Opinion
Civil Action No. 03-5300.
June 18, 2004
Memorandum
I. Introduction
Derek Reed ("Reed"), the plaintiff in this case, alleges that the Defendants William C. Lindsay ("Lindsay") and Andrew M. Stone ("Stone") assaulted and battered him on or about November 24, 2001 while in New York City. Presently before the Court are the Defendants' Motions to Dismiss this Case or for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rules 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6) and 56. Defendants argue that the Court does not possess personal jurisdiction over them and that Reed's case is time barred by the New York statute of limitations. Because resolution of these issues requires the Court to consider facts submitted by Defendants in affidavits, it will treat Defendants' motions as motions for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56.
Reed opposes both these arguments, contending that the Court possesses personal jurisdiction over both Lindsay and Stone and that Pennsylvania's or New Jersey's statute of limitations applies to his cause of action, thereby making the filing of his Complaint timely. However, Reed does not dispute the affidavits of Lindsay and Stone. II. Facts
During the time of the alleged assault and battery, which Reed alleges occurred in New York City, Reed, Lindsay and Stone attended Gettysburg College in Pennsylvania, where they temporarily resided. (Lindsay Aff. ¶ 9; Stone Aff. ¶ 7.) However, as of the filing date of this lawsuit, the uncontested facts show that none of the parties continued to reside in Pennsylvania and that Lindsay and Stone never permanently resided in Pennsylvania.
Although Reed has submitted no affidavits or other evidence, the parties do not appear to contest that Reed also attended Gettysburg College during the time in question.
As to Reed, the Complaint states that he is a resident of New Jersey. (Complaint ¶ 1.) Lindsay and Stone do not contest this allegation. Additionally, the Complaint does not allege that Reed has ever been a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, and no facts to the contrary have been submitted to the Court.
Lindsay, in an uncontested affidavit, states that he has always been a resident of the state of New York, and although he attended Gettysburg College, he has never maintained a permanent residency in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (Lindsay Aff. ¶¶ 2-3, 9.) Similarly, Stone's uncontested affidavit states that he has always been a permanent resident of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and has never maintained a permanent residency in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, even though he attended college at Gettysburg College. (Stone Aff. ¶ 2-3, 9.)
As will be discussed more fully below, these facts demonstrate that the Court does not possess in personam jurisdiction over the defendants in this cause of action, and that even if the Court did possess in personam jurisdiction, New York law would govern, thereby making Reed's cause of action time barred by New York's statute of limitations.
III. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A factual dispute is "material" if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id. A party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility for informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue at trial, the moving party's initial burden can be met simply by "pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case." Id. at 325. After the moving party has met its initial burden, "the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by making a factual showing "sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the opposing party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.
IV. Discussion A. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendants Stone and Lindsay
Personal jurisdiction constitutes the threshold issue in this case. The issue is whether the Court possesses in personam jurisdiction over two out of state defendants who only resided in Pennsylvania temporarily, while in college, for an alleged tort that occurred in New York.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances, the Court perceives no basis upon which to assert in personam jurisdiction over Defendants, who have never been domiciled in Pennsylvania, for a civil wrong that also took place outside of Pennsylvania and against a permanent resident of New Jersey. The Defendants' only contact with Pennsylvania is that they attended school here. Based on these circumstances, the facts do not suffice to force the defendants to submit to this Court's jurisdiction.
The Court's opinion on this matter does not hinge solely on the fact that the defendants were college students and only temporarily resided in Pennsylvania. Indeed, if the alleged tortious conduct took place in Pennsylvania, jurisdiction would most likely be appropriate. However, the alleged offensive conduct in this case occurred outside of Pennsylvania. Hence, for reasons more fully explained below, the Court finds that it lacks in personam jurisdiction over the defendants.
The Supreme Court has held the Constitution requires that a foreign defendant have at least "minimum contacts" with the forum state. As set forth by the Supreme Court:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quotingMilliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
It is notable that Pennsylvania's long arm statute does not require more substantial contacts than the minimum contacts required by the Constitution. In Pennsylvania, jurisdiction may be based "'on the most minimum contact with [the] Commonwealth allowed under the Constitution of the United States.'" Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (1984) (quoting Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 42, § 5322(b)). This is important because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) permits a district court to assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident to the extent allowed under the law of the state in which the district court sits. Id.
