Opinion
Civil No. 02-1406-MO.
July 28, 2004
Stephen R. Sady, Chief Deputy Federal Public Defender, Portland, Oregon, Attorney for Petitioner.
Hardy Myers, Attorney General, Lester R. Huntsinger, Assistant Attorney General Department of Justice, Salem, Oregon, Attorneys for Respondent.
OPINION AND ORDER
Petitioner brings this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in which he raises several constitutional challenges to his underlying state court proceedings. For the reasons which follow, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#2) is denied.
BACKGROUND
At 9:30 p.m. on March 14, 1996, petitioner went to the City Nightclub, an underage club in Portland Petitioner, who was nine weeks shy of his fifteenth birthday, met a 15-year-old girl, Stacey Jones, outside the club. Jones had a fifth of vodka with her and petitioner proceeded to drink half the bottle. Juvenile Transcript, p. 54; Bail Transcript, pp. 12, 16. Earlier that evening, petitioner had used cocaine, methamphetamine and marijuana. Bail Transcript, pp. 49-50. Once inside the club, he went upstairs, found a corner and fell asleep. Id 49.
Petitioner woke up at 1:30 a.m. and, when the club closed, met Jones and another 15-year-old, Jennifer Secomb, outside. Id at 50-51. They decided to find some drugs, and petitioner told Jones and Secomb that he knew a "troll" who might have methamphetamine, marijuana and $1000 in cash with him. Id at 53. The three youths then decided to rob REDACTED. REDACTED had been involved in an automobile accident several years earlier and had been partially paralyzed, thus the youths considered him "an easy target." Id at 51.
When formulating the plan, petitioner told the girls that he would take REDACTED's money but did not want to stab him. Id at 52. Secomb, who was in possession of the knife, "told him that she would do that part." Id. Petitioner then approached REDACTED, who was sitting in his automobile, and asked him for a ride to a nearby bowling alley. Id at 52. REDACTED refused petitioner's request, but when Jones and Secomb asked REDACTED for a ride, he agreed on the condition that the minors provide a pipe for smoking marijuana. Id at 54. They produced the pipe, and petitioner proceeded to get in the front passenger side of the vehicle while Secomb and Jones seated themselves in the backseat. Id at 55.
Petitioner later told police that he turned to Secomb and "pointed to [petitioner's] neck in a way to indicate to Jennifer Secomb that she should shank [REDACTED] in the neck." Id at 56. "He said he mouthed the words, he didn't say it out loud so REDACTED wouldn't hear him." Id at 56. When REDACTED pulled the car over at the intended destination, Secomb reached forward and cut REDACTED's throat. Id. The girls exited the car and fled, while petitioner reached into REDACTED's pockets attempting to find money or drugs. Id at 57. REDACTED was able to drive off, but shortly crashed his car and ultimately died of blood loss.
Petitioner, Jones and Secomb were subsequently arrested for the murder and petitioner immediately confessed his participation in the crime. Following a three-day hearing in juvenile court, petitioner was remanded to adult court to stand trial. Respondent's Exhibit 103. There, he was indicted for Murder, Felony Murder, Robbery in the First Degree and Criminal Conspiracy to commit each of these offenses. Respondent's Exhibit 103, App-4.
Petitioner opted to enter a plea of guilty to one count of Felony Murder. In exchange, the remaining charges were dismissed. Plea Transcript, pp. 2-21. The parties stipulated to an upward departure, and the court sentenced petitioner to 200 months with the Corrections Division Oregon Youth Authority. Id at 18. The sentence allowed for a "second look" hearing after petitioner served half of his sentence. Id at 19. Although the plea agreement called for three months of post-prison supervision, it was corrected at the beginning of the plea hearing to impose lifetime supervision. Id at 3, 19.
Petitioner filed a direct appeal challenging the juvenile court's conclusions. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court without opinion on February 11, 1998. Matter of Rennells, 152 Or. App. 566, 953 P.2d 433 (1998). On June 2, 1998, the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. State ex rel. Juvenile Department of Multnomah County v. Rennells, 327 Or. 192, 961 P.2d 218 (1998).
Petitioner next filed for collateral relief in Oregon's post-conviction ("PCR") courts, but the PCR trial court denied relief. Respondent's Exhibit 116. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court without opinion. Rennells v. Lampert, 179 Or. App. 742, 42 P.3d 950 (2002). The Oregon Supreme Court denied review on all issues pertinent to this case. 334 Or. 327, 52 P.3d 435 (2002).
