Opinion
Opinion, November 13, 1933.
JURY FINDINGS. EVIDENCE.
Where there is credible evidence to sustain a jury finding, it will not be disturbed.
In the case at bar, the jury found Reid negligent in crossing directly in front of Mrs. Walton's car. No other finding could be justified. The question of due care on Mrs. Walton's part was arguable, but the jury did not necessarily err in finding her free from negligence.
On general motion for new trial by plaintiff Mary N. Reid, and on motion and exceptions by defendant Fergus Reid. Three cases arising out of a collision between an automobile driven by Fergus Reid and one driven by Jane Walton. Cases were tried together at the June Term, 1933, of the Superior Court for the County of Cumberland. The jury rendered a verdict for the defendant in Mary N. Reid's case and for the plaintiff Jane Walton, in the sum of $5,000.00, and for the plaintiff James A. Walton, in the sum of $3,500.00. General motions for new trials were thereupon filed by Mary N. Reid and Fergus Reid, and also exceptions by Fergus Reid to refusal to direct a verdict in his behalf. Motions overruled. The cases sufficiently appear in the opinion.
William B. Mahoney, John B. Thomes, for Mary Reid and Fergus Reid.
Coombs Gould, Ralph M. Ingalls, Verrill, Hale, Booth Ives, for Jane Walton and James A. Walton.
SITTING: PATTANGALL, C. J., DUNN, STURGIS, BARNES, THAXTER, JJ.
On motions. Actions growing out of collision between automobiles, one of which was driven by Fergus Reid in which Mary N. Reid was a passenger, and the other by Jane Walton. The claim of James A. Walton was based on disbursements by him on account of injuries sustained by his wife. Verdicts were for defendant in the case against Mrs. Walton, for plaintiff in cases against Fergus Reid.
The collision occurred on the three-lane concrete state highway between Portland and Portsmouth, at the point of intersection with a road leading southerly toward York. Jane Walton was driving toward the east in the southerly lane. Reid, coming from the opposite direction, left the northerly lane on which he had been driving and made a left-hand turn, crossing the highway directly in the path of the oncoming car, for the purpose of taking the road to York. The cars were in plain view of the respective drivers thereof for at least 250 feet. As they approached each other, they were moving at a rate of speed which would have caused their meeting within two or three seconds after each had opportunity to observe the other's approach.
Under these circumstances, the jury found Reid negligent in crossing directly in front of Mrs. Walton's car. No other finding could be justified. The question of due care on Mrs. Walton's part is arguable, but we can not say the jury necessarily erred in finding her free from negligence.
The case falls within the doctrine stated in Fernald v. French, 121 Me. 4, 115 A. 420, and can be readily distinguished from Ritchie v. Perry, 129 Me. 440, 152 A. 621, and Esponette v. Wiseman, 130 Me. 297, 155 A. 650.
Motions overruled.