Opinion
No. CV 02 0467282 S
April 17, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
The plaintiff/applicant, Jack Reilly, seeks "an order in the nature of mandamus" compelling the defendant Claims Commissioner to reconsider his decision that the applicant's claim against the State was barred by the applicable statute of limitations. He argues that Commissioner erroneously concluded that his claim was time-barred and that this court has the power to order the Commission to reverse his ruling and entertain the claim.
The Claims Commissioner contends that although styled as an Application For Writ Of Mandamus, Reilly in reality is seeking an unauthorized judicial review of the Claims Commissioners's order dismissing his claim. The Commissioner argues that neither the statutes nor the Constitution of the State of Connecticut authorize judicial appeals of the rulings or determinations handed down by the Commissioner, who functions as an arm or agent of the General Assembly in performing the legislative function of waiving the state's sovereign immunity. The Commissioner suggests that while mandamus might lie if he were performing a mere ministerial act without the exercise of any discretionary authority and pertaining to a clear legal right of the plaintiff, the challenged ruling of the Claims Commissioner here addresses the construction, interpretation and application of the statute of limitations governing the timely filing of claims, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-148. His deliberative ruling holding the applicant's claim to be untimely, the Commissioner argues, cannot be properly viewed as simply an incorrect ministerial act that deprived the applicant of a clear legal right.
The facts underlying Reilly's claim are set forth in State v. Reilly, 60 Conn. App. 716 (2000), and are briefly summarized as follows: On July 12, 1994, Reilly had pleaded guilty to sexual assault and was sentenced to a period of four years incarceration, suspended after one year, with 5 years probation. On April 12, 1995, he was released from prison and began a period of probation that included a condition that he receive sex offender treatment. He began his participation in this program in June of 1995, but by July of 1998, following disagreements with program staff about his treatment, he was discharged. In August, he was charged with a probation violation based on allegedly improper activities during the therapy sessions. The Court revoked his probation in September of 1999, finding that "the defendant `willingly and intentionally' chose not to comply with the special condition of his probation requiring that he attend sex therapy." Id. at 723-24. The Appellate Court reversed, finding this case to be "one of first impression in Connecticut." Id. at 718. Although it did not condone his conduct, the Appellate Court held that Reilly had not received fair notice that his actions would subject him to probation revocation. Id. at 735-36.
On November 7, 2001, Reilly filed a notice of claim with the defendant Commissioner, alleging that he had been denied due process and wrongfully was incarcerated. He sought money damages of $1,000,000 as well as permission to sue the State. The State filed a motion to dismiss, based upon Reilly's failure to file his claim within the one-year limitation period set forth in Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-148 (a). The State argued that the one-year period began to run no later than September 29, 1999, the date the Superior Court revoked his probation. Reilly argued that his claim was timely filed within one year of date of the Appellate Court's ruling which, in his view, is the date that harm accrued for purposes of the statute of limitations. The Claims Commissioner agreed with the State, found that the claim was untimely filed, and dismissed the claim.
Reilly thereupon filed this action, in which he requests the Court to order Commissioner Smith "to accept, hear, consider and decide the applicant's claim." He argues that our Supreme Court has left the door open to Superior Court review of the conduct of the Claims Commissioner in appropriate cases. In Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, 195 Conn. 534, 542-43 (1985), the defendant Claims Commissioner heard and considered the evidence presented by the plaintiffs in support of their claim and determined that the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proving legal causation. Id., 536-37. The plaintiffs appealed under the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act, General Statutes § 4-183 (g). Id., 537. The trial court sustained the plaintiffs' appeal and remanded with direction that the Claims Commissioner grant the plaintiffs permission to sue the state. Id., 538. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to review the decision of Claims Commissioner. The Court concluded that 1982 Public Act No. 167, now codified at General Statutes § 4-164a, clarified the legislative intent that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction to hear appeals from the claims commissioner. Id., 541. Notwithstanding that holding, the Supreme Court had stated:
Our holding that the plaintiffs do not have a remedy by way of an administrative appeal does not, of course, foreclose other forms of judicial review in an appropriate case. Even the proceedings of a legislative commissioner may come within the jurisdiction of a court "acting under the judicial power of article fifth of the [state] constitution . . . if . . . egregious and otherwise irreparable violations of state or federal constitutional guarantees are being or have been committed by such proceedings." . . . In the present case, however, we have neither a procedural nor a substantive basis for venturing upon an inquiry into the extent of the scope of possible judicial alternatives to administrative appeals.
The plaintiff would have the court believe that the Commissioner's application of the statute of limitations in this case is one of those "egregious and otherwise irreparable violations of state or federal constitutional guarantees" that entitles him to judicial review of the Commissioner's decision. This court disagrees.
