Opinion
C. A. 5:19-CV-3231-SAL-KDW
03-06-2023
Jonathan Donell Edwards Rhodes, Plaintiff, v. Joseph McFadden; James Blackwell; Tiffany Ravenell; Larry Cooper; Francine Bachman; Ms. Birch; Captain Jordan Williams; and Ms. Rice, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Kaymani D. West, United States Magistrate Judge.
Jonathan Donell Edwards Rhodes (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, is an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections (“SCDC”). On November 15, 2019, Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights afforded under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. At the time of the allegations forming the basis of Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff was housed at Lieber Correctional Institution. This matter is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) filed March 8, 2022. ECF No. 79. Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to Defendants' Motion on June 6, 2022. ECF No. 106. This matter is now ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C, which provides for all pretrial proceedings in certain types of matters be referred to a United States Magistrate Judge. Because Defendants' Motion is dispositive, the undersigned enters this Report for the district judge's consideration.
I. Factual Background
The entirety of Plaintiff's acrimony against Defendants stems from the fact that Plaintiff was not provided an incident report prior to a disciplinary hearing where he was ultimately found guilty of several offenses, including possession of an escape tool. The parties agree upon the general timeline of events in this case. According to the allegations in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, the operative pleading in this action, on July 21, 2016, a search of Plaintiff's prison cell resulted in the confiscation of a cell phone. ECF No. 60 at 3. Later that evening, a subsequent search of Plaintiff's prison cell resulted in the confiscation of a cell phone charger. ECF No. 60 at 3.
Plaintiff was served with a total of seven disciplinary charges by Officers Cole and Kline. Id. These offenses included: (1) Possession of a Communication Device by Captain Williams; (2) Possession of a Communication Device (related to a cell phone charger) by Lt. Harper; (3) Possession of a Communication Device by Lt. Cooper: (4) Possession of an Escape Tool by Lt. Cooper; (5) Security Threat Group by Lt. Cooper; (6) Smuggling Contraband by Lt. Cooper; and (7) Possession of a Purchasing Instrument by Lt. Cooper. Id. Plaintiff does not dispute that he was guilty of possessing a cell phone charger and does not name Defendant Harper in this action. However, it is Plaintiff's contention that when he was served the charges, he was not provided an incident report from either Defendant Cooper or Defendant Williams.
According to Plaintiff, he obtained a signed statement from serving officers Cole and Kline stating that, “no incident report came with” the charges brought by Williams and Cooper. Id. On August 12, 2016, Plaintiff requested via the kiosk machine to have Officers Cole and Kline present at his disciplinary hearing for the purpose of being witnesses. Id.On August 15, 2016, Plaintiff appeared before disciplinary hearing officer Defendant Bachman for three separate hearings. Id. Plaintiff's requested witnesses were not present. Id. Plaintiff pled guilty and admitted guilt to the charge brought by Lt. Harper, possession of a communication device related to the possession of a phone charger. Id. at 4. He pled not guilty to the charges brought by Defendants Williams and Cooper, because, according to Plaintiff, he could not properly defend himself without being provided the incident reports related to these charges in advance of the hearing. Id. With Defendant Bachman presiding over the hearings, Plaintiff was ultimately found guilty of five of the seven charged offenses. Id. On August 16, 2016, Plaintiff accessed the kiosk system to request a copy of the hearing. Id.
Plaintiff has not produced or otherwise provided with his filing any statement to this effect.
A copy of this kiosk request, dated August 12, 2016, was attached to Plaintiff's Response Brief as Exhibit “A.”
A copy of this kiosk request, dated August 16, 2016, was attached to Plaintiff's Response Brief as Exhibit “B.” In the request, Plaintiff states, “I was wandering [sic] do you mind sending my dho hearing recorder for the future use of my step 1 grievance.” ECF No. 106, Exhibit B. (emphasis added).
Because Plaintiff was found guilty of several of the charged offenses, Plaintiff lost a number of privileges and was rehoused to a Restrictive Housing Unit (the “RHU”). Id. While in the RHU, Plaintiff alleges the conditions were unsanitary, cold, and the unit was infested with roaches. Id. Plaintiff further alleges he became mentally and emotionally disturbed as a result of the outcome of the hearings, which he believes violated his due process rights. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he was eventually informed by another officer, Lt. Grant, that Defendant Cooper never included the possession of an escape tool offense in his incident report, as evidenced by a report allegedly shown to Plaintiff in the computer system. Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that while Defendant Cooper's paper incident report alleges that an escape tool was found, the computer version does not. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Lt. Grant concluded the paper report was fabricated. Id.
As a result of the charge related to possession of an escape tool, Plaintiff went before the Security Detention Board on September 19, 2016. Id. At this hearing, which Plaintiff alleges was presided over by Defendants Blackwell, Ravenell, and Rice, Plaintiff explained that while he was found guilty of the offense of possessing an escape tool, that offense was not included in the computer version of the incident report. Id. Plaintiff alleges that at the hearing, despite the officers seeing that the offense was not included in the computer incident report, and despite providing a valid reason not be to be classified as a security risk, he was found guilty. Id. Plaintiff alleges he appealed this decision. Id. Plaintiff alleges he became depressed and disturbed as a result of these circumstances. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of phone calls, contact visits, warm or hot food, routine cell cleaning, recreation, daily showers, exercise, hygiene, mail, pictures, canteen, a sanitary environment, proper clothing, radio, and television. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges that on December 1, 2016, he was sent back to general population. Id. Plaintiff also states he was denied the ability to attend his sister's funeral because, during that time, he was classified as a security risk. Id. at 7.
