Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-00466-SAL-JDA
09-07-2022
Admassu Regassa, Petitioner, v. Warden of FCI Williamsburg, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JACQUELYN D. AUSTIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Respondent's motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 18.] Petitioner brought this habeas action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge certain prison disciplinary proceedings. [Doc. 1 at 2.] Petitioner is a prisoner in the custody of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) and is presently incarcerated at the Williamsburg Federal Correctional Institution in Salters, South Carolina (“FCI Williamsburg”). [Id. at 1.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review post-trial petitions for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, Petitioner filed a Petition for writ of habeas corpus on February 6, 2022. [Id.] On May 19, 2022, Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 18.] On May 20, 2022, the Court filed an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Petitioner of the summary judgment procedure and of the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to the motion. [Doc. 19.] On June 2, 2022, the Clerk docketed a response from Petitioner opposing summary judgment. [Doc. 21.] Respondent's motion is now ripe for review. Having carefully considered the parties' submissions and the record in this case, the Court recommends that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted and the Petition be denied.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). Accordingly, this action was filed on February 6, 2022. [Doc. 1 at 9 (declaration by Petitioner stating that he submitted his Petition to prison mailroom employees to be deposited in the U.S. Mail on February 6, 2022).]
BACKGROUND
As noted, Petitioner is a federal inmate presently confined at FCI Williamsburg. [Doc. 1 at 1.] On May 18, 2021, while Petitioner was an inmate at the Petersburg Federal Correctional Complex in Petersburg, Virginia (“FCC Petersburg”), Corrections Officer B. White filed Incident Report number 3505042 charging Petitioner with violating Code 299A most like Code 225. [Docs. 1 at 1; 1-1 at 8-10.] On June 22, 2021, a disciplinary hearing was held and Discipline Hearing Officer (“DHO”) L. Callis found Petitioner guilty of Code 225. [Doc. 1 at 2.] DHO Callis issued a DHO Report on July 23, 2021, imposing the following sanctions for the Code 225 violation: 20 days of disciplinary segregation, 6 months loss of commissary privileges, and 6 months loss of email privileges. [Doc. 1-1 at 19-22.] Petitioner contends the DHO's findings violated his due process rights. [Doc. 1 at 2.]
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Southeast Regional Office on September 15, 2021, but that appeal was rejected on October 5, 2021. [Id. at 2; Doc. 1-1 at 24-30.] Petitioner filed another appeal to the Mid-Atlantic Regional Office on October 14, 2021, but that appeal was also rejected on October 24, 2021. [Docs. 1 at 3; 1-1 at 35.] Petitioner then filed an appeal to the BOP Central Office on December 21, 2021, but he never received a response. [Docs. 1 at 3; 1-1 at 36-38.]
Petitioner then filed this Petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on February 6, 2022. [Doc. 1.] Petitioner asserts the following grounds in his Petition, quoted substantially verbatim:
GROUND ONE: I did not commit the prohibited act of Code 299A most like Code 225 or Code 225. I never violated any BOP rules and regulations and policies because I did not express anything inappropriate or disrespectful towards Ms. B. White verbally or in writing. I never gave her a note/letter.
SUPPORTING FACTS : On May 18, 2021, I was inside my cell #75 in D- South when Ms. B. White made a round and passed my cell. I never gave her a note or a letter. On section 11 of the incident report, Ms. B. White clearly stated that all the three papers read, “Dear Ms. White: I appreciate you. I respect you the most. I want to thank you.” However, none of these statements would constitute Code 299A or 225.
GROUND TWO: On May 18, 2021, I only received one bogus incident report Code 299A most like Code 225. I was never charged with Code 225. On June 22, 2021, the DHO violated my due process rights and found me guilty of Code 225 without providing me advance notice 24 hours prior to DHO hearing.
SUPPORTING FACTS : At the beginning of the DHO hearing, Ms. L. Callis (DHO) clearly stated that I was charged with Code 299A most like Code 225. However, at the conclusion of the DHO hearing, she found me guilty of Code 225 without providing me advance notice 24 hours prior to the DHO hearing or without a rewrite and denied me the opportunity to call witnesses [or] to gather evidence for my defense.
GROUND THREE: The DHO refused to give me a copy of my DHO report for several months. Then, I was transferred from FCC Petersburg, Virginia, to FCI Williamsburg, South Carolina, with a pending DHO appeal. Southeast Regional Office unfairly and improperly rejected my DHO appeal (BP-10).
