.” ECF No. 23. For relief, Richards seeks a court order “enjoining [Defendant Dr. Baird], her successors in office, agents and employees and all other persons acting in concert and participation with [her], from refraining in servicing any and/or all” “non-privileged” legal documents upon Richards through Smart Communications (the Pennsylvania Department of Correction's (“DOC”) processing center for inmate communications) and restraining these individuals “from retaining the custody and control of [him].” ECF No. 22 at 1. He also requests an immediate transfer “to a specialized unit for visually impaired inmates.” ECF No. 23.
Richards appended the following exhibits to his motion: an envelope addressed to Richards from Weber Gallagher, three Certificate of Service papers, ten Inmate's Request to Staff Member forms; two Medical Sick Call Requests, documents related to Grievance No. 1081229, and witness statements from Thomas A. Bradbury and David Tyus. ECF Nos. 23-2-23-27. See also ECF No. 23-1 (“Table of Contents” categorizing these exhibits by claim).
A. Standard of Review
A temporary restraining order is assessed under the same standards as a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Alves v. Main, 747 Fed.Appx. Ill. 112 n.3 (3d Cir. 2019) (citingHolland v. Rosen, 895 F.3d 272, 285 (3d Cir. 2018)). As a threshold procedural matter, however,
[t]he court may issue a temporary restraining order without written or oral notice to the adverse party or its attorney only if: (A)
specific facts in an affidavit or a verified complaint clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition; and (B) the movant's attorney certifies in writing any efforts made to give notice and the reasons why it should not be required.”
The party seeking preliminary injunctive relief has the burden of demonstrating: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; (3) that the issuance of an injunction will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the public interest would best be served by granting the injunction. Council of Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876, 879 (3d Cir. 1997); Opticians Ass 'n of America v. Independent Opticians of America, 920 F.2d 187, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1990).
As the moving party, Richards bears the burden of producing evidence to support the first two factors. See Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 653 (3d Cir. 1994). He must allege facts and produce evidence that clearly support a finding that immediate and irreparable injury will result to the movant if preliminary relief is denied. See United States v. Stazola, 893 F.2d 34, 37 n.3 (3d Cir. 1990); Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989). Absent support for either of the first two factors, a court must deny the request for a preliminary injunction. See Acierno, 40 F.3d at 653 (3d Cir. 1994); Adams v. Freedom Forge Corp., 204 F.3d 475, 484 (3d Cir. 2000).
The purpose of the preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until the rights of the parties can be fairly and fully litigated and determined by strictly legal proofs and according to the principles of equity. Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980). The grant of injunctive relief is an “extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in limited circumstances.” American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Frank's GMC Truck Center, Inc. v. General Motor Corp., 847 F.2d 100, 102 (3d Cir. 1988)). In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief “must always be viewed with great caution because ‘judicial restraint is especially called for in dealing with the complex and intractable problems of prison administration.'” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting Rogers v. Scurr, 676 F.2d 1211,1214 (8th Cir. 1982)).
B. Discussion
Richards' motion for emergency injunctive relief satisfies none of the requirements for issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction. Richards argues that Dr. Baird and her “successors in office, agents and employees and all other persons acting in concert and participation with [her]” endanger his safety by sending him non-privileged mail through third-party mail vendor Smart Communications. See ECF Nos. 22, 23. As an initial matter, injunctive relief against the individuals related to Dr. Baird is unavailable because they are not parties to this case. See Pryor v. Harper, 2021 WL 3563372, at *5 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 12, 2021) (citing McLaughlin v. Zavada, 2019 WL 5697347, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2019) (citing Victor v. SCI Smithfield, 2011 WL 6003923, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2011) (“pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(d), non-parties to litigation cannot be bound by injunctions unless they have been found to be acting ‘in active concert or participation' with the party against whom injunctive relief is sought”))). Richards also fails to seek relief that has some connection to the allegations asserted in his Complaint. This deficiency is fatal to his motion because “the Court completely Tacks jurisdiction over claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief where those matters are ‘unrelated to the underlying complaint.'” Pryor, 2021 WL 3563372, at *5-6 (quoting Seldon v. Wetzel, 2020 WL 1495303, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2020)). See Brathwaite v. Phelps, 602 Fed.Appx. 847, 849 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212, 220 (1945)) (“Because the preliminary injunction motion dealt with claims and actions by prison employees unrelated to the suit at that time, the District Court appropriately held that Brathwaite could not establish any right to injunctive relief.”).
Even if Richards' allegations were tethered to his underlying Complaint, he has failed to set forth sufficient grounds for the injunction he seeks. The DOC requires Defendants to mail service copies of all non-privileged information to Richards through Smart Communications, pursuant to DOC policy DC-ADM 803, § 1.A.3, to wit: “All incoming, non-privileged inmate correspondence must be addressed and sent to the Department's contracted central incoming inmate mail processing center ... Smart Communications ...” See, e.g., Rosario v. Westmoreland Cnty., 2022 WL 4819550, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 4778669 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 3, 2022) (“Because Plaintiff does not have an attorney-client relationship with Defendants' counsel in this matter, they are required to send this non-privileged mail through Smart Communications.”); accord. McLaughlin v. Zavada, 2019 WL 5697347, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2019). In essence, Richards asks for an order requiring Defendants to use the DOC “privileged” mail procedures in their communications with him. Such an order would contravene DOC policy and effectively prevent Richards from receiving Defendants' mail. See, e.g., Rosario., 2022 WL 4819550, at *2 (“If the Court were to require Defendants to mail documents to Plaintiff directly, as he requests, he would not receive those documents” because they are non-privileged material). Nor can the Court issue an order directing the DOC to change its mail policy, as the DOC is not a party in this matter. See McLaughlin, 2019 WL 5697347, at *2 (“[P]aintiff is also requesting that the Court order the DOC to change its mail policy”; “(h]owever,.. the Court cannot issue injunctive relief against the DOC because it is not a party to this case.”). See also Rosario, 2022 WL 4819550, at *2. And Richards' desire for an immediate transfer would require the Court to interject itself into matters of routine prison administration, which the Court is loath to do. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 566 (1974). For these reasons, the Court should deny Richards' requested relief.
What's more, the motion is comprised solely of conclusions of law and devoid of factual allegations to support any claim for relief. Richards has therefore alleged nothing to support a likelihood of success on the merits of any conceivable claim against any Defendant or the threat of irreparable harm absent emergency injunctive relief. His failure to make these showings is fatal to his motion for a TRO and preliminary injunction.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Richards' motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction (ECF No. 22) should be DENIED.
IV. Notice
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72, the parties may seek review by the district court by filing Objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have fourteen (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to file timely objections may waive appellate rights. See Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187,194 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011); Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187 (3d Cir. 2007).