On October 15, 2002, petitioner filed this federal habeas corpus action in which he raises 12 grounds for relief. Because those claims are adequately stated in both the Petition and the State's response, they are not repeated here. The State asks the court to deny relief on the Petition because: (1) many of the claims have been abandoned; (2) others are procedurally defaulted; (3) the decisions of the Oregon courts denying relief on the non-defaulted claims are entitled to deference; and (4) all claims are without merit.
DISCUSSION
I. Unelaborated Claims.
The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus identifies 12 grounds for relief. Respondent filed a response in which he provides specific reasons why the court should deny relief on all claims. In his reply, petitioner supports only the following three claims with argument, although he expressly does not abandon the remainder of his claims:
4. Appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the juvenile court's refusal to reconsider the waiver decision;
10. Juvenile counsel was ineffective for failing to properly object to the admissibility of the incriminating statement; and
11. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (a) adequately advise petitioner as to the consequences of pleading guilty; and (b) perform proper investigation.
Respondent argues that the claims not addressed in the supporting memorandum are waived. Petitioner expressly rejects this contention, asserting that although nine of his claims are unsupported by briefing, they are neither abandoned nor waived; he merely rests on the position taken in his Petition.
"The allegations of a return to the writ of habeas corpus or of an answer to an order to show cause in a habeas corpus proceeding, if not traversed, shall be accepted as true except to the extent that the judge finds from the evidence that they are not true." 28 U.S.C. § 2248. Accordingly, the court declines to deem the unsupported claims waived. However, a review of the record reveals that petitioner's nine unsupported grounds for relief would not entitle him to relief in this proceeding. Accordingly, Grounds One, Two, Three, Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine and Twelve are denied.
II. Expansion of the Record.
Petitioner attempts to expand the record pursuant to Rule 7 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. He offers a single onepage appendix which is an Oregon Department of Corrections Admission and Release History form detailing the dates and locations of petitioner's incarceration. The document is intended to support one of petitioner's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims.
Respondent objects to the expansion of the record claiming petitioner has failed to satisfy the stringent requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Because admission of petitioner's Appendix A does not affect the outcome of this case, the court need not decide whether it is properly admissible in this proceeding.
III. The Merits. A. Standard of Review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless adjudication of the claim in state court resulted in a decision that was: (1) "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d). A state court's findings of fact are presumed correct and petitioner bears the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
A state court decision is "contrary to . . . clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases" or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [that] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant relief "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court's] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id at 413. The "unreasonable application" clause requires the state court decision to be more than incorrect or erroneous. Id at 410. The state court's application of clearly established law must be objectively unreasonable. Id at 409.
When a state court reaches a decision on the merits but provides no reasoning to support its conclusion, the federal habeas court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court clearly erred in its application of Supreme Court law. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2000). In such an instance, although the court independently reviews the record, it still defers to the state court's ultimate decision. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002). B. Analysis.
1. Ground Four: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel.
Petitioner argues his appellate attorney was constitutionally ineffective when he failed to appeal the juvenile court's refusal to reconsider its decision to remand petitioner to adult court. He claims the decision to remand was based in part on the charge of Aggravated Murder, a charge which was unsupported by the facts of the case.
The Supreme Court has established a two-part test to determine whether a petitioner has received ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the petitioner must show that his lawyer's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-687 (1984). Due to the difficulties in evaluating counsel's performance, courts must indulge a strong presumption that the conduct falls within the "wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Id at 689.
Second, the petitioner must show that his lawyer's performance prejudiced the defense. The appropriate test for prejudice is whether the defendant can show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694. A reasonable probability is one which is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id at 696.
An appellate attorney "who files a merits brief need not (and should not) raise every non-frivolous claim, but rather may select from among them in order to maximize the likelihood of success on appeal." Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 288 (2000). Accordingly, a petitioner wishing to bring a Strickland claim based on his appellate attorney's failure to raise a particular claim must not only show that the claim had merit, but must also demonstrate that the omitted claim was "clearly stronger than issues that counsel did present." Id.
The PCR trial court made the following findings with respect to petitioner's claim:
there appears to be an issue as to whether appellate counsel appealed the denial of a motion for reconsideration of waiver made to the juvenile court, but I would not find that in fact that is a proper basis for in fact concluding that somehow appellate counsel was giving ineffective representation by not pursuing that particular matter. It's clear to, no matter why the Court chose not to reconsider waiver once made. It's up to that particular Court and that Court has discretion as to whether reconsideration would be given in any event and the juvenile court was not required, no matter what the reasons to reconsider the waiver decision once made with the matter being sent to adult court.
Respondent's Exhibit 116, pp. 35-36.