Defendants do not agree with Plaintiff that he was not provided all of the incident reports. Nevertheless, it is their contention that (1) even if Plaintiff was not provided an incident report related to his charges, he should have requested one via the inmate kiosk; and (2) whether he received the report is insignificant because Plaintiff's charges all stemmed from the possession of a contraband cell phone, and not only was he aware that it had been confiscated, he admitted to it being in his possession at the hearing. Defs.' Br at 16. In support of their Motion, Defendants provide the audio recordings of each of the disciplinary hearings, as well as the security detention hearings. Exhibit 1 to Defendants' Motion is an audio recording of the detention hearing held on August 15, 2016, related to the possession of a communication device charge brought by Defendant Williams. Defs.' Br., Exhibit 1, ECF No. 79. At that hearing, presided over by Defendant Bachman, she read the charge to Plaintiff and explained that Defendant Williams stated in his report that during a search of Plaintiff's cell, a cellular device was found on Plaintiff's person. See Exhibit 1 at 1:17-2:02. Plaintiff stated that he was never provided the incident report associated with this charge and was unable to defend himself. See Exhibit 1 at 2:00-2:34. Plaintiff further explained that he had a statement from Officer Kline stating that when he served Plaintiff the charges, Plaintiff was not served with the incident report. See Exhibit 1 at 2:40-2:52. Upon inquiry by Defendant Bachman, Plaintiff admitted that the phone was found on him, but Plaintiff stated he was holding it for someone else. See Exhibit 1 at 3:00-3:20. Plaintiff was found guilty of possession of a cell phone. See Exhibit 1 at 3:45-4:19. Plaintiff was advised of his right to file a grievance related to this charge. See Exhibit 1 at 3:45-4:19.
Exhibit 2 to Defendants' Motion is an audio recording of another disciplinary hearing held the same day related to the possession of a communication device due to the confiscation of a cell phone charger in Plaintiff's cell. Defs.' Br., Exhibit 2, ECF No. 79. Plaintiff pled guilty to this charge and admitted he was in possession of a cell phone charger. See Exhibit 2 at 2:00-2:30. Exhibit 3 to Defendants' Motion is an audio recording of a third disciplinary hearing held the same day regarding the five separate charges brought by Defendant Cooper. Defs.' Br., Exhibit 3, ECF No. 79. During this hearing, Plaintiff informed Defendant Bachman that he was not ready to proceed because he was not provided the incident report in reference to these charges prior to the hearing, and he had a signed statement from Officer Kline attesting to this fact. See Exhibit 3 at 0:12-1:00. Defendant Bachman read Plaintiff the charges, including the possession of an escape tool charge. See Exhibit 3 at 2:00-2:22. Defendant Bachman also read the incident report to Plaintiff, wherein Defendant Cooper indicated that upon a search of the confiscated cell phone, Defendant Cooper discovered several photos on an S.D. card, including an aerial photo of the institution, resulting in the possession of escape tool charge. See Exhibit 3 at 4:10-5:40. Plaintiff was provided this evidence. See Exhibit 3 at 6:00-6:15. Plaintiff pled not guilty to all of these charges. See Exhibit 3 at 6:26-7:08. At the hearing, Plaintiff stated that he was never provided the incident report that was presented the day of the hearing. See Exhibit 3 at 7:10-7:15. Plaintiff argued that the failure to provide him the incident report prior to the hearing prevented him from properly defending himself as allowed under SCDC policy and the Constitution. See Exhibit 3 at 7:17-7:30.
Plaintiff was given the opportunity to ask questions of Defendant Cooper, who was present at the hearing, via Defendant Bachman. In response to the questions, Defendant Cooper affirmed that he completed an incident report (Form 19.29). See Exhibit 3 at 7:45-8:00. Plaintiff was also given the opportunity to review the incident report and ask questions related to the report. See Exhibit 3 at 9:45. Plaintiff asked why he was not provided an incident report in reference to these charges until the day of the hearing See Exhibit 3 at 10:18-10:28. Defendant Bachman responded that Plaintiff should have received the incident report on the same day he signed the paperwork (ostensibly, the charges) and advised Plaintiff that had he not received one, he should have submitted a request to staff via the kiosk. See Exhibit 3 at 10:25-10:42. Plaintiff indicates the only incident report he received was related to the cell phone charger. See Exhibit 3 at 10:45-10:57. Defendant Bachman stated that as far as she understood, when Plaintiff was served his charges, he should receive a copy of the incident report, as well. See Exhibit 3 at 11:05-11:13. Plaintiff was found guilty of three of the five charges, including the possession of escape tool charge. See Exhibit 3 at 12:05-13:22. Plaintiff was advised of his right to file a grievance form related to the hearing, as well. See Exhibit 3 at 13:23-13:40.
Exhibit 5 to Defendants' Motion is an audio recording of a security detention hearing held on September 19, 2016. Defs.' Br., Exhibit 5, ECF No. 79. This detention hearing was held due to the guilty finding of the possession of an escape tool charge. Defs. Br. at 4; See Exhibit 5 at 0:28-50. Plaintiff explained that prior to the underlying detention hearing, he was not provided the incident report. See Exhibit 5 at 0:55-1:10. Plaintiff further stated that a few days prior to the security detention hearing, an officer pulled him into an office and showed Plaintiff the incident report on the computer, which did not reference possession of an escape tool. See Exhibit 5 at 1:10-1:22. Plaintiff was asked whether he grieved the hearing process, and he indicated that he did, but he never received a response. See Exhibit 5 at 1:25-1:42. At this hearing, the committee recommended that Plaintiff be put in restrictive housing because he was convicted of possession of an escape tool. See Exhibit 5 at 1:45-2:00. The committee explained that their recommendation was supported by Plaintiff's charge and ultimately, his conviction of that charge. See Exhibit 5 at 2:15-2:26. Exhibit 6 to the Defendants' Motion is an audio recording of a review hearing held on November 28, 2016, at which time Plaintiff was recommended to be taken out of restrictive housing.
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following as his “legal claims” against Defendants: (1) Defendants Cooper and Williams violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Due Process Clause due to the failure to provide an incident report prior to his detention hearing; (2) Defendant Bachman violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Due Process Clause due to the failure to conduct a fair disciplinary hearing; (3) Defendants Blackwell, Ravenell, and Rice violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference during his security detention hearing; (4) Defendant Birch violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference toward his medical needs; and (5) Defendant McFadden violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with deliberate indifference by failing to respond to his requests in a timely manner and failing to correct the issue related to his incident report. ECF No. 60 at 10.
