We interpret the term "employee" to mean an individual and not a union. Reid v. Dep't of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 282 (Fed. Cir. 1986).

Significant here, if the arbitration results in an unfavorable decision, only the employee may appeal the unfavorable arbitration award before this court. See Reid v. Dep't of Com., 793 F.2d 277, 282 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also AFGE Loc. 3438 v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2021-1972, 2022 WL 1653177, at *3 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2022) (Reyna, J., additional views); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f) (explaining 5 U.S.C. § 7703 applies to the review of an arbitrator's award in this court "in the same manner and under the same conditions as if the matter had been decided by the Board"). As noted above, Mr. Johnson elected arbitration, where he was represented by the local Union.

Significant here, if the arbitration results in an unfavorable decision, only the employee may appeal the unfavorable arbitration award before this court. See Reid v. Dep't of Com., 793 F.2d 277, 282 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also AFGE Loc. 3438 v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2021-1972, 2022 WL 1653177, at *3 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2022) (Reyna, J., additional views); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7121(f) (explaining 5 U.S.C. § 7703 applies to the review of an arbitrator's award in this court "in the same manner and under the same conditions as if the matter had been decided by the Board"). As noted above

We have held that "Congress, in using the term 'employee' in § 7703(a)(1) and in defining that term to mean an individual, has exercised its legislative prerogative to impose a prudential limitation on the exercise of this court's jurisdiction over adverse decisions of the MSPB." Reid v. Dep't of Com., 793 F.2d 277, 284 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We have therefore concluded that an organization (like FOP) lacks standing to appeal from an MSPB or arbitration decision because it is not an individual.

But this court has repeatedly rejected this argument. See Reid v. Dep't of Com., 793 F.2d 277, 279-82 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also AFGE Local 3438 v. SSA, No. 2021-1972, 2022 WL 1653177, at *3 (Fed. Cir. May 25, 2022). We cannot construe the union's response and request for joinder of Mr. Mack as a petition for review filed by Mr. Mack.

Page 4, line 3, "Reid, 793 F.2d at 279." is changed to "Reid v. Dep't of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 279 (Fed. Cir. 1986)."

To the extent OPM believes that § 7512 should include an exception for actions taken against tenured employees based on suitability determinations, it must make its case to Congress rather than this court. If Congress determines that an individual in Hopper's position should not have the right to appeal a negative suitability decision as an adverse action under chapter 75, it can amend the CSRA to include suitability actions in the list of those matters not subject to appeal. See Reid v. Dep't of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 284 (Fed.Cir.1986) (“ ‘The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress' and not this court. ‘Congress may amend the statute; we may not.’ ”) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) ). Until it does so, however, we must apply the statute as written. See Van Wersch, 197 F.3d at 1152 (“[W]hen a statute expresses its purpose in short, clear terms, the duty of the court is to apply the statute as written.”) (citation omitted).B. Mitigation of the Penalty

To the extent OPM believes that § 7512 should include an exception for actions taken against tenured employees based on suitability determinations, it must make its case to Congress rather than this court. If Congress determines that an individual in Hopper's position should not have the right to appeal a negative suitability decision as an adverse action under chapter 75, it can amend the CSRA to include suitability actions in the list of those matters not subject to appeal. See Reid v. Dep't of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 284 (Fed.Cir.1986) (“ ‘The remedy for any dissatisfaction with the results in particular cases lies with Congress' and not this court. ‘Congress may amend the statute; we may not.’ ”) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 576, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982) ). Until it does so, however, we must apply the statute as written. See Van Wersch, 197 F.3d at 1152 (“[W]hen a statute expresses its purpose in short, clear terms, the duty of the court is to apply the statute as written.”) (citation omitted).

"Statutory analysis requires first that we look to the express language of the statute to determine its meaning." Reid v. Dep't of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 281 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981)). Section 7701(a) provides a right of appeal to the Board to an "employee or applicant for employment.

In addition, the legislative history of § 7703 states that "the wording [of § 7703(a)] is similar to the general provisions governing the right of review from agency actions found in Section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act." S.Rep. No. 969, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 62; see Reid v. Dep't of Commerce, 793 F.2d 277, 283 (Fed. Cir. 1986). Heed is warranted to the Court's admonition that "only upon a showing of 'clear and convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should the courts restrict access to judicial review" of administrative actions.