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finding that the "filing of a false misbehavior report can qualify as an adverse action for the purposes of a First Amendment retaliation" where the report resulted in a fourteen-day term in keeplock confinement
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Civil Action No. 9:11-CV-0250 (TJM/DEP)
07-26-2012
BENJI D. REED, Plaintiff, v. JOHN DOE No. 1; JOHN DOE No 2; and M. SOTO, Defendants.
BENJI D. REED, Pro Se 1 HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN Attorney General of the State JAMES SEAMAN, ESQ. Assistant Attorney General
APPEARANCES: FOR PLAINTIFF:
The court's records list the plaintiff as being confined in the Southport Correctional Facility "Southport", based upon a change of address notice filed by Reed on February 22, 2012. See Dkt. No. 20. According to publically available information, however, Reed is now being held in the Elmira Correctional Facility. See http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov.GCA00P00/WINQ130 (screenshot attached). Plaintiff is reminded of his obligation under the court's rules to notify the court and defendants' counsel of any further address changes in order to facilitate communications with him. See N.Y.N.D.L.R. 10.1(c)(2).
OF COUNSEL:
FOR DEFENDANT SOTO:
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General of the State
JAMES SEAMAN, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General
DAVID E. PEEBLES
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT, RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Benji D. Reed, a New York State prison inmate who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, has commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various prison officials, alleging deprivation of his civil rights. While the scope of his complaint has been winnowed, and it now raises only claims of cruel and unusual punishment and unlawful retaliation against one named and two unidentified "Doe" defendants, as originally filed that pleading asserted an array of claims stemming from incidents occurring at two separate correctional facilities.
In response to plaintiff's complaint the sole remaining named defendant has moved for dismissal of all claims against him for failure to state a plausible cause of action upon which relief may be granted. The plaintiff, in turn, has applied for leave to amend his complaint, and for appointment of counsel to represent him pro bono. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that defendant's motion to dismiss be granted, and will deny plaintiff's application for leave to amend, on the basis of futility in light of my recommendation regarding the legal sufficiency of his existing claims, as well as his request for assignment of counsel. I. BACKGROUND
The following recitation is drawn principally from plaintiff's amended complaint, the contents of which have been accepted as true for purposes of the pending motion. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)); see also Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S. Ct. 1733, 1734 (1964). In light of the severance and transfer of plaintiff's claims arising out of his confinement at the Southport Correctional Facility to the Western District of New York, I have included only the facts relevant to his remaining claims, all of which involve events at the Eastern Correctional Facility ("Eastern").
Plaintiff is a prison inmate entrusted to the custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS"). See generally Complaint (Dkt. No. 1). At the times relevant to the claims remaining in the action, he was designated to Eastern, located in Napanoch, New York. Id. at 3.
The events giving rise to plaintiff's claims were set in motion on September 14, 2010, when Reed developed an illness he attributed to food consumed in the mess hall at Eastern. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 32-37. Plaintiff maintains that the food causing his intestinal issues was known by defendant John Doe No. 1 to have been contaminated, and should have been inspected by defendant John Doe No. 2 prior to being served to the inmates. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 41-42.
Plaintiff was initially treated on the following day at the facility's medical clinic, along with several other affected inmates, and given "dymotabs" to address the condition. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 38. The medication was subsequently discontinued on that same day, however, and plaintiff was confined to his cell and placed on a water diet for one day. Id. at ¶¶ 39-40.
While at Eastern, plaintiff was designated to undergo alcohol and substance abuse treatment in a program ("ASAT") overseen by defendant M. Soto, a counselor at the facility. See Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 6, 31. Based apparently upon his absence from ASAT treatment while confined to his cell due to illness, plaintiff received a misbehavior report authored by defendant M. Soto accusing him of lying regarding his location on September 15, 2010, after being asked why he did not appear for ASAT treatment, and for failing to follow facility rules regarding attendance in the program. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 46-47. At a subsequent disciplinary hearing conducted to address the accusations set forth in the misbehavior report, however, the charges were dismissed. Id. at ¶ 49.