II. Standard of Review
Defendants have moved to dismiss this action based on Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendants attached the affidavit of Felecia McKie, copies of Plaintiff's grievance documents, and several audio recordings of the disciplinary hearings relevant to Plaintiff's allegations. Plaintiff also attached several documents, apparently produced in discovery, which include copies of SCDC policies, several kiosk requests, and his grievance documents. When matters outside the pleadings are submitted with a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6), the motion is instead treated as one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and all parties should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to present material pertinent to a motion made pursuant to Rule 56. Wilson-Cook Med., Inc. v. Wilson, 942 F.2d. 247, 251 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 56); Gay v. Wall, 761 F.2d 175, 177 (4th Cir. 1985); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). When a party is aware that materials outside the pleadings are before the court, the party is on notice that the motion may be treated as one for summary judgment. Gay, 761 F.2d at 177.
Here, Defendants filed their Motion to Dismiss as one alternatively seeking a Motion for Summary Judgment. Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), the undersigned advised Plaintiff on March 9, 2022, of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Defendants' Motion. ECF No. 80. Further, the parties have had the opportunity to engage in discovery, of which the deadline ended February 22, 2022. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that all parties have had notice that the motion may be treated as one for summary judgment, and all parties have had a reasonable opportunity to engage in, and have engaged in, the discovery process. Accordingly, the undersigned will treat the Motion as a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment.
The court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is appropriate; if the movant carries its burden, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). If a movant asserts that a fact cannot be disputed, it must support that assertion either by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials;” or “showing . . . that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1).
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the evidence of the non-moving party is to be believed and all justifiable inferences must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248. All that is required is that “sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. “Mere unsupported speculation . . . is not enough to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ennis v. Nat'l Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 62 (4th Cir. 1995). A party cannot create a genuine issue of material fact solely with conclusions in his or her own argument, affidavit, or deposition that are not based on personal knowledge. See Latif v. The Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore, 354 Fed.Appx. 828, 830 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming district court's grant of summary judgment, noting plaintiff's affidavit, which offered conclusions not based on his own knowledge, did not create genuine issues of material fact). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
III. Analysis a. Plaintiff's Alleged Due Process Violations
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Cooper, Williams, and Bachman violated the constitutional protections afforded to him pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations that he suffered a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violation fail as a matter of law. In response, Plaintiff argues that he has a liberty interest in avoiding placement in the restrictive housing unit in prison, that he has a right to adequate notice prior to his disciplinary hearing, and he has a right to a meaningful review of his detention hearing proceeding. According to Plaintiff, because he was not afforded these rights, he was arbitrarily placed in punitive segregation and suffered harm as a result. In so arguing, Plaintiff argues that the Supreme Court case Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) is applicable to his claims.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states, “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. Amend XIV, Section 1. Prisoners are entitled to claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 556. While an inmate's rights may be diminished by the needs of the institutional environment of the penal system, a prisoner is not “wholly stripped” of the protections afforded under the Constitution while incarcerated. Id. In order to state a due process violation has occurred, a plaintiff must (1) identify a protected liberty or property interest; and (2) demonstrate deprivation of that interest without due process of law. Prieto v. Clarke, 780 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir, 2015).
Defendants argue that summary judgment is appropriate because Plaintiff has not pled a state law or policy that imposes a hardship, and that by all accounts, Plaintiff's disciplinary hearings were conducted properly and afforded Plaintiff his due process rights. Defs. Br. at 16. As to Plaintiff's argument that he was not provided a copy of his incident reports, Defendants argue that he should have requested one via the inmate kiosk, if he indeed did not receive one at the same time he was served with his charges. Defendants further point to the fact that Plaintiff's charges all stemmed from the fact that he possessed a cell phone, to which he admitted in the hearing and was what ultimately led to the escape tool charge. Defs. Br. at 16; Exhibit 3.
Plaintiff does not allege that the disciplinary hearing procedure involved in this case is per se violative of constitutional rights. Instead, the linchpin of his argument, and indeed the central issue related to the entirety of his claims is that, because he was not provided the incident report detailing Defendant Cooper's charges prior to his hearing, his due process rights were violated by Defendants Cooper and Bachman.Plaintiff received the incident reports the day of the hearing. Defs' Br., Exhibit 3. Plaintiff asserts that because he was found guilty of these charges, specifically, the possession of an escape tool, he was sent to restrictive housing arbitrarily, which was a violation of his liberty interest. He alleges Defendant Cooper also did not provide him an incident report, though he admitted in his hearing that the cell phone that Cooper charged him with being in his possession was found on his person. Plaintiff alleges that while he received the several charges outlining his offenses, he did not receive the incident report underlying the “possession of an escape tool” charge by Defendant Cooper or the “possession of a cell phone” charge by Defendant Williams prior to the hearing in a violation of SCDC Policy.
The other named Defendants did not participate in the hearing related to the escape tool charge, nor were they the correctional officers who charged Plaintiff with the escape tool.
In Wolff, the Supreme Court attempted to strike a balance between the due process rights of an inmate and the penological needs of prisons. Wolff acknowledges that inmates are entitled to advance written notice of claimed violations, as well as a written statement concerning the evidence relied on to assert this violation. Id. at 563; see also Brown v. Braxton, 373 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2004). However, the liberty interests protected under the Due Process Clause are “generally limited to freedom from restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in such an unexpected manner as to give rise to the protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force . . . nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 486 (1995).
Plaintiff admitted that he was served the charges, including the charge related to possession of an escape tool, on August 6, 2016. Defs. Br., Exhibit 3, ECF No. 79. Therefore, Plaintiff was aware more than a week prior to the hearing, held on August 15, 2016, that Defendant Cooper brought this charge, and it was related to the confiscation of a cell phone found on Plaintiff's person. Plaintiff was notified of the charges being brought against him and the underlying reason for the escape tool charge, he was afforded a detention hearing, he was allowed to confront Defendant Cooper and ask questions, and he was also afforded the opportunity to ask questions related to the incident report on the day of the hearing. See Allen v. Young, No. 5:18-01306, 2019 WL 6843664, at *1 (S.D. W.Va. June 26, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 5:18-cv-1306, 2019 WL 6859631 (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 16, 2019), aff'd, 818 Fed.Appx. 299 (4th Cir. 2020); Asar v. Barnes, No. 6:21-3235-HMH-KFM, 2022 WL 345657, at *4 (D.S.C. Jan. 10, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 6:21-3235-HMH-KFM, 2022 WL 345033 (D.S.C. Feb. 4, 2022) (“ Wolff does not mandate that written notice of the pending charges be given specifically through an incident report.”).