This Constitutional test requires a court to first ask, "whether 'the quality and nature of the defendant's activity is such that it is reasonable and fair to require [that it] conduct [its] defense in that state.'" Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd., 735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984) (quotingKulko v. Superior Court of California, 436 U.S. 84, 92, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 98 S.Ct. 1690 (1978)) (alterations in original). In elucidating when it is reasonable and fair to assert in personam jurisdiction over an individual who does not consent to the court's jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has held that jurisdiction may be asserted where a "defendant has 'purposefully directed' his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to' those activities." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984)).
Asserting jurisdiction over the defendants in this case would not be reasonable or fair. Although Defendants Stone and Lindsay both temporarily resided in Pennsylvania during the time in question, they no longer do so. Additionally, the complained of activity in this case did not occur in Pennsylvania, but in New York. Hence, the defendants' conduct did not arise out of or relate to their activities in Pennsylvania, but to their activities in New York. Moreover, the defendants' allegedly offensive conduct was not directed at a permanent resident of Pennsylvania, but at a permanent resident of New Jersey. Taking all of this into consideration, it is inconceivable that, after leaving their temporary residencies in Pennsylvania, Stone and Lindsay could have expected to be hailed back to Pennsylvania to defend against an alleged wrong that occurred in New York against a permanent resident of New Jersey. To expect otherwise offends traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, and the jurisdictional limitations of due process. See e.g. Bonacci v. Marks, No. 92-4047, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12482, at *10-11 (D.N.J. Sept. 7, 1993) ("Sporadic contact between the nonresident defendant and the forum state may suffice if the plaintiff's cause of action arises out of, or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum state. . . . there is sufficient due process contact for personal jurisdiction if the defendant purposefully has directed his activities at residents of the forum.")).
As an additional matter, Reed does not raise a proper defense to Stone's and Lindsay's jurisdictional challenges. Third Circuit precedent requires that "[o]nce a jurisdictional defense has been properly raised, 'the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating contacts with the forum state sufficient to give the court in personam jurisdiction.'" Time Share Vacation Club, 735 F.2d at 63 (quoting Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v. L'Union, 723 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1983)). A plaintiff may not rely on the pleadings alone. Digiralomo v. Shop at Home, Inc., No. 01-4001, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23640, at *6 (D.N.J. Mar. 1, 2001). "[T]he plaintiff must come forward with facts sufficient to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the district court has personal jurisdiction." Id.
Reed simply does not elucidate any facts in his Complaint or in opposition to Defendants' Motion to rebut Stone's and Lindsay's claims that the Court does not possess in personam jurisdiction over them. B. Even If the Court Possessed Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants, Plaintiff's Case Would be Time Barred By the Statute of Limitations
Even if the Court did possess personal jurisdiction over the defendants, New York law would apply to Reed's claims and his case would be time barred by New York's statute of limitations, which requires a plaintiff to file a cause of action for assault and battery within a year after the allegedly offensive conduct. N.Y. Civ. Law § 215(3) (McKinney 1990).
Pennsylvania's and New Jersey's Statute of Limitations, on the other hand, permit a cause of action for assault and battery to be filed up to two years after the occurrence of the alleged tortious conduct. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:8-3.
Although Plaintiff contends that the Court should apply Pennsylvania or New Jersey law to the case at hand, it is clear that New York is the state with the most significant interest in this case. This is determined by applying Pennsylvania's choice of law provision, which constitutes a two step inquiry. First, it must be determined if a conflict of law exists. Scirex Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 313 F.3d 841, 847 (3d Cir. 2002) (citingKeystone Aerial Surveys, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Property Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 777 A.2d 84, 94 (Pa.Super. 2001)). If no conflict exists, Pennsylvania law may be applied. Id. If a conflict does exist, a court must "analyze the governmental interests underlying the issue and determine which state has the greater interest in the application of its law." Keystone Aerial Surveys, Inc., 777 A.2d at 94. This analysis has been referred to as a "flexible approach," which favors the law of the jurisdiction "'having the most interest in the problem.'"Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 203 A.2d 796, 805-806 ( Pa. 1964) (quoting Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963)). It requires that courts not merely count the contacts a state has with an injury, but consider them qualitatively. Normann v. Johns-Manville Corp., 593 A.2d 890, 893 (Pa.Super. 1991) (citing Cipolla v. Shaposka, 267 A.2d 854 (Pa. 1970)). Factors that may be considered include:
In a diversity cause of action, a district court must "apply the choice of law rules of the forum state in determining which state's law will be applied to the substantive issues before it." Shuder v. McDonald's Corp., 859 F.2d 266, 269 (3d Cir. 1988).