Following plaintiff's return to the ASAT program he was called into defendant Soto's office and, after a conversation during which Reed refused to discuss the conviction that led to his incarceration, he was forced by Soto to sign a refusal to participate in ASAT training. Id. at ¶¶ 50-56. Plaintiff was then removed from the ASAT program and escorted to his cell, where he remained in keeplock pending a hearing stemming from the issuance of a new misbehavior report alleging his refusal to participate in the ASAT program. Id. at ¶ 57-61. At a subsequent hearing, conducted on October 12, 2010, Reed was exonerated of all charges and was permitted to return to the ASAT program. Id. at ¶¶ 64-65. As a result of issuance of the two misbehavior reports, while at Eastern plaintiff was keeplock-confined for a total of fourteen days. See Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. No. 18) p. 6 of 18.
Keeplock is a form of confinement restricting an inmate to his or her cell, separating the inmate from others, and depriving the inmate of participation in normal prison activities. Gittens v. LeFevre, 891 F.2d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1989); Warburton v. Goord, 14 F. Supp.2d 289, 293 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (citing Gittens); Tinsley v. Greene, No. 95-CV-1765, 1997 WL 160124, at *2 n. 2 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1997) (Pooler, D.J. & Homer, M.J.) (citing, inter alia, Green v. Bauvi, 46 F.3d 189, 192 (2d Cir. 1995)) (Copies of all unreported decisions cited in this document have been appended for the convenience of the pro se plaintiff.). Inmate conditions while keeplocked are substantially the same as in the general population, the primary exception being that keeplocked inmates do not leave their cells for out-of-cell programs, and are usually allowed less time out of their cells on the weekends. Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F. Supp. 2d 615, 628 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
Plaintiff's opposition memorandum also intimates that he lost good time credits as a result of the relevant events. See Plaintiff's Memorandum (Dkt. No. 18) at p. 6 of 18. There is no factual support for this statement, however, in either plaintiff's complaint or the attached exhibits.
Plaintiff was subsequently transferred out of Eastern and into the Southport Correctional Facility, located in Pine City, New York, in December 2010. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶ 71.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this action on March 8, 2011. Complaint (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff's complaint named the two Doe defendants, M. Soto, and seven corrections employees assigned to Southport as defendants, and asserted claims under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12,101 et seq., and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, additionally setting forth a pendent claim of negligence. By order issued on August 2, 2011, based upon an initial review of plaintiff's complaint and accompanying in forma pauperis application, Senior District Judge McAvoy ordered all claims arising from events occurring at Southport severed, and directed that those claims be transferred to the Western District of New York. Dkt. No. 4.
In lieu of answering plaintiff's complaint defendant Soto, the sole remaining named defendant in this action, moved on October 17, 2011 for dismissal of plaintiff's claims, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 11. In his motion defendant argues that plaintiff's complaint fails to allege a plausible claim upon which relief may be granted, and that in any event he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. Id. Plaintiff has since submitted a response in opposition to defendant's motion. Dkt. No. 18.
Following the filing of defendant's dismissal motion, plaintiff moved on December 7, 2011 for leave to file an amended complaint, pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. No. 14. In his motion Reed asserts that amendment is sought to permit elimination of the claims and references to the defendants affected by the transfer to the Western District of New York, and to clarify and expand upon facts set forth in his original complaint relating to events at Eastern. See Motion for Leave to Amend (Dkt. No. 14) ¶¶ 1-2. Plaintiff has also requested appointment of counsel to represent him in the action, pro bono. Dkt. No. 15. Defendant Soto has since responded in opposition to those motions, by letter dated January 6, 2011 from his counsel, Megan A. Brown, Esq., arguing that the motion for leave to amend should be denied as futile for the same reasons as set forth in his dismissal motion, and taking no position with regard to plaintiff's request for appointment of counsel. Dkt. No. 17.