SUPPORTING FACTS : The DHO refused to give me a copy of my DHO report for several months and prevented me from timely filing my DHO appeal and from seeking relief through the BOP grievance process. Because I was in Southeast Region when I received a copy of my DHO report, Southeast Regional Office had jurisdiction over my DHO appeal but improperly rejected my appeal.
GROUND FOUR: I complied with the instruction that I received in the rejection notice from Southeast Regional Office and resubmitted my DHO appeal in MidAtlantic Regional Office. However, Mid-Atlantic Regional Office also rejected my appeal for being untimely.
SUPPORTING FACTS : Southeast Regional Office and Mid-Atlantic Regional Office used machination and misrepresentation and gave me misleading or conflicting statements in the rejection notices as to where I should file my DHO appeal. On November 2, 2021, I filed my DHO appeal in Southeast Regional Office for the second time. On December 21, 2021, I filed my DHO appeal in the Central Office in DC.
GROUND FIVE: I am 64 years old. I have been in continuous incarceration for nearly a quarter of a century. I have served nearly 80% of my total sentence of 32 years. I have maintained clear conduct for nearly 8 years. I am planning to see the Parole Board for my parole rehearing pretty soon. This bogus incident report adversely affects the
overall conditions of my confinement and creates undue burden and significant hardship on the overall quality of my daily life and severely cripples or most seriously jeopardizes my chances of being granted parole at my next rehearing. Specifically, the Parole Board can use the bogus incident report against me as a perfect excuse to deny my parole. Likewise, corrupt prison officials can use the bogus incident report as a disguise to discriminate against me with unfettered impunity to deny me certain rights and privileges and opportunities that are available to other prisoners. I have been already denied gainful employment benefits in Education Department and in UNICOR under the pretext that I must maintain one year clear conduct in order to be hired even though I am highly qualified for the jobs. Prison officials are also using the bogus incident report against me to increase my custody classification points and to prevent me from going to low or minimum custody facilities.[Id. at 6-8.] For his relief, Petitioner asks that the Court (1) expunge the Incident Report; (2) order prison officials to not use that Incident Report against him in any future proceedings, including for any parole rehearing, computation of Petitioner's custody classification points, and eligibility for employment opportunities and programming; and (3) transfer Petitioner to a low custody or minimum custody facility. [Id. at 7.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Petition
Petitioner brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, the pro se petition is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means only that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the petitioner could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the petitioner's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
Habeas Corpus
Habeas corpus proceedings are the proper mechanism for a prisoner to challenge the legality or duration of his custody. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). The primary means of attacking the validity of a federal conviction and sentence is through a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, while a petition for habeas corpus under § 2241 is the proper method to challenge the computation or execution of a federal sentence. See United States v. Little, 392 F.3d 671, 678-79 (4th Cir. 2004).
A petitioner may bring a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2241 if he is “attack[ing] the computation and execution of the sentence rather than the sentence itself.” United States v. Miller, 871 F.2d 488, 490 (4th Cir. 1989). A petition pursuant to § 2241 challenging the execution of a federal prisoner's sentence generally addresses “such matters as the administration of parole, computation of a prisoner's sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, prison transfers, type of detention and prison conditions.” Jiminian v. Nash, 245 F.3d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 2001); see also Manigault v. Lamanna, No. 8:06-cv-047-JFA-BHH, 2006 WL 1328780, at *1 (D.S.C. May 11, 2006) (“A motion pursuant to § 2241 generally challenges the execution of a federal prisoner's sentence, such as parole matters, computation of sentence by prison officials, prison disciplinary actions, and prison transfers.”). Thus, an analysis under § 2241 is the appropriate mechanism by which to review Petitioner's claims arising from the DHO hearing.
DISCUSSION
Respondent argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on all claims raised in the Petition. [Doc. 18.] Specifically, Respondent contends that Petitioner's claims are not cognizable under § 2241 because they do not affect the fact or duration of his confinement. [ Id. at 2-4.] The Court agrees.
