Opinion
01-21-00292-CR
08-25-2022
ARNE RAY RENFRO, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Do not publish. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 412th Judicial District Court Brazoria County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 90032-CR
Panel consists of Justices Landau, Guerra, and Farris.MEMORANDUM OPINION
Sarah Beth Landau, Justice
A jury found appellant, Arne Ray Renfro, guilty of aggravated kidnapping and sentenced him to 25 years' imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code § 20.04(a). In his sole issue, Renfro challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We affirm.
Background
P. Jackson, the complainant, dated Renfro on and off from March 2019 until early March 2020. After their romantic relationship ended, Jackson and Renfro tried to remain friends.
On March 27, 2020, Jackson and Renfro were having dinner together at Renfro's home when he told her that he slept with another woman. Jackson responded that she wanted to leave. Renfro ordered her to sit down, eat, and talk about it. Renfro had taken Jackson's cell phone and keys and refused to return them. Because Jackson could not leave, she sat down at the table but refused to eat. Renfro began striking her repeatedly with his fist on the side of her head. Jackson screamed for help. Renfro then forced Jackson outside and into her car. Jackson sat in the front passenger seat, and Renfro sat in the driver's seat.
Renfro continued to hit Jackson as he drove the car and threatened to drive the car off the Houston Ship Channel bridge. Jackson repeatedly demanded to be let out of the car, but Renfro refused and kept the doors locked. When Jackson managed to get the door open, Renfro initially accelerated but was forced to slow the car by traffic stopped at a red light. Jackson took this opportunity to jump out of the car. She ran to another vehicle and told the motorist that Renfro was trying to kill her and to call the police. The motorist let Jackson into his vehicle and drove her to the Pearland Police Department. Renfro drove off in Jackson's car.
Jackson told the police what had happened and was taken to a hospital for treatment. The police located Renfro a few hours later by tracking the location of Jackson's phone and arrested him. Renfro was charged with felony aggravated kidnapping with the intent to inflict bodily injury on Jackson or terrorize her.
Standard of Review
We review sufficiency of the evidence under the standard in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-20 (1979). See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 894- 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Under Jackson, the evidence is sufficient if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational jury could find each essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Murray v. State, 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). We consider direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence. Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
Evidence is insufficient under four circumstances: (1) the record contains no evidence probative of an element of the offense; (2) the record contains a mere "modicum" of evidence probative of an element of the offense; (3) the evidence establishes a reasonable doubt; or (4) the acts alleged do not constitute the criminal offense charged. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 314, 318 & n.11; Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 518 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The Jackson standard defers to the factfinder to resolve any conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from "basic facts to ultimate facts." Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. If the evidence is insufficient under this standard, we must reverse the judgment and enter a judgment of acquittal. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41 (1982).
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his sole issue, Renfro contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for aggravated kidnapping because the State did not prove he intended to secrete or hold Jackson in a place where she was unlikely to be found. See Tex. Penal Code §§ 20.01(2), 20.04(a)(4), (5). A person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping if he "intentionally or knowingly abducts another person" and commits an aggravating element. Id. § 20.04. To "abduct" is "to restrain a person with the intent to prevent [her] liberation by: (A) secreting or holding [her] in a place where [she] is not likely to be found; or (B) using or threatening to use deadly force." Id. § 20.01(2). To "restrain" is "to restrict a person's movements without consent, so as to interfere substantially with [her] liberty, by moving [her] from one place to another or by confining [her]." Id. § 20.01(1). Restraint is "without consent" if it is accomplished by force, intimidation, or deception. Id. § 20.01(1)(A).
Renfro points to Jackson's testimony that he threatened to drive off the Houston Ship Channel Bridge as evidence that his intent was not to secrete her in a place where she was not likely to be found, because that location is public. But forcing a person into a car and moving her from one place to another qualifies as holding the person in a place where she is not likely to be found. See Megas v. State, 68 S.W.3d 234, 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). That Renfro intended to take Jackson to a public area, the Houston Ship Channel Bridge, does not negate the intent to take her somewhere she was not likely to be found. See id. at 241 (State proved intent element of abduction and restraint even though "incident took place on a well-traveled urban highway"). Moreover, Renfro ignores that Jackson's testimony supports an inference that, by driving off the Houston Ship Channel Bridge, he intended to plunge her into the water at night, a place where a person is not likely to be found.
