See Becker v. Becker,127 N.C.App. 409, 412, 489 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1997) (holding that a court “mayconsider a party's earning potential as a factor justifying an unequal division of marital property” (emphasis added)); Harris v. Harris,84 N.C.App. 353, 359, 352 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1987) (holding only that § 50–20(c)(1) grants “the trial court the authority to consider the future prospects of the parties, as well as their status at the time of the hearing”). See also Rice v. Rice,159 N.C.App. 487, 498, 584 S.E.2d 317, 325 (2003) (citing Harrisfor proposition that trial court may consider future prospects). Here, the trial court's calculation of the parties' incomes at the time of distribution is supported by the evidence in the record, and it was not error for the trial court to decline to speculate regarding the parties' future earnings potentials.
We have also held that financial contributions made during marriage which reduce a mortgage are active increases in equity and shall, therefore, be treated as marital property. Rice v. Rice, 159 N.C.App. 487, 497, 584 S.E.2d 317, 324 (2003) (holding that “there is no difference between financial contributions to reduce the mortgage principal and those to improve the property itself” and that “both types of active contributions entitle the marital estate to a proportionate return on its investment”). In this case, the only evidence regarding the reduction of the $65,000.
See Becker v. Becker, 127 N.C. App. 409, 412, 489 S.E.2d 909, 912 (1997) (holding that a court " may consider a party's earning potential as a factor justifying an unequal division of marital property" (emphasis added)); Harris v. Harris, 84 N.C. App. 353, 359, 352 S.E.2d 869, 873 (1987) (holding only that § 50-20(c)(1) grants "the trial court the authority to consider the future prospects of the parties, as well as their status at the time of the hearing"). See also Rice v. Rice, 159 N.C. App. 487, 498, 584 S.E.2d 317, 325 (2003) (citing Harris for proposition that trial court may consider future prospects). In other words, although the trial court was permitted to take into account future earning capacity as part of its consideration of the parties' income, it was not required to do so.
On the other hand, the source of funds rule has been used to determine whether appreciation in separate property was marital or separate property. See, e.g., Lawrence, 75 N.C. App. at 592, 331 S.E.2d at 186 (held wife's unimproved property should be treated as separate, but the increase in value due to husband's efforts should be marital); Rice v. Rice, 159 N.C. App. 487, 497, 584 S.E.2d 317, 324 (2003)("there is no difference between financial contributions to reduce the mortgage principal and those to improve the property itself. Because both types of active contributions entitle the marital estate to a proportionate return on its investment, the trial court properly applied the source of funds rule. . . .").
"As the point in evaluating the parties' accustomed standard of living is to consider the pooling of resources that marriage allows," findings that merely set out the parties' separate "estates" during the marriage are insufficient to support a conclusion that plaintiff is a dependant spouse and defendant is a supporting spouse. Rice v Rice, 159 N.C. App. 487, 501, 584 S.E.2d 317, 326 (2003). As the trial court failed to make sufficient findings of the parties' standard of living prior to separation and defendant's current expenses so as to permit a determination of whether plaintiff is a dependant spouse and defendant is a supporting spouse, we "`cannot appropriately determine whether the order of the trial court is adequately supported by competent evidence, and therefore such an order must be reversed and the case remanded for necessary findings.'"
Id. Further, funds received after the separation may appropriately be considered as marital property when the right to receive those funds was acquired during the marriage and before the separation. Rice v. Rice, 159 N.C. App. 487, 495, 584 S.E.2d 317, 323 (2003). Therefore, the fact that the parties chose to defer receipt of this property does not change the character of it, as it was acquired during the marriage.