Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-1383, Section "T" (5).
August 17, 2004
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendant, Rouse's Enterprises ("Rouse's"). The parties requested, and were granted, oral arguments which were heard on April 7, 2004. The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court record, the law and applicable jurisprudence is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND
Nadia Rhodes ("Rhodes") was hired by Rouse's on April 24, 2002 as a "wine and spirits manager" at the Rouse's supermarket in Houma. On September 20, 2002, the plaintiff learned that she was pregnant and on that same day, informed her store manager Donnie McDowell("Mr. McDowell"). On or about October 8, 2002, Ms. Rhodes provided the defendant a note from her physician which placed her on medical restrictions and limited the amount she could lift to ten pounds. On October 11, 2002 the plaintiff experienced a sharp pain in her groin while performing her job duties. Mr. McDowell arranged transportation for and immediately sent her to the doctor's office. Plaintiff did not work from October 11 until October 17, at which time she revisited her physician. On October 17, 2002, the plaintiff was informed that she would be out of work for six to eight weeks due to a groin pull.
On October 18, 2002, the plaintiff returned to the store and completed an injury report in order to assert a worker's compensation claim. Rouse's subsequently challenged her claim for worker's compensation. The insurance carrier, however, determined that it was a compensable worker's compensation claim. The plaintiff was terminated at some point between October 15 and 25, 2002, but did not receive notice until November 3, 2002, when she received a termination notice by mail.
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS:
A. Law on Summary Judgment:
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)). When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588. Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. Title VII Discrimination
A claim for pregnancy discrimination is analyzed under the same burden shifting framework as any other Title VII discrimination claim. In order to overcome a motion for summary judgment in a Title VII discrimination action, a plaintiff first must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, a prima facie case of discrimination. See Shackelford v. Deloitte Touche, L.L.P., 190 F.3d 398, 404 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801-03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)). In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must prove the following: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the employment position; (3) that she was denied employment; and (4) that others similarly situated were more favorably treated. See Geier v. Medtronic, Inc., 99 F.3d 238, 241 (7th Cir. 1996).
If a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, then the defendant must rebut the presumption of discrimination by proffering a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive for its actions. See Shackelford, 190 F.3d at 404 (citing Meinecke v. H R Block, 66 F.3d 77, 83 (5th Cir. 1995)).
I. Defendant's Arguments:
The defendant argues that its motion should be granted because the plaintiff has failed to establish her prima facie case under the Geier factors. More specifically, the defense alleges that the plaintiff will not be able to establish the second or fourth prongs under Geier.
The second prong under Geier explains that a plaintiff must establish that she was qualified for the employment position from which she was terminated. The defense uses the plaintiff's own statements and the report of her treating physician to establish that she was not qualified. In the plaintiff's deposition she admits that she was incapable of performing her job duties (Def. Ex. 1 at 70-72) and that her treating physician determined that she was unable to perform any work between the time of her October 11, 2002 injury and approximately late July 2003.
Next, the defense alleges that Ms. Rhodes will not be able to establish that others similarly situated were treated more favorably than herself. The defense explains and cites to their policy which states that an employee must be employed for at least six months before they are entitled to a leave of absence and to the fact that the plaintiff admits she wasn't entitled to such a leave. (Def. Ex. 1 at 83). They also point to their standard practice of terminating any employee who is absent for more than one week in that initial six month period. (Def. Ex. 2 at 26) and to the fact that Rouse's has not granted any employee with less than six months of service leave. (Id at 28).
The defense also points to the fact that they have recently fired three employees (two male and one female) who became injured and unable to work within their first six months of employment. (Def. Ex. 3) While three female employees at the plaintiff's store were eligible for a leave of absence and were granted maternity leave and subsequently returned to work. (Id.)
II. Plaintiff's Arguments:
The plaintiff claims that she can establish all four factors under Geier and therefore prove her prima facie case. The plaintiff alleges that she was treated differently at work once she announced her pregnancy. She claims, for example, that she could no longer get the assistance she once received with moving some of the more difficult things at work. The plaintiff also cites to the fact that Rouse's has no sick leave policy per se, and that the one week rule is just a general rule of thumb. The plaintiff admits to being disabled throughout her pregnancy, yet contends that neither she nor Rouse's knew that this would be the case at the time she was terminated. She claims that both parties had reason to believe that she might be able to return to work after the leave of absence to which she was allegedly entitled.
The plaintiff claims she was entitled to this leave because she was allegedly employed with Rouse's for six months at the time of her termination. The plaintiff began her employment with the defendant on April 24, 2002 and did not receive notice of her termination until November 3, 2002. On said termination notice there was a typed date of termination of October 25, 2002, which was scratched through and replaced with October 15, 2002. The plaintiff claims that her employment with Rouse's from April 24, 2002 until the possible termination date of October 25, 2002 gives her six months of employment with the company and entitles her to leave. The plaintiff also claims that the defendant's allegedly discriminatory motives are obvious in her termination notice, where the defendant cited as the reason for the plaintiff's termination "physically unable to handle the requirements of the job due to pregnancy."