Defendant's dismissal motion, which is now ripe for determination, has been referred to me for the issuance of a report and recommendation, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Northern District of New York Rule 72.3(c). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The remaining two motions brought by the plaintiff fall within my non-consensual jurisdiction, and therefore will be addressed in the form of an order from this court.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Defendant's motion to dismiss a complaint, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, calls upon a court to gauge the facial sufficiency of that pleading, utilizing as a backdrop a pleading standard which, though unexacting in its requirements, "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed me accusation" in order to withstand scrutiny. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, (2007)). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While modest in its requirement, that rule commands that a complaint contain more than mere legal conclusions; "[w]hile legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Ashcroft, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
To withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must plead sufficient facts which, when accepted as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face. Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 188 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). As the Second Circuit has observed, "[w]hile Twombly does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require enough facts to 'nudge [plaintiff's] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'" In re Elevator Antitrust Litig., 502 F.3d 47, 50 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S. Ct. at 1974).
In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal motion, the court must accept the material facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546, 84 S. Ct. 1723, 1734 (1964); Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, LLP, 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 823, 124 S. Ct. 153 (2003); Burke v. Gregory, 356 F. Supp. 2d 179, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 2005) (Kahn, J.). The burden undertaken by a party requesting dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) is substantial; the question presented by such a motion is not whether the plaintiff is likely ultimately to prevail, "'but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims.'" Log On America, Inc. v. Promethean Asset Mgmt. L.L.C., 223 F. Supp.2d 435, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (quoting Gant v. Wallingford Bd. of Educ., 69 F.3d 669, 673 (2d Cir. 1995) (citations and quotations omitted)).
When assessing the sufficiency of a complaint against this backdrop, particular deference should be afforded to a pro se litigant whose complaint merits a generous construction by the court when determining whether it states a cognizable cause of action. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007) ('"[A] pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers'") (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 (1976) (internal quotations omitted)); Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 350 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); Donhauser v. Goord, 314 F. Supp.2d 119, 121 (N.D.N.Y. 2004) (Hurd, J.).
B. Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim
Plaintiff alleges that defendant Soto, motivated by Reed's use of the medical facilities at Eastern, issued two false misbehavior reports to him in September 2010. In response, Soto argues that plaintiff's vague and conclusory allegations offered in support of this retaliation claim are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
When adverse action is taken by prison officials against an inmate, motivated by the inmate's exercise of a right protected under the Constitution, including the provisions of the Eighth Amendment, a cognizable retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lies. See Franco v. Kelly, 854 F.2d 584, 588-90 (2d Cir. 2008). Claims by inmates that adverse actions taken by prison workers are, of course, easily incanted, and inmates often attribute adverse action, including the issuance of misbehavior reports, to retaliatory animus; courts must therefore approach such claims "with skepticism and particular care." Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d Cir. 1983)), overruled on other grounds, Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002); Davis, 320 F.3d at 352 (same).
In order to state a prima facie claim under section 1983 for retaliatory conduct, a plaintiff must advance non-conclusory allegations establishing that 1) the conduct at issue was protected; 2) the defendants took adverse action against the plaintiff; and 3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action - in other words, that the protected conduct was a "substantial or motivating factor" in the prison officials' decision to take action against the plaintiff. Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S. Ct. 568, 576 (1977); Dillon v. Morano, 497 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2007); Dawes, 239 F.3d at 492 (2d Cir. 2001). If the plaintiff succeeds in carrying this burden, then to avoid liability the defendants must show by a preponderance of the evidence that they would have taken action against the plaintiff "even in the absence of the protected conduct." Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, 97 S. Ct. at 576. If taken for both proper and improper reasons, state action may be upheld if the action would have been taken based on the proper reasons alone. Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 79 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
Affording plaintiff the deference which he is due as a pro se litigant and broadly construing his complaint, it appears that plaintiff is claiming the September misbehavior reports were issued in retaliation for his having sought medical treatment due to a sudden illness. As defendant correctly argues, the mere allegation that a false misbehavior report has been issued to an inmate, standing alone, does not rise to level of constitutional significance. Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997); Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982, 108 S. Ct. 1273 (1988)). The further assertion that the false misbehavior report was prompted by the accused inmate having engaged in protected activity, however, can suffice to support a cognizable claim of unlawful retaliation. Franco, 854 F.2d at 589.
