We deduce from that statement that, in substance, DMV is seeking review of the order denying its motion for reconsideration. Otherwise, it has not complied with the preservation requirements of ORAP 5.45. Petitioner's counsel's argument to the trial court was correct despite DMV's contrary argument. DMV's motion for reconsideration made after entry of the March 6 order was the functional equivalent of a motion for a new trial made under ORCP 64 C.See Carter v. U.S. National Bank, 304 Or. 538, 544-46, 747 P.2d 980 (1987) (holding that a motion to reconsider a summary judgment order implicated ORCP 64 even though no judgment has been entered at the time);see also Renfroe v. State of Oregon, 90 Or. App. 446, 448, 752 P.2d 1245 (1988). ORCP 64 C provides authority to grant a new trial in an action tried without a jury on any grounds set forth in ORCP 64 B where applicable.
"The so-called `motion for reconsideration' appears neither in the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure nor in any other Oregon statute. Lawyers filing motions to reconsider * * * might better denominate such a motion as a `motion asking for trouble[.]'" Carter v. U.S. National Bank, 304 Or. 538, 546, 747 P.2d 980 (1987) (Peterson, C.J., concurring). We considered an essentially identical sequence of events in Renfroe v. State of Oregon, 90 Or. App. 446, 752 P.2d 1245 (1988), and held that the appeal was premature. As in Renfroe, the motion for reconsideration in this case was the functional equivalent of a motion for new trial.