III. Court's Analysis:
The defendant does not refute the fact that the plaintiff meets factors one and three under Geier, therefore, for the purposes of this motion alone, they will be deemed admitted. The defense does, however, contend that the plaintiff can not carry her burden with regards to factors two and four.
The main points of contention by the parties deal with factor four and whether or not the plaintiff has carried her burden in proving that other similarly situated employees were treated more favorably. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits an employer from "discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's . . . sex . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 ("PDA") amended Title VII by explicitly including discrimination based on pregnancy and related medical conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
Ms. Rhodes argues that she was terminated because of her pregnancy. All of the evidence, however, is to the contrary. The plaintiff has provided no evidence that she would have been treated differently if her absences had been due to something completely unrelated to her pregnancy. The defense has, however, provided the Court with specific instances where non-pregnant employees were terminated for similar conduct and examples where employees who had been employed for over six months were granted maternity leave and returned successfully. Rouse's policy does not in any way mention or focus on pregnancy, it merely limits permissible absenteeism during the first six months of employment.
"The [PDA] does not protect a pregnant employee from being discharged for being absent from work even if her absence is due to pregnancy or to complications of pregnancy, unless the absences of non pregnant employees are overlooked. Stout v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 282 F.3d 856, 859 (5th Cir. 2002). The statute has been interpreted to provide equal treatment for pregnant women, not preferential treatment. Urbano v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998).
In the instant case, it is the opinion of this Court that the plaintiff was treated exactly the same as any non-pregnant employee would have been under similar circumstances. The discharge of the plaintiff was due to her excessive absenteeism during her first six months of employment. Ms. Rhodes has provided no evidence to support the contention that Rouse's has in any way applied its policy unevenly or has favored non-pregnant employees. The plaintiff has, therefore, failed to carry her burden of proof under factor four of Geier and identify any issues of material fact.
The defense has additionally argued that the plaintiff was not qualified for the employment position from which she was terminated. The plaintiff was obviously qualified for her position prior to her pregnancy and/or her injury. The question, therefore, is if either or both of these occurrences consequently rendered her unqualified for the position. By the plaintiff's own admissions and that of her physician, she was physically incapable of performing her job duties and would remain so until July 2003, some nine months later.
The plaintiff argues that at the time of her termination, neither she nor the defendant had any idea of the term of her injury. Irrespective of the term of the plaintiff's injury, it is the plaintiff's burden to prove that at the time of her discharge she was qualified for the position, not that she was qualified in the past nor that she would possibly be qualified for the position in the future, but that at the moment of her termination she was qualified. In this case, there simply is no evidence to support any contention that the plaintiff even possibly could have been qualified. The job which she held required tasks that the plaintiff admitted she couldn't do and tasks which her own physician restricted her from doing. There are no genuine issues of material fact under factor two of Geier.
The plaintiff having failed to establish two of the four factors under Geier has not carried her burden of proof to establish a prima facie case, therefore summary judgment is proper with regards to the plaintiff's Title VII discrimination claim.
C. Retaliatory Discharge:
Next, Ms. Rhodes claims that she was retaliated against by the Defendant in violation of La.R.S. 23:1361, which states in pertinent part:
No person shall discharge an employee from employment because of said employee having asserted a claim for benefits under the provisions of this chapter or under the law of any state or of the United States. Nothing in this Chapter shall prohibit an employer from discharging an employee who, because of injury, can no longer perform the duties of his employment.
The plaintiff alleges that she was fired because she filed a claim for workers' compensation. She claims that when she filled out the report of injury form on October 18, 2002, assistant manager Thibodeaux was "hostile," refused to give her a copy and told her that she would be contacted by workers' compensation about her claim. Steve Galtier deemed the claim "frivolous" because he believed that she was suffering from pregnancy complications, not a work related injury, and the claim was not submitted to the insurance company. Plaintiff alleges that at the time she was terminated both she and Rouse's had every reason to believe that she would be able to return to work after completing the leave of absence to which she says she was entitled.
However, Plaintiff must prove that she "was discharged solely for the reason that she asserted a claim for Louisiana Worker's Compensation benefits." Owens v. Georgia Pacific Corp., 535 So. 2d 970, 974 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1988). Plaintiff is unable to do this because at the time of her termination her physician had provided Rouse's with a doctor's note stating that her extended absence was due to complications with her pregnancy, not a workplace injury. Galtier relied on this document in determining that the absence was not work related. At the time Galtier instructed store management to terminate Plaintiff, Rouse's had no medical documents indicating that the absence from work was caused by a work related injury. Furthermore, she admits that she was unable to work between October 11, 2002 and July 2003 and that she thought that the pain was due to a possible miscarriage, not a work related injury. The statute allows for termination of an employee who can no longer perform her duties and there is no evidentiary basis for challenging Rouse's stated reason for Plaintiff's discharge. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact and therefore, Rouse's is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
III. CONCLUSION:
The plaintiff has failed to carry her burden under the Geier case in order to establish a prima facie case of pregnancy discrimination. She has also failed to establish any genuine issues of material fact with regards to her retaliation claim.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment, filed on behalf of Defendant, Rouses Enterprises, LLC, be and the same is hereby GRANTED.