In his motion defendant Soto has assumed, for the sake of argument, that plaintiff's resort to seeking medical treatment within the facility constituted protected activity sufficient to trigger the First Amendment's protection against retaliation, and I will do likewise.
Having assumed plaintiff's ability to establish that he engaged in protected activity, the court's focus turns next to the question of whether he has sufficiently alleged that he experienced adverse action at the hands of the defendant. In the prison context, "[o]nly retaliatory conduct that would deter a similarly situated individual of ordinary firmness from exercising his or her constitutional rights constitutes an adverse action for a claim of retaliation." Dawes, 239 F.3d at 493; see also Davis, 320 F.3d at 353. The adverse action inquiry is a contextual one. Davis, 320 F.3d at 353. Courts should bear in mind that "[p]risoners may be required to tolerate more ... than average citizens, before a [retaliatory] action taken against them is considered adverse." Id.
The adverse action alleged by the plaintiff in support of his retaliation claim consists of the issuance of two false misbehavior reports. The filing of a false misbehavior report can qualify as an adverse action for purposes of a First Amendment retaliation. See Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir.2004). The false misbehavior reports at issue led to plaintiff's keeplock cell confinement for a period of fourteen days. At this early procedural juncture, I am unable to conclude that this allegation is insufficient to support a plausible finding of adverse action. See Edwards v. Horn, No. 2012 WL 76012, at * 16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012) (citing Gill, 389 F.3d at 384) (false misbehavior report and placement in keeplock constitutes adverse action)).
The third requirement for pleading a cognizable retaliation claim involves linking the protected activity and adverse action alleged. It is in connection with this element that plaintiff's retaliation claim fails. In cases involving claims of retaliation based on the filing of allegedly false misbehavior reports, "[t]he difficulty lies in establishing a retaliatory motive." Barclay v. New York, 477 F. Supp. 2d 546, 558 (N.D.N.Y. 2007). When evaluating whether a misbehavior report is the product of retaliatory animus, an analysis most typically undertaken on a motion for summary judgment, courts generally look to several factors as bearing upon any potential nexus between the protected conduct and the misbehavior report, including "temporal proximity, prior good discipline, finding of not guilty at the disciplinary hearing, and statements by defendants as to their motives." Id. (citations omitted); see also Rivera v. Goord, 119 F. Supp. 2d 327, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
In this instance, plaintiff's complaint is lacking in any factual allegations that would establish the requisite nexus between his visit to the prison infirmary and defendant Soto's issuance of misbehavior reports. Indeed, in his complaint Reed hypothesizes that Soto disbelieved his explanation concerning his whereabouts at the time of his absence from the ASAT program, prompting him to issue the misbehavior reports. See, e.g., Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 54, 65. This allegation by the plaintiff suggests a non-retaliatory motivation for defendant's issuance of the misbehavior reports at issue.
In light of the plaintiff's failure to state facts sufficient to satisfy this critical element of a retaliation claim, I recommend that the defendant's motion be granted, and that plaintiff's retaliation cause of action under the First Amendment be dismissed.
C. Verbal Harassment/False Misbehavior Report Claims
Liberally construed, plaintiff's complaint could be interpreted as also asserting a claim, independent of retaliation, under the Eighth Amendment for harassment and for issuance of false misbehavior reports.
As was previously observed, the mere issuance of a false misbehavior report, standing alone, is insufficient to support a cognizable claim under the Eighth Amendment or otherwise on behalf of a prison inmate; a "prison inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report." Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997) (citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 982, 108 S. Ct. 1273 (1988)). As such, plaintiff's claim related to the filing of a false misbehavior report, independent of his First Amendment retaliation cause of action, is subject to dismissal.
Defendant also interprets plaintiff's complaint as alleging that he was generally harassed by Soto, and that Soto stated to other inmates that Reed was a monster with whom they should not associate. These allegations appear to be calculated to state a violation of his Eighth Amendment's right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Reed's complaint, however, fails to allege any conduct that would warrant Eighth Amendment protection. As a general matter, mere verbal harassment, including that accompanied by the use of profanity, without any corresponding physical injury does not support a cognizable claim under section 1983, however boorish and unprofessional the alleged conduct may be. See Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986); Gill v. Hoadley, 261 F. Supp. 2d 113, 129 (N.D.N.Y. 2003); Aziz Zarif Shabazz v. Pico, 994 F. Supp. 460, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Nor do threats amount to a constitutional violation. Malsh v. Austin, 901 F. Supp. 757, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Because plaintiff's complaint lacks allegations that would plausibly support an Eighth Amendment violation claim, I recommend dismissal of that cause of action, to the extent that his complaint may properly be construed as raising such a claim.