“[T]he settled rules [provide] that habeas corpus relief is appropriate only when a prisoner attacks the fact or duration of confinement; whereas, challenges to the conditions of confinement that would not result in a definite reduction in the length of confinement are properly brought by some other procedural vehicle, including a Bivens action.” Mentzos v. BOP, No. 3:19-cv-450, 2020 WL 5645818, at *4 (E.D. Va. Sept. 22, 2020) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). Thus, although a petition for habeas corpus relief allows a federal inmate to seek “immediate release or a speedier release from” confinement, Preiser, 411 U.S. at 498, “a § 2241 claim only permits a petitioner to assert a liberty interest.” Mitchell v. Entzel, No. 1:19-cv-10, 2020 WL 523264, at *8 (N.D. W.Va. Jan. 9, 2020), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 522143 (N.D. W.Va. Jan. 31, 2020). However, sanctions such as disciplinary segregation or the loss of privileges such as commissary, phone, and visitation, “do not involve a liberty interest because they do not impact the length of his confinement” and, thus, “they do not state a claim for relief” under § 2241. Id.
Here, the Petition fails to state a claim for relief because Petitioner has not alleged the loss of any liberty interest. “Petitioner's sanctions, including disciplinary segregation and loss of [commissary and email] privileges do not involve a liberty interest, because they do not impact the length of his confinement[ and, t]herefore, they do not state a claim for relief.” Thompson v. Entzel, No. 5:19-cv-11, 2019 WL 4794742, at *6 (N.D. W.Va. Sept. 6, 2019), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 4781873 (N.D. W.Va. Sept. 30, 2019), aff'd, 801 Fed.Appx. 139 (4th Cir. 2020). “[B]ecause [Petitoner] did not suffer the loss of good conduct time, or any sanction resulting in a direct change in the length or duration of his overall confinement, he cannot establish a liberty interest on that basis in order to assert a cognizable procedural or substantive due process claim.” Miller v. Ballard, No. 2:13-cv-15024, 2016 WL 5395711, at *3 (S.D. W.Va. July 15, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 5387642 (S.D. W.Va. Sept. 23, 2016).
The Court will now briefly address each of Petitioner's five grounds for relief. Ground One appears to assert a claim of actual innocence. [Doc. 1 at 6 (“I did not commit the prohibited act of Code 299A most like Code 225 or Code 225.”).] However, a claim of actual innocence is not a basis for federal habeas corpus relief in the prison disciplinary context. Belt v. Warden FCI Edgefield, No. 9:17-cv-0286-JFA-BM, 2017 WL 6820041, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 20, 2017) (collecting cases), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 321549 (D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2018).
Ground Two appears to assert a claim for due process violations based on Petitioner's contention that he was initially charged with a Code 299A most like Code 255 violation but that DHO Callis found Petitioner guilty of Code 225 “without providing [Petitioner] advance notice 24 hours prior to the DHO hearing.” [Doc. 1 at 6.] As noted, Petitioner has not alleged the deprivation of any protected liberty interest and is therefore unable to assert a due process claim. Further, even if Petitioner had identified a protected liberty interest, his assertion in Ground Two is without merit because he received adequate due process regarding the alleged disciplinary infraction. Petitioner was provided advanced written notice of the charges against him as he was given a copy of the Incident Report on May 18, 2021, by staff member Delossantos. [Doc. 1-1 at 19.] Petitioner was advised of his rights by staff member R. Smith on May 24, 2021. [Id.] Petitioner was represented at the DHO hearing by Unit Manager W. Stallings. [Id.] Petitioner waived his right to call witnesses. [Id. at 20.] After receiving evidence, DHO Callis issued a written decision identifying the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action. [ Id. at 19-22.] These procedural steps, along with others, satisfy the requirements of due process under Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563, 567-70 (1974). See Jackson v. Labier, No. 9:07-cv-01317-RBH, 2008 WL 3992653, at *10 (D.S.C. Aug. 25, 2008). Critically, the Incident Report provided notice that Petitioner was being charged with “Prohibited Act Code(s) 225 299A.” [Doc. 1-1 at 8.] Thus, Petitioner's contention that he did not have 24-hour notice of the charged code violations is simply without merit as he has attached to his Petition a signed copy of the Incident Report giving him that very notice. [Id. at 8-9.]
