Nor is Taylor's alleged confinement to "punitive seg" (Dkt. No. 11: Am. Compl. ΒΆ II(E)[5]), a basis for equitable tolling. E.g., Reese v. United States, 11 Civ. 5432, 2012 WL 195607 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012) ("Simply being placed in the SHU alone does not constitute a basis for equitable tolling."); Prescod v. Brown, 10 Civ. 2395, 2011 WL 182063 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011) (Peck, M.J.) ("[K]eeplock or SHU status does not provide a basis for equitable tolling." (citing cases)), report & rec. adopted, 2011 WL 497855 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011); Pillco v. Bradt, 10 Civ. 2393, 2010 WL 3398467 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2010) ("To meet the extraordinary circumstances standard, a petitioner must prove that the cause of his delay was 'both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.'