D. Leave to Amend
Following the filing of plaintiff's dismissal motion, plaintiff sought leave to amend his complaint to flesh out certain factual allegations in support of his claims. See Dkt. No. 14. At this juncture the court must determine whether to permit the amendment now sought, and additionally whether the plaintiff should be granted leave to amend in any event in an effort to cure the deficiencies perceived with regard to his existing claims against defendant Soto.
1. Leave to Amend Generally
Motions for leave to amend are governed by Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which provides, in pertinent part, that unless amendment as a matter of right is permitted-under circumstances not applicable here-a party may amend its pleading "only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires." Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Under Rule 15(a), leave to amend ordinarily should be liberally granted absent undue delay, bad faith, dilatory tactics, undue prejudice in being served with the proposed pleading, or futility. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182, 83 S. Ct. 227, 230 (1962); Elma RT v. Landesmann Int'l Mktg. Corp., No. 98-CIV.-662, 2000 WL 297197, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2000) (citing Foman).
Notwithstanding the familiar and well-accepted precept that leave to amend should be granted freely and is typically permitted, if a claim contained in a proposed amended complaint would be vulnerable in the face of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, then permitting amendment would be an act of futility that should not be sanctioned. See, e.g., Saxholm AS v. Dynal, Inc., 938 F. Supp. 120, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); In re Boesky Sec. Litig., 882 F. Supp. 1371, 1379 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). If, on the other hand, a proposed claim sets forth facts and circumstances that may entitle the pleader to relief, then futility is not a proper basis on which to deny the right to amend. Saxholm, 938 F. Supp. at 124 (citing Allstate Ins. v. Administratia Asigurarilor De Stat, 875 F. Supp. 1022, 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) and Mathon v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 875 F. Supp. 986, 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (leave to replead granted where court could not say that under no circumstances would proposed claims provide a basis for relief)).
The court has reviewed plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, and finds that it suffers from the same deficiencies as are noted above with respect to his initial complaint. Accordingly, plaintiff's motion for leave to file the proposed amended complaint accompanying his motion will be denied on basis of futility. Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted); accord Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) ("[T]he court need not grant leave to amend where it appears that amendment would prove to be unproductive or futile.") (citation omitted).
In his proposed amended complaint plaintiff seeks to add a claim for denial of equal protection, alleging that because he was issued a misbehavior report for exercising his right to seek medical care while another inmate was permitted to attend the medical clinic, his right to equal protection was denied. See Proposed Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 14-1) ¶ 60.
The Equal Protection Clause directs state actors to treat similarly situated people alike. See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985). To prove a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was treated differently than others similarly situated as a result of intentional or purposeful discrimination directed at an identifiable or suspect class. See Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1057 (2d Cir.1995) (citing, inter alia, McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 107 S. Ct. 1756, 1767 (1987)). The plaintiff must also show that the disparity in treatment "cannot survive the appropriate level of scrutiny which, in the prison setting, means that he must demonstrate that his treatment was not reasonably related to [any] legitimate penological interests." Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 225, 121 S.Ct. 1475 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
While plaintiff's complaint alleges that he was treated differently than another inmate, conspicuously absent from his proposed amended complaint is the allegation of any fact plausibly suggesting that the difference in treatment was the result of an intentional or purposeful discrimination directed at an identifiable or suspect class. For this reason, I find that the proposed amended complaint does not state a plausible equal protection claim.