Ground Three appears to assert a claim for violations of due process and/or for interfering with the BOP grievance process because the DHO report was not issued for several months. [Doc. 1 at 6.] The DHO hearing was held on June 22, 2021. [Doc. 1-1 at 19.] DHO Callis issued the DHO Report on July 23, 2021. [Id. at 22.] Petitioner received the DHO Report on September 15, 2021. [Id.] The relevant BOP policy states that “[t]he DHO gives the inmate a written copy of the decisions and disposition, ordinarily within 15 work days of the decision.” BOP Program Statement 5270.09, at 34.3.Nevertheless, the approximately two-month delay in this case between the issuance of the DHO Report and its delivery to Petitioner does not give rise to a due process violation. See Gainer v. Breckon, No. 7:19-cv-00450, 2022 WL 1502569, at *3 (W.D. Va. May 12, 2022). “[C]ourts have held that inmates do not suffer any prejudice when they receive the DHO's report months after the hearing, and that such a multi-month delay does not constitute a due process violation.” Smith v. Andrews, No. 3:19-cv-701, 2020 WL 6386862, at *3 (E.D. Va. Oct. 30, 2020) (collecting cases). Further, to the extent Petitioner asserts that the BOP's failure to abide by its own regulations vests him with a constitutional claim, any such claim fails. See, e.g., United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 751-52 (1979) (explaining the violation of an agency regulation does not raise a constitutional question).
BOP Program Statement 5270.09 is available at https://www.bop.gov/policy/ progstat/5270009.pdf. (last visited Sept. 7, 2022).
Ground Four appears to assert a claim that Petitioner was denied adequate opportunities by BOP staff to appeal his disciplinary conviction through the BOP administrative remedies process. [Doc. 1 at 7 (alleging that the BOP “used machination and misrepresentation and gave me misleading or conflicting statements”).] This claim fails because there is no constitutional right to a prison grievance system. Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994); Sanders v. Holder, No. 3:09-cv-3342-CMC-JRM, 2010 WL 1463432, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 11, 2010) (“Petitioner has no constitutional right of access to a prison grievance system such as the BOP's administrative remedies program.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2010 WL 1463429 (D.S.C. Apr. 12, 2010). Further, Petitioner is unable to show that he suffered any prejudice because he “was not barred from pursuing this habeas corpus action and he will not be precluded for lack of administrative exhaustion from engaging in any further litigation on the facts involved in this case.” Kerr v. Rogers, No. 5:16-cv-00278-MGL-KDW, 2016 WL 5109544, at *5 (D.S.C. Sept. 12, 2016), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2016 WL 5076074 (D.S.C. Sept. 20, 2016), aff'd, 671 Fed.Appx. 74 (4th Cir. 2016).
Finally, Ground Five appears to assert that Petitioner will suffer adverse collateral affects due to the “bogus incident report” with respect to future parole eligibility, loss of privileges, and improper custody classification and/or prison transfers. [Doc. 1 at 8.] As to Petitioner's argument concerning his future parole eligibility, courts have rejected such “efforts to identify a liberty interest in future parole prospects as too speculative.” Pinkney v. U.S. Dep't of Just., No. 1:07-cv-132, 2009 WL 385476, at *3 (N.D. W.Va. Feb. 17, 2009) (collecting cases); Parks v. Jordan, 573 Fed.Appx. 233, 235 (3d Cir. 2014) (“The fact that the disciplinary infraction may affect [petitioner's] chances at parole is insufficient to bring his due process claims within the ambit of habeas.”). As to any loss of privileges, as noted above, such a claim is not cognizable in this action. See, e.g., Reid v. Antonelli, No. 6:18-cv-990-MGL-KFM, 2018 WL 2770167, at *2 (D.S.C. May 22, 2018) (“The loss of commissary privileges that the petitioner suffered as a result of the disciplinary charge does not give rise to a federal habeas corpus claim because it fails to affect the length of the petitioner's confinement.”), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 2764785 (D.S.C. June 7, 2018), aff'd, 746 Fed.Appx. 226 (4th Cir. 2018). Finally, Petitioner's custody classification claim and/or prison assignment claim are also not cognizable under § 2241. See Rodriguez v. Streeval, No. 7:20-cv-373, 2020 WL 3840424, at *2 (W.D. Va. July 8, 2020) (“Challenges to a federal prisoner's custody classification . . . [are] not cognizable in habeas under § 2241.”); Rodriguez v. Ratledge, 715 Fed.Appx. 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting that a claim challenging a transfer from one prison to another is not a cognizable § 2241 claim because it challenges the conditions of an inmate's confinement, not its fact or duration).
In sum, Petitioner has failed to state a cognizable claim for relief under § 2241 and Respondent's motion for summary judgment therefore should be granted.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the undersigned recommends that Respondent's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 18] be GRANTED and the Petition [Doc. 1] be DENIED and DISMISSED.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.