Opinion
No. COA10-627
Filed 5 July 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendants from order entered 9 March 2010 by Judge Ben F. Tennille in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 October 2010.
Poyner Spruill LLP, by Cynthia L. Van Horne and E. Fitzgerald Parnell, III, for defendants Clements Walker, PLLC, F. Rhett Brockington, Greg N. Clements, and Christopher L. Bernard. James, McElroy Diehl, P.A., by Edward T. Hinson, Jr. and John S. Arrowood, for defendant Ralph H. Dougherty. Harrington Cipriani LLP, by James M. Harrington and Glen A. Cipriani, for plaintiff Revolutionary Concepts, Inc.
Mecklenburg County No. 08 CVS 4333.
Defendants appeal from an order entered by the trial court denying their motions to dismiss the complaint filed by Plaintiffs for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Defendants contend that the trial court erred by refusing to find that Plaintiffs' claims involved substantial questions of federal patent law and were, for that reason, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. After careful consideration of Defendants' challenge to the trial court's order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that Defendants have appealed from an unappealable interlocutory order, that their alternative petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari should be denied, and that their appeal should, for that reason, be dismissed.
I. Factual Background
On 29 February 2008, Plaintiffs Revolutionary Concepts, Inc., and Ronald Carter, filed a complaint in Mecklenburg County Superior Court asserting claims against Defendants Clements Walker PLLC; F. Rhett Brockington; Ralph H. Dougherty; Greg N. Clements; and Christopher L. Bernard, sounding in professional negligence by a patent agent, professional negligence by an attorney, failure to supervise a non-attorney employee, misappropriation of funds, and breach of contract. Plaintiffs alleged that they retained Defendant Clements Walker PLLC, to represent them in, advise them about, and guide them through the processes required in order to gain patent protection for a technology known as the Automated Audio Video Messaging and Answering System or the Digital Video Messaging System. As part of this process, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants were required to file an international patent application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office pursuant to the Patent Cooperation Treaty. A filing of this nature is necessary in order for an applicant to obtain patent protection in numerous foreign countries. Prior to filing the required international application, however, Defendants withdrew a request that Plaintiffs' domestic patent application not be published, causing the application to be made publicly available. According to Plaintiffs, Defendants' failure to file the international application prior to publication of the domestic application precluded Plaintiffs from satisfying the "absolute public novelty" requirement necessary for a successful patent application in many foreign countries, including those of the greatest economic interest to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants' error precluded them from patenting the invention in the most important foreign jurisdictions.
Ronald Carter is a founder and owner of Revolutionary Concepts, Inc.
On 3 March 2008, the case was designated as a mandatory complex business case and assigned to the North Carolina Business Court.
Although Plaintiffs' claims for relief stemmed from the conduct of Defendant F. Rhett Brockington, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants Clements Walker PLLC; Ralph H. Dougherty; Greg N. Clements; and Christopher L. Bernard were vicariously liable for Defendant F. Rhett Brockington's negligence.
On 15 and 16 May 2008, Defendants filed answers, motions to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and motions to dismiss Plaintiff Ronald Carter's claims for lack of standing. On 9 June 2009, Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their breach of contract claim. After receiving briefs and hearing arguments concerning the merits of Defendants' dismissal motions, the trial court entered an order on 9 March 2010 (1) denying Defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and (2) granting Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff Ronald Carter's claims for lack of standing given that his rights to the underlying technology had been assigned to Plaintiff Revolutionary Concepts. On 7 April 2010, Defendants noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's decision to deny their motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On 13 July 2010, Defendants filed a petition for writ of certiorari in which they sought review of their challenges to the trial court's order pursuant to N.C.R. App. P. 21 on a discretionary basis in the event that this Court concluded that their appeal had been taken from an unappealable interlocutory order.
II. Legal Analysis
On appeal, Defendants argue that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss Plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In essence, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), which provides as follows:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety protection and copyright cases.
However, we need not finally decide the merits of Defendants' challenge to the trial court's order because Defendants' appeal has been taken from an unappealable interlocutory order, effectively depriving this Court of jurisdiction over Defendants' appeal, and because we conclude, in the exercise of our discretion, that Defendants' certiorari petition should be denied.
