The law is well-settled that unexpressed subjective intentions are irrelevant to the issue of mutuality. ( Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 579-580, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 887, 150 P.3d 764 ["uncommunicated subjective intent is irrelevant" to mutual assent, which is determined from reasonable meaning of parties’ words and actions], Hilleary v Garvin (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 322, 327, 238 Cal.Rptr. 247 [because "existence of mutual assent is determined by objective criteria[,]" uncommunicated subjective intent is irrelevant], Schmitz v. Wetzel (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 210, 212, 10 Cal.Rptr. 219 [" ‘[Where] the terms of an agreement are set forth in writing, and the words are not equivocal or ambiguous, the writing or writings will constitute the contract of the parties, and one party is not permitted to escape from its obligations by showing that he did not intend to do what his words bound him to do.’ [Citation.]" (Italics omitted.)
Subdivision (b) of section 1295 states: "Immediately before the signature line provided for the individual contracting for the medical services must appear the following in at least 10-point bold red type: [¶] `NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS CONTRACT.'" As we stated in Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 577-578 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 887, 150 P.3d 764] ( Reigelsperger): "Section 1295 was enacted as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA). (Stats.
He determined the open book account initiated by the knee surgery in 2007 was closed when Valbuena's surgery was completed and he paid the bill. However, Judge Miller, citing Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574 (Reigelsperger), concluded this ruling was just a starting point in his analysis because parties may agree to arbitrate future events. Focusing on Article 5 of the 2007 arbitration agreement, Judge Miller determined the clause covered disputes not only related to the knee surgery but also any future treatment unrelated to the same condition.
"Section 1295 was enacted as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 ...." (Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 577 (Reigelsperger).) "The purpose of section 1295 [was] to encourage and facilitate arbitration of medical malpractice disputes.
The Supreme Court has stated that "[t]he purpose of section 1295 is to encourage and facilitate arbitration of medical malpractice disputes. [Citations.] Accordingly, the provisions of section 1295 are to be construed liberally [to support that legislative purpose]." ( Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 578, 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 887, 150 P.3d 764 ( Reigelsperger ).)The provisions of section 1295 dictate the form, and to some degree the substance, of such agreements. For example, subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 1295 require the presence of certain language in medical services arbitration agreements, and also specify certain font and color requirements.
" Ms. Lisitsa cited as examples that Mr. Behrend paid for legal services and costs in the subsequent matters in the same amount and as he had in the Williams matter. Citing Business and Professions Code section 6148, subdivision (d)(2), Hilleary v. Garvin (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 322, 326 and Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 579-590, defendants asserted that the subsequent matters were subject to the arbitration provision in the Williams fee agreement. As an alternative claim, defendants argued the fee agreement specified that the American Arbitration Association rules governed the dispute.
Indeed, the failure to use the language specified by the statute could render the arbitration provision unenforceable. (See Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 578 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 887, 150 P.3d 764].) The arbitration agreement does not limit its application to cases involving personal injuries or wrongful death, and does not quote from or refer to section 1295, or mention the term "professional negligence."
A book account, stated in somewhat simplified terms, is "a detailed statement of debit/credit transactions kept by a creditor in the regular course of business, and in a reasonably permanent manner." Imperial Merch. Servs., Inc. v. Hunt, 47 Cal. 4th 381, 397, 97 Cal. Rptr. 3d 464, 476, 212 P.3d 736, 746 (2009) (quoting Reigelsperger v. Siller, 40 Cal. 4th 574, 579 n. 5, 53 Cal. Rptr. 3d 887, 150 P.3d 764 (2007)) (quotation marks omitted). A book account is open when there is a balance due on the account.
(§ 1717.5, subd. (a).) A " book account is a detailed statement of debit/credit transactions kept by a creditor in the regular course of business, and in a reasonably permanent manner." ( Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, 579, fn. 5 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.3d 887, 150 P.3d 764], citing Code Civ. Proc., § 337a.) A check — a document created by the pay or/debtor — is not a record entered in the creditor's regular course of business.
Defendants here point to the arbitration agreement's reference to "future disputes" and its requirement that any modifications be made by signed writing to argue that the parties intended the agreement to bind them moving forward, absent any effort to terminate the agreement. While this argument is superficially supported by the holding in Reigelsperger v. Siller (2007) 40 Cal.4th 574, we find the case to be distinguishable. In Reigelsperger, a patient signed an arbitration agreement during his first visit to a chiropractor and did not return until two years later.