Under Oregon law, a juvenile court could remand a youth to adult court if he was under 15 years of age at the time the crime was committed if the youth was alleged to have committed Murder or any aggravated form thereof. O.R.S. 419C. 352(3)(a). Petitioner was therefore subject to remand for either Aggravated Murder or Felony Murder, so long as the juvenile court determined he was "of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved," and retaining jurisdiction would not serve the best interests of the youth and society. O.R.S. 419C.349(3) (4).
In remanding petitioner to adult court, the juvenile court did not mention the Aggravated Murder charge a single time. Instead, it focused on petitioner's troubled history as well as the facts of the crime, finding "[petitioner's] history and psychological makeup present him to the court as a dangerous predator. . . ." Respondent's Exhibit 103, App-3, p. 2. It concentrated on petitioner's pattern of violence, finding community protection to be "a paramount concern considering [petitioner's] violent history and the serious, aggressive, intentional and premeditated conduct which resulted in the death of [REDACTED]." Id. "The fact that [petitioner] could not control his violence while in detention awaiting a waiver hearing [was] an important consideration for the Court." Id.
Given the "totality of the evidence," the juvenile court found that the juvenile system was incapable of meeting petitioner's needs. Id. In light of the record in this case, the court finds that the juvenile court did not rest its decision on the contents of the charging instrument in any meaningful way, therefore the exclusion of the Aggravated Murder charge from the indictment would not have altered the decision to remand For this reason, any challenge to the juvenile court's refusal to reconsider its decision would not have been well taken.
In addition, appellate counsel pursued two claims on direct appeal: (1) whether the juvenile court erred in remanding petitioner to adult court; and (2) whether the circuit court erred in denying petitioner's motion to set aside the order waiving him to adult court. Respondent's Exhibit 103. The Oregon Court of Appeals was therefore given the opportunity to review, de novo, whether remand in petitioner's case was proper. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court without opinion, thus any appeal of the reconsideration issue would not have led to a different result, nor was this claim clearly stronger than those presented. Accordingly, the state court decision denying petitioner relief on this claim was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
B. Ground 10: Ineffective Assistance of Juvenile Counsel.
Petitioner next alleges his attorney during his juvenile court proceedings provided ineffective representation when he failed to object to the admissibility of the incriminating statement petitioner provided law enforcement authorities. Petitioner argues that his confession was involuntary because his youth, the importance of the decision to confess to the police and his limited legal autonomy required authorities to notify his parents prior to questioning. He asserts that their failure to do so violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, thereby giving counsel grounds upon which to challenge the confession.
"Whether a confession is voluntary is determined under the totality of the circumstances, which include 'the crucial element of police coercion; the length of the interrogation; its location; its continuity; the defendant's maturity; education; physical condition; and mental health.'" Taylor v. Maddox 366 F.3d 992, 1015 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693 (1993) (citations omitted)). With respect to the case at bar, the PCR trial court made the following findings:
there is no proper basis for objections to the petitioner's statement that's been shown by this particular record. Law enforcement authorities are not constitutionally required to obtain the consent of a parent or guardian before questioning petitioner and I'm taking into account in that conclusion the citation to the federal case made by the petitioner.
Respondent's Exhibit 116, p. 34.
Petitioner was arrested by authorities at a youth shelter on March 19, 1996 at 3:43 p.m. Forty minutes later, detectives arrived to question him and at 4:42, the interview began. Juvenile Transcript, p. 43. Detectives read petitioner hisMiranda rights which he claimed to understand He then signed a form acknowledging his understanding before confessing his participation in REDACTED's murder. Id at 44-45. As petitioner states in his supporting memorandum, "he cooperated with [authorities] immediately." Memo in Support (#42), p. 6. The first interview lasted 55 minutes, at which time petitioner was given a 24-minute break, offered the use of a bathroom, drinks and food. Id at 49, 73. When questioning resumed, authorities taped his confession.
In light of the foregoing, petitioner does not rest his claim on any alleged coercion by the police. Instead, he maintains his confession was involuntary because his youth required authorities to contact his parents or legal guardian. In U.S. v. Doe, 155 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1998), the Ninth Circuit addressed this issue with respect to a 17-year-old juvenile who, in the absence of parental notification, confessed to various crimes including premeditated murder. The court concluded "[t]here is no due process requirement that the juvenile's parents be notified for the [Miranda] waiver to be valid, and we decline to create one. Rather, the lack of parental notification is one factor to consider in the totality of the circumstances." Id at 1073.