A. General Principles Governing Appeals from Interlocutory Orders
The order from which Defendants have sought relief on appeal was "made during the pendency of [the] action[,]" "[does] not dispose of the case," and assumes the necessity for "further action by the trial court . . . to settle and determine the entire controversy," Carriker v. Carriker, 350 N.C. 71, 73, 511 S.E.2d 2, 4 (1999) (citing Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 361, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)), rendering it interlocutory in nature. As a general proposition, interlocutory orders are not subject to immediate appellate review. Steele v. Hauling Co., 260 N.C. 486, 491, 133 S.E.2d 197, 201 (1963) (citing Perkins v. Sykes, 231 N.C. 488, 490, 57 S.E.2d 645, 646 (1950)); Goldston v. American Motors Corp., 326 N.C. 723, 725, 392 S.E.2d 735, 736 (1990). The rule precluding immediate appellate review of interlocutory orders is intended "to prevent fragmentary and premature appeals that unnecessarily delay the administration of justice and to ensure that the trial divisions fully and finally dispose of the case before an appeal can be heard," Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 209, 270 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1980) (citations omitted), and is predicated on the understanding that "[t]here is no more effective way to procrastinate the administration of justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from intermediate orders." Veazey, 231 N.C. at 363, 57 S.E.2d at 382. However, immediate appellate review of interlocutory orders is available in a number of circumstances, including instances in which the interlocutory order addresses the extent to which the trial court has "jurisdiction over the person" under the "minimum contacts" doctrine pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b), Love v. Moore, 305 N.C. 575, 581, 291 S.E.2d 141, 146 (1982), or the interlocutory order "affects a substantial right" pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 277(a) and 7A-27(d)(1). Sharpe v. Worland, 351 N.C. 159, 162, 522 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1999).
B. Specific Bases for Appeal 1. Jurisdiction
On appeal, Defendants contend that they are entitled to immediate appellate review of the trial court's order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b), which provides that "[a]ny interested party shall have the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant[.]" However, while "[N.C. Gen. Stat. § ] 1-277(b) provides that [an] appeal [may] lie from denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, t[he statute] does not apply [equally] to the denial of a motion challenging subject matter jurisdiction." Duke University v. Bryant-Durham Electric Co., 66 N.C. App. 726, 727, 311 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1984) (citing Shaver v. N.C. Monroe Construction Co., 54 N.C. App. 486, 487, 283 S.E.2d 526, 527 (1981)). Thus, Defendants' argument to the contrary notwithstanding, the trial court's order denying Defendants' "motion[s] to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is interlocutory and not immediately appealable" pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b). Id. (citing Shaver, 54 N.C. App. at 487, 283 S.E.2d at 527.
In their brief, Defendants argue that we have jurisdiction over their appeal from the trial court's order under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b) in reliance on North Carolina Railway Company v. City of Charlotte, 112 N.C. App. 762, 437 S.E.2d 393 (1993), disc. review denied, 336 N.C. 608, 447 S.E.2d 397 (1994), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1130, 132 L. Ed. 2d 808, 115 S. Ct. 2554 (1995), which Defendants describe as holding that exclusive jurisdiction claims such as those presented here are immediately appealable pursuant to N.C Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b). A careful review of our opinion in North Carolina Railway establishes, however, that the appealing party argued in that case that this Court had jurisdiction over its interlocutory appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b) because "the trial court improperly assumed jurisdiction over [its] property[.]" North Carolina Railway, 112 N.C. App. at 768, 437 S.E.2d at 395. As a result of the fact that Defendants have not claimed that any of their property has been subjected to state court jurisdiction in violation of provisions of federal law providing for exclusive federal court jurisdiction, we do not believe that our decision in North Carolina Railway supports an assertion of jurisdiction over Defendants' appeal pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(b).
2. Substantial Right
Secondly, Defendants argue that the trial court's decision to deny their dismissal motions is immediately appealable because it affects a substantial right. We disagree.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d)(1), a party may appeal from an interlocutory order which "[a]ffects a substantial right[.]" See also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277(a) (providing that "[a]n appeal may be taken from every judicial order or determination of a judge of a superior or district court, upon or involving a matter of law or legal inference . . . which affects a substantial right"). "The `substantial right' test for appealability is more easily stated than applied." Bailey, 301 N.C. at 210, 270 S.E.2d at 434. An interlocutory order affects a substantial right for purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d) in the event that it "deprive[s] the appealing party of a substantial right which will be lost if the order is not reviewed before a final judgment is entered." Cook v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 329 N.C. 488, 491, 406 S.E.2d 848, 850 (1991) (citing Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240 S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978)). "Essentially[,] a two-part test has developed — the right itself must be substantial and the deprivation of that substantial right must potentially work injury . . . if not corrected before appeal from final judgment." Goldston, 326 N.C. at 726, 392 S.E.2d at 736. A "substantial right" is "`a legal right affecting or involving a matter of substance as distinguished from matters of form[;] a right materially affecting those interests which a [litigant] is entitled to have preserved and protected by law[;] a material right." Oestreicher v. Stores., 290 N.C. 118, 130, 225 S.E.2d 797, 805 1976) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1971)). "Whether an interlocutory ruling affects a substantial right requires consideration of `the particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which appeal is sought was entered.'" Dep't of Transp. v. Rowe, 351 N.C. 172, 175, 521 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1999) (quoting Waters, 294 N.C. at 208, 240 S.E.2d at 343).
