Reese v. United States

4 Citing cases

  1. Then v. Griffin

    17-CV-3681 (MKB) (E.D.N.Y. May. 25, 2018)   Cited 3 times

    See Gonzalez v. Rikers Island Warden, No. 14-CV-6749, 2016 WL 8711444, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2016) ("Courts in this Circuit have consistently held that 'transfers between prison facilities' and 'solitary confinement' are routine experiences of prison life and do not rise to a level of extraordinary circumstances." (collecting cases)), report and recommendation adopted, No. 14-CV-6749, 2016 WL 8711079 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016); Walker v. Sheahan, No. 13-CV-0361, 2013 WL 2181039, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013) (same); Reese v. United States, No. 11-CV-5432, 2012 WL 195607, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012) ("Simply being placed in the SHU alone does not constitute a basis for equitable tolling." (first citing Prescod v. Brown, 2011 WL 182063, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 497855 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011); and then citing Pillco v. Bradt, 2010 WL 3398467, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2010))).

  2. Reese v. United States

    15-CV-6083 (DLI) (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2016)

    On January 23, 2012, this Court denied Petitioner's § 2255 motion as time barred under the one-year limitations period imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See Reese v. United States, 2012 WL 195607 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012). In light of that dismissal, § 2255 prohibits this Court from considering a second or successive motion by Petitioner, challenging the same conviction and sentence, unless the Court of Appeals first authorizes the filing of the motion.

  3. Pemberton v. United States

    1:12CR55-1 (M.D.N.C. May. 4, 2015)   Cited 2 times

    Finally, Petitioner cannot secure equitable tolling based on his bald declaration that he "was in the SHU (Special Housing Unit) and did not have the proper access to file a timely motion" (Docket Entry 29 at 2). See San Martin v. McNeil, 633 F.3d 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Mere conclusory allegations are insufficient to raise the issue of equitable tolling."); Reese v. United States, No. 11CV5432(DLI), 2012 WL 195607, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012) (unpublished) ("Simply being placed in the SHU alone does not constitute a basis for equitable tolling."); Allen v. Johnson, 602 F. Supp. 2d 724, 728 (E.D. Va. 2009) (holding that "solitary confinement [and] lockdowns . . . do not qualify as extraordinary circumstances" warranting equitable tolling (internal quotation marks omitted)), appeal dismissed, 396 F. App'x 46 (4th Cir. 2010). In sum, Paragraph (1) of Subsection 2255(f) applies and Petitioner's Section 2255 Motion is untimely.

  4. Taylor v. Fresh Direct

    12 Civ. 2084 (GBD) (AJP) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2012)   Cited 10 times
    Stating that the ninety-day period in which a complaint must be filed following receipt of an EEOC right-to-sue letter expired on January 3, 2012, where January 1 and January 2 were both legal holidays

    Nor is Taylor's alleged confinement to "punitive seg" (Dkt. No. 11: Am. Compl. ¶ II(E)[5]), a basis for equitable tolling. E.g., Reese v. United States, 11 Civ. 5432, 2012 WL 195607 at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2012) ("Simply being placed in the SHU alone does not constitute a basis for equitable tolling."); Prescod v. Brown, 10 Civ. 2395, 2011 WL 182063 at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2011) (Peck, M.J.) ("[K]eeplock or SHU status does not provide a basis for equitable tolling." (citing cases)), report & rec. adopted, 2011 WL 497855 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011); Pillco v. Bradt, 10 Civ. 2393, 2010 WL 3398467 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2010) ("To meet the extraordinary circumstances standard, a petitioner must prove that the cause of his delay was 'both beyond his control and unavoidable even with diligence.'