The undersigned also does not agree that the SCDC Policy attached to Plaintiff's Brief affirmatively requires Plaintiff to be provided the actual incident report in advance of a hearing, in addition to the formal charges, which Plaintiff admits he received. Instead, the undersigned's review of the SCDC policies attached to Plaintiff's Response Brief indicate that while Level 1 and 2 disciplinary offenses will be documented on SCDC Form 19-29A within 24 hours of the incident, the policies do not affirmatively require Plaintiff to be served with anything other than the formal charges. See Pl.s' Br., Exhibit 1-3; 106-1, at 75, SCDC Policy OP-22.14: 2.2; 4.1.
Level 1 offenses include possession of any communication device and possession of escape tools and/or paraphernalia. ECF No. 106-1 at 100-103; SCDC Policy 22.14.
Even if SCDC Policy did require as such, it is well-settled that the mere fact that a prison official allegedly did not follow SCDC policy does not, in itself, amount to a constitutional violation. Fordham v. Bachman, No. 2:16-cv-249-RMG, 2016 WL 1688743, at *2 (D.S.C. April 26, 2016) (citing United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1978)). In Fordham, the plaintiff alleged a defendant violated his due process rights by charging him without an incident report in violation of policy OP-22.14. Id. at *1. In granting summary judgment in favor of defendants, the court found that the plaintiff admitted he was given advanced notice of the charges, he was given a hearing, he was allowed to ask questions, and was ultimately found not guilty. Id. at *2. Thus, the court found that the plaintiff was provided all process afforded him under Wolff. Id. Similarly, as to Defendants Cooper, Williams and Bachman, a review of the record reveals that Defendants complied with the minimum due process requirements as set forth in Wolff. Further, the related security detention hearing was based on Plaintiff's guilty findings and was unrelated to any alleged failure to be provided an incident report, or to the conduct at the initial detention hearing.
As to Defendants Ravenell, Blackwell, and Rice, they had no involvement with the underlying detention hearing which is where Plaintiff alleges the due process violations occurred, and Plaintiff does not bring a due process violation claim against them (instead he argues they violated his Eighth Amendment rights, which the undersigned considers later in this Report). Nor does Plaintiff come forth with any evidence that these Defendants possessed the ability to remedy the fact that Plaintiff was convicted of the possession of an escape tool charge. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding summary judgment is appropriate as to any claims related to due process violations against Defendants Ravenell, Blackwell, and Rice.
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends finding that summary judgment is appropriate as to Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims brought against Defendants Cooper, Williams, and Bachman (and, to the extent any Fourteenth Amendment claims are alleged to be brought against Defendants Ravenell, Blackwell, and Rice). However, even were the undersigned to find that a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding a due process violation, for the reasons set forth below, the undersigned also recommends finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to these claims.
b. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Defs.' Br. at 6. The Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PRLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of all available administrative remedies. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.'” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739).
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is twofold. First, it gives an administrative agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992)). Second, “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.” Id. Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Id. at 90 (quoting Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 2002) (emphasis in original)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Defendants have the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 681 (4th Cir. 2005).
To support a finding that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, Defendants have produced the affidavit of Felecia McKie, the Chief of the Inmate Grievance Branch of the Office of General Counsel for SCDC. Defs.' Br., Exhibit 7, ECF No. 79, Affidavit of Felecia McKie, ¶ 2. In her affidavit, Ms. McKie provides a synopsis of the inmate grievance policy at the time that Plaintiff alleged he suffered a violation of his constitutional rights. Ms. McKie describes a three-step process. First, an inmate must submit a Request to Staff Member Form (“RTSM”) or an Automated Request to Staff Member (“ARTSM”) via the Kiosk within eight (8) working days of the incident in question. Aff. of McKie, ¶ 6. However, this step is not necessary when appealing a disciplinary conviction or a custody reduction. Aff. of McKie, ¶ 6. Upon receiving a response to this request, an inmate must then file a Step 1 Grievance on Form 10-5. Aff. of McKie, ¶ 8. If an inmate is not satisfied with the response, the inmate must then file a Step 2 Grievance on Form 10-5A within five calendar days of the response received from the Step 1 Grievance. Aff. of McKie, ¶ 11. Upon receiving a response from the Step 2 Grievance, if an inmate is still not satisfied, the inmate must appeal to the South Carolina Administrative Law Court. Aff. of McKie, ¶ 12. Ms. McKie averred that Plaintiff did not submit a Grievance until November 22, 2016, well past the deadline afforded under the applicable policy. Aff. of McKie, ¶ 15. She further averred that Plaintiff's Grievance was returned with an explanation that it was untimely. Aff. of McKie, ¶ 16. Finally, Ms. McKie averred that Plaintiff never filed a Step 2 Grievance Form or otherwise appealed the decision to the South Carolina Administrative Law Court. Aff. of McKie, ¶ 18. Defendants argue that not only did Plaintiff fail to file a Step 1 Grievance Form in the time prescribed, he also did not appeal the decision that it was untimely via a Step 2 Grievance Form.