a. Exclusive Federal Patent Jurisdiction
In seeking to persuade us to allow an immediate appeal from the trial court's order, Defendants rely on a claimed "substantial right" (1) "to have any civil action in which Plaintiffs' right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law heard in the federal courts" and (2) to avoid the inconsistent verdicts which they claim will result absent immediate review by this Court of the trial court's order. We do not find either argument persuasive.
As part of their effort to establish that the trial court's order affects their substantial right to have all civil actions involving substantial questions of federal patent law heard and decided in the federal courts, Defendants place principal reliance on Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811, 108 S. Ct. 2166 (1988). In Christianson, the United States Supreme Court delineated which cases "arise[] under" a federal patent statute for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), explaining that "only [] those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the well-pleaded claims[,]" come within the scope of the statutory provision upon which Defendants rely. Christianson, 486 U.S. at 807, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 824-25, 108 S. Ct. at 2173-74 (citation omitted. "Under the well-pleaded complaint rule . . . whether a claim `arises under' federal patent law `must be determined from what necessarily appears in the plaintiff's statement of his own claim . . . [,] unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose[,]'" so that "a case raising a federal patent-law defense does not, for that reason alone, `arise under' patent law, `even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.'" Id. at 809, 100 L. Ed. 2d at 825-26, 108 S. Ct. at 2174 (quoting Franchise Tax Board of California v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10, 77 L. Ed. 2d 420, 431, 103 S. Ct. 2841, 2846-47 (1983)). Although Defendants concede that "malpractice and breach of contract claims are created by state law" rather than federal patent law, they argue that Plaintiffs' claims are subject to the exclusive patent jurisdiction of the federal courts because "patent law is a necessary element of [Plaintiffs' state law] claims under the circumstances of this case."
Although Defendants assert that such a right exists and that it is substantial for purposes of determining the appealability of the trial court's order pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d), they have not cited any authority tending to show that the entry of an order asserting state court jurisdiction over an area committed to the exclusive control of the federal courts affects a "substantial right" as that concept is utilized in our appealability cases. We need not decide whether such an order would affect a "substantial right," however, since we are not persuaded of the validity of Defendants' claim that this case is, in fact, subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.
In light of Plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of their breach of contract claim, the only remaining claims pending before the trial court in this case concern whether or not Defendants' actions during their representation of Plaintiffs constituted actionable professional negligence. In order to prevail "[i]n a legal malpractice case, a plaintiff is required to prove that he would not have suffered the harm alleged absent the negligence of his attorney." Hummer v. Pulley, Watson, King Lischer, P.A., 157 N.C. App. 60, 66, 577 S.E.2d 918, 923 (citing Rorrer v. Cooke, 313 N.C. 338, 361, 329 S.E.2d 355, 369 (1985)), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 459, 585 S.E.2d 758 (2003) . As a result, in order for Plaintiffs to obtain a recovery from Defendants on the basis of alleged professional negligence, Plaintiffs must establish that they had a right to obtain the various foreign patents which was lost and that they lost the ability to obtain these patents as a result of Defendants' negligence.
