Both parties have over the course of this litigation made clear the need to determine what was permitted under Ecuadorian law in 1974 before the Court endeavored to undertake any analysis whether PetroEcuador could be bound to the JOA under the United States federal laws of estoppel. See The Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 376 F. Supp. 2d 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (hereinafter ROE I); The Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 426 F. Supp. 2d 159 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (hereinafter ROE II). The advisory committee notes on Rule 44.1 suggest that courts are allowed great leeway in making a foreign law determination and provide that traditional evidentiary standards need not apply.

See, e.g., In Re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation, 618 F. Supp. 2d 335, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that a court "is under no obligation" to look beyond the submissions of the parties "if the party whose burden it is fails to produce sufficient evidence that foreign law applies"); Republic of Ecuador v. ChevronTexaco Corp., 426 F. Supp. 2d 159, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Ecuador has not met its burden of showing that a conflict exists with respect to how the contract at issue would be interpreted under New York law and Ecuadorian law."); In re Air Crash at Belle Harbor, New York on November 12, 2001, 241 F.R.D. 202, 204 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Parmalat, 383 F. Supp. 2d 587, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Where, as here, there is a failure of proof of foreign law, the court may presume that it is the same as local law.").

The Lago Agrio plaintiffs have been so termed long before this Court came to preside over the pertinent proceedings. See, e.g., Republic of Ecuador v. Chevrontexaco Corp., 426 F.Supp.2d 159, 161, 163 (S.D.N.Y.2006). Indeed, their own counsel has used the phrase from the outset of this Court's involvement.