Opinion
No. 3-03-CV-2810-M.
June 21, 2004
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff James Reedom, appearing pro se and proceeding in forma pauperis, brings this action against Defendants Patricia Scott and Donnie Scott under the Fair Housing Act of 1968 ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Texas law. For the reasons stated herein, the clerk's entry of default dated May 21, 2004 should be vacated. Plaintiff's federal claims should be summarily dismissed with prejudice and his state claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
I.
In the fall of 2003, plaintiff, who is African-American, entered into an agreement with defendants to lease a house located at 5629 Bong Drive in Fort Worth, Texas. After the rental agreement was signed, plaintiff discovered that the house was uninhabitable. Specifically, plaintiff states that the house was infested with rats, the roof leaked, the floors were rotten, and the sewage system was inadequate. When defendants failed to correct these problems, plaintiff expended $4,000 of his own money to repair the house. Eventually, plaintiff and his roommate, Arnold James Bell, who also is African-American, were evicted from the premises.
On November 19, 2003, plaintiff tendered a pro se complaint to the district clerk and filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis. Because the information provided by plaintiff in his pauper's affidavit indicates that he lacks the funds necessary to prosecute this case, the court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and allowed the complaint to be filed. Two sets of written interrogatories were then sent to plaintiff in order to obtain additional information about the factual basis of this suit. See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179, 181 (5th Cir. 1985). After reviewing plaintiff's interrogatory answers, the court directed the district clerk to issue summonses to the defendants. See ORDER, 12/5/03. The case was referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan for pretrial management by order dated January 27, 2004.
Plaintiff also filed an application for temporary restraining order and temporary injunction to prevent defendants "from exercising a writ of possession from a forcible detainer while the case was in federal court under federal removal." (Plf. Mot. at 1). By order dated December 9, 2003, the TRO was denied. REP. REC. OF MAG. JUDGE, 12/05/03, adopted by ORDER, 12/9/03.
Patricia Scott and Donnie Scott were served with process on January 8, 2004. However, neither defendant answered or otherwise appeared as required by law. On May 10, 2004, plaintiff moved for the entry of default and a default judgment. The clerk entered defaults against both defendants on May 21, 2004. A default prove-up was held on June 18, 2004. At that time, plaintiff appeared in court to present evidence regarding the liability of defendants and his damages. After considering this evidence, the court now determines that plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief under the FHS or section 1981.
II.
A district court may dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis at any time if it determines that the action is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) (ii). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 2232, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984). The complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the plaintiff and the allegations contained therein must be taken as true. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 1161, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993); Baker v. Putnal, 75 F.3d 190, 196 (5th Cir. 1996).
A.
Plaintiff sues defendants for violations of the FHA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601, et seq., and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The FHA prohibits discrimination "against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). Section 1981 provides, in pertinent part:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . . For purposes of this section, the term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance, modification and termination of contracts, and enjoyment of all benefits or privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (b). A race discrimination claim brought under either the FHA or section 1981 is governed by the same burden-shifting paradigm applicable to Title VII cases. Baker v. The Waterford Square Homeowners Ass'n, 2002 WL 1461735 at *3 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 2, 2002) (FHA claim); Harrington v. Harris, 118 F.3d 359, 367 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 603 (1997) (section 1981 claim). Thus, in order to establish a violation of the FHA or section 1981, plaintiff must prove that defendants discriminated against him on the basis of race.
Plaintiff alleges no facts to support his claim that defendants discriminated against him because he is African-American. ( See Sec. Spears Quest. #1). At the default prove-up, Arnold James Bell testified that he believes defendants were motivated by racial animus because they rent only to low-income African-American tenants. However, the court is unable to infer race discrimination based on this fact alone. Without more, plaintiff cannot establish his claims under the FHA and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
B.
Plaintiff also sues for breach of contract and fraud under Texas law. A federal court has broad discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims after all federal claims have been dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); see also Noble v. White, 996 F.2d 797, 799 (5th Cir. 1993). Among the factors to be considered in exercising this discretion are judicial economy, convenience, fairness, federalism, and comity. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 403-04, 90 S.Ct. 1207, 1213-14, 25 L.Ed.2d 442 (1970). When all federal claims are dismissed prior to trial, these factors weigh heavily in favor of declining to exercise jurisdiction. See Bunch v. Duncan, 2002 WL 324287 at * 4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2002), quoting Parker Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) ("Our general rule is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendant are dismissed."). Accordingly, plaintiff's state law claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
RECOMMENDATION
The clerk's entry of default against Defendants Patricia Scott and Donnie Scott should be vacated. Plaintiff's federal claims should be summarily dismissed with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). His state claims should be dismissed without prejudice.
The disposition of this case does not prevent plaintiff from refiling his breach of contract and fraud claims in Texas state court.