In their brief, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs could not defeat the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts over substantial issues of patent law by voluntarily dismissing their breach of contract claim on the grounds that "[t]he existence of federal jurisdiction ordinarily depends on the facts as they exist when the complaint is filed[,]" Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 830, 104 L. Ed. 2d 893, 900, 109 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (1989), and that, once it has been determined that federal jurisdiction exists, such jurisdiction "cannot be ousted by subsequent events, including action by the parties." F. Alderete General Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 715 F.2d 1476, 1480 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). However, Defendants have not cited any authority tending to show that this principle applies to the specific issue we have before us, which involves whether claims of exclusive federal jurisdiction over actions initiated in the state courts must be decided on the basis of the action as filed rather than the action as it appears to the trial court at the time that the necessary jurisdictional determination must be made. As Plaintiffs point out in their brief, the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction while the General Court of Justice is a court of general jurisdiction. Morse v. Curtis, 276 N.C. 371, 375, 172 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1970) (stating that the "Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction"). In view of the fact that establishing the existence of federal jurisdiction is a necessary preliminary step in any federal civil case, it is understandably critical for a determination of whether a particular case is subject to federal jurisdiction to be made at an early stage in the litigation process. Since subject matter jurisdiction is presumed in the state courts until the contrary is shown, Jackson, Long, Johnson, Evans, Swann v. Bobbitt, 253 N.C. 670, 673, 117 S.E.2d 806, 808 (1961) (referring to "the prima facie presumption of [] jurisdiction"); Morgan v. Bank, 93 N.C. 307, 311 (1885) (stating that "the State Superior Courts possess general jurisdiction, and will be interrupted in a particular case only when in apt time the objection is brought forward and passed on"), aff'd, 132 U.S. 141, 33 L. Ed. 282, 10 S. Ct. 37 (1889), we believe that the adoption of the rule upon which Defendants rely for purposes of determining whether the jurisdiction of the state courts is ousted by provisions of federal law would be inconsistent with North Carolina's fundamental approach to the resolution of subject matter jurisdiction questions. Thus, we are not persuaded that the trial court erred by recognizing the voluntary dismissal of Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim and deciding the issues raised by Defendants' dismissal motion by focusing solely on Plaintiffs' non-contract claims.
According to Defendants, Plaintiffs cannot prevail in their professional negligence action against Defendants without proving that they have standing to seek relief from Defendants and that Plaintiffs cannot establish the necessary standing without proving that Plaintiff Ronald Carter invented the technology for which Plaintiffs sought patent protection. In addition, Defendants claim that determining the identity of the persons who invented the technology in question will require resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law that is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. We are not persuaded by this logic, however, since the extent to which one is considered an inventor for purposes of foreign patent law must be determined by reference to the law of the particular country in which patent protection is sought rather than by reference to federal law. Thus, despite the fact that "inventorship" might well be a critical issue in this litigation, we do not believe that the "inventorship" determination for purposes of this case involves a question of federal, as compared to foreign, patent law.
Moreover, in order to successfully prosecute their professional negligence action against Defendants, Plaintiffs will need to establish that, in the absence of Defendants' negligence, they would have obtained a collectible judgment in their favor. Rorrer, 313 N.C. at 361, 329 S.E.2d at 369. In their brief before this Court, Defendants cite numerous cases establishing that, when a plaintiff's ability to prove his or her right to recover hinges upon federal patent law, the case is subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction. We have no quarrel with the fundamental proposition expounded in those cases, which seems to be generally accepted around the country. However, we believe that Defendants' argument is not persuasive in light of the nature of Plaintiffs' claims, since Plaintiffs assert that, but for Defendants' negligence, the invention would have benefitted from foreign, not domestic, patent protection.
In Davis v. Brouse McDowell, L.P.A., 596 F.3d 1355, cert denied, 178 L. Ed. 2d 32, 131 S. Ct. 118 (2010), which most closely resembles the facts of this case of all the cases that have been cited for our consideration by either party, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit addressed a professional negligence claim in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendant acted in a negligent manner by "failing to timely file the [foreign patent] applications [and] by `other omissions'" stemming from the preparation and filing of a domestic patent application. Id. at 1359.
On the one hand, [plaintiff] alleges that Mr. Thomson committed malpractice simply by failing to file the [foreign patent] applications on or before January 22, 2009. Additionally, however, she alleges that Mr. Thomson committed malpractice by performing various acts of negligence in connection with the preparation and filing of the U.S. applications — for example, she asserts that Mr. Thomson drafted inadequate claims; failed to include information sufficient to comply with the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, P 1; and failed to apply any of his own legal expertise to synthesize the descriptive materials she provided into a cohesive specification. Therefore, [plaintiff's] complaint presents at least two distinct claims: one relating to Mr. Thomson's preparation and filing of the U.S. applications and one relating to his failure to timely file the [foreign patent] applications.
Id. at 1360. After stating that "[plaintiff's] allegations relating to the [foreign patent] applications d[id] not raise any issue of U.S. patent law[,]" Id., the Federal Circuit pointed out that other portions of the plaintiff's claim rested on allegations that her attorney had negligently prepared and filed domestic patent applications and that she could only prevail on her claim stemming from the allegedly negligent preparation and filing of these domestic patent applications "by proving that U.S. patents would have issued on her applications but for Defendants' malpractice — i.e., that her inventions were patentable under U.S. law." Id. As a result, the Davis Court held that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the case because the plaintiff's claim arising from the allegedly negligent preparation and filing of the domestic patent applications was subject to federal patent jurisdiction.