Plaintiff argues that he attempted to exhaust his remedies with his request to Defendant McFadden, thus putting Defendants on notice that he believed he suffered a violation of his rights. Pl.'s Br. at 6. He argues that in so doing, Defendant McFadden looked into his request, ultimately resulting in him being released back to general population, because, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Cooper did not put the escape tool offense in his narrative report. Pl.'s Br. at 8. Plaintiff further argues that the grievance system “operated as a dead end to the matter complained of” and that his failure to file a Step 2 Grievance does not preclude this action. Pl.'s Br. at 6.Plaintiff agrees that he filed a Step 1 Grievance on November 23, 2016. Pl.'s Br. at 7. However, he does not agree that he was required to file a Step 1 Grievance within five days of the hearing because he learned of “new evidence” outside of this window of time; therefore, he argues his Step 1 Grievance was erroneously rejected. Plaintiff argues that he timely filed his grievance within five days of discovering that the incident report did not contain any information about an escape tool. Pl.'s Br. at 7. Plaintiff further argues that the return of his Step 1 Grievance was not compliant with the grievance system in that there was an unclear decision on the returned form, and that the form's notation was simply “exceed time to appeal.” Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff argues that therefore he was prevented the ability to appeal and file a Step 2 Grievance because the option for “appeal” was left unchecked. Id. at 8. Finally, Plaintiff attached a document entitled “State of Genuine Issues of Material Fact in Dispute” to his Response Brief. ECF No. 106-1 at 10-11. In this document, Plaintiff states, “Plaintiff was not required to file the November 23, 2016 Step 1 within 5 days of DHO. And it wasn't given an opportunity to appeal that Step 1. And Plaintiff notified Administration through RTSM.” ECF No. 106-1 at 10-11.
“[A]n administrative remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented from availing himself of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008). However, here there is no indication that Plaintiff was prevented from participating in the grievance process.
Both parties provided a copy of the Step 1 Grievance Form. The Step 1 Grievance indicates that Plaintiff filed the grievance “in reference to newly discovered evidence on a possession of escape tool.” Defs.' Br., Ex. 4, ECF No. 79-4; Pl.'s Br. Ex. J, ECF No. 106-1. Plaintiff writes, “[m]y argument is in the initial computer incident report no possession of escape tool was found or mentioned whatsoever.” Id. The Step 1 Grievance Form has a section titled “Action Taken by IGC,” and the box checked is “other” with a note stating, “exceed time to file appeal.” Id. In the section titled “Warden's Decision and Reason,” it states, “[y]ou have exceeded all time frames for filing a grievance on this issue” and further states, “your disciplinary appeal was due 8/22/16.” Id. Finally, the Form has a box that is marked which states, “I accept the Warden's decision and consider the matter closed” along with the notation, “N/A” on Grievant Signature, Warden Signature, and IGC Signature. Id. In other words, Plaintiff was not able to file a Step 2 Grievance because the matter was administratively closed.
The relevant inquiry is whether the Step 1 Grievance Form was timely filed. Plaintiff's argument is that he filed the Step 1 Grievance upon learning of “new evidence,” therefore the date of the hearing is immaterial to the date of the filing of the grievance. The undersigned disagrees. The substance of the Step 1 Grievance Form filed on November 23, 2016 is that the initial computer incident report did not contain any information about possession of an escape tool. However, the record provided to this court provides evidence affirmatively proving that Plaintiff was aware of the facts surrounding the alleged different version of the incident report on the computer as early as September 19, 2016 when he explained this finding at the security detention hearing. Plaintiff did not file a Step 1 Grievance Form until two months later. This Form was therefore untimely.
Plaintiff also submitted several exhibits with his brief, including Exhibit I, a copy of an Inmate Request, dated October 7, 2016. Pl.'s Br. Ex. I, ECF No. 106-1. In that request, Plaintiff states, “I went to S.D. Board for possession of a escape tool and was found guilty.” However, newly discovered evidence was found in my case that my initial incident report did not say anything about an escape tool. Please look into.” Id. This is yet another example of evidence within the record that supports a finding that Plaintiff knew several weeks prior to the filing of his Step 1 Grievance that this alleged different incident report existed. Indeed, even were the undersigned to construe this as Plaintiff's attempt at an informal resolution to his grievance, this request was sent well past eight days after first learning of this alleged computer incident report.
Additionally, the undersigned observes that the issue of whether the paper incident report provided to Plaintiff the day of his initial disciplinary hearing was fabricated is a separate issue from what Plaintiff's real complaint is in this case; that is, his argument that he was not provided an incident report prior to the hearing such that he could defend himself. Assuming without deciding that Plaintiff did not in fact receive this incident report, Plaintiff does not now argue that he timely filed a Step 1 Grievance within five days after this hearing.The only unrefuted evidence in the record that he attempted to grieve any issue related to the incident report is the Step 1 Grievance Form filed November 23, 2016.Plaintiff indicates in the November 23 Form that he never received an incident report at his detention hearing. That grievance was filed more than three months after the hearing date. Even if the court accepts Plaintiff's argument that the analysis of whether the grievance was timely filed should be measured from the date of the newly discovered evidence, here, the evidence affirmatively shows that Plaintiff did not file a Step 1 Grievance in a timely manner upon learning of the information he believed supported his argument that he should not have been charged with possession of an escape tool. Thus, the undersigned recommends finding that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff timely filed his grievance form. Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because he did not properly exhaust his administrative remedies prior to bringing this § 1983 claim.
The undersigned notes that in his Amended Complaint and in the factual background of his Response Motion, Plaintiff states he requested a copy of the hearing tapes and on that same day filed a paper grievance related to the incident report. In an inmate request form dated August 16, 2016, he alleges he seeks the recordings from his hearings for “future use of my step 1 grievance.” Pl.'s Br., Exhibit B, ECF No. 106-1. However, Plaintiff does not provide any additional grievance (or thereafter argue in his Response Brief that he did timely file a Step 1 Grievance Form after his hearing related to the failure to obtain an incident report prior to the hearing). Further, if Plaintiff previously filed a Step 1 Grievance Form it is unsupported by the record before the undersigned. Even so, were the undersigned to consider Plaintiff's statement that he filed a Step 1 Grievance on August 16, 2016 (which Plaintiff does not rely on in his Brief at pp.6-8), there is no evidence in the record that he ever filed a Step 2 Grievance for any of his alleged grievances. Indeed, Plaintiff summarily alleges his failure to file a Step 2 does not preclude this action.
