Opinion
CASE NO. 738 CRD-3-88-6
OCTOBER 26, 1988
The claimant was represented by Robert F. Carter, Esq., Carter, Rubenstein Civitello.
The respondents were represented by James Pomeranz, Esq., Pomeranz, Drayton Stabnick.
This Petition for Review from the May 26, 1988 Decision on a Motion to Preclude of the Commissioner at Large acting for the Third District was decided on briefs submitted for the August 19, 1988 Compensation Review Division's proceedings. The matter was decided by a Compensation Review Division panel consisting of the Commission Chairman, John Arcudi, and Commissioners Robin Waller and Andrew Denuzze.
OPINION
Respondents have appealed the May 26, 1988 Decision granting claimant's Motion to Preclude. The pertinent facts are as follows. Claimant forwarded a Form 30C — Notice of Claim and followed the procedures required in Sec. 31-321, C.G.S. Respondents filed a Form 43 disclaimer of liability within twenty (20) days of receiving the claimant's Form 30C. The Form 43 was forwarded to the claimant and his attorney by certified mail, return receipt requested. A copy of the Form 43 was sent by regular mail to the Office of the Third District Compensation Commissioner within twenty (20) days of the original Form 30 notice.
The narrow issue on appeal is whether a timely disclaimer sent certified mail, return receipt requested to an employee but sent by ordinary mail to the Compensation Commissioner is valid under Sec. 31-297(b), C.G.S. or Sec. 31-321 if applicable.
Section 31-297(b) provides, "Whenever liability to pay compensation is contested by the employer, he shall file with the compensation commissioner . . . a notice in accord with a form prescribed by the commissioners stating that the right to compensation is contested . . . and a copy thereof shall be sent to the employee". We held in Skorupski v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 2 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 133, 135, 338 CRD-3-84 (1985), "Sec. 31-321 defines the statutory method by which actual notice is to be achieved".
Respondents argue that Sec. 31-297(b)'s requirement of "filing" with the Commissioner is not the same as "serving" notice and thus the manner of service need not comply with Sec. 31-321's requirements. In Timothy v. Upjohn, 2 Conn. Workers' Comp. Rev. Op. 1, 150 CRD-3-82 (1983), dism'd on other grounds, 3 Conn. App. 162 (1984), we held that in order for a claimant to prevail on a Motion to Preclude the claimant must comply with Sec. 31-321. To require such procedures only of claimants and not respondents would be inequitable.
Further, respondents cite Secor v. C.A. Parshall, Inc., 340 CRD-7-84 (decided March 8, 1988) as supporting their position. We are unpersuaded that Secor lends any support to the respondents' argument. Secor concerned the applicable standard for written notice under Sec. 31-294, C.G.S. not under Sec. 31-297(b).
We therefore, affirm the trial Commissioner's decision granting the claimant's Motion to Preclude.
Commissioners Robin Waller and Andrew Denuzze concur.