"The commissioner of claims performs a legislative function directly reviewable only by the General Assembly." Circle Lanes of Fairfield, Inc. v. Fay, 195 Conn. 534, 541 (1985). "The action of the Claims Commissioner in approving or rejecting payment of any claim or part thereof shall be final and conclusive on all questions of law and fact and shall not be subject to review except by the General Assembly." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 4-164 (b). Considering Reilly's application for mandamus would amount to judicial review of an action of the Commissioner rejecting a claim based on his determination of law and fact relating to the statute of limitations, in contradiction to the mandated finality of the Commissioner's determination.
In Fidelity Bank v. State, 166 Conn. 251, 253-54 (1974), the Supreme Court reviewed the history of the Claims Commission, reconstituted in 1975 as the Office of the Claims Commissioner. 1975 Conn. Pub. Acts 75-605. This historical account shows the Commissioner's function to be a legislative one. "The legislature has established a system for the determination of claims against the state. A significant part of that system is the appointment of a claims commissioner; who is vested with sole authority to authorize suit against the state. Decisions of the claims commissioner are not subject to judicial review. The entire scheme which authorizes claims against the state makes clear that the claims commissioner, and not the court, can waive sovereign immunity." Cooper v. Delta Chi Housing Corp. of Connecticut, 41 Conn. App. 61, 64 (1996) (citations omitted). The Court has also held that "[i]t is a matter for the legislature, not this court, to determine when our state's sovereign immunity should be waived. The question of whether the principles of governmental immunity from suit and liability are waived is a matter for legislative, not judicial, determination." Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 (1987).
In Handley v. Arkansas State Claims Commissioner, 333 Ark. 159, 970 S.W.2d 198 (1998), the Supreme Court of Arkansas was faced with an issue similar to that presented by this case. A state agency, the Department of Human Services ("DHS") had filed a motion to dismiss a claim pending before the Arkansas Claims Commission, on the grounds the Commission did not have jurisdiction to hear it. The motion was denied, and DHS petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandamus, which was also denied. The trial court's finding "that it did not have jurisdiction to issue either a writ of mandamus or a writ of certiorari to the Claims Commission because it is an arm of the General Assembly" was affirmed. Even if it had jurisdiction, the writs would have been inappropriate because DHS had an adequate remedy, appeal of the Commission's decision to the General Assembly. 970 S.W.2d at 199. "Because DHS is asking the judiciary to compel the Claims Commission to reverse its prior discretionary determination that it had jurisdiction to hear [the claimant's] claim, and DHS has the adequate remedy of appealing the Commission's ruling to the General Assembly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied DHS's petition for a writ of mandamus." Id., at 200. The statutory structure and the constitutional basis of the Arkansas Claims Commission are similar to those of the Connecticut Office of the Claims Commissioner for all purposes relevant to this proceeding. Thus, the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is equally applicable to this proceeding.
The plaintiff in Ruiz v. Butterly, Connecticut Claims Commissioner, 1995 Conn. Super, LEXIS 52610 (1995), had also tried to bring a writ of mandamus after the Commissioner had dismissed his claim. The Court, M.R. Hennessey, J., dismissed that application, holding that:
Mandamus is not appropriate in the present case because the plaintiff has failed to establish that an unconstitutional taking has occurred. The plaintiff's claim, that General Statues 4-141 requires that a "hearing" be held by the Claims Commissioner, is unsupported by the statute, itself, or case law. The Claims Commissioner does not have a ministerial duty to hold a "hearing" regarding the claim brought by the plaintiff.
This decision was affirmed by the Appellate Court in a per curiam opinion, 44 Conn. App. 915 (1997).
In the present case, the Commissioner issued a discretionary ruling that Reilly's claim against the state was time-barred. No constitutional rights are implicated by that ruling, in which the Commissioner did no more than apply the statute of limitations to the facts underlying Reilly's claim. Reilly's remedy, if he has one, is with the legislature, not the court. Subsection (b) of § 4-148 provides:
The General Assembly may, by special act, authorize a person to present a claim to the Claims Commissioner after the time limitations set forth in subsection (a) of this section have expired if it deems such authorization to be just and equitable and makes an express finding that such authorization is supported by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose. Such finding shall not be subject to review by the Superior Court.
Although Reilly would prefer a direct judicial review of the Commissioner's adverse decision regarding the application of the statute of limitations, our laws do not provide for it. What our laws do provide is the right to go directly to the legislature and to argue that in this case of "first impression," Reilly's failure to appreciate that he had a potential cause of action against the State until the Appellate Court had finally ruled in his favor constitutes the kind of compelling equitable circumstances that justify a legislative waiver of the statute of limitations.
Because this court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction to compel the commissioner to reconsider its ruling regarding the statute of limitations, it is unnecessary to consider the plaintiff's contention that his claim was not time-barred as a matter of law.
Although the Appellate Court viewed Reilly's argument on appeal as an issue of first impression in Connecticut, he had in fact asserted that argument, which forms the basis of his claim for civil liability, at the time of his violation of probation hearing, thus giving rise to the State's contention that the claim had accrued then, and not only after the Appellate Court's decision.
For the above reasons, the Application for a Writ of Mandamus is dismissed.
Jonathan E. Silbert, Judge