Plaintiff does provide a later filed Step 1 Grievance Form, dated December 2, 2016, but this Form was in response to finding out that the November 23, 2016 Step 1 Grievance Form was rejected as untimely. Pl's. Br., Exhibit L, ECF No. 106-1 at 155.
c. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment Rights Were Not Violated
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Ravenell, Blackwell, Rice, Birch and McFadden all acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff sufficient to establish a violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment Rights fail as a matter of law because Plaintiff was not subjected to “cruel and unusual” punishment. Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants' argument that his Eighth Amendment Claims should be dismissed.
In order to establish a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show: (1) “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States”; and (2) “the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff's alleges several Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from inhumane conditions of confinement. He further alleges Defendants subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment and acted with deliberate indifference in the handling of his disciplinary hearings and his subsequent time spent in restrictive housing. He further alleges Defendant Birch acted with deliberate indifference toward his medical needs. The undersigned will consider each claim in turn.
In Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, Plaintiff makes several claims that the conduct by several Defendants constitutes “cruel and unusual punishment” forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment violation of cruel and unusual punishment stems from what he believes to be the mishandling of his disciplinary hearing. The Eighth Amendment, which applies to the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits cruel and unusual punishment of prisoners convicted of crimes. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296-97 (1991). The analysis of whether there is an Eighth Amendment violation includes both a subjective and objective component. Id. at 302. To establish the subjective component of a conditions-of-confinement claim, a prisoner must show that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference-that is, the prisoner must show the officials acted with more than mere negligence but less then malice. See Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835-37 (1994). For the objective component of a conditions-of-confinement claim, the prisoner must demonstrate an extreme deprivation of his rights. See Williams v. Branker, 462 Fed.Appx. 348, 353 (4th Cir. 2012).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has wholly failed to allege a serious deprivation of a basic human need. Defendants further argue that in response to Plaintiff's argument that Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights in their treatment of him during the disciplinary hearing process, Plaintiff received multiple disciplinary hearings and was allowed to explain his position at each hearing. Defendants further provide that Plaintiff was provided the opportunity to be heard via a hearing and given the opportunity to appeal afterward.
As to Defendants Blackwell, Ravenell, and Rice, while Plaintiff provides a detailed timeline of the disciplinary hearing process at issue and alleges he was not provided an incident report, he does not provide any facts establishing that the conduct of these Defendants resulted in an extreme deprivation of his rights or that they acted with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff. Similarly, while Plaintiff alleges that Defendant McFadden failed to reasonably respond to his requests and thereby prolonged Plaintiff's time in security detention, those issues are more closely aligned with the claim for a due process violation, which the undersigned has previously considered. As to Defendants Blackwell, Ravenell, and Rice, their only conduct occurred with respect to Plaintiff's security detention hearing wherein these Defendants were provided with Plaintiff's conviction for the underlying escape tool charge and were tasked with making a recommendation as to whether Plaintiff should be placed in restrictive housing. However, Plaintiff does not establish that these Defendants acted with deliberate indifference at the security detention hearing or otherwise were responsible for subjecting him to cruel and unusual punishment. To the contrary, at the hearing these Defendants inquired whether Plaintiff had sufficiently grieved his issues with his underlying detention hearing and explained to Plaintiff the reasons for their recommendation. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Plaintiff has not established an Eighth Amendment violation related to his disciplinary hearings as to Defendants Blackwell, Ravenell, and Rice.
Similarly, Plaintiff's own evidence shows that Defendant McFadden responded to Plaintiff's inmate requests, though ultimately not with the outcome Plaintiff desired. See ECF No. 106-1 at 150, 151, 160-162. Plaintiff has therefore not established any genuine issue of material fact that Defendant McFadden exhibited deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff or that Defendant McFadden was responsible for an extreme deprivation of Plaintiff's rights. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendant McFadden is entitled to summary judgment as to these claims.
Plaintiff further argues that Defendant Birch, a mental health counselor, acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs by depriving him of adequate mental health assistance. ECF No. 60 at 10. In their Motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not show how this action caused him to experience cruel and unusual punishment, nor does he provide evidence of any such behavior.
The government is obligated to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Supreme Court has held that deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs constitutes the “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain” proscribed by the Eighth Amendment, whether the indifference manifests in response to a prisoner's needs, there is an intentional denial or delay in access to medical care, or there is intentional interference with prescribed treatment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. To establish that a defendant deprived a plaintiff of adequate medical care, a plaintiff must establish first that he suffered a serious medical condition; that is, one that is either “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment” or is “so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Mays v. Sprinkle, 992 F.3d 295, 300 (4th Cir. 2021) (quoting Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 241 (4th Cir. 2008)). Second, Plaintiff must establish that the prison official acted with “deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety,” which requires that the official have “had actual subjective knowledge of both the inmate's serious medical condition and the excessive risk posed by the official's action or inaction.” Mays, 992 F.3d at 300 (citations omitted). Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need requires proof that each defendant knew of and disregarded the risk posed by the plaintiff's objectively serious medical needs. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846 (1994).
Plaintiff generally alleges that he began having panic attacks, randomly breaking down into tears, and experiencing worry. ECF No. 60 at 5. He alleges he consistently wrote and informed Defendant Birch of his circumstances and emotional state of being to seek mental assistance, but she did nothing to assist him. ECF No. 60 at 6. Defendants argue that not only are these allegations vague, they argue they are unfounded. The undersigned agrees that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Defendant Birch acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. While Plaintiff alleges that he began to experience mental health issues, he does not provide any indication that he was diagnosed with any mental health conditions or had otherwise sought mental health treatment prior to the allegation that he did not receive a fair disciplinary hearing. Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant Birch knew he “risked harm to himself,” but he provides no support for this assertion. However, assuming without deciding that Plaintiff has sufficiently established that he suffered from a serious medical condition, Plaintiff does not provide any evidence, beyond his assertion that he wrote and/or informed Defendant Birch of his “circumstances mental and emotional state of being,” that Defendant Birch knew of and disregarded a risk posed by these needs. In response to Defendants' argument that there is no evidence of any of this conduct, Plaintiff has not produced any evidence to support his claims that he informed Defendant Birch of his request for mental health assistance or that Defendant Birch knew of his requests and ignored Plaintiff. Plaintiff generally alleges Defendant Birch did not take him seriously, but he provides no evidence or supporting facts to support this claim. Plaintiff does not allege he was affirmatively denied any treatment. Bare assertions and conclusory statements do not suffice at the summary judgment stage. Baber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992) (“once the moving party has met his burden, the nonmoving party must come forward with some evidence beyond mere allegations contained in the pleadings” to support his claims). Therefore, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants on this ground.