2. Leave to Amend to Cure Perceived Deficiencies
Ordinarily, a court should not dismiss a complaint filed by a pro se litigant without granting leave to amend at least once if there is any indication that a valid claim might be stated. Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir.1991) (emphasis added); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (leave to amend "shall be freely given when justice so requires"); see also Mathon, 875 F. Supp. at 1003 (leave to replead granted where court could not say that under no circumstances would proposed claims provide a basis for relief). The court must next determine whether plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of this general rule, given the procedural history of the case.
I am unable to conclude that if given the opportunity plaintiff nonetheless would be unable to set forth allegations sufficient to avoid dismissal of his claims at this early stage in the litigation. If he opts to amend, however, the plaintiff is advised that the law requires that "complaints relying on the civil rights statutes are insufficient unless they contain some specific allegations of fact indicating a deprivation of rights, instead of a litany of general conclusions that shock but have no meaning." Hunt v. Budd, 895 F. Supp. 35, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, C.J.) (citing Barr v. Abrams, 810 F.2d 358, 363 (2d Cir. 1987) (other citations omitted)); Pourzandvakil v. Humphry, No. 94-CV-1594, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7136, at *24-25 (N.D.N.Y. May 22, 1995) (Pooler, D.J.) (citation omitted). Such an amended complaint will replace the existing second amended complaint, and therefore must be a wholly integrated and complete pleading that does not rely upon or incorporate by reference any pleading or document previously filed with the court. See Harris v. City of N.Y., 186 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(a). The proposed amended complaint also specifically allege facts indicating the involvement of each of the named defendants in the constitutional deprivations alleged, providing sufficient detail to establish the they were tangibly connected to those deprivations. See Bass v. Jackson, 790 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1986).
E. Appointment of Counsel
In addition to seeking leave to amend, plaintiff has applied to the court for appointment of counsel. As a threshold matter, prior to requesting appointment of pro bono counsel, a party must first demonstrate that he or she has been unable to obtain counsel through the private sector or public interest firms. Cooper v. A. Sargenti Co., Inc., 877 F.2d 170, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). Given that plaintiff has not provided the court with information regarding any efforts by him to obtain counsel, his request is subject to denial on this basis alone.
Turning to the merits of his application, I find that Reed has not demonstrated entitlement to appointment of counsel under the applicable statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1) affords district courts broad - though not limitless - discretion in determining whether to appoint counsel to represent indigent civil litigants. Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60. In Hodge, the Second Circuit noted that when exercising that discretion the court
should first determine whether the indigent's position seems likely to be of substance. If the claim meets this threshold requirement, the court should then consider the indigent's ability to investigate the crucial facts, whether conflicting evidence implicating the need for cross-examination will be the major proof presented to the fact finder, the indigent's ability to present the case, the complexity of the legal issues and any special reason in th[e] case why appointment of counsel would be more likely to lead to a just determination.Id. at 61-62; see also Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1341 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Hodge). As can be seen, of the criteria enunciated by the Second Circuit to be considered when determining whether assignment of pro bono counsel is appropriate, the most important is the merits - that is, "whether the indigent's position [is] likely to be of substance." Cooper, 877 F.2d at 172 (citations and internal quotations omitted). Where a plaintiff does not provide a court with evidence, as opposed to mere allegations, relating to his or her claims, that party does not meet this threshold requirement. See Herman v. Runyon, No. 96 CIV. 6080, 1997 WL 118379, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1997).
Each case must be decided on its own facts. Velasquez v. O'Keefe, 899 F. Supp. 972, 974 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, J.) (citing Hodge, 802 F.2d at 61). Although the Constitution guarantees indigent litigants "meaningful access" to the courts, it does not entitle all such parties to receive the benefit of pro bono representation. Hodge, 802 F.2d at 60. While, as was previously indicated, the appointment of counsel to represent indigent parties in civil suits is authorized by statute, when that authority is exercised the court is required to call upon attorneys to donate their time pro bono to the benefit of indigent litigants and the court. Accordingly, in deference to the limited resources available to the court to serve the interests of the many indigent litigants who pursue claims before it, and recognizing the "thankless burden" associated with such assignments, Miller v. Pleasure, 296 F.2d 283, 285 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 964, 82 S. Ct. 1592 (1962), courts should not grant such applications indiscriminately, but instead must exercise good judgment and restraint in doing so. Cooper, 877 F.2d at172.
In this instance, plaintiff has failed to make a sufficient showing to warrant appointment of counsel to represent him at this early stage in the litigation. Plaintiff's application for appointment of counsel will therefore be denied, without prejudice to renewal.
In accordance with the customary practice of this court, once a case passes through the discovery and motion phases and becomes trial ready, pro bono counsel is usually appointed for an indigent pro se inmate litigant to assist in preparation for and during the trial, either as attorney of record or as standby counsel.
IV. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATION
The claims now remaining before this court, following severance and transfer of a portion of plaintiff's original complaint to the Western District of New York, include causes of action against two John Doe defendants arising from plaintiff's alleged investigation of contaminated food, as well as claims of retaliation, harassment, and cruel and unusual punishment against defendant M. Soto. Because the Doe defendants in this case have not yet been identified and thus have not yet appeared in the action, the court has not been called upon to gauge the sufficiency of plaintiff's claims against those defendants. Turning to plaintiff's claims against defendant Soto, based upon a review of the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint, I recommend that all claims against defendant Soto be dismissed, with leave to replead, and find it unnecessary to address his alternative argument, to the effect that he is entitled to qualified immunity from suit.
Because only "persons" may act under color of state law, a complaint seeking money damages pursuant to § 1983 must name one or more individuals as defendants. See Walker v. State of Connecticut, No. 3:06CV165, 2006 WL 1981783, *2 (D. Conn. 2006); Connor v. Hurley, No. 00Civ.8354LTSAJP, 2004 WL 885828, at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). It is not uncommon for a pro se plaintiff to include a "John Doe" or other unknown defendants, together with named defendants in a complaint. Generally, in such cases the complaint is served upon the named defendants, and the plaintiff is directed to pursue discovery to identify the John Doe(s) and to thereafter seek leave to amend the complaint to name them as defendants. In the event the plaintiff chooses to abandon his claims against defendant Soto, leaving only the two "Doe" defendants in the case, I recommend the court allow plaintiff to name the superintendent of Eastern as a defendant - even though there is no suggestion of his or her personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violations - solely for the purpose of effecting service and so that issue may be joined. In that event, once issue is joined, plaintiff may seek through discovery the identity of the John Doe defendant(s). See Peralta v. Doe, No. 04-CV-6559P, 2005 WL 357358, at * 2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2005) (citing Valentin v. Dinkins, 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997)) (district court should assist pro se incarcerated litigants with their inquiry into the identities of unknown defendants and "may pursue any course that it deems appropriate to a further inquiry into the identity" of the unknown defendant); Harvey v. Corrections Officer, 9:09-CV-0517 (N.D.N.Y.) (LEK/GHL) (order filed 6/1/09 permitting plaintiff to name superintendent as a defendant for purposes of service and discovery).
Turning to plaintiff's pending motions, I conclude that his motion for leave to amend should be denied, based upon futility, but that he nonetheless should be afforded an opportunity to further amend his complaint in an effort to cure the deficiencies cited in this report and recommendation in connection with his allegations against defendant Soto. I further find, however, that he has failed to establish a basis for appointment of counsel to represent him, pro bono, at this early procedural juncture in this litigation.
Based upon the foregoing it is hereby respectfully,
RECOMMENDED that the motion of defendant M. Soto to dismiss plaintiff's claims against him in this action (Dkt. No. 11) be GRANTED, and that all claims against that defendant be DISMISSED, with leave to file an amended complaint as directed above within thirty days from the date of the filing a decision and order acting upon my recommendation of dismissal; and it is further
ORDERED, that plaintiff's motions for leave to amend (Dkt. No. 14) and for appointment of counsel (Dkt. No. 15) be DENIED in all respects, without prejudice to renewal.
NOTICE: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may lodge written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the Clerk of the Court within FOURTEEN days of service of this report. FAILURE TO SO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 6(d), 72; Roland v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1993).
It is hereby ORDERED that the clerk of the court serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon the parties in accordance with this court's local rules.
_________________
David E. Peebles
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Dated: July 26, 2012
Syracuse, NY