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denying motion for summary judgment because movant had not submitted a statement of material facts
Summary of this case from BSSI v. TRAVELERS CASUALTY SURETY CO. OF AMEROpinion
CASE NUMBER 02 C 1012
October 3, 2003
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff's Kenneth and Cynthia Reynolds sued Defendants Claridge Hotel, Inc. OCT 06 2003 ("Claridge"), and Hopkins Illinois Elevator Co. ("Hopkins") because of an elevator door that shut on Mr. Reynolds's arm. Plaintiff's accuse Defendants of negligence and seek damages for Mr. Reynolds's injuries and Mrs. Reynolds's loss of consortium. Hopkins and Claridge also seek contribution from each other with respect to Plaintiff's' claims.
Hopkins and Claridge filed motions seeking summary judgment on both counts of Plaintiff's' complaint, and Claridge seeks summary judgment on Hopkins's counterclaim. For the reasons discussed below, Defendants' summary judgment motions are denied.
LEGAL STANDARDS
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 So. Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court's function is "not to weigh the evidence but merely to determine if `there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Jackson v. Illinois Medi-Car, Inc., 300 F.3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). A genuine issue of material fact exists only if a "fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [non-moving party] on the evidence presented." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. In assessing whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the Court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable and justifiable inferences in favor of that party. See id. at 255. However, neither "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties," id. at 247, nor the existence of "some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), is sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See also Skorup v. Modern Door Corp., 153 F.3d 512, 514 (7th Cir. 1998).
I, Hopkins's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff's
Hopkins's attorneys have simplified this Court's task by completely ignoring the requirements of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Local Rule 56.1(a)(3) requires a party moving for summary judgment under Rule 56 to serve and file a "statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue and that entitle the moving party to a judgment as a matter of law." Further, the Local Rules warn that "[f]ailure to submit such a statement constitutes grounds for denial of the motion." Noting Hopkins's failure to submit a Rule 56.1(a)(3) statement of fact, and acknowledging that "judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried" in the record, this Court denies Hopkins's motion for summary judgment against Plaintiff's. United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 1991),
II. Claridge's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff's
Unlike Hopkins, Defendant Claridge filed a Rule 56.1 statement of fact. Claridge, however, also glosses over several of the requirements of Rule 56.1. Although Claridge's statement does not consist of "short numbered paragraphs," it does exist, and it provides specific references to supporting materials. For this reason, the Court will consider Claridge's motion and statements of fact.
Plaintiff's concede paragraphs 1-6 of Claridge's statement of facts. The remainder of Claridge's asserted facts are under the heading "The Deposition Testimony" and three attached exhibits. Plaintiff's concede all of the facts asserted by Claridge under the heading of "The Deposition Testimony," pointing the Court to its statement of additional facts as rebuttal. Additionally, Plaintiff's concede that the exhibits attached to Claridge's statement contain undisputed facts with the exception of paragraph three of Michael Wathen's affidavit. Claridge has not contested any of the facts set forth in Plaintiff's' Designation of Additional Facts. This Court will therefore consider all of the facts contained therein to be admitted by Claridge. Local R. 56.1(a)(3).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts of this case for the purpose of deciding this motion are as follows. On January 30, 2001, Plaintiff Kenneth Reynolds attempted to board the east elevator in the lobby of Defendant's hotel. (R. 44-1, PL's Designation of Additional Facts Requiring Denial of Summ. J. ¶ 23.) Although the elevator door was closing, Plaintiff inserted his right arm into the elevator. (Id.) Instead of opening when Plaintiff inserted his arm, the door of the elevator continued to close. (Id.) When Plaintiff was unable to stop the closing of the door with his elbow, his right arm was pinned in the elevator door. (Id.) After the door closed on his arm, Plaintiff was able to remove it from the door by grasping his right forearm and pulling with his left hand. (Id.) As a result of his encounter with the elevator door, Plaintiff sustained injuries including a bruised and swollen forearm, but refused medical assistance offered by Claridge employees. (Id. ¶ 25; R. 37-1, Claridge's Statement of Facts ¶ 10.)The elevator at issue is one of two elevators in Claridge's hotel. (R. 44-1, PL's Designation of Additional Facts Requiring Denial of Summ. J. ¶ 1.) Claridge and Hopkins are parties to a Maintenance and Service Contract under which Hopkins agreed to examine and maintain the elevators on a monthly basis. (Id. ¶ 2; R. 37-1, Claridge's Statement of Facts ¶ 5, Ex. A.) Plaintiff's presented unrebutted evidence that such monthly service contracts are less effective than weekly contracts in terms of identifying and correcting problems with elevators. (R. 44-1, PL's Designation of Additional Facts Requiring Denial of Summ. J. ¶ 4.) Under the contract, Hopkins may recommend that certain repairs be made, but final decisions reside with Claridge. (Id. ¶ 2.) The personnel at the Claridge Hotel have not undergone any elevator training. (Id. ¶ 6.)
In 1998, Hopkins performed a "changeover" on the elevators in the Claridge Hotel, replacing the old controls with new controls. (R. 37-1, Claridge's Statement of Facts ¶ 7). On May 22, 2000, Hopkins submitted a proposal to install new operators for each of Claridge's hotel elevators. (R. 44-1, PL's Designation of Additional Facts Requiring Denial of Summ. J. ¶ 7.) Eight months later, days before Mr. Reynolds's injury, Hopkins installed only one new operator — in the elevator that is not at issue in this case. (Id.) Additionally, the parties dispute whether door detector edges had been installed in either elevator as a result of a 1999 proposal by Hopkins. (Id. ¶ 8.) It is undisputed, however, that during the months preceding Mr. Reynolds's accident, the east elevator was "not running, stuck, or was down" several times. (Id. ¶ 10-19.)
ANALYSIS
In this case, Claridge argues that it had either no duty or little duty to Plaintiff's for the following reasons: (1) Claridge's contract with Hopkins nullifies its duty of care to the Plaintiff's; and (2) Claridge had neither actual nor constructive notice of the dangerous condition of the elevator. With respect to both of these arguments, Claridge has failed to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
First, there is room for a hotel owner's negligence even where the owner has contracted with a vendor to maintain and service its elevators. The simple existence of its contract with Hopkins does not insulate Claridge from all elevator-related liability. Stewart v. Beegun, 126 Ill. App.2d 120, 261 N.E.2d 491 (1970); Koenig v. 399 Corp., 97 Ill. App.2d 345, 240 N.E.2d 164 (1968). Plaintiff's have brought forth evidence that Claridge opted for a monthly service contract when a weekly contract would have been more effective, (R. 44-1, PL's Designation of Additional Facts Requiring Denial of Summ. J. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff's also presented evidence that Claridge ignored Hopkins's maintenance recommendations. (Id. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff's have, therefore, created a genuine issue of fact as to Claridge's negligence despite the existence of Claridge's contract with Hopkins.
Second, Claridge argues that it had no notice of the dangerous condition of the elevator. More specifically, Claridge argues that it owes no heightened duty of care to its guests, and as a result, may escape liability if it can show that there was no actual or constructive notice of the danger. Without reaching the issue of heightened duty of common carriers, the Court finds that Plaintiff's have created an issue of material fact as to whether Claridge knew or should have known of a dangerous condition within its elevators. Plaintiff's have not only presented evidence of several recent malfunctions in the elevator in question, but they have also called into question the frequency with which Claridge had its elevators inspected and serviced. These asserted facts create a genuine question as to whether Claridge knew or should have known of a dangerous condition in its elevators.
Because a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for Plaintiff's on the evidence presented, Claridge's motion for summary judgment is denied with respect to Plaintiff's.
III, Claridge's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Hopkins
Claridge did not file a separate 56.1 statement of fact in connection with its motion for summary judgment against Hopkins. This Court will therefore use the undisputed facts above for the purposes of this motion as well. Claridge argues that it is free from liability for Mr. Reynolds's injury by virtue of the contract that it signed with Hopkins. As discussed above, the contract does not provide a complete barrier to Claridge. When viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hopkins, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Claridge's negligence despite the existence of the service and maintenance contract. Similarly, as discussed above, Claridge's notice arguments are insufficient to prevail at summary judgment. Claridge's motion is therefore denied with respect to Hopkins.