The situation before the Federal Circuit in Davis differs from the one before us in this case in that Plaintiffs' claims relate exclusively to Defendants' handling of their foreign patent applications and do not rest on an alleged failure on the part of Defendants to successfully perfect a domestic patent application. As a result, the claims that Plaintiffs have asserted against Defendants, like the claim asserted in Davis arising from the loss of foreign patent rights, "do not raise any issue of U.S. patent law [, ]" Id., and [are] not subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts.
In seeking to persuade us that the successful prosecution of Plaintiffs' professional negligence claim does, in fact, involve substantial issues of federal patent law, Defendants argue that, even though Plaintiffs' claim stems from an alleged inability to obtain foreign patent protection for the technology, Defendants' liability cannot be established without resolving various ancillary questions of federal patent law. For example, Defendants argue that the scope of the permit under federal patent law must be addressed in order to properly adjudicate Plaintiffs' claim since the proposed foreign patent was intended to have the same scope as the federal patent. However, nothing in the present record tends to show that there is any substantial question about the scope of Plaintiffs' rights under the federal patent, making this essentially a question of fact rather than a question of law. Similarly, Defendants argue that successful prosecution of Plaintiffs' claim requires a determination of whether a proper non-publication request could have been filed pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2)(B)(i) and whether Plaintiffs or any other party had taken any action that would, under 35 U.S.C. § 102, have destroyed the "absolute public novelty" of the invention. However, given that 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(2) simply provided the mechanism by which the invention was published, since other forms of publication would appear to have had the effect of eliminating the required "absolute public novelty" as well, and since the extent to which any party took any other action pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 102 that would have had the effect of eliminating the "absolute public novelty" of the invention strikes us as a question of fact rather than a question of law, we do not find these arguments persuasive either. Thus, we are simply not persuaded that there are substantial questions arising under federal patent law that must be resolved in order to adjudicate Plaintiffs professional negligence claim.
At bottom, we agree with the trial court that the applicable law:
requires Plaintiffs to prove that Defendants breached a duty of care which resulted in the loss of foreign patent rights. Whether the duty of care was breached does not involve a substantial question of federal patent law. The issue is whether Defendants erred in some procedure which caused the loss of the foreign patent rights for the same technology covered by the U.S. patent. The Complaint does not seek any declaration or determination concerning ownership of the U.S. patent, nor is ownership critical to the malpractice determination.
As a result, even if the right "to have any civil action in which Plaintiffs' right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law heard in the federal courts" is a "substantial right for purposes of [N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 1-277(a) and 7A-27(d) ], the proper resolution of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants does not appear to require the adjudication of any substantial issues of federal patent law, precluding us from finding that Defendants' appeal from the trial court's order is cognizable before this Court on the basis of a "substantial right" theory.
b. Risk of Inconsistent Verdicts
In addition, Defendants claim that they are entitled to immediate review of the trial court's order on the grounds that any failure on our part to review the trial court's order on an interlocutory basis creates a risk of inconsistent verdicts. As we understand it, Defendants' inconsistent verdict argument hinges upon the fact that Plaintiffs have filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina for the purpose of obtaining a declaratory judgment that Plaintiff Ronald Carter is the sole inventor of the technology for which patent protection has been sought. We do not find Defendants' argument in reliance on the risk of inconsistent verdicts persuasive.
A party does not possess a substantial right to have related claims addressed and resolved in a single proceeding. J B Slurry Seal Co. v. Mid-South Aviation, Inc., 88 N.C. App. 1, 7, 362 S.E.2d 812, 816 (1987); see also Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 608, 290 S.E.2d 593, 596 (1982) . A party does, however, have a "substantial right to avoid two separate trials of the same `issues.'" J B Slurry Seal, 88 N.C. App. at 7, 367 S.E.2d at 816; see also Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 361 N.C. 630, 634, 652 S.E.2d 231, 234 (2007) (stating that "a substantial right is affected if the trial court's order granting summary judgment to some, but not all, defendants creates the possibility of separate trials involving the same isues which could lead to inconsistent verdicts") (citing Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 439, 293 S.E.2d 405, 408 (1982)). Issues are the "same" if the facts relevant to their determination overlap in such a way that inconsistent verdicts might result from their separate litigation. Davidson v. Knauff Ins. Agency, 93 N.C. App. 20, 25, 376 S.E.2d 488, 491, disc. review denied, 324 N.C. 577, 381 S.E.2d 772 (1989). However, the mere fact that claims stem from a single event, transaction, or occurrence does not, without more, establish that there is a risk that separate juries may return inconsistent verdicts. Moose v. Nissan of Statesville, 115 N.C. App. 423, 428, 444 S.E.2d 694, 697-98 (1994).