Similarly, in the context of a 16-year-old boy who confessed to killing his parents, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) precludes the claim petitioner attempts to bring here. "As the Eighth Circuit stated, 'Connelly makes it clear that . . . personal characteristics of the defendant are constitutionally irrelevant absent proof of [police] coercion.'" Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Rohrbach, 813 F.2d 142, 144 (8th Cir. 1987) (internal citations omitted). The appellate court "reject[ed] Derrick's claims of improper police conduct because . . . Derrick's age and mental capacity are 'the critical part' of his coercion claim" and noted that "[s]uch a claim is precisely the type that Connelly was intended to foreclose."Derrick, 924 F.2d at 819.
The PCR trial court correctly determined that law enforcement authorities were not obligated to contact petitioner's parents or a guardian prior to conducting their interrogation. As there is no credible evidence of police misconduct during petitioner's questioning, counsel was under no obligation to raise an objection to the incriminating statement which resulted. See Lowry v. Lewis, 21 F.3d 344, 346 (9th Cir. 1994), rev. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (an attorney is not required to file a motion he knows to be meritless). Accordingly, the state court decision denying petitioner relief on this claim is neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law.
C. Ground 11: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel.
Petitioner next argues his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective when he failed to: (1) properly advise petitioner regarding the consequences of pleading guilty; and (2) conduct adequate investigation with respect to the guilty plea. In proving prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have entered such a plea and would have insisted on going to trial.Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Petitioner maintains that but for counsel's failure to properly investigate the case and accurately advise him as to the real significance and illusory nature of the plea agreement, he would not have pleaded guilty. To support this contention, he offers the following arguments:
(1) The plea petition contained an inaccurate post-prison supervision term of three years, while petitioner received lifetime post-prison supervision as a result of the plea bargain;
(2) The State's promise in the plea petition not to reindict petitioner for Aggravated Murder was illusory because Oregon law requires a defendant to personally and intentionally commit the homicide for a murder to be aggravated;
(3) Although counsel stipulated to an upward departure sentence, an upward departure was not warranted, and there were available but unargued grounds for a downward departure;
(4) Not only was the Aggravated Murder charge unavailable given the facts of this case, but the dismissal of the other charges had little or no effect because they arose from the same continuous and uninterrupted episode. The extra charges could therefore not serve to "reconstitute" petitioner's criminal history score, nor could they have resulted in consecutive sentences;
(5) Trial counsel advised petitioner that he would be serving out his sentence in a juvenile facility when, in fact, the State transferred him to an adult facility almost immediately; and
(6) Counsel failed to prepare and investigate mitigation evidence for petitioner's case, instead dedicating his energies to the potential trial which never took place.
Respondent contends that most of these arguments were procedurally defaulted because petitioner failed to make them during his collateral proceedings. See Carriger v. Stewart, 971 F.2d 329, 333-34 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 992 (1993) (ineffective assistance of counsel claims are discrete and must be properly raised in order to avoid procedural default). Procedural default occurs where a petitioner has not fairly presented his claims in the state courts. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 519 (1982). The exhaustion doctrine is designed "to avoid the unnecessary friction between the federal and state court systems that would result if a lower federal court upset a state court conviction without first giving the state court system an opportunity to correct its own constitutional errors."Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490 (1973).
Petitioner presented the Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court with three bases for his claim that counsel misadvised him regarding the nature of his guilty plea. Specifically, he alleged the advice led him to believe that a guilty plea would: (1) keep him in the juvenile court system; (2) lead to his automatic release after serving only 100 months; and (3) entail only three years of post-prison supervision. Respondent's Exhibit 118, p. 9; Respondent's Exhibit 120, pp. 7-8. Accordingly, the remainder of the claims petitioner seeks to present here appear to be unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Petitioner's claim regarding his release after 100 months of incarceration, although exhausted, is neither raised in the Petition, nor argued in his briefing. Accordingly, it is not before the court for consideration.
Even if this claim were before the court, there is nothing in the record to substantiate petitioner's assertion that trial counsel assured him he would be released when it came time for his "second look" after 100 months in custody.
With respect to his failure to investigate claim, petitioner presented the Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court only with a claim that he asked his attorney to interview his two co-defendants as well as other unnamed potential witnesses because their testimonies "could have been used at both the waiver hearing and at sentencing." Respondent's exhibit 118, p. 11; Respondent's exhibit 120, p. 9. In this proceeding he offers no such argument. While he does argue counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence, the arguments he offers were not presented to the state courts and therefore appear to be unexhausted and procedurally defaulted.
To the extent petitioner does seek to pursue his exhausted claim regarding counsel's alleged failure to interview witnesses, that claim is without merit. Petitioner makes no attempt to identify the non-defendant witnesses, nor does he describe what the witnesses would have testified to which could have been helpful to his case. Petitioner also fails to establish that the witnesses were available for trial.
