Opinion
8:22-cv-01409-SAL-BM
04-26-2024
Cassiopia Rhoads, Plaintiff, v. Southern Health Partners, Inc.; Robert J. Williams, M.D.; Brandi Galloway Donna White; Chanate Buchanan; Tonetta Buggs; Tamara Erikson; Erik Riddell; Jessica Whitaker, Defendants.
ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Bristow Marchant, United States Magistrate Judge
This matter is before the Court on a motion to strike filed by Defendants Chanate Buchanan, Tonetta Buggs, Tamara Erikson, Erik Riddell, and Jessica Whitaker (the “ACDC Defendants”) (ECF No. 102); Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a supplemental response (ECF No. 103); the ACDC Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 81); and a motion to dismiss filed by Defendants Southern Health Partners, Inc. (“SHP”), Robert J. Williams, Brandi Galloway, and Donna Wright (the “SHP Defendants”) (ECF No. 83). This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C.
During the time relevant to this action, the ACDC Defendants were all employed by the Aiken County Sheriff's Office as correctional officers at the Aiken County Detention Center (“ACDC”). ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 4.
SHP contracted with Aiken County and/or the Aiken County Sheriff's Office to provide medical care to inmates at ACDC. ECF No. 1 at 1 ¶ 2. During the time relevant to this action, Defendants Williams, Galloway, and Wright were employed by SHP to provide medical care at ACDC. ECF No. 1 at 2 ¶ 3.
Plaintiff filed this action on May 2, 2022, asserting that Defendants violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. ECF No. 1. On September 1, 2023, the ACDC Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 81. Plaintiff filed a response opposing the motion for summary judgment on September 14, 2023. ECF No. 84. The ACDC Defendants filed a reply on September 21, 2023. ECF No. 85.
On November 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to supplement the record and her submission in opposition to the ACDC Defendant's motion for summary judgment. ECF No. 90. Plaintiff filed her supplemental response in opposition on February 12, 2024. ECF No. 100. On February 20, 2024, the ACDC Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's supplemental response. ECF No. 102. On February 26, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file her supplemental response, ECF No. 103, and a response in opposition to the motion to strike, ECF No. 104. The ACDC Defendants filed a response in opposition to the motion for leave to file the supplemental response on March 11, 2024. ECF No. 106. Plaintiff filed a reply on March 14, 2024. ECF No. 107.
On September 14, 2023, the SHP Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 83. The ACDC Defendants filed a response in opposition on September 28, 2023. ECF No. 87. The SHP Defendants filed a reply on October 2, 2023. ECF No. 88.
These motions are all ripe for review.
BACKGROUND
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Complaint. ECF No. 1-1 at 3-8.
Plaintiff was arrested and detained at ACDC beginning on May 3, 2019. ECF No. 1 at 3 ¶ 10. During her detention at ACDC for approximately 30 days in May/June of 2019, Plaintiff repeatedly complained that she had a worsening medical condition that involved the right side of her head/face. Id. at 3 ¶ 11. Plaintiff's symptoms included headaches, head pressure, nausea, vomiting, fever, nosebleeds, a swollen face, pain in her right ear, pain in her right jaw/teeth, and loss of consciousness. Id. at 3 ¶ 12. Although Plaintiff was showing symptoms of a growing abscess/infection on the side of her head, Defendants failed to follow proper protocols and procedures, ignored the obvious sings that Plaintiff was experiencing medical problems, and failed to administer adequate medical treatment. Id. at 4 ¶ 14.
On May 7, 2019, Plaintiff complained that she had a knot on the right side of her head. Id. at 4 ¶ 15. SHP personnel alerted Defendant Williams of this complaint and, although he did not personally see Plaintiff, he directed Defendant Galloway to provide Plaintiff with 600mg of ibuprofen. Id. On May 8, 2019, Plaintiff fell in the women's pod at ACDC (the “B-Pod”), and Defendant Whitaker and/or another correctional officer contacted medical staff about the fall. Id. at 4 ¶ 16. Defendant Galloway responded to B-Pod, found Plaintiff laying on the floor, and noted a knot on the side of Plaintiff's head. Id. However, he did not record the encounter in Plaintiff's medical records and, “[d]espite this worrisome event,” Defendants took no action at that time to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical treatment or take measures to ensure her safety. Id.
On May 10, 2019, Plaintiff “passed out” in her cell. Id. at 4 ¶ 17. Correctional officers contacted medical staff and Defendant Wright came to Plaintiff's cell. Id. Jail staff did not create an incident sheet for this event and, “[d]espite this worrisome complaint,” Defendants took no action at that time to provide Plaintiff with adequate medical treatment or take measures to ensure her safety. Id.
Documentation dated May 11, 2019, reflects that Plaintiff complained of having a huge abscess on the side of her head that was getting bigger and hurt real bad. Id. at 5 ¶ 18. Documentation dated May 16, 2019, reflects that Plaintiff complained of having pain in her ear and a fever. Id. at 5 ¶ 19. SHP medical records document that, on May 17, 2019, Plaintiff's right side of her head had a knot. Id. at 5 ¶ 20. SHP medical records document that, on May 19, 2019, Plaintiff was placed on amoxicillin and ibuprofen. Id. at 5 ¶ 21. However, as of that date, Plaintiff had still not been seen by a physician during her detainment at ACDC. Id.
Documentation dated May 20, 2019, reflects that Plaintiff complained that she had a fluid sack on the side of her head above her ear, that her ear ached, that she was fighting a fever and severe head pressure, that her eyes watered constantly, that she had severe nausea and vomiting, that she felt dizzy and could not focus her eye when she stood up, that the whole right side of her face was swollen and painful, and that she had not been able to get out of bed for four days except to shower. Id. at 5-6 ¶ 22.
Documentation dated May 21, 2019, reflects that Plaintiff complained that she had fluid under her skin above her right ear that had been there for four days, that the whole side of her face was swollen, that she had placed several sick calls and had not been seen yet, and that she was in severe pain and felt pressure in her head. Id. at 6 ¶ 23. SHP medical records dated May 22, May 23, and May 24, 2019, document Plaintiff's continued complaints of pain and swelling and responses by SHP medical staff. Id. at 6 ¶¶ 24-26.
SHP medical records dated May 28, 2019, indicate that SHP medical staff responded to an emergency call because Plaintiff had fainted. Id. at 7 ¶ 27. Dr. Williams was notified and issued a verbal order for ibuprofen and a head CT scan. Id. SHP medical records dated May 29 and 31, 2019, indicate that Plaintiff continued to complain of pain and was given Tylenol but no other treatment. Id. at 7 ¶¶ 28-29. SHP medical records dated June 2, 2019, document that Plaintiff had fainted again, but “Defendants took no action at that time to provide [Plaintiff] with adequate medical treatment and did not take reasonable measure to ensure her safety.” Id. at 7 ¶ 30.
SHP medical records dated June 2, 2019, document that an emergency call was made because Plaintiff felt weird, was vomiting, had a fever, and had numerous other symptoms. Id. at 8 ¶ 31. Plaintiff was then taken to the hospital. Id. at 8 ¶¶ 31-32. A head CT was performed on June 2, 2019. Id. at 8 ¶ 33. Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital for further diagnostic studies and treatment. Id. at 9 ¶ 34. By June 5, 2019, Plaintiff had been diagnosed with “Osteomyelitis with subgaleal and epidural abscesses, transferred to ICU and underwent a right parietal craniectomy for abscess, right,” and, by June 7, 2019, she had been diagnosed with severe sepsis. Id. at 9 ¶¶ 35-36. Plaintiff remained hospitalized until July 8, 2019, after which she was discharged back to ACDC, at which time she had a horseshoe shaped scar on the right side of her head. Id. at 9 ¶ 34.
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff contends that Defendants violated her rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 14 ¶ 45. She asserts a single cause of action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 14-15 ¶¶ 44-50. For her relief, Plaintiff seeks an award of actual, compensatory, special, general, economic, non- economic, and punitive damages against Defendants, a jury trial, and attorneys fees costs. Id. at 14-15.
The State Court Action
In addition to this federal court action, Plaintiff filed an action in the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas at case number 2020-CP-02-02238 (the “State Court Action”) asserting state law claims arising from the underlying incidents at issue in the present case. See ECF No. 90 at 1. A jury trial was held on October 9-13, 2023, in the State Court Action with the jury returning a verdict in favor of Plaintiff and awarding her damages. ECF No. 92 at 2. At the outset of this federal court action, the parties agreed to consolidate certain discovery between the two cases. Id.; see also ECF Nos. 24 at 1 (the parties' joint Rule 26(f) discovery plan noting “Plaintiff and Defendants anticipate using much of the discovery exchanged to date [in the State Court Action] in this new federal action”); 60 (consent motion for extension of scheduling order deadlines noting “[t]he parties have consolidated discovery with the state case . . .”).
APPLICABLE LAW
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
The sole claim in this action is asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, they must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to the action that they bear the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
Motion to Dismiss Standard
Rule 41(a) governs voluntary dismissals of federal actions. Under Rule 41(a)(1), a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss an action without a court order by filing (1) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party has filed an answer or summary judgment motion or (2) a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties that have appeared. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)-(2). Pertinent to this case, Rule 41(a)(2) provides that in any other circumstance, “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). “The primary force of [Rule] 41(a)(2) is to empower district courts to exercise discretion over voluntary dismissals.” GO Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2007). The underlying “purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is freely to allow voluntary dismissals unless the parties will be unfairly prejudiced,” Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987); thus, a district court should grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion “absent plain legal prejudice to the defendant,” Ellett Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 275 F.3d 384, 388 (4th Cir. 2001).
“When determining whether a Rule 41(a)(2) motion should be appropriately granted, the court should consider the following non-exclusive factors: (1) the opposing party's effort and expense in preparing for trial; (2) excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant; (3) insufficient explanation of the need for a dismissal; and (4) the present stage of the litigation, i.e., whether a motion for summary judgment is pending.” United States ex rel. Glasser v. Boykin Contracting Inc., No. 3:14-cv-00224-JMC, 2021 WL 199864, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 19, 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
DISCUSSION
Order on the Parties' Supplemental Briefing and Related Motions
As noted, on November 10, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of intent to supplement the record, ECF No. 90, and then filed a supplemental memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on February 12, 2024, ECF No. 100. Thereafter, the ACDC Defendants filed a motion to strike Plaintiff's supplemental memorandum. ECF No. 102. Plaintiff then filed a motion for leave to file her supplemental memorandum. ECF No. 103. The parties filed responses and replies. ECF Nos. 104; 106; 107. For the reasons below, the undersigned finds that the ACDC Defendants' motion to strike should be granted and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a supplemental memorandum should be denied.
In her notice of intent to supplement the record, Plaintiff notes that certain evidence was presented in the State Court Action relevant to the ACDC Defendants' grounds for summary judgment. ECF No. 90 at 1-2. Specifically, Plaintiff contends that, during the trial in the State Court Action, the defendants' counsel in that case “produced new documents that had never been provided previously,” namely, an inmate handbook which purports to “relay[] how a detainee can file an administrative grievance.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff contends that this new “evidence speaks directly to the pending arguments before the Court on [the ACDC] Defendants' motion for summary judgment” in that it is relevant to the exhaustion issue. Id. In her supplemental memorandum, Plaintiff presents arguments regarding how the evidence from the State Court Action trial impacts the parties' arguments in the present case on the issue of exhaustion. ECF No. 100.
In their motion to strike, the ACDC Defendants argue that Plaintiff's supplemental memorandum should be treated as a sur-reply and that Plaintiff never received authorization from the Court to file such a reply. ECF No. 102-1 at 1. Relying on United States v. New-Indy Catawba, LLC, No. 0:21-cv-02053-SAL, 2022 WL 18357257, at *1 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2022), the ACDC Defendants argue that the Court should strike Plaintiff's supplement because she has not shown that the filing meets the requirements of a sur-reply. Id. at 2-4.
In her motion for leave to file her supplemental memorandum, Plaintiff argues that her supplemental memorandum “is not a sur-reply, as it does not address arguments raised in Defendants' [reply] but seeks merely to provide the Court one newly discovered document . . . and newly acquired testimony that contradicts [the ACDC Defendants'] PLRA Exhaustion argument.” ECF No. 103 at 3. Plaintiff concedes, “with the benefit of hindsight,” that her original notice of intent to supplement should have been formulated as a motion seeking leave to file a supplemental memorandum. Id. Finally, Plaintiff contends that, while she “could find no case law offering guidance on when to allow supplementation to a memorandum to present new evidence,” a court has the power to exercise its discretion to admit new evidence, even after the close of a case. Id. at 4.
Upon review of the parties' motions and briefs, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff's request to file a supplemental memorandum should be denied. As noted in New-Indy Catawba, “[t]he Federal Civil Rules of Procedure and Local Civil Rules do not mention supplements” and “[j]ust because supplements are not prohibited does not mean they are allowed.” 2022 WL 18357257, at *5. Critically, when a party seeks to file a supplemental memorandum, “[t]he proper procedure [is] to file a motion for leave to file the [s]upplement.” Id. Here, Plaintiff did not initially file a motion requesting leave of the Court before filing her supplemental memorandum. As such, the undersigned concludes that the ACDC Defendants' motion to strike the supplemental memorandum should be granted.
“Replies to responses are disfavored in this jurisdiction.” Chandler v. Tech. Coll. of Lowcountry, No. 9:22-cv-01969-DCN, 2023 WL 3026111, at *6 (D.S.C. Apr. 20, 2023). Plaintiff contends that her supplemental memorandum is not a reply as it seeks to present newly discovered evidence. ECF No. 103 at 3. Regardless of whether Plaintiff's supplemental memorandum is treated as a sur-reply or a supplemental memorandum, the Court concludes that it is not proper for the reasons stated herein. Further, even if the Court were to consider the supplemental memorandum, that consideration would not change the Court's analysis of the ACDC Defendants' motion for summary judgment.
However, Plaintiff has now filed a motion requesting leave to file her supplemental memorandum. See ECF No. 103. The undersigned concludes that the motion should be denied. Plaintiff's supplemental memorandum seeks to introduce the inmate handbook and testimony from the State Court Action pertaining to the ACDC Defendants' exhaustion argument. The ACDC Defendants have not offered the inmate handbook as part of their argument concerning exhaustion. Indeed, as explained in the section below, the ACDC Defendants have failed to meet their burden of showing Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. As such, the Court need not consider Plaintiff's additional arguments concerning the exhaustion issue as presented in her supplemental memorandum.
Accordingly, the ACDC Defendants' motion to strike is granted and Plaintiff's motion to file a supplemental memorandum is denied.
The ACDC Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
As noted, the ACDC Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's claim against them. ECF No. 81. Specifically, the ACDC Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment on the following three grounds: (1) Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her deliberate indifference claim, ECF No. 81-1 at 5-8; (2) the record contains no evidence of deliberate indifference by the ACDC Defendants, id. at 9-13; and (3) the ACDC Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity, id. at 13-18. The Court will evaluate each argument in turn below.
Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
First, the ACDC Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to her deliberate indifference claim. ECF No. 81-1 at 5-8.
The Applicable Law
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (the “PRLA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” This requirement “applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong.” Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002). To satisfy this requirement, a plaintiff must avail himself of all available administrative remedies. See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). Those remedies “need not meet federal standards, nor must they be ‘plain, speedy, and effective.'” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524 (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at 739).
The purpose of the exhaustion requirement is twofold. First, it gives an administrative agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into federal court[.]” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (citation omitted). Second, “[c]laims generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.” Id. Satisfaction of the exhaustion requirement requires “using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly.” Id. at 90 (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)). Thus, “it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007). Defendants have the burden of establishing that a plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 681 (4th Cir. 2005).
The Parties' Arguments
The ACDC Defendants assert that “[i]t is undisputed that the Plaintiff did not exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to her allegations that [they] were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs.” ECF No. 81-1 at 7. By way of support, the ACDC Defendants contend Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she never filed any grievances that were directed at or to the security staff at ACDC complaining about her level of medical care. Id. The ACDC Defendants further argue that “[t]he only documents called ‘grievances' that [Plaintiff] submitted were sick call requests that she directed to the medical providers with SHP.” Id.
In response, Plaintiff contends that she filed numerous grievances through ACDC's kiosk system during her incarceration at ACDC.5 ECF No. 84 at 3-5. Plaintiff further argues that, to the extent she did not exhaust her administrative remedies, such remedies were not available to her as she was placed into B-Max on May 24, 2019, up until the time she was transported to the hospital and did not have access to the kiosk system. Id. at 5-9.
Plaintiff submitted five grievances while incarcerated at ACDC, with each grievance being directed to medical staff. ECF No. 84-2. Plaintiff filed her first grievance on May 11, 2019, with the subject “Need to see a dentist” in which she complained as follows:
I have a huge [abscess] on the side of my head that keeps getting bigger and hurts real bad I need my tooth pulled or some [antibiotics.]Id. at 2. Plaintiff filed her second grievance on May 16, 2019, with the subject “Earache” in which she complained as follows:
I am having really [bad] pain in my ear and fever[.]Id. at 3. Plaintiff filed her third grievance on May 20, 2019, with the subject “Abscess (may appear to be a bite)” in which she complained as follows:
I have a [fluid-]like sack on side of my head, above my ear. My ear aches and Im still fighting a fever[] and severe [head] pressure. My eyes water constantly and I have severe nausea [and vomiting]. I also feel dizzy and [can't] focus my eyes when I stand up. The whole rights side of my face is swollen and very painful. I have not been able to get out of bed for 4 plus days on the exception of showering. Please help me and send motrin[.]Id. at 4. Plaintiff filed her fourth grievance on May 21, 2019, with the subject “Abscess (may appear to be a bite)” in which she complained as follows:
I have a fluid under my skin above my [right] ear. Been there for 4 plus days, whole side of face is swollen and have placed several sick calls and have not been seen yet. I am in severe pain and pressure in my head.Id. at 5. Plaintiff filed her fifth grievance on May 24, 2019, with the subject “I have not been seen by a dentist” in which she complained as follows:
I have been taken off all pain [medications and] still have yet too have seen the [difference.]Id. at 6.
The Court's Analysis
Upon review of the record presently before the Court, the undersigned cannot conclude that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff did not properly exhaust her administrative remedies before filing suit. Critically, despite arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, the ACDC Defendants have failed to provide sufficient detail about ACDC's administrative remedies procedures or Plaintiff's attempts to follow those procedures. The ACDC Defendants have the burden of establishing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. Anderson, 407 F.3d at 681. Here, the ACDC Defendants have not explained what administrative remedies were available to Plaintiff that she was required to exhaust. As such, the Court is unable to find that Plaintiff has not properly exhausted those remedies.
Further, although the ACDC Defendants argue that no grievances were directed specifically to any of the ACDC Defendants, they present no argument or evidence showing that the grievances that Plaintiff actually filed did not encompass the acts or omissions of the ACDC Defendants. The law is well settled that the PLRA does not impose “a ‘name all defendants' requirement.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 217 (2007) (“[E]xhaustion is not per se inadequate simply because an individual later sued was not named in the grievances.”); see also Pellum v. Burtt, No. 9:05-cv-3339-JFA-GCK, 2008 WL 759084, at *17 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2008) (“Jones v. Bock teaches that although the PLRA requires exhaustion of such administrative remedies as are available, ‘nothing in the statute imposes a ‘name all defendants' requirement [.]'”). In sum, the ACDC Defendants have failed to offer evidence sufficient to meet their burden of showing Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.
It is noteworthy that the ACDC Defendants have not provided a copy of the inmate handbook in support of their motion. Indeed, the ACDC Defendants have objected to Plaintiff's attempt to provide a copy of the inmate handbook. Absent an explanation of the administrative remedies procedures, such as that contained in the inmate handbook, the Court is simply unable to determine whether Plaintiff followed those procedures to properly exhaust her remedies. The only information submitted by the ACDC Defendants as to the administrative remedies procedures is a brief explanation by ACDC Administrator Nicholas Gallam in his affidavit. ECF No. 85-1. Nevertheless, Gallam's cursory explanation of the kiosk process is insufficient to explain both the required steps in the exhaustion process and Plaintiff's failure to follow each required step.
No Evidence of Deliberate Indifference
Next, the ACDC Defendants argue they are entitled to summary judgment because the record contains no evidence of deliberate indifference by the ACDC Defendants. ECF No. 81-1 at 9-13. The Court agrees.
The Applicable Law
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, relief may be sought when a plaintiff alleges the violation of a right secured by the Constitution by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Askins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment “protects inmates from inhumane treatment and conditions while imprisoned.” Williams v. Benjamin, 77 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1996). However, because Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee at the time of the alleged violation, her deliberate indifference claim is properly brought under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Coney v. Davis, 809 Fed App'x 158, 159 (4th Cir. 2020), which protects the rights of pretrial detainees to receive adequate medical care, Brown v. Harris, 240 F.3d 383, 388 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating that “the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Eighth Amendment, mandates the provision of medical care” to pretrial detainees “who require it”); Hill v. Nicodemus, 979 F.2d 987, 990-91 (4th Cir. 1992). Pretrial detainees “retain at least those constitutional rights [held] by convicted prisoners.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979). “The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects pretrial detainees from governmental actions that are ‘not rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive purpose or that . . . appear excessive in relation to that purpose.'” Harold v. Lauren, No. 7:23-cv-00363, 2024 WL 150776, at *2 (W.D. Va. Jan. 11, 2024) (quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015)).
Applying Kingsley, the Fourth Circuit recently noted that the test for a Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claim is an objective standard such that a pretrial detainee must simply show that a defendant's actions or inactions were “objectively unreasonable.” Short v. Hartman, 87 F.4th 593, 606, 611 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[I]t is sufficient that the plaintiff show that the defendant's action or inaction was, in Kingsley's words, ‘objectively unreasonable,' . . . that is, the plaintiff must show that the defendant should have known of that condition and that risk, and acted accordingly.”). Thus, to prevail on a claim for deliberate indifference to a medical need under the Fourteenth Amendment, a pretrial detainee must demonstrate that “(1) they had a medical condition or injury that posed a substantial risk of serious harm; (2) the defendant intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly acted or failed to act to appropriately address the risk that the condition posed; (3) the defendant knew or should have known (a) that the detainee had that condition and (b) that the defendant's action or inaction posed an unjustifiably high risk of harm; and (4) as a result, the detainee was harmed.” Id. at 611. However, “it is still not enough for the plaintiff to allege that the defendant negligently or accidentally failed to do right by the detainee.” Id. at 611-12. “Negligence was not enough before, and it is not enough now.” Id. at 612 (internal citation omitted).
The parties did not have the benefit of the holding and test identified in Short as that decision was issued after the parties completed briefing on the summary judgment motion. However, the Court finds that the objective standard adopted in Short does not impact the arguments submitted by the parties in this case and the Court does not find additional briefing necessary at this time. The Court will apply the standard set forth in Short.
The Parties' Arguments
The ACDC Defendants argue that Plaintiff received “substantial medical care, including over twenty different encounters with medical personnel” during her approximately 30-day incarceration at ACDC. ECF No. 81-1 at 9. The ACDC Defendants note that Aiken County contracted with SHP to provide medical services and care for the inmates housed at ACDC. Id. at 10. Relying on Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2008), the ACDC Defendants argue that, because they are all non-medical correctional officers, they were entitled to rely on the judgment of the medical professionals. Id. The ACDC Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that they were personally involved in providing Plaintiff's medical care or were responsible for the decisions made by medical personnel or that they personally denied her medical treatment, deliberately interfered with her medical treatment, or were indifferent to any known misconduct by the medical providers. Id. at 10-11.
Plaintiff, on the other hand, argues that the facts of the present case “remove [the ACDC Defendants] from the ‘general' justifiable reliance protection of Iko.” ECF No. 84 at 16. Plaintiff contends that she had an objectively serious medical need that was so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention. Id. at 17. Plaintiff further argues that the ACDC Defendants “had a nondelegable duty to not be deliberately indifferent to inadequate medical care SHP provided [to Plaintiff].” Id. at 30. As such, Plaintiff contends, there is a question of material fact as to whether the ACDC Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her medical needs. Id.
Plaintiff's Medical Treatment at ACDC
On May 3, 2019, Plaintiff was admitted to ACDC. ECF Nos. 1 at 3 ¶ 10; 15 at 3 ¶ 11; 21 at 3 ¶ 12. That same day, SHP medical staff screened Plaintiff and started her on a medication schedule under the direction of Defendant Williams because she was undergoing heroin detox. ECF No. 82 at 3, 13. Plaintiff underwent intensive monitoring by SHP medical staff from May 4, 2019, through May 13, 2019, with SHP nurses evaluating Plaintiff multiple times a day and administering her prescribed medication. Id. at 14-17. An SHP withdrawal monitoring form indicates that Plaintiff was evaluated three times on May 4, 2019, twice on May 5, once on May 6, twice on May 7, three times on May 8, twice on May 9, multiple times on May 10 and May 11, and twice on May 13. ECF No. 82 at 14-17. During each of those encounters, SHP nurses documented Plaintiff's blood pressure, pulse and oxygen saturation, respiration, temperature, weakness, sweating, shakiness, dehydration, vomiting, diarrhea, confusion, and slurred speech. ECF No. 82 at 14-17.
Medical records show that Defendant Williams issued orders for medication on May 3, 7, 13, 23, 28, 29, and 31. ECF No. 82 at 3-4. Records show that Plaintiff refused medication on May 13, 14, 15, 16, and 17. ECF No. 82 at 6.
On May 7, 2019, Plaintiff complained of a knot on her head. ECF Nos. 1 at 4 ¶ 15; 15 at 3 ¶ 16. SHP personnel alerted Dr. Williams of this complaint who ordered that Plaintiff should receive 600 mg ibuprofen for five days. ECF Nos. 1 at 4 ¶ 15; 15 at 3 ¶ 16; 82 at 3. On May 8, 2019, Plaintiff fell in B-Pod. ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ 16; 15 at 3 ¶ 17; 21 at 4 ¶ 16. Defendant Whitaker contacted medical staff and Defendant Galloway came to B-Pod to evaluate Plaintiff and noted a knot on the side of her head. ECF No. 1 at 4 ¶ 16; 15 at 3 ¶ 17; 21 at 4 ¶ 16.
On May 10, 2019, Plaintiff passed out in her cell and correctional officers made an emergency call to medical. ECF Nos. 1 at 4 ¶ 17; 15 at 4 ¶ 18; 82 at 9. Defendant Wright responded to Plaintiff's cell. ECF Nos. 1 at 4 ¶ 17; 15 at 4 ¶ 18. Medical records indicate that Plaintiff complained of a headache and claimed her nose was bleeding. ECF Nos. 82 at 9. However, medical staff noted that there was no evidence of her nose bleeding. Id. Medical staff documented Plaintiff's vitals and noted that she was taking ibuprofen and “encourage[d] fluids due to detox.” Id.
On May 11, 2019, Plaintiff submitted her first grievance, complaining that she had “a huge abscess on the side of [her] head that keeps getting bigger and hurts real bad. I need my tooth pulled or some antibiotics.” ECF Nos. 1 at 5 ¶ 18; 15 at 4 ¶ 19; 84-2 at 2. On May 12, 2019, SHP Nurse Malinda Breedlove responded to Plaintiff's complaints and grievance and completed a “Clinical Pathway/Patient Clinical Data Form,” ECF No. 82 at 19-20; and, on May 13, 2019, Defendant Williams ordered that Plaintiff be placed on 500 mg amoxicillin for five days and 800 mg ibuprofen for seven days, ECF No. 82 at 3. See also ECF No. 84-2 at 2.
On May 16, 2019, Plaintiff submitted her second grievance, complaining of “having really [b]ad pain in [her] ear and fever.” ECF Nos. 1 at 5 ¶ 19; 15 at 4 ¶ 20; 84-2 at 3. Nurse Donna placed Plaintiff on the sick call list and a notation on her grievance dated May 19, 2019, explained that Plaintiff was taking amoxicillin and ibuprofen. ECF No. 84-2 at 3. On May 17, 2019, SHP personnel documented in Plaintiff's medical records that her “[right] head has knot.” ECF Nos. 1 at 5 ¶ 20; 15 at 4 ¶ 21. On May 19, 2019, Plaintiff was again placed on amoxicillin and ibuprofen. ECF No. 1 at 5 ¶ 21.
On May 20, 2019, Plaintiff submitted her third grievance, complaining that she had “a fluid sack on side of [her] head,” that she had an ear ache, fever, and severe head pressure, along with other symptoms. ECF Nos. 1 at 5 ¶ 22; 15 at 4 ¶ 23; 84-2 at 4. In response, Nurse Malinda noted that Plaintiff would be seen at the next available sick call. ECF No. 84-2 at 4. On May 21, 2019, Plaintiff submitted her fourth grievance, complaining that she had “fluid under [her] skin above [her right] ear [that had been] there for 4 plus days, whole side of face is swollen” and had severe pain and pressure in her head. ECF Nos. 1 at 6 ¶ 23; 15 at 5 ¶ 24; 84-2 at 5. On May 22, 2019, Plaintiff was examined by SHP staff for her complaints of pain. ECF No. 1 at 6 ¶ 24; 15 at 5 ¶ 25.
On May 23, 2019, Plaintiff was examined by Dr. Williams, who diagnosed Plaintiff with a small hematoma and directed Plaintiff to apply warm compresses and continue with pain medication. ECF Nos. 1 at 6 ¶ 25; 15 at 5 ¶ 26; 82 at 3, 10.
On May 24, 2019, Plaintiff submitted her fifth grievance, complaining that she had been taken off all pain medications and still had not seen the dentist. ECF Nos. 1 at 6 ¶ 26; 15 at 5 ¶ 27; 84-2 at 6. On May 24, 2019, Plaintiff also barricaded herself by refusing to leave the B-Pod dayroom and return to her cell, purportedly demanding to be taken to the hospital. ECF No. 1 at 11 ¶ 38(e).
On May 28, 2019, Plaintiff fell in her cell and Dr. Williams issued an order for a head CT scan. ECF Nos. 1 at 7 ¶¶ 27, 38(f); 15 at 5 ¶ 28; 82 at 4, 11. Dr. Williams also prescribed 800 mg ibuprofen. ECF No. 82 at 3. On May 29, 2019, Plaintiff complained of pain on the right side of her head and was given Tylenol. ECF Nos. 1 at 7 ¶ 28; 15 at 6 ¶ 29; 82 at 4, 11. On May 31, 2019, Plaintiff complained of increased “pain from [right] side of temple protrusion.” ECF Nos. 1 at 7 ¶ 29; 15 at 6 ¶ 30. Plaintiff was prescribed 500 mg of Tylenol. ECF No. 82 at 4.
On June 2, 2019, Plaintiff collapsed in her cell and was taken to the hospital. ECF Nos. 1 at 7-8 ¶¶ 30-32; 15 at 6 ¶¶ 31-33.
The Court's Analysis
Having considered the parties' arguments, the applicable law, and the evidence in the record, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff has not submitted evidence to support a deliberate indifference claim as to the ACDC Defendants. As noted, to succeed on her deliberated indifference claim, Plaintiff must show both that she had a medical condition that was sufficiently serious and that the ACDC Defendants were deliberately indifferent to her serious medical need.
As to the first factor, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated a serious medical need that was obvious to the ACDC Defendants. Most of Plaintiff's memorandum opposing summary judgment focuses on this factor and she presents deposition testimony from numerous inmates and correctional officers to suggest that she had a serious medical need that was so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for medical attention. ECF No. 84 at 17. Nevertheless, even assuming that Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated a serious medical need that was obvious, she has failed to present evidence as to the second factor to show the ACDC Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's serious medical need. Indeed, there is no evidence that the ACDC Defendants failed to respond reasonably in light of Plaintiff's need for medical care, assuming it was obvious to them.
Importantly, the ACDC Defendants are non-medical correctional officers. It is well-established under Fourth Circuit precedent that,
[t]o establish a claim for denial of medical care against non-medical personnel, a prisoner must show that they failed to promptly provide needed medical treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. Moreover, because most prison officials are not trained medical personnel, they are entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment, and expertise of medical personnel concerning the course of treatment which the medical personnel deemed necessary and appropriate for the prisoner.Vinson v. U.S. Marshals Serv., No. 0:10-cv-79-RMG-PJG, 2011 WL 3903057, at *8 (D.S.C. July 29, 2011) (citing Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 854 (4th Cir. 1990)), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 3903199 (D.S.C. Sept. 2, 2011), aff'd, 459 Fed.Appx. 221 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Coleman v. Stevenson, No. 0:09-cv-872-HMH, 2010 WL 2990737, at *5 (D.S.C. June 22, 2010) (“To establish a claim for denial of medical care against non-medical personnel, [Plaintiff] must show that they failed to promptly provide needed medical treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2990740 (D.S.C. July 26, 2010), aff'd, 407 Fed.Appx. 709 (4th Cir. 2011); Harding v. Rubenstein, No. 1:16-cv-173, 2018 WL 3069188, at *10 (N.D. W.Va. Feb. 1, 2018) (“Regardless of Plaintiff's insistence that these Defendants had a personal duty to ensure adequate care, the case law in this jurisdiction is that non-medical supervisory personnel are entitled to rely on the opinion of medical staff regarding the proper medical treatment of inmates.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 1326506 (N.D. W.Va. Mar. 15, 2018). As the Fourth Circuit has observed, “[i]f a prisoner is under the care of medical experts . . ., a non-medical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” Iko, 535 F.3d at 242; see also Gordon v. Schilling, 937 F.3d 348, 358 (4th Cir. 2019) (noting that “a nonmedical prison official can generally defer to the decisions of prison medical personnel at the institutional level”). Further, “[t]he law is clear that personal participation of a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against a government official in his individual capacity” and “[m]ere knowledge is not sufficient to establish personal participation.” Coleman v. Stevenson, No. 0:09-cv-872-HMH, 2010 WL 2990737, at *4 (D.S.C. June 22, 2010), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 2990740 (D.S.C. July 26, 2010), aff'd, 407 Fed.Appx. 709 (4th Cir. 2011). In light of this standard, and construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record does not show that the ACDC Defendants' actions or inactions were “objectively unreasonable.”
This is so because, as non-medical correctional officers, the ACDC Defendants were generally entitled to defer to the decisions of the medical personnel who were treating Plaintiff. See Ketter v. Aaron, No. 3:14-cv-619-FDW, 2016 WL 7108429, at *8 (W.D. N.C. Dec. 5, 2016) (explaining that, as non-medical staff members, the corrections officer defendants “cannot be liable for the medical staff's diagnostic decisions”). “In certain circumstances, claims against [non-medical personnel] can go forward,” such as “where a prisoner is complaining about a lack of medical care and has not received any medical treatment whatsoever.” Annarelli v. Clarke, No. 7:20-cv-00261, 2022 WL 4798345, at *14 (W.D. Va. Sept. 20, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-7135, 2023 WL 5348337 (4th Cir. Aug. 21, 2023). However, that is not the case here. Plaintiff was receiving medical care and treatment by SHP nurses and doctors.
As noted, Plaintiff had interaction with SHP medical staff on the following dates: May 3, May 4, May 5, May 6, May 7, May 8, May 9, May 10, May 11, May 12, May 13, May 19, May 22, May 23, May 28, May 29, May 31, and June 2. See ECF Nos. 1 at 4-7, ¶¶ 15-17, 21,24-32; 82 at 9-11; 84-3. Plaintiff was evaluated by SHP medical staff numerous times, prescribed medication for her complaints of pain, directed to use a warm compress, and Defendant Williams ordered a head CT scan to further evaluate her condition. Thus, this case does not present a scenario where medical staff failed to provide Plaintiff any medical care and treatment, and the ACDC Defendants were entitled to defer to the treatment plan and diagnostic decisions of the SHP medical staff. See Annarelli, 2022 WL 4798345, at *14 (concluding “[i]t was not [the non-medical defendants' role] to determine that something additional should have been done by a physician or that more treatment was warranted” and, “[i]nstead, they were entitled to defer to the [medical staff] physicians”); see also Lowe v. Johnson, No. 21-7443, 2023 WL 7179461, at *5 (4th Cir. Nov. 1, 2023) (noting that, “[b]ecause it was reasonable for [the non-medical defendants] to rely on the prison's medical personnel to choose the proper course of treatment for [the plaintiff], we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in their favor”).
“A non-medical provider generally cannot be held liable for a failure to provide an inmate medical treatment where, as here, that inmate is under the care of a physician for the ailment or injury.” Harvey v. Whitlock, No. 7:18-cv-00097, 2021 WL 3852731, at *10 (W.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2021). Instead, as noted, “in order to hold a non-medical provider liable in such circumstances, the plaintiff must show that the defendant was personally involved with a denial of treatment, deliberately interfered with a doctor's treatment, or tacitly authorized or was indifferent to the prison physician's misconduct.” Harvey v. Whitlock, No. 7:18-cv-00097, 2021 WL 3852731, at *10 (W.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2021).
Here, Plaintiff does not appear to argue that any of the ACDC Defendants were personally involved with a denial of treatment or deliberately interfered with a doctor's treatment. Instead, Plaintiff argues that the ACDC Defendants were indifferent to SHP medical staff's misconduct. Like the plaintiff in Harvey, Plaintiff claims that SHP medical staff were “deliberately indifferent to [her] medical needs and [were] so wrong in [their] assessment of [her] needed treatment that these other non-medical defendants should have known that [she] required outside treatment.” Harvey, 2021 WL 3852731, at *10 (noting that the plaintiff “contends that it was obvious even to a layperson that he was in need of hospitalization or other care”). The court in Harvey disagreed with the plaintiff's argument finding he had “not offered any facts that would allow a reasonable jury to find that any of [the non-medical] defendants knew he was receiving inadequate treatment or had reason to believe that he was being mistreated.” Id. The same is true here.
Clearly, Plaintiff's medical issue was not insignificant. However, SHP medical staff evaluated Plaintiff on multiple occasions, issued medication, directed her to use a warm compress, and scheduled a head CT scan. “Given that assessment by [SHP medical staff], no reasonable jury could find that [Plaintiff's] injuries were so obvious to laypeople that these non-medical defendants should have taken unauthorized steps to override [SHP medical staff's] treatment decisions.” Id. Like in Harvey, here it is undisputed that Plaintiff was under the direct care of SHP medical staff, that she received medication prescribed by SHP medical staff, that she had contact with SHP medical providers throughout her incarceration (sometimes multiple times a day), and that she had other avenues available to her for asking for treatment or relief, such as making requests directly to the SHP medical staff. Id. at * 11. Therefore, “[a]s non-medical personnel, [the ACDC] Defendants were entitled to rely on the medical staff's expertise, diagnosis, and treatment plan.” McNeal v. Hutchinson, No. 2:21-cv-03431-JFA-MGB, 2022 WL 17418060, at *10 (D.S.C. Sept. 19, 2022), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2022 WL 16631042 (D.S.C. Nov. 2, 2022), aff'd, No. 22-7319, 2024 WL 1366553 (4th Cir. Apr. 1, 2024).
Relying on Cooper v. Dyke, 814 F.2d 941 (4th Cir. 1987), Plaintiff argues that “defendants who ignore clear warning that the medical treatment provided a pretrial detainee is inadequate may be liable for failing to provide additional care.” ECF No. 84 at 9, 33-35. However, the facts of the present case are distinguishable from Cooper. In Cooper, the defendants, who were police officers, responded to an altercation during which the plaintiff had “received a gunshot wound in the upper chest, under his left arm.” Cooper, 814 F.2d at 943. Paramedics also arrived and, after examining the plaintiff, “told the police that they found no injury on [the plaintiff].” Id. at 944. After the plaintiff was handcuffed and taken to the police station, the plaintiff “and his friends repeatedly complained that [he] had been shot and pleaded with the officers to take him to the hospital.” Id. Indeed, their
protests were apparently so loud and persistent that he was removed from the rail and placed in a cell in another part of the station. At some point, [the plaintiff's] handcuffs were even altered by an unidentified officer so as to permit him to lie down on the floor. Aside from that, however, he remained unattended to until [another inmate] vomited on him. When [the plaintiff] failed to respond, [an officer] finally decided to examine him more carefully. The wound was discovered and an ambulance was called.Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that “there was, at a minimum, more than sufficient evidence of deliberate indifference to warrant submitting this claim to the jury.” Id. at 946. The Court noted the plaintiff
and his friends repeatedly pled with the officers to obtain medical attention for [the plaintiff's] gunshot wound, but the officers either ignored them or told them to “shut up” because Cooper had already been examined. [The plaintiff's] friend . . . apparently complained so vociferously that he was moved to another part of the station. [The plaintiff] himself attracted enough attention at one point to convince an officer to change his handcuffs so that he could lie down on the floor. Moreover, . . . [the plaintiff's] ‘symptoms would have made it obvious that he required immediate medical attention during this time period.' These indications that defendants had notice of [the plaintiff's] need for further medical care are underscored by the officers' knowledge of the chaotic conditions under which the initial exam was undertaken.Id. at 945-46 (citation omitted).
Those same considerations are absent in the present case. For example, although the defendants in Cooper ignored the plaintiff's complaints and requests for medical attention, the record in the present case shows that, when Plaintiff requested medical attention and/or had medical emergencies (such as when she fell or fainted in her cell), correctional officers called medical staff who evaluated Plaintiff and provided medical attention. Likewise, the officers in Cooper knew that the “chaotic conditions under which the initial exam was undertaken” put them on notice for the plaintiff's need for further medical attention. Id. at 945. In the present case, on the other hand, Plaintiff was under the ongoing care of medical staff and received routine visits with SHP nurses who were administering medication and providing extensive evaluations throughout her incarceration at ACDC.
Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges, and the evidence in the record shows, that correctional officers repeatedly summoned medical personnel whenever Plaintiff needed or requested medical attention. For example, in her deposition, Plaintiff testified that she asked Defendant Whitaker “to call the nurse and see if they would bring me some Tylenol or come see me” and that Defendant Whitaker followed through with her request and contacted medical. ECF No. 81-2 at 6. Plaintiff testified that nurses came through at least twice a day for med pass and that she had daily interactions with the nurses. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff testified that numerous other correctional officers also would call the nurses when she needed them. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff testified that she never asked Defendant Whitaker for medical assistance. Id. at 13. Plaintiff testified that she never asked Defendant Whitaker to take her to the hospital. Id. Plaintiff testified that, after a fall on May 10, she had an obvious knot on her head, and that Defendant Whitaker responded with medical and that Defendant Whitaker “knew on that day [she was] receiving attention from the medical personnel because she was there with them watching them do it.” Id. at 14. Plaintiff testified that she never made any requests to Defendant Riddell for medical assistance or asked him to be taken to the hospital. Id. at 15.
Plaintiff testified that she also asked Defendant Buchanan to call for medical. ECF No. 81-2 at 9. Plaintiff testified that “there were a few times where [she] asked [Defendant Buchanan] to get medical and medical came.” Id. at 9-10. Plaintiff also testified that there were “a few times . . . [l]ike two or three” that she asked Defendant Buchanan to summon medical, but medical did not respond. Id. at 11. However, Plaintiff could not recall specific dates, she did not file a grievance or document her requests, and she did not know whether or not Defendant Buchanan actually did attempt to summon medical when requested by Plaintiff. Id.
Thus, the evidence in the record “demonstrate[s] that time and time again, [the ACDC] Defendants responded to the Plaintiff's complaints and relayed [her] requests to the appropriate medical personnel.” Moore v. Lassiter, No. 1:20-cv-00058-MR, 2021 WL 2338954, at *5 (W.D. N.C. June 7, 2021) (noting that, to the extent that the defendants denied the plaintiff any of his requested accommodations, they were entitled to rely on the instructions of medical personnel who advised “rightly or wrongly” that the plaintiff was not authorized to receive such accommodations).
Plaintiff asserts that the ACDC Defendants were deliberately indifferent in that they did not take Plaintiff to the hospital for treatment. Plaintiff testified in her deposition that she asked Defendant Buchanan to be taken to the hospital on May 24 during the barricading incident. ECF No. 81-2 at 15-17. However, Plaintiff also testified in her deposition that she never asked Defendants Whitaker, Riddell, or “any other correctional officers” besides Defendant Buchanan to be taken to the hospital. ECF No. 81-2 at 13-15. Additionally, Plaintiff did not ask to be taken to the hospital in any of her grievances. ECF No. 84-2. Further, none of the medical records document that Plaintiff asked to be taken to the hospital or that any SHP medical personnel recommended that Plaintiff be taken to the hospital. See generally, ECF No. 82. And none of the ACDC records from the barricading incident document that Plaintiff asked to be taken to the hospital. ECF No. 8414. Thus, the only evidence in the record showing that Plaintiff ever asked to be taken to the hospital is her uncorroborated statement in her deposition that she asked Defendant Buchanan on May 24 during the barricading incident. Even taking Plaintiff's statement as true, however, that fact alone is insufficient to demonstrated deliberate indifference on the part of any of the ACDC Defendants. First, there is no evidence in the record showing that Defendants Buggs, Erikson, Riddell, and Whitaker knew about Plaintiff's request to be taken to the hospital. And, there is no evidence to show that Defendant Buchanan knew or should have known that Plaintiff's request to be taken to the hospital presented a sufficiently serious request such that Defendant Buchanan should have overridden SHP personnel.
The record shows that Plaintiff “received prompt, thorough, and continuing treatment” and, although she may be dissatisfied with SHP medical staff's “diagnosis method or prescribed treatment plan, this amounts to nothing more than a disagreement between medical staff and an inmate as to proper diagnostic methods and a course of treatment, which are not actionable under the [Fourteenth] Amendment.” Owensby v. Ofagh, No. 7:06-cv-00347, 2006 WL 1699743, at *1 (W.D. Va. June 12, 2006) (finding no deliberate indifference and explaining that, although the plaintiff complained “that institutional staff have provided him with inadequate care for his knee and refuse to transfer him to the hospital for further treatment, he admits that he was examined and treated by medical staff within fifteen minutes of his first complaint of injury, was extensively examined and prescribed additional medication the same day he complained his condition was deteriorating, and was subsequently moved to the institutional medical unit for continuing treatment”).
Additionally, the ACDC Defendants have provided numerous statements from SHP employees that none of the ACDC Defendants delayed, denied, or interfered with any medically necessary treatment. Specifically, the SHP employees testified as follows in their respective depositions. Defendant Williams testified that he had no “knowledge or information that any employee of the sheriff or the county delayed or denied [Plaintiff's] medical care while she was in the jail.” ECF No. 81-3 at 3. Defendant Galloway testified that none of the jail administrators or correctional officers at ACDC interfered in any way with SHP's treatment of Plaintiff and never prohibited or delayed any care or treatment that SHP personnel believed was necessary for Plaintiff. ECF No. 81-4 at 3. Defendant Wright testified that she was not aware of any employees of the sheriff's department or detention center or the county who ever interfered with SHP's treatment or care of Plaintiff or did anything whatsoever to prohibit or delay any care or medical treatment that SHP was providing to Plaintiff. ECF No. 81-5 at 3. Sherry Shutters testified that she did not experience or observe any of the ACDC jail administrators or correctional officers interfere with, prohibit, or delay the treatment of Plaintiff by SHP and its nurses and doctors any medical care or treatment by SHP. ECF No. 81-6 at 3-4. On the other hand, Plaintiff has not identified any evidence in the record showing that any ACDC Defendant delayed, denied, or interfered with any medically necessary treatment needed by Plaintiff.
Shutters was an SHP nurse at ACDC that provided medical care to Plaintiff. ECF No. 81-1 at 2. Shutters is not named as a Defendant in this action.
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to establish that the ACDC Defendants had any actual involvement in Plaintiff's medical treatment or had the authority to override the SHP medical personnel's diagnosis or treatment of Plaintiff. See Lowe v. Johnson, No. 2:17-cv-02345, 2018 WL 4222829, at *7 (S.D. W.Va. Aug. 13, 2018) (finding the plaintiff had failed to establish that the warden had supervisory authority over the medical doctor or could have overridden her medical judgment), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 4212416 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 4, 2018). Therefore, in light of all the foregoing, there is not a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the ACDC Defendants either knowingly or recklessly disregarded Plaintiff's need for medical care, and the ACDC Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment.
Qualified Immunity
Finally, the ACDC Defendants contend they are entitled to qualified immunity under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). ECF No. 81-1 at 13-18.
In Harlow, the Supreme Court held that government officials performing discretionary functions are generally shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights which a reasonable person would have known. 457 U.S. at 818. When a qualified immunity defense is raised, the courts apply a two-part test. First, the court must determine whether the facts viewed in the plaintiff's favor make out a violation of one's constitutional rights, and second, whether the violated right was clearly established at that time. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 233, 231 (2009)). The Fourth Circuit employs a split burden of proof for the qualified immunity defense. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the first prong, and the [officer] bears the burden on the second prong. Stanton v. Elliott, 25 F.4th at 233 (citing Henry v. Purnell, 501 F.3d 374, 377-78 & n.4 (4th Cir. 2007)). Courts are not required to analyze the two-part qualified immunity test sequentially, though it is often the better approach to first determine whether a plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right. E.W. by & through T.W. v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 178-79 (4th Cir. 2018) (citing Estate of Armstrong ex rel. Armstrong v. Vill. of Pinehurst, 810 F.3d 892, 898 (4th Cir. 2016)). The test is meant to satisfy both interests, “by holding public officials responsible only for conduct that a reasonable official should readily be able to determine unlawful.” Mitchell v. Rice, 954 F.2d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 1992).
Here, the undersigned recommends granting summary judgment in favor of the ACDC Defendants because Plaintiff has failed to establish a Fourteenth Amendment violation as to her claims of deliberate indifference to her medical needs. Alternatively, the undersigned recommends finding that these Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. As previously analyzed, Plaintiff has failed to show that Defendants' conduct violated a constitutional right for the reasons previously explained. Plaintiff has not otherwise explained how the conduct in question by these Defendants violated her clearly established rights. Therefore, the ACDC Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to the claims regarding deliberate indifference to her medical needs.
SHP Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
The SHP Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explaining that “Plaintiff has agreed to dismiss this action with prejudice and without payment and forever ended as between Plaintiff and the [SHP] Defendants.” ECF No. 83 at 1. The SHP Defendants note that the motion does not apply to Plaintiff's action pending against the ACDC Defendants and that counsel for those Defendants has declined to sign a stipulation of dismissal. Id. at 2. Plaintiff consents to the motion and her counsel have affixed their signatures to the motion. Id.
The ACDC Defendants oppose the motion on the basis that they have not been “provided full disclosure of the terms of the settlement and a fair opportunity to request that the Court impose conditions . . .” ECF No. 87 at 1. The ACDC Defendants argue that their requests for a copy of any settlement agreements in both this federal action and the companion State Court Action have been denied. Id. at 1-2. The ACDC Defendants contend that, although they “are not trying to needlessly impede the dismissal of the SHP Defendants,” they need to be informed of the details of the settlement before being in a position to consent to that dismissal because they should be entitled to a set-off for any amount paid in settlement by the SHP Defendants. Id. at 3. The ACDC Defendants further contend that the moving party to a Rule 41(a)(2) motion must be the plaintiff and that the rule only applies to “an action”-neither of which is satisfied by the presently pending motion. Id. at 2.
Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure describes the circumstances under which an action may be dismissed. Rule 41(a)(2) provides that “an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request . . . by court order, on terms that the court considers proper.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). The purpose of Rule 41(a)(2) is “freely to allow voluntary dismissals unless the parties will be unfairly prejudiced.” Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir. 1986) (noting that absent “substantial prejudice” to the defendant, the plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice should be granted). This is particularly true when the plaintiff seeks voluntary dismissal with prejudice. See Bioxy, Inc. v. Birko Corp., 935 F.Supp. 737, 740 (E.D. N.C. 1996) (“[A] motion for voluntary dismissal with prejudice should be granted absent evidence of collusion, an imminent decision on the merits, or other extraordinary circumstances.”).
The Fourth Circuit has expressed that voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) is favored, see, e.g., Andes v. Versant Corp., 788 F.2d 1033, 1036 (4th Cir. 1986), and a plaintiff's motion to dismiss pursuant to this Rule “should not be denied absent substantial prejudice to the defendant,” Evans v. Milliken & Co., No. 7:13-cv-2908-GRA, 2013 WL 6780588, at *3 (D.S.C. Dec. 19, 2013). “As a general rule, a plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) should not be denied absent plain legal prejudice to the defendant.” Gross v. Spies, 133 F.3d 914 (Table), 1998 WL 8006, at *5 (4th Cir. 1998). When ruling on a motion for voluntary dismissal, the court should consider the following factors: “(1) the opposing party's effort and expense in preparing for trial; (2) excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant; (3) insufficient explanation of the need for dismissal; and (4) the present stage of the litigation.” Id. “These factors are not exclusive, however, and any other relevant factors should be considered by the district court depending on the circumstances of the case.” Id.
Here, the SHP Defendants advised the Court that Plaintiff voluntarily wishes to dismiss her claims against them, and Plaintiff consents to the dismissal of those claims. Applying the Gross factors, the undersigned finds no plain legal prejudice to the SHP Defendants or to the ACDC Defendants and concludes, for the reasons below, that the case should be dismissed without prejudice as to the SHP Defendants. See Tyler v. Coe, No. 9:23-cv-00270-MGL-MHC, 2023 WL 4603514, at *1 (D.S.C. June 13, 2023), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 4601936 (D.S.C. July 18, 2023).
To begin, the undersigned finds that the ACDC Defendants' two technical objections to the motion-that only a plaintiff can file such a motion and that such a dismissal can be sought only for an entire action-are without merit. First, although the statute's literal language provides the court may dismiss an action “at the plaintiff's request,” Rule 41(a)(2), the undersigned does not find that the language forbids counsel for a defendant with the consent of the plaintiff-as in the present case-to file a motion under the Rule. “While Rule 41(a)(2) speaks only in terms of a ‘plaintiff's request' for an order of dismissal, [Plaintiff's] joinder in the [SHP Defendants'] motion reasonably complies with this requirement.” Brown v. Erie Cnty., No. 1:20-cv-00251-SPB, 2023 WL 3026767, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 3, 2023), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2023 WL 3027431 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 20, 2023). Here, Plaintiff consents to dismissal of the action against the SHP Defendants and the motion bears the electronic signature of Plaintiff's counsel.
Second, “courts have . . . recognized that Rule 41(a) may be used to dismiss individual defendants in a multi-defendant case” and “plaintiffs seeking to dismiss all claims against specific defendants have been allowed to do so under Rule 41.” Ledford v. Bryson City Police Dep't, No. 1:20-cv-168-MR-WCM, 2021 WL 2982315, at *3 (W.D. N.C. Apr. 23, 2021) (collecting cases), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2021 WL 2525572 (W.D. N.C. June 21, 2021); see also Fagnant v. K-Mart Corp., No. 4:11-cv-00302-RBH, 2013 WL 6901907, at *2 (D.S.C. Dec. 31, 2013) (discussing the dismissal of individual defendants in a multiple defendant case under Rule 41).
The ACDC Defendants' remaining argument that dismissal is improper at this time because the terms of the settlement agreement between Plaintiff and the SHP Defendants have not been disclosed to the ACDC Defendants is also without merit. The Court is mindful that “details surrounding Plaintiff's settlements with the other parties may be relevant with regard to any possible setoff that [the ACDC Defendants] may be entitled to and thus may become discoverable.” Beuster v. Equifax Info. Servs., No. CV DKC 2005-2816, 2006 WL 8456998, at *3 (D. Md. Sept. 1, 2006). “[C]ourts have allowed non-settling parties to obtain settlement agreements between other litigants when such agreements relate to the issue of damages and the potential for a setoff.” Covil Corp. by & through Protopapas v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 544 F.Supp.3d 588, 598 (M.D. N.C. 2021); see also Pier View Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Johns Manville, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-00022-BHH, 2019 WL 13112011, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 15, 2019) (“There is no question or dispute that the Settlement Agreements are relevant to setoff.”).
Nevertheless, the non-disclosure of the terms of the settlement agreement at this time does not provide a basis for denying the Rule 41(a)(2) motion. The ACDC Defendants have not asked the Court to compel disclosure of the settlement agreements. If, at the appropriate time, disclosure of the terms of the settlement agreement becomes necessary, the dismissal of the SHP Defendants from this action will not impede such disclosure. Accordingly, the SHP Defendants' motion to dismiss should be granted.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
The ACDC Defendants' motion to strike (ECF No. 102) is GRANTED. Plaintiff's motion for leave to file supplemental response (ECF No. 103) is DENIED.
With respect to the pending dispositive motions, and based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that the ACDC Defendants' motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 81) be GRANTED, and that the SHP Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 83) also be GRANTED.