Opinion
1:20-CV-8352 (JPC)
08-19-2021
CALVIN REED, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF NEW YORK; NYC POLICE DEP'T; POLICE OFFICERS JOHN DOE #1-#6; POLICE OFFICER DENNIS; DETECTIVE JANE AND JOHN DOE, #1-#2; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION; CYNTHIA BRANN, Commissioner; ANTHONY ANNUCCI, Acting Commissioner; NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION formerly, New York State Division of Parole; P.O., ANDRE LOGAN; SPO MEDINA; AREA SUPV., NYDIA GARCIA; SPO SHANAVIA DANDRIDE; NYS PAROLE OFFICERS JANE AND JOHN DOE #1-#5; NEW YORK CITY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION Riker's Island Correction Officers; JOHN AND JANE DOE #1-#5 Special Search Team; JOHN DOE #1-#3; CENTRAL BOOKING NURSE JANE DOE, Defendants.
ORDER OF SERVICE
JOHN P. CRONAN, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff, currently held in the Vernon C. Bain Center in the Bronx, New York, brings this pro se action alleging that the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights as well as state law. He seeks damages, his immediate release, and the lifting of a parole-violation warrant lodged against him. Plaintiff sues: (1) the City of New York; (2) the New York City Police Department (“NYPD”); (3) the New York City Department of Correction (“NYCDOC”); (4) the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”); (5) NYPD officers; (6) NYCDOC officers; (7) an NYCDOC nurse; (8) the NYCDOC Commissioner, Cynthia Brann; (9) the DOCCS Acting Commissioner, Anthony Annucci; and (10) DOCCS parole officers, senior parole officers, and another DOCCS parole supervisor. The Court construes Plaintiff's amended complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claims for habeas corpus relief, and claims under state law.
Plaintiff filed his original complaint while he was held in the North Infirmary Command (“NIC”) on Rikers Island.
By order dated December 7, 2020, the court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee, even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
The Court directs service on the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis. The Court also directs the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York to provide Plaintiff and the Court with the identities and badge numbers of those unidentified defendants who are members of the NYPD.
The Court severs Plaintiff's claims against the City of New York and NYCDOC employees that arise out of Plaintiff's allegedly being locked in a NYCDOC van and directs the Clerk of Court to open those claims in a new unassigned civil action.
The Court also severs Plaintiff's claims that arise from his allegedly being beaten by DOCCS parole officers and directs the Clerk of Court to open those claims in another new unassigned civil action.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against DOCCS, the NYPD, and the NYCDOC. The Court also dismisses Plaintiff's remaining claims - those not including Plaintiff's claims against the City of New York, “Police Officers John Doe #1-#6, ” Police Officer Dennis, and “Detective Jane and John Doe #1-#2, ” that arise from Plaintiff's arrests and detainments by members of the NYPD - without prejudice as improperly joined.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis in original).
BACKGROUND
In an order dated December 15, 2020, Judge Stanton dismissed Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOCCS as well as his claims against the NYPD. (ECF 6, at 4-5.) In that same order, Judge Stanton granted Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint: (1) alleging facts sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 against the City of New York, (2) naming individuals as defendants and alleging facts showing those individuals' personal involvement in the violations of his constitutional rights, and (3) naming as defendants only those against whom he asserts properly joined claims. (Id. at 5-8.) Judge Stanton also noted that if Plaintiff was seeking his release from confinement, he would have to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. (Id. at 8 n.3.) After Judge Stanton granted Plaintiff two extensions of time, Plaintiff filed his amended complaint, which is the operative pleading for this action. (ECF 12.) The relevant allegations are discussed below.
DISCUSSION
A. DOCCS, the NYPD, and the NYCDOC
In his December 15, 2020 order, Judge Stanton dismissed Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOCCS, a New York State agency, under the doctrine of Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF 6, at 4-5.) Judge Stanton also dismissed Plaintiff's claims against the NYPD because, as an agency of the City of New York, it is not a suable entity. (Id. at 5.)
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff again names DOCCS and the NYPD as defendants, and names the NYCDOC, another agency of the City of New York, as a defendant. For the reasons discussed in Judge Stanton's December 15, 2020 order, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 against DOCCS and dismisses his claims against the NYPD and the NYCDOC.
B. Service on the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis
Because Plaintiff has been granted permission to proceed IFP, he is entitled to rely on the Court and the U.S. Marshals Service to effect service. Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d. 119, 123 n.6 (2d Cir. 2013); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process . . . in [IFP] cases.”); Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(3) (the court must order the Marshals Service to serve if the plaintiff is authorized to proceed IFP). Although Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally requires that the summons and complaint be served within 90 days of the date the complaint is filed, Plaintiff is proceeding IFP and could not have served summonses and the amended complaint on the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis until the Court reviewed the amended complaint and ordered that summonses be issued for those defendants. The Court therefore extends the time to serve the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis with the amended complaint until 90 days after the date the summonses are issued for those defendants. If the amended complaint is not served on the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis within that time, Plaintiff should request an extension of time for service. See Meilleur v. Strong, 682 F.3d 56, 63 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that it is the plaintiff's responsibility to request an extension of time for service); see also Murray v. Pataki, 378 Fed.Appx. 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (“As long as the [plaintiff proceeding IFP] provides the information necessary to identify the defendant, the Marshals' failure to effect service automatically constitutes ‘good cause' for an extension of time within the meaning of Rule 4(m).”).
To allow Plaintiff to effect service of the amended complaint on the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis through the U.S. Marshals Service, the Clerk of Court is instructed to fill out U.S. Marshals Service Process Receipt and Return forms (“USM-285 form”) for those defendants. The Clerk of Court is further instructed to issue summonses for the City of New York and Police Officer Dennis and deliver to the Marshals Service all the paperwork necessary for the Marshals Service to effect service of the summonses and the amended complaint on those defendants.
Plaintiff must notify the Court in writing if his address changes, and the Court may dismiss the action if Plaintiff fails to do so.
C. Unidentified defendants who are NYPD members
Under Valentin v. Dinkins, a pro se litigant is entitled to assistance from the district court in identifying a defendant. 121 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1997). In the amended complaint, Plaintiff supplies sufficient information to permit the NYPD to identify those unidentified defendants who are NYPD members. They are those NYPD members who participated in Plaintiff's arrests and detainments on September 9, 2019; July 17, 2020; and August 3, 2020; they were likely assigned to the NYPD's 48th Precinct on those dates. It is therefore ordered that the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, who is the attorney for and agent of the NYPD, must ascertain the identity and badge number of each of those unidentified NYPD members whom Plaintiff seeks to sue here and the addresses where those defendants may be served. The Corporation Counsel must provide this information to Plaintiff and the Court within 60 days of the date of this order.
Within 30 days of receiving this information, Plaintiff must file a second amended complaint in which he names as defendants those newly identified NYPD members. The second amended complaint will replace, not supplement, the original and amended complaints. A second amended complaint form that Plaintiff should complete is attached to this order. Once Plaintiff has filed a second amended complaint, the Court will screen it and, if necessary, issue an order directing service on the newly identified defendants.
D. Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
[p]ersons . . . may be joined in one action as defendants if: (A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences; and (B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the action.Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). A plaintiff may not pursue unrelated claims against multiple defendants. See, e.g., Deskovic v. City of Peekskill, 673 F.Supp.2d 154, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). “[T]he mere allegation that Plaintiff was injured by all Defendants is not sufficient [by itself] to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit pursuant to Rule 20(a).” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, second alteration in original); Webb v. Maldanado, No. 3:13-CV-0144, 2013 WL 3243135, at *3 (D. Conn. June 26, 2013) (“Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits[] . . . to prevent the sort of morass” created by a complaint with more than 20 defendants and multiple unrelated claims.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In the December 15, 2020 order, Judge Stanton held that Plaintiff's original complaint asserted unrelated claims against multiple defendants. (ECF 6, at 8.) In granting Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint, Judge Stanton directed Plaintiff to assert only related claims, and to name as defendants only those against whom he asserts related claims. (Id.) Judge Stanton informed Plaintiff that he “may seek relief for unrelated constitutional injuries by filing separate civil actions”; he noted that if Plaintiff was seeking release from confinement, he would have to make that request by filing a separate petition for a writ of habeas corpus, after exhausting available state remedies. (Id. at 6 n.3.)
Plaintiff has failed to comply with those instructions. The allegations in Plaintiff's amended complaint, in which he names multiple defendants, concern the following unrelated groups of events: (1) Plaintiff's arrests on September 9, 2019; July 17, 2020; and August 3, 2020; (2) an NYCDOC nurse's rejection of Plaintiff from the NYCDOC's central booking facility on August 3, 2020, because of a suspicion that Plaintiff was infected with COVID-19; (3) irregularities during Plaintiff's criminal proceedings; (4) NYCDOC officers' strip search of Plaintiff, their dogs' sniffing of him, and the officers' and dogs' trampling on his legal papers; (5) Plaintiff's being forced to sleep less than two feet away from other NYCDOC prisoners; (6) Plaintiff's being locked in an NYCDOC van in warm weather, with closed windows and without air conditioning, in or about August 2020, while correction officers were outside the van talking and laughing as Plaintiff was having difficulty breathing and was yelling for help; (7) DOCCS's administrative imposition of a period of postrelease supervision on Plaintiff that had not been included in the sentence originally imposed on him by the state court; and (8) six parole officers' beating of Plaintiff with batons on September 13, 2019, when Plaintiff reported to a DOCCS parole office.
Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The Court may also sever any claim against a party.” Id. In determining whether to sever a claim, the Court considers “the two requirements of Rule 20 and additional factors, including (1) whether severance will serve judicial economy; (2) whether prejudice to the parties would be caused by severance; and (3) whether the claims involve different witnesses and evidence.” Kehr v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 596 F.Supp.2d 821, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing cases).
In addition to Plaintiff's claims arising from his arrests and detainments by NYPD members, Plaintiff may have alleged facts sufficient to state claims with regard to the following two other groups of claims: (1) claims against NYCDOC employees and the City of New York arising out of Plaintiff's being locked in a NYCDOC van; and (2) claims arising from Plaintiff's being beaten by DOCCS parole officers. These two other groups of claims are clearly unrelated to each other and unrelated to Plaintiff's claims arising from his arrests and detainments. These claims would therefore involve different witnesses and evidence than the claims remaining in this action. Moreover, severance of these two groups of claims serves judicial economy and does not prejudice the defendants. In light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to sever these two other groups of claims from this action and to open each group of these claims in a new unassigned civil action.
With respect to Plaintiff's remaining groups of unrelated claims - Plaintiff's claims arising from: (1) an NYCDOC nurse's rejection of Plaintiff from the NYCDOC's central booking facility on August 3, 2020, because of a suspicion that Plaintiff was infected with COVID-19; (2) irregularities during Plaintiff's criminal proceedings; (3) NYCDOC officers' strip search of Plaintiff, their dogs' sniffing of him, and the NYCDOC officers' and dogs' trampling on his legal papers; (4) Plaintiff's being forced to sleep less than two feet away from other NYCDOC prisoners; and (5) DOCCS's administrative imposition of a period of postrelease supervision on Plaintiff - the Court dismisses these claims without prejudice as improperly joined.
The dismissal of these claims without prejudice includes any claims in which Plaintiff seeks habeas corpus relief from his confinement, under either 28 U.S.C. § 2241 or § 2254. Under the gatekeeping provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a habeas corpus petitioner must obtain authorization from the appropriate court of appeals before filing a second or successive habeas corpus petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). A petition is “second or successive” if a previous habeas corpus petition was decided on the merits. See Graham v. Costello, 299 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2002). Because conversion of a submission into a habeas corpus petition may restrict a litigant's future attempts to seek habeas corpus relief, a district court must normally give a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to withdraw his submission before the court recharacterizes it as a § 2241 petition or a § 2254 petition. See Simon v. United States, 359 F.3d 139, 144 (2d Cir. 2004); Cook v. N.Y.State Div. of Parole, 321 F.3d 274, 282 (2d Cir. 2003). But there is no need to give Plaintiff notice and an opportunity to withdraw here because the Court's dismissal of habeas corpus relief without prejudice does not trigger the AEDPA's restrictions on second or successive petitions. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 489 (2000).
CONCLUSION
The Court directs the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff, together with an information package.
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against DOCCS, and his claims against the NYCDOC and the NYPD.
The Court also directs the Clerk of Court to: (1) issue summonses for the City of New
York and Police Officer Dennis; (2) complete USM-285 forms with the service addresses for those defendants; and (3) deliver all documents necessary to effect service of summonses and the amended complaint on those defendants to the U.S. Marshals Service.
The Court further directs the Clerk of Court to mail a copy of this order and a copy of the amended complaint to the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York at 100 Church Street, New York, New York 10007. The Corporation Counsel must provide to Plaintiff and the Court, within 60 days of the date of this order, the identities and badge numbers of the unidentified defendants who are members of the NYPD.
A second amended complaint form is attached to this order.
The Court additionally directs the Clerk of Court to sever Plaintiff's claims against NYCDOC employees and the City of New York arising out of his allegedly being locked in a NYCDOC van (claims against the City of New York and “John and Jane Doe #1-#5”) and to open those claims in a new unassigned civil action.
The Court also directs the Clerk of Court to sever Plaintiff's claims arising from his allegedly being beaten by DOCCS parole officers (claims against “PO Andre Logan, ” “SPO Medina, ” “Area Supv. Nydia Garcia, ” “SPO Shanavia Dandride, ” and “NYS Parole Officers Jane and John Doe #1-#5”) and to open those claims in another new unassigned civil action.
The Court further directs the Clerk of Court to enter a copy of this order and a copy of the amended complaint (ECF 12) on the docket of each new unassigned civil action opened as a result of this order.
The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims against the remaining defendants (those not including Plaintiff's claims against the City of New York, “Police Officers John Doe #1-#6, ” Police Officer Dennis, and “Detective Jane and John Doe #1-#2”) without prejudice as improperly joined. In sum, the only remaining claims are those stemming from Plaintiff's arrests on September 9, 2019; July 17, 2020; and August 3, 2020. Thus, the only remaining defendants in this action are as follows: the City of New York, “Police Officers John Doe #1-#6, ” Police Officer Dennis, and “Detective Jane and John Doe #1-#2.”
Because Plaintiff makes no substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right, a certificate of appealability will not issue. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.
DEFENDANTS AND SERVICE ADDRESSES
1. City of New York
Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, New York 10007 2. Police Officer Dennis
48thPrecinct
450 Cross Bronx Expressway
Bronx, New York 10457-7401