Opinion
No. 06-17-00075-CR
12-22-2017
DONTAVIOUS TERRELL REDMOND, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 5th District Court Cass County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2016F00125 Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted Dontavious Terrell Redmond of aggravated sexual assault of a child and assessed a sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment, which the trial court imposed. Redmond appeals.
In our cause number 06-17-00076-CR, Redmond also appeals from another conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child.
Initially, the State believed that the offense was committed in 2012 when Redmond was a juvenile. However, due to a delayed outcry, Redmond was already twenty years old at the time of his apprehension. Nevertheless, the State filed a motion for detention of a juvenile in Cass County. The juvenile court held a hearing on the State's motion, found that Redmond had engaged in delinquent conduct, and ordered him detained in the Cass County Jail for ten days "until the filing of [a] petition to transfer [the matter to the district court] or until further order of the Juvenile Court." Yet, the record does not establish that the State ever filed a petition to adjudicate juvenile conduct in the juvenile court. Instead, because Redmond was an adult, and additional information suggested that the offense could have occurred after Redmond was an adult, he was indicted and tried in district court.
On appeal, Redmond argues that (1) the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over the proceedings because a motion to transfer proceedings to the district court was never filed, (2) the trial court erred in refusing Redmond's request that his status as a juvenile had already been established in the juvenile proceeding, and (3) the trial court violated his "SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO CONFRONTATION AND PRODUCTION OF EVIDENCE" by excluding the records of the juvenile proceