Opinion
Case No. 3:13-cv-33
11-25-2013
DONNA REYNOLDS, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
Judge Timothy S. Black
ORDER THAT: (1) THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING IS FOUND
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, AND AFFIRMED;
AND (2) THIS CASE IS CLOSED
This is a Social Security disability benefits appeal. At issue is whether the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred in finding the Plaintiff "not disabled" and therefore unentitled to disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and supplemental security income ("SSI"). (See Administrative Transcript ("PageID") (PageID 70-113) (ALJ's decision)).
I.
Plaintiff initially filed applications for DIB and SSI on May 20, 2008, which were denied. (PageID 119-120, 125-131). Plaintiff filed new applications on October 7, 2008. (PageID 227-246). She alleged a disability onset date of December 12, 2007, owing to back and leg pain, anxiety, shortness of breath, and sleep apnea. (PageID 240, 293). Her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. (PageID 121-124, 132-138, 143-147). Plaintiff requested a hearing which was held on August 23, 2011 before an ALJ. (PageID 93-113, 148-152). The ALJ denied the applications on September 23, 2011, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. (PageID 86). Specifically, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i), 223(d), and 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act and was not eligible for benefits. (Id.) The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (PageID 53-55). Plaintiff then commenced this action in federal court for review of the ALJ's final decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1883(c)(3).
Plaintiff was born on March 29, 1952. (PageID 240). She attended college for two years and was also trained in cosmetology. (PageID 298). Plaintiff's past relevant work consisted of cashier, light exertion and unskilled; assistant manager, light exertion and skilled; medical assistant, light exertion and skilled; school bus driver, medium exertion and semiskilled; supply clerk, heavy exertion and semiskilled; and referral clerk, sedentary exertion and semiskilled. (PageID 108). Plaintiff stopped working due to a confrontation with her employer caused by her emotional state. (PageID 293).
The ALJ's "Findings," which represent the rationale of her decision, were as follows:
1. The claimant meets the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act through December 31, 2012.(PageID 75-85).
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since December 12, 2007, the alleged onset date.
3. The claimant has the following severe impairments: mild lumbar degenerative disk disease and osteoarthritis; residuals of remote left pelvic fracture; obesity (20 CFR 404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
5. The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform the full range of light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b).
6. The claimant is capable of performing past relevant work as a cashier, assistant manager/manager trainee, medical assistant, school bus driver, and referral clerk. This work does not require performance of work-related activities precluded by the claimant's residual functional capacity (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from December 12, 2007, through the date of this decision (20 CFR 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f)).
On appeal, Plaintiff alleges that: (1) the ALJ erred in finding that Plaintiff did not have a severe mental impairment; and (2) the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician. (PageID 590). The Court will consider each allegation in turn.
II.
The Court's inquiry on appeal is to determine whether the ALJ's non-disability findings are supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). In performing this review, the Court considers the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ's denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found plaintiff disabled. As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
"The Commissioner's findings are not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion. The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a "zone of choice" within which the Commissioner may proceed without interference from the courts. If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing court must affirm."Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994).
The claimant bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). That is, she must present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that left her unable to perform any job in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
A.
The record reflects that:
On August 6, 2007, Plaintiff was diagnosed with obstructive sleep apnea syndrome and given CPAP therapy. (PageID 355). She also had "significant periodic leg movements." (PageID 357).
Sleep apnea is a type of sleep disorder characterized by pauses in breathing or instances of shallow or infrequent breathing during sleep.
Continuous positive airway pressure ("CPAP") is the use of continuous positive pressure to maintain a continuous level of positive airway pressure in a spontaneously breathing patient.
On September 28, 2007, Plaintiff's lumbar back x-ray revealed:
The lumbar spine is osteopenic and there is a spinal list toward the left. Sclerosis suggests some left-sided sacroliiitis. There is mild disc space narrowing with endplate lipping at the L3-L4 level and some mild narrowing is also suggested at the L5-S1 level. Lumbosacral facet joint arthropathy is present.(PageID 360).
Osteopenia is a condition where bone mineral density is lower than normal.
Sacroiliitis is an inflammation of the sacroiliac joint.
The lumbar vertebrae are the five vertebrae between the rib cage and the pelvis. They are designated L1 to L5, starting at the top.
Segmental spinal cord levels L5-S1 are responsible for plantar flexion of the foot and nexion of the toes.
An arthropathy is the disease of a joint.
On July 14, 2008, Dr. Richard Donini, a pain specialist, evaluated Plaintiff for back and shoulder pain. (PageID 362). Plaintiff had positive straight leg raising test bilaterally; right positive sacroiliac resisted-abduction test; moderate tenderness of L3, L4, and L5; reduced range of motion of thoracolumbar spine; diminished patellar reflexes bilaterally; and absent ankle clonus reflexes. (PageID 364). The diagnosis was thoracic or lumbosacral neuritis or radiculitis, lumbosacral sprain, and sprain of the sacrum. Lumbar epidural injections, physical therapy, medication, and low impact exercise were recommended. (PageID 365).
Sacroiliac joint dysfunction or incompetence generally refers to pain in the sacroiliac joint region that is caused by abnormal motion in the sacroiliac joint, either too much motion or too little motion. It typically results in inflammation of the sacroiliac joint, and can be debilitating.
Thoracic neuritis is a painful condition caused by nerve inflammation. Lumbosacral neuritis is the inflammation of the nerves in the lumbosacral, or low back.
Radiculitis is a nonspecific term used loosely to describe pain or numbness in the distribution of a single spinal nerve root, but without objective signs of neurologic dysfunction. Radiculitis is thought to occur from inflammation of nerve roots found within the lowest portion of nerves within the spine.
A lumbosacral sprain is a ligament injury in the lumbar or sacral areas (lower back).
The sacrum is a large, triangular bone at the base of the spine and at the upper and back part of the pelvic cavity, where it is inserted like a wedge between the two hip bones.
On July 22, 2008, at the request of the State agency, the record was reviewed by Dr. Gary Hinzman, a non-examining physician. He opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift/carry up to twenty pounds and frequently lift/carry up to ten pounds. Plaintiff could stand/walk for six hours out of eight and sit for six hours out of eight. (PageID 368). She was never to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She could occasionally balance, crouch, and crawl. (PageID 369). Dr. Hinzman found that her morbid obesity was a major factor. (PageID 372).
On July 29, 2008, Plaintiff was treated in the emergency room for complaints of left leg swelling and dyspnea on exertion. (PageID 376). Peripheral venous testing revealed "[r]ecanalized chronic deep venous thrombosis" on the left ventricular diastolic dysfunction. (PageID 485).
Dyspnea is the subjective symptom of breathlessness.
Deep venous thrombosis is the presence of coagulated blood, a thrombus, in one of the deep venous conduits that return blood to the heart.
From March 31, 2005, Plaintiff was treated at Striebel Family Practice. On March 20, 2006, duplex imaging of her lower extremities showed "persisting partially occluding chronic clot involving left Popliteal Vein ("POPV") but with adequate venous flow detected." (PageID 475). On August 28, 2007, Plaintiff underwent an echocardiogram which revealed "evidence of left ventricular diastolic dysfunction." (PageID 485). A September 5, 2007 cardiolite gated spect imaging testing revealed no ischemia. (PageID 474). Prior to her onset date, she was treated for hypertension, lumbago, thoracic or lumbosacral neuritis or radiculitis, sleep apnea, fatigue, and chest pain. (PageID 401-405, 407, 410-411, 414, 416, 418, 420, 422-423, 425-426). After her onset date, she was treated for hypothyroidism, hypertension, shortness of breath, muscle weakness, and lumbago. (PageID 426, 428, 430, 499). Plaintiff was also treated for chronic obstructive disease. (PageID 430). On exam, she had decreased breath and poor air movement. (PageID 431). She had pitting edema of the extremities. (PageID 431, 500). Plaintiff also had an apathy affect and labile mood. (PageID 431, 500). She could not afford treatment. (PageID 432).
The popliteal vein is located behind the knee. Its course runs alongside the popliteal artery, but carries the blood from the knee joint and muscles in the thigh and calf back to the heart.
Gated SPECT is a nuclear medicine imaging SPECT ("Single Photon Emission Computed Tomography") procedure where the ECG ("Electrocardiogram") guides the acquisition so that the resulting set of SPECT images shows the heart as it contracts over the interval from one R wave to the next.
Hypothyroidism is a state in which the thyroid gland does not produce enough of the thyroid hormones thyroxine ("T4") and triiodothyronine ("T3").
Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease is a lung disease defined by persistently poor airflow as a result of breakdown of lung tissue (known as emphysema) and dysfunction of the small airways.
On November 1, 2008, at the request of the State agency, psychologist Dr. Christopher Ward evaluated Plaintiff. Plaintiff related a history of being raised by an abusive family. She was married and had four adult children, one of whom was deceased. (PageID 491). She dropped out of school in the eleventh grade, but had earned her GED and obtained further education to be a medical assistant and cosmetologist. Plaintiff reported that she had no insurance and could not afford treatment for her physical impairments. She also gave a history of depression. (PageID 492). Dr. Ward observed that Plaintiff was depressed, her affect was flat, and her facial expression was downcast. Plaintiff had passive suicidal ideation, poor mood, crying spells, concentration problems, fatigue, low energy, and feelings of worthlessness and guilt. Her short term memory was below average. Her intelligence was thought to be in the low average range. (PageID 493). Plaintiff was thought to have cognitive problems resulting from an aneurism. (PageID 494). She had no friends and spent her days watching television and reading. She performed limited chores such as washing dishes from a seated position and carrying laundry. (Id.)
Dr. Ward diagnosed dysthymic disorder and cognitive disorder. Plaintiff's GAF score was 51. Plaintiff's ability to understand, remember, carry out simple instructions, and relate to co-workers and supervisors was moderately impaired. Her ability to deal with stress, maintain attention, concentration, persistence, and pace was markedly impaired. (PageID 495).
The Global Assessment of Functioning ("GAF") is a numeric scale (0 through 100) used by mental health clinicians and physicians to rate subjectively the social, occupational, and psychological functioning of adults, e.g., how well or adaptively one is meeting various problems-in-living. A score of 51 - 60 indicates moderate symptoms (e.g., flat affect and circumlocutory speech, occasional panic attacks) or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., few friends, conflicts with peers or co-workers).
On December 4, 2008, at the request of the State agency, Dr. Bonnie Katz, a non-examining psychologist, reviewed the record. (PageID 502). She opined that Plaintiff had a mild restriction of her daily activities, a moderate restriction in her social functioning, and a moderate restriction in her ability to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. (PageID 512). She was moderately limited in her ability to understand, remember, and carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual within customary tolerances; complete a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without unreasonable number and length of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general public; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors; get along with coworkers or peers without distracting them or exhibiting behavior extremes; and respond appropriately to changes in the work setting. (PageID 516-517).
Dr. Katz stated:
Clt can understand, remember, and carry out simple and somewhat complex tasks. Symptoms interfere with ability to sustain close consistent attention to detail. She can make simple decisions. She can relate to coworkers and supervisors and the public on a superficial and occasional basis only. Clt can deal with occasional changes in routine. Clt would require a calm, consistent setting with clear performance expectations and no fast-paced production demands.(PageID 519).
On January 18, 2009, at the request of the State agency, Dr. Esberdado Villanueva, a non-examining physician, reviewed the record. (PageID 527). He opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift/carry up to fifty pounds and frequently lift/carry twenty five pounds. She could stand/walk for six hours and sit for six hours. (PageID 521). She was never to climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She could occasionally climb ramps and stairs and she could frequently stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. (PageID 522). She was to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards such as machinery, heights, etc. (PageID 524). Dr. Villanueva relied upon a "thorough evaluation at the ER" as the basis for his findings. (PageID 522). Dr. Willa Caldwell, another non-examining physician, affirmed the assessment on September 17, 2009. (PageID 536).
On July 15, 2009, at the request of the State agency, Plaintiff was seen by Dr. Jerry Flexman, a psychologist, after she reported a worsening of her mental condition on reconsideration. (PageID 528-529). She reported that she did dishes, laundry, general cleaning, and straightening of the house a couple of times a week. She home schooled her granddaughter, used the computer, played cards, babysat her grandchildren, watched television, and socialized with family and friends. (PageID 530).
Dr. Flexman reported that Plaintiff was disheveled and her facial expressions were apprehensive. She was mildly pressed in her language and mildly anxious. He found that Plaintiff was moderately malingering. (PageID 531). However, he explained that "[i]nsight revealed that she was not able to acknowledge the presence of psychological issues in her life....She does not have a realistic degree of recognition for the amount that her impairment has on her ability to function." (PageID 532). Dr. Flexman diagnosed anxiety disorder NOS, depression NOS, and somatoform disorder NOS. Plaintiff's GAF score was 60. (Id.) Plaintiff's ability to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions was unimpaired. Her ability to make simple work-related decisions and her ability to sustain attention and concentration were mildly impaired. Her ability to deal with work stress, respond to changes in the work setting, and deal with the public and supervisors was moderately impaired. (PageID 533).
A somatoform disorder is a mental disorder characterized by symptoms that suggest physical illness or injury and symptoms that cannot be explained fully by a general medical condition or by the direct effect of a substance, and are not attributable to another mental disorder (e.g., panic disorder).
On August 18, 2009, at the request of the State agency, Dr. Patricia Semmelman, a non-examining psychologist, reviewed the record. She affirmed the previous RFC assessment. (PageID 535). On October 28, 2010, Plaintiff had lumbosacral spine x-rays taken. They revealed demineralization without compression, mild scoliosis, degenerative disc at L3-L4, and right facet arthropathy at L5-S1 on the right. X-rays also showed "[s]ome sclerosis SI joint on the left...." (PageID 537).
"Ordinary RFC is the individual's maximum remaining ability to do sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing basis, and the RFC assessment must include a discussion of the individual's abilities on that basis. A regular and continuing basis means 8 hours a day, for five days a week, or an equivalent work schedule." SSR 96-8p, 1996 SSR LEXIS 5.
Plaintiff had an arterial exam of her lower extremity on March 2, 2011. It indicated no arterial occlusive disease at rest. She was "unable to treadmill for exercise or tolerate pressures for reactive hyperemia." (PageID 538).
In July 2011, Plaintiff underwent an eye exam of pain and pressure in her eye. The diagnosis was third nerve palsy and episcleritis. (PageID 539-541).
Third nerve palsy describes a condition involving the third cranial nerve (also called the oculomotor nerve), which is responsible for innervating some of the muscles responsible for eye movement.
Episcleritis is a benign, self-limiting inflammatory disease affecting part of the eye called the episclera. The episclera is a thin layer of tissue that lies between the conjunctiva and the connective tissue layer that forms the white of the eye (sclera). Episcleritis is a common condition, and is characterized by the abrupt onset of mild eye pain and redness.
On August 22, 2011, Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Susan Franer, completed an RFC assessment form. She opined that Plaintiff could occasionally lift/carry twenty pounds and frequently lift/carry up ten pounds. She could stand/walk for four hours out of eight and one half an hour without interruptions. She could sit for six hours out of eight and uninterrupted for one hour. She was limited by her degenerative disc disease as shown by x-rays. (PageID 543-544). Plaintiff was morbidly obese and had venous insufficiency. She was never to climb, stoop, crouch, kneel, or crawl. She could occasionally balance. (PageID 544). Plaintiff was limited in her ability to push/pull and was limited from heights and vibrations. (PageID 544-545). Dr. Franer opined that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work. (PageID 546). Dr. Franer's treatment notes show that she treated Plaintiff from September 19, 2010 through July 7, 2011. Plaitiff was seen for venous insufficiency, hypertension, and thyroid problems. (PageID 557, 561-562, 565, 569-575, 578-579). She had pedal edema on exam. (PageID 559, 562, 578). Plaintiff was first seen for back pain on October 25, 2010. She had weakness, straight leg raising test, edema, and tenderness. (PageID 559, 565, 568). On May 23, 2011, Plaintiff was crying and seen for depression. (PageID 555). She was observed to have a flat effect on June 7, 2011 and on July 7, 2011. (PageID 548, 552).
Pedal edema is an abnormal accumulation of fluid in the interstitium, which are locations beneath the skin or in one or more cavities of the ankles and feet. It is clinically referred to as swelling.
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B.
First, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in finding that she did not have a severe mental impairment.
The record shows, however, that the ALJ considered Plaintiff's mental impairment. (PageID 76-77). After reviewing the record, the ALJ concluded that "[t]he claimant's mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not cause more than minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to perform basic mental work activities and are therefore nonsevere." (Id.) The ALJ considered Plaintiff's daily activities and medical records in determining that Plaintiff was mildly restricted in her daily living activities, and had mild difficulties in maintaining social functioning and concentration. (Id.) See Heston v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 245 F.3d 528, 536 (6th Cir. 2001) ("The ALJ could properly determine that her subjective complaints were not credible in light of her ability to perform other tasks."). The ALJ found that "[t]he claimant has provided inconsistent reports to different contacts, she has had no formal mental health treatment, mental status findings have been relatively normal, and her daily activities are inconsistent with a 'severe' mental impairment." (PageID 77). Plaintiff's ability to participate in and perform daily activities undermined her claims of a severe mental impairment. (PageID 78).
Specifically, the ALJ noted that "[a]lthough the claimant stated that she was in therapy for only three months before her therapist left, this is not substantiated in the record." (PageID 78). Additionally,"[t]he claimant stated on October 15, 2008, that she was only 'a little forgetful at times' and could remember what she read [PageID 300], but only a few days later, on November 1, 2008, she told consultative psychologist Dr. Ward that she had significant memory problems and difficulty reading [PageID 491, 494]." (PageID 79). Further, "[t]he claimant told Dr. Ward on November 1, 2008, that she had a history of, but no current, suicidal ideation [PageID 493], but she told a DDS interviewer on June 29, 2009, that she had suicidal thoughts [PageID 337]. Moreover, she told Dr. Flexman less than one month later, on July 18, 2009, that she had no history of suicidal ideation [PageID 531]." (PageID 79). Finally, "[t]he claimant also stated on June 26, 2009, that she did not want to leave the house or 'do anything' [PageID 337]; however, as noted above, she told Dr. Flexman on July 18, 2009, that she enjoyed attending her grandchildren's activities, home schooling, visiting and talking with her family, talking on the phone with friends, babysitting her grandchildren, and eating out [PageID 530]." (PageID 79).
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff received unemployment benefits. This supported the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff had "only mild mental limitations" because "she was certified ready, willing, and able to work." (PageID 79). See Workman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 105 F. App'x 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Applications for unemployment and disability benefits are inherently inconsistent.").
Additionally, the medical records did not indicate any severe mental impairment. The evidence presented by Drs. Ward and Flexman supports the ALJ's finding. While Dr. Ward indicated that Plaintiff had a depressed mood, he also noted that she "had adequate energy during the evaluation." (PageID 494). Specifically, Plaintiff's speech was normal, she was not confused, she possessed sufficient insight and judgment to make decisions, and she did not demonstrate any evidence of anxiety. (PageID 491-495). Moreover, Dr. Flexman opined that Plaintiff was only impaired in her ability to interact with others and to tolerate work stress and changes. Generally, he reported a normal mental status, finding that Plaintiff possessed the ability to manage daily activities and make reasonable life decisions. (PageID 529-533). While, Plaintiff reported that her primary care physician diagnosed depression in May 2011, she was not receiving treatment or taking any medications for her mental symptoms. (PageID 337, 348).
After considering the evidence presented, the ALJ correctly determined that Plaintiff has a mild mental impairment. Therefore, the ALJ properly found that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
C.
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in rejecting the opinion of Dr. Franer, her treating physician. (PageID 337). Treating source opinions may receive controlling weight in certain circumstances unless it is considered an "error to give an opinion controlling weight simply because it is the opinion of a treating source." Soc. Sec. Rul. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *2. Treating source opinions have to be well-supported and consistent with the record as a whole. Warner v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004) ("Treating physicians' opinions are only given such deference when supported by objective medical evidence.").
Dr. Franer's opinion, in this case, is constant with the ALJ's findings. The ALJ did not reject Dr. Franer's opinion, rather the ALJ did not give controlling weight to the evidence presented by Dr. Franer that was inconsistent with the substantial evidence in the case record. (PageID 82,84).
Dr. Franer did not start treating Plaintiff until September 2010, nearly three years after her alleged disability onset date and two years after the filling of her applications for SSI and DIB. (PageID 557, 561-562, 565, 569-575, 578-579). On January 19, 2010 and July 6, 2010, Dr. Franer found no physical abnormalities during Plaintiff's physical examinations. (PageID 547-584). In November 2010, Dr. Franer documented tenderness at L4-5 and L5-S1, but on April 28, 2011, Plaintiff told Dr. Franer that prescribed medicine was helping with "back pain." (Id.) All subsequent physical examinations were normal. (Id.)
The Sixth Circuit notes that when "the record is replete with inconsistent medical reports..., we acknowledge the discretion vested in the ALJ to weigh all the evidence." Bradley v. Sec'y of HHS, 862 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1988). Here, the ALJ considered all medical reports and inconsistencies, and found that the medical records showed only mild abnormalities. (PageID 82,367,537). Accordingly, the record supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's impairment was not as severe as alleged.
The Court's duty on appeal is not to re-weigh the evidence, but to determine whether the decision below is supported by substantial evidence. Raisor v. Schweiker, 540 F.Supp. 686 (S.D. Ohio 1982). The Commissioner's decision in this case is supported by such evidence. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff's assignments of error are unavailing.
III.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:
The decision of the Commissioner, that Donna Reynolds was not entitled to disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income is found SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and AFFIRMED; and, as no further matters remain pending for the Court's review, this case is CLOSED.
___________________
Timothy S. Black
United States District Judge