(1) The place where the injury occurred;
(2) The place where the conduct causing the injury occurred;
(3) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation, and place of business of the parties; and
(4) The place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws § 145(2); see also Griffith, 203 A.2d at 802 (citing the flexible approach adopted by the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts with approval).
Reed's first argument maintains that the conflict in this case is a false conflict, and that Pennsylvania is the only state with a true interest in the litigation of this matter. In so arguing, Reed contends that it was merely "fortuitous" that the alleged injurious conduct occurred in New York and not Pennsylvania, because the alleged assault and battery arose out of a previous conflict between the parties in Pennsylvania. As such, Reed's argument maintains that the alleged assault and battery was an inevitable consequence of the previous Pennsylvania conflict. It was merely by coincidence that the assault and battery occurred in New York.
Reed's argument is faulty on two grounds. First, his Complaint does not refer to any conflict arising in Pennsylvania prior to the alleged assault and battery, and he has not presented any evidence of such a conflict, through depositions, affidavits or otherwise. Second, to label this a false conflict because the connection to New York is fortuitous stretches the imagination too far. Based on this argument, one might argue that the location of any event in life is fortuitous. In this case, Reed, Lindsay and Stone purposefully traveled to New York prior to the occurrence of the alleged tortious conduct. The Defendants did not engage in the alleged tortious conduct prior to leaving Pennsylvania and did not wait to return to Pennsylvania. Hence, the alleged conduct in question did not occur in New York by chance or happenstance. It occurred because of the purposeful acts of the defendants.
In contrast, acts that are fortuitous happen accidentally. Thus, the cases cited by Reed lend no support to his case. BothReyno v. Piper Aircraft Co., 630 F.2d 149, 170 (3d Cir. 1980) and Kuchinic v. McCrory, 422 Pa. 620 (1966) deal with airplane crashes. By their nature, airplanes travel across state lines. While such interstate travel is intended, the crashes, except when done intentionally, are not. Hence, the location of a crash constitutes a fortuitous event that bears no relationship to the state in which the crash occurred. This is distinguishable from the present case in which the Defendants' conscious actions caused the alleged conduct to occur in New York.
Reed's second argument is that Pennsylvania has the most significant relationship to his alleged injury. In making this argument, Reed contends that the Parties' relationship was centered in Pennsylvania and that the parties temporarily resided there while in school. In the alternative, Reed contends that New Jersey law should apply because Reed is a resident of New Jersey. These arguments are unpersuasive.
In weighing the aforementioned factors, it is clear that New York and not Pennsylvania or New Jersey law applies to this case. New Jersey has only one contact to the alleged incident. It is the place of Reed's domicile. This one factor alone cannot require the application of New Jersey law.
Pennsylvania's interest in this litigation is that the parties' relationship was centered there. Additionally, the parties temporarily resided there. However, this second factor is relatively weak. Although the parties temporarily resided in Pennsylvania, their permanent domiciles were all located outside of Pennsylvania. Furthermore, at the time this lawsuit was filed, none of the parties presently resided in Pennsylvania.
Thus, the Court considers New York to be the state with the most significant contacts to this case. Where neither state is the primary domicile of the aggrieved party, it makes sense that the situs of the alleged offensive conduct and injury has the most significant interest. Such a state has a compelling interest in protecting not just its residents but also its visitors from tortious conduct. In contrast, Pennsylvania has a relatively weak interest in protecting temporary residents from such conduct when that conduct occurs out of state. Thus, because New York's statute of limitations places a one year limitation on causes of action for assault and battery, Reed's case would be time barred if the Court possessed in personam jurisdiction and the authority to decide the issue.
V. Conclusion
Because the Defendants do not possess sufficient minimum contacts with Pennsylvania, this Court is without jurisdiction to hear this case. However, assuming arguendo the Court did possess such jurisdiction, Reed's case would be time barred by the New York statute of limitations.
An appropriate Order follows.