The requirement of secreting the victim or holding her in a place where she is not likely to be found is a part of the intent of the offense, not the conduct. See Laster, 275 S.W.3d at 521; Brimage v. State, 918 S.W.2d 466, 475-76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Once the State proves restraint, the offense of kidnapping is complete when the defendant shows a specific intent to prevent liberation. Brimage, 918 S.W.2d at 475-76 . That is, the State need not prove the defendant accomplished a restraint by secretion, only that the defendant completed a restraint and evidenced a specific intent to prevent liberation by secretion. See id. at 476; see also Laster, 275 S.W.3d 521. "Nothing in the kidnapping statute requires the State to prove that a defendant moved a victim a certain distance or held [her] for a specific length of time." Griffin v. State, 491 S.W.3d 771, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Intent can be inferred from the defendant's conduct and remarks and the circumstances. See Turner v. State, 600 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Murchison v. State, 93 S.W.3d 239, 254 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd).
Jackson testified that she wanted to leave Renfro's home, but he took her phone and keys and then assaulted her. She screamed for help to no avail. She also testified that Renfro forced her into her car and locked the doors to prevent her from leaving. She eventually jumped out of the car and obtained help from a nearby motorist.
Renfro's neighbor testified that on the night of the incident he heard "a female voice starting to scream for help." He described the screams as "a stop, stop, don't do this" that became "a full-fledged stop, please somebody help me, somebody please call the cops, call 9-1-1, somebody help me." He called the landlord and "told him that there was somebody in the room next door, in Renfro's room, screaming for help, it was a woman screaming to call the police, and that I was like afraid. Like I was trying to keep my voice down since the room was next to each other. The walls were so thin."
The motorist who helped Jackson also testified. He stated that he was stopped at a red light in Pearland when he saw Jackson fall out of a car. Jackson entered his vehicle on the passenger side and told him that the man driving the car she jumped out of was "threatening her life." The motorist further testified that Jackson was in distress and asked him to call the police, which he did.
Renfro relies on Kenny v. State, where the defendant stated he would drive the complainant back to their home and no evidence controverted that statement. 292 S.W.3d 89, 95 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. ref'd). But in Kenny, the defendant drove the complainant directly from a local pub to their shared residence nearby. Id. at 96. The primary dispute was how the complainant would get home- being driven by the defendant or driving herself-not whether she would go home. Id. at 95-96. Here, Renfro and Jackson went from Renfro's residence where Jackson did not live, and from which Renfro would not let her leave, to a vehicle where Renfro told Jackson he would drive her off a bridge, confirming, at a minimum, that there was a dispute on whether Jackson would go home at all.
This case is closer to Megas. There, the complainant tried to exit the defendant's car parked on the side of a highway during a physical and verbal altercation, but the defendant dragged her back into the car and drove away from a motorist who had stopped to render aid. Megas, 68 S.W.3d at 237. The court noted that proof the complainant was "kept isolated from anyone who might have been of assistance meets the element of secreting or holding in a place where the victim is not likely to be found." Id. at 240. That standard is satisfied here by Jackson's testimony that she tried to escape as Renfro was driving, but he repeatedly thwarted her by locking the door and threatening to drive the car off a bridge. Unlike the complainant in Megas, however, Jackson ultimately escaped when she jumped out of the car and was rescued by a nearby motorist.
In sum, Jackson testified that she screamed for help in Renfro's apartment. Renfro took her keys and phone and then forced her into her car. She tried to escape from the car, finally managing to jump out and be rescued by another motorist. Renfro's neighbor corroborated parts of Jackson's testimony, as did the motorist who witnessed Jackson's escape and helped her. Jackson's testimony also was consistent with her statements to two Pearland police officers.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Renfro intended to prevent Jackson's liberation by secreting or hiding her in a place she was not likely to be found. See Tex. Penal Code § 20.01(2)(A). We therefore hold the evidence is sufficient to support Renfro's conviction for aggravated kidnapping. See id. §§ 20.01(2)(A), 20.04(a).
We overrule Renfro's sole issue.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.