Petitioner argues that all of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims he seeks to pursue in this proceeding were fairly presented to the state courts because he raised general claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on his attorney's alleged failure to properly advise and perform adequate investigation. The court declines to adopt this general approach to the exhaustion and procedural default analysis. It would offend notions of comity and federalism to allow petitioner to present distinct claims to this court which the Oregon Court of Appeals and Oregon Supreme Court never had an opportunity to address. For this reason, the claims petitioner seeks to raise here but which were not fairly presented to the Oregon courts are procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner, therefore, presents the following claims for consideration in this proceeding:
(1) Trial counsel misadvised petitioner, leading him to believe that the guilty plea would entail only three years of post-prison supervision; and
(2) Trial counsel improperly advised petitioner that the term of incarceration would be served entirely in the juvenile court system.
1. Post-Prison Supervision Term.
When petitioner's plea hearing began, upon being given his first opportunity to speak, counsel immediately sought to correct the post-prison supervision length from three years to life. Plea Transcript, p. 3. Immediately afterwards, the court told petitioner to ask any questions if he had them. Id. Throughout the course of the hearing, petitioner never objected to the change in the post-prison supervision term and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. However, based upon the improper three-year post-prison supervision figure contained in the plea petition, petitioner is able to offer an inference that he was misadvised. The PCR trial court made the following findings pertinent to this claim:
petitioner signed a plea petition. This is exhibit number 102 in this case. Petitioner reaffirmed his desire to proceed with the plea petition on the record before the Court. I do note in examining the plea petition, that just as has been testified to by [petitioner], the plea petition does say that the State would be recommending three (3) years of post-prison supervision. That's found on page two (2) of exhibit number 103. However, this is also conditioned by the particular recommendations, although the State would be bound in making the recommendations that are set out in the plea agreement. I do not find that in fact the supervision period entered by the Court is erroneous as a matter of law.
I would find further the defense counsel discussed the matter with petitioner on numerous occasions, as shown by his affidavit. Also, he was accompanied by a Juvenile Rights Project lawyer and that in fact, all the matters leading up to this particular agreement, were discussed and covered with the petitioner.
Respondent's Exhibit 116, pp. 34-35.
The affidavit cited by the PCR trial court is not particularly helpful. Counsel attests that, along with a Juvenile Rights Project attorney, he visited petitioner at least once each week and spoke to him on the telephone approximately three times each week. Respondent's Exhibit 115, p. 1. According to the affidavit, petitioner "did not want to go to trial, and was interested in entering into a plea agreement from the beginning." Id at 2. From this information, the PCR trial court concluded that counsel and petitioner adequately discussed the post-prison supervision term.
While counsel's affidavit does not strongly support the PCR trial court's factual finding, petitioner has not overcome the finding by clear and convincing evidence. This is especially true when viewed in light of petitioner's ready acceptance of the change in terms during the hearing where he exhibited no indication of surprise or confusion. Accepting the PCR trial court's factual finding as true, petitioner could not have been misadvised on this issue.
2. Service of Sentence in Juvenile System.
With respect to petitioner's claim that counsel falsely advised him that he would serve his sentence in the juvenile system, petitioner did begin his sentence with the Oregon Youth Authority ("OYA") on September 19, 1996. Petitioner's Exhibit A. On May 26, 1997, he was transferred to the Oregon Corrections Intake Center and on June 5, 1997, he arrived at the Oregon State Correctional Institution ("OSCI"). Id. The parties are unable to advise the court why petitioner was later transferred to OSCI.
Given the extensive record documenting petitioner's violent past and lack of interest in rehabilitative programming, his transfer could very well have been the result of his own conduct at OYA. This court is unable to find any other evidence in the record which might shed light on the reason for petitioner's transfer to OSCI, and petitioner has provided no guidance on this issue. Without this information, even assuming counsel promised petitioner placement at OYA, it cannot be presumed that counsel had reason to know petitioner would be transferred to OSCI.
See Juvenile Transcript, pp. 128-311; Respondent's Exhibit 103, App-3.
For the foregoing reasons, petitioner has not shown that the state court denial of his claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel was either contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. In addition, petitioner has not shown that the state courts made "an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented" with respect to any of his claims properly before this court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons identified above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (#2) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The victim in this case, REDACTED, was known to the youths as a "troll," an older person who picks up minors downtown and pays them for sex. Juvenile Transcript, p. 9; Bail Transcript, pp. 16-17, 52.