In Moose, a plaintiff, who had sought compensatory and punitive damages stemming from a single automobile accident, sought immediate review of a trial court order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant concerning the punitive damages issue. On appeal, we held that, despite the fact that plaintiff's compensatory and punitive damages claims arose from the same incident, "[t]here [was] no possibility of inconsistent verdicts" if plaintiff's claims were determined in separate proceedings because "the issues before the jury [would be] separate." Id.; see also Nguyen v. Taylor, 200 N.C. App. 387, 393-94, 684 S.E.2d 470, 474-75 (2009) (stating that, "[w]hile plaintiffs are correct that all of these claims ultimately arise out of [the same incident], they are not correct in asserting that this creates a substantial right based upon the possibility of inconsistent verdicts" since "plaintiffs have failed to show that they will be prejudiced by the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in two separate proceedings"). Thus, there is no risk of inconsistent verdicts when the issues under consideration are governed by different legal standards.
Here, as in Moose, there is no danger of inconsistent verdicts resulting from the separate litigation of the claims at issue in Plaintiffs' federal declaratory judgment action and in this case because the issues under consideration in the two cases differ. The sole issue to be resolved in the pending federal litigation concerns the identity of the inventor or inventors of the technology for purposes of federal patent law. As we have already established, the "inventorship" that is relevant to the claims before us in this case is governed by foreign law rather than federal patent law. As a result of the fact that different bodies of law control the resolution of the "inventorship" issue in the related federal case and in this case, we do not believe that there is any genuine risk of inconsistent verdicts in the event that we decline to hear Defendants' appeal on the merits at this time. Thus, Defendants' second argument to the effect that the trial court's interlocutory order denying Defendants' dismissal motions is immediately apealable on "substantial rights" grounds is unpersuasive as well.
c. Certiorari Petition
Alternatively, Defendants request that we issue a writ of certiorari in order to review their challenges to the trial court's order on the merits in the event that we conclude, as we have, that the trial court's order is not appealable as a matter of right. A "writ of certiorari may be issued in appropriate circumstances by either appellate court to permit review of the judgments and orders of trial tribunals when . . . no right of appeal from an interlocutory order exists[.]" N.C.R. App. P. 21(a)(1). "A writ of certiorari is an extraordinary remedial writ and . . . lies for two purposes: (1) as a writ of false judgment to correct errors of law; and (2) as a substitute for an appeal." Pue v. Hood, Comr. Of Banks, 222 N.C. 310, 312, 22 S.E.2d 896, 898 (1942) (citation omitted). In support of their request for the issuance of a writ of certiorari, Defendants argue that "[i]t is an appropriate exercise of this Court's discretion to issue a writ of certiorari in an interlocutory appeal where . . . there is merit to an appellant's substantive arguments and it is in `the interests of justice' to treat an appeal as a petition for writ of certiorari." Zaliagiris v. Zaliagiris, 164 N.C. App. 602, 606, 596 S.E.2d 285, 289 (2004) (citations omitted), disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662, app. withdrawn, 360 N.C. 180, 625 S.E.2d 114 (2005). Aside from a reiteration of their arguments on the merits, however, Defendants have not attempted to establish that there is anything about the facts of this case that differentiates it from the facts of any other case in which a defendant has unsuccessfully sought dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint on subject matter jurisdiction grounds. As a result of Defendants' failure to persuade us that there are any specific features about this case that suggest that allowing immediate review of the trial court's order would be particularly appropriate and our belief that the routine allowance of certiorari petitions in circumstances similar to those at issue here would be inconsistent with the general rule against allowing immediate appeals from interlocutory orders, we conclude, in the exercise of our discretion, that Defendants' request for the issuance of a writ of certiorari should be denied.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Defendants' appeal has been taken from an unappealable interlocutory order and that Defendants' certiorari petition should be denied in the exercise of our discretion. As a result, Plaintiffs' appeal from the trial court's order should be, and hereby is, dismissed.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Judges BRYANT and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).