Further to the extent Plaintiff alleges he suffered from inhumane conditions of confinement, these allegations do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. The Eighth Amendment imposes a duty upon prison officials to provide inmates with humane conditions of confinement and ensure inmates receive “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care.” Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 225 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)). To establish a violation of humane conditions of confinement, a plaintiff must prove that he was deprived a “basic need” and that this deprivation was attended by deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. Strickler v. Waters, 989 F.2d 1375, 1379 (4th Cir., cert. denied, 510 U.S. 949 (1993)). Further, the plaintiff must produce evidence of serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from challenged conditions to withstand summary judgment on prison conditions claim. Id. at 1380-1381. Plaintiff generally alleges his conditions in restrictive housing were unsanitary, dirty, and very cold. Plaintiff does not allege any specific Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights pursuant to these allegations, nor does he specifically include this as one of his legal claims. However, the undersigned has considered whether Plaintiff's allegations regarding the conditions in the RHU constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Conditions which “deprive inmates of the minimal civilized measures of life's necessities” may amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981). However, allegations that a cell is dirty and cold are insufficient to state a constitutional violation. See Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1235-35 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Inmates cannot expect the amenities, conveniences, and services of a good hotel.”). Nor has Plaintiff alleged he suffered a serious or significant physical or emotional injury as a result of these conditions. Plaintiff generally alleges he was depressed and experienced mental health issues; however, Plaintiff alleges these were as a result of his alleged due process violations. The undersigned therefore recommends Defendants be granted summary judgment on Plaintiff's conditions-of-confinement claims.
The undersigned also notes that Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of the ability to attend his sister's funeral in person because he was in security detention. However, while Plaintiff alleges he was deprived of his due process rights as a result of the disciplinary process hearing, he does not allege any particular claim against Defendants related to the inability to attend his sister's funeral.
d. Qualified Immunity
Defendants next argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity, which precludes imposition of individual liability on them as defendants. Plaintiff disagrees. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known. 457 U.S. 800 (1982). In evaluating whether qualified immunity applies, the court must determine: (1) whether the facts alleged, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff show that Defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the time of the complained of misconduct. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009). If a plaintiff satisfies the first step, the court must then determine whether the right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged misconduct. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. To determine whether a right was “clearly established” the court must first determine the right at issue. Scinto v. Stansberry, 841 F.3d 219, 235 (4th Cir. 2016). The Fourth Circuit has stated that the purpose of qualified immunity is to ensure that government officials can perform their job free from the specter of endless and debilitating lawsuits. Torchinksy v. Siwinksi, 942 F.2d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1991).
Defendants argue that prisoners have limited due process rights in disciplinary proceedings; therefore, to succeed on a due process violation claim, an inmate must first show he was deprived of life, liberty, or property by governmental officials. Therefore, according to Defendants, because Plaintiff has not shown he was deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process, Defendants' actions “did not give rise to clear constitutional violations towards the Plaintiff.” Defs. Br. at 13. Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated his rights when he was deprived of minimal procedural protections during the disciplinary hearing process. Plaintiff further argues he was indefinitely placed in administrative segregation, which he had a liberty interest in avoiding. For the reasons previously established, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendants' conduct, as a matter of law, did not violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
e. Immunity Pursuant to the SCTCA
Plaintiff does not allege that any Defendants violated the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (the “SCTCA”) or any other state law claims. However, Defendants argue that to the extent the court construes any state law tort claims, Defendants are immune from liability under the SCTCA. The SCTCA confers immunity upon a governmental employee “who commits a tort while acting within the scope of his official duty.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(a). The SCTCA further provides, “[n]othing in this chapter may be construed to give an employee of a governmental entity immunity from suit and liability if it is proved that the employee's conduct was not within the scope of his official duties or that it constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(b). Provisions establishing limitations on liability should be liberally construed in favor of the State. Faile v. S.C. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 566 S.E.2d 536, 540, 350 S.C. 315, 324 (2000). Under the SCTCA, employees of the state government are not subject to suit as personal defendants for any alleged torts committed within the course and scope of their employment, provided that the conduct did not constitute actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or a crime involving moral turpitude. An “employee” is defined as “any officer, employee, agent, or court appointed representative of the State or its political subdivisions, including elected or appointed officials, law enforcement officers, and persons acting on behalf of or in service of a governmental entity in the scope of official duty.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-30(c).
Defendants argue that while there are certain exceptions to immunity, none of those were alleged in this case, nor does Plaintiff allege any actions occurred outside of Defendants' official duties. Defs. Br at 18. Plaintiff argues for the first time in his Response Brief that Defendant Cooper was “acting outside the scope of employment” when he “arbitrarily charged Plaintiff with an escape tool infraction.” Pl.'s Br. at 16. Plaintiff further argues that Defendant Cooper was “grossly negligent” in failing to provide him a description of facts to refute his escape charge. Id. Plaintiff argues that Defendants Ravenell, Blackwell, and Rice's recommendation that he be placed in “SD” or restrictive housing “knowing Plaintiff did not meet the criteria” constitutes punishment and placed Plaintiff in punitive conditions indefinitely. Id. at 17. Plaintiff argues that Defendant Bachman was grossly negligent and abused her discretion to continue the hearing knowing Plaintiff had not received documents he requested. Id. Finally, Plaintiff argues Defendant McFadden was grossly negligent because he was highly aware of Plaintiff's conditions and failed to take proper action, defined by Plaintiff as notifying the Deputy Director to order a hearing. Id.
Plaintiff does not allege that immunity pursuant to the SCTCA should not apply to Defendants Birch and Williams. After reviewing the record, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of these two Defendants as to any potential claims made under the SCTCA. As to the other Defendants, first, Plaintiff does not allege within the Amended Complaint that these Defendants acted outside the scope of their official duties or that their conduct constituted actual fraud, actual malice, intent to harm, or involved a crime involving moral turpitude. As alleged by Plaintiff, these individual Defendants are employees of Lieber Correctional Institution, which is a detention center operated by SCDC.The SCTCA specifies that in the event an employee is individually named, “the agency or political subdivision for which the employee was acting must be substituted as a party defendant.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-70(c). The undersigned notes that suits brought under the SCTCA against SCDC are to be brought in state court. See S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(e) (explaining that the State of South Carolina does not waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, consents to suits only in a court of the State of South Carolina, and does not consent to suit in a federal court or in a court of another State); see also Laudman v. Padula, No. 3:12-2382-SB; 2013 WL 5469977, at *7 (D.S.C. Sept. 30, 2013) (explaining that under the SCTCA, the State of South Carolina consents only to suit in the State of South Carolina).
Plaintiff alleges Defendant McFadden is the Warden of Lieber Correctional Institution (“Lieber”); Defendant Blackwell is the Associate Director of Lieber; Defendant Ravenell is a case manager at Lieber; Defendant Bachman is the disciplinary hearing officer at Lieber; Defendants Birch and Rice are mental health counselors at Lieber; and Defendants Williams and Cooper are correctional officers at Lieber.
Second, even assuming an exception to immunity applies pursuant to § 15-78-60(25),Plaintiff has still failed to show that any of these individuals acted in a grossly negligent manner or with an intent to harm. Under South Carolina law, to state a claim for gross negligence, one must show the “intentional, conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do.” Hollins v. Richland County School Distr. One, 427 S.E.2d 654, 656, 310 S.C. 486, 490 (1993). Alternatively, it has been described as “the failure to exercise slight care.” Id. Plaintiff fails to specify what conduct by any Defendant meets the standard of gross negligence, nor has Plaintiff provided any evidence that Defendants acted in a manner that constitutes gross negligence. Plaintiff does not specifically allege claims for negligence or gross negligence, nor does he alleged that any of the Defendants breached a duty of care owed to him in his Amended Complaint. In his Response Brief, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Cooper acted with an intent to harm for arbitrarily charging him with an offense, but Plaintiff offers no facts or evidence to support this claim. He further alleges Defendant Cooper was grossly negligent in failing to provide him a description of facts to refute his escape charge, but again, he does not provide a factual explanation for his bare allegations. Defendant Cooper affirmed at the hearing that he did prepare an incident report. Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Cooper was responsible for providing the incident report to Plaintiff. In fact, the only evidence before the undersigned is that two other officers brought Plaintiff his charges. Accordingly, there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether Defendant Cooper was grossly negligent.
This code section provides, “[t]he governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from . . . responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate, or client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25).
Plaintiff alleges Ravenell, Blackwell, and Rice's actions constitute punishment in recommending he be segregated, but he does not provide any facts to support these bare allegations. He alleges both Defendants Bachman and McFadden were grossly negligent in how they conducted the hearing process without any facts to support these claims. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends finding that Plaintiff has failed to establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on any alleged state law claims, to the extent Plaintiff's Amended Complaint could be construed as alleging any state law claims. The undersigned therefore recommends finding that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to any state law claims.
f. Right to Redress Grievances
Defendants argue that, to the extent this court construes Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as having brought a claim for a violation of his constitutional right to redress grievances, Defendants argue that this is not a constitutional right. Plaintiff does not specifically address this argument. The Fourth Circuit has held that the Constitution does not create an entitlement to a grievance procedure or access to any such procedure that is voluntarily established by the state. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994). Thus, as Defendants argue, even assuming they violated the SCDC grievance procedures, as alleged by Plaintiff, this conduct does not state a claim which is actionable under § 1983. See Flick v. Alba, 932 F.2d 728, 729 (8th Cir. 1991). A state's grievance procedure does not confer a substantive right upon prison inmates; thus, the failure by a prison official to comply with a state's grievance procedure is not actional under § 1983. Brown v. G.P. Dodson, 863 F.Supp. 284, 285 (W.D. Va. 1994) (citing Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988)). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants to the extent Plaintiff's Amended Complaint can be construed as bringing claims related to the violation of the grievance procedure.
g. Right to Work/Right to Employment
Similarly, Defendants argue that, to the extent Plaintiff argues he lost the ability to work while in segregated housing, these claims must also be denied. Plaintiff does not respond to this argument either. The classification of work assignments are matters of prison administration and are not violative of due process rights. Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812, 812-13 (4th Cir. 1978). Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff brings any claims alleging his rights were violated because he was unable to work while in segregated housing, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to those claims.
h. Frivolous Litigation Pursuant to the PLRA
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Complaint was frivolous, and he should therefore be issued a strike pursuant to the PLRA. When a plaintiff, proceeding in forma pauperis, files a complaint that a court deems frivolous, the court may dismiss the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). The undersigned does not find that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint was filed frivolously. Therefore, the undersigned recommends that the district court deny Defendants' request to consider this action as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
i. Injunctive Relief
Finally, Defendants argue that to the extent Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, such relief should be denied. “[P]reliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies involving the exercise of very far-reaching power to be granted only sparingly and in limited circumstances.” MicroStrategy Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 339 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). A plaintiff does not have an automatic right to a preliminary injunction, and such relief should be used sparingly. The primary purpose of injunctive relief is to preserve the status quo pending a resolution on the merits. Injunctive relief which changes the status quo pending trial is limited to cases where “the exigencies of the situation demand such relief.” Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283, 286 (4th Cir. 1980).
An analysis of the Winter factors reveals that, to the extent Plaintiff seeks an injunction, this requested relief should be denied. First, Plaintiff has not made a clear showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits of his Amended Complaint. Second, Plaintiff does not make any specific factual allegations that he is currently threatened with imminent injury, loss, or damage. Finally, Plaintiff has not shown that a preliminary injunction is in the public interest. Accordingly, it is recommended that any request for injunctive relief be denied.
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is recommended that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 79, construed as a Motion for Summary Judgment, be granted as to all Defendants for the reasons contained herein.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. [I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 2317
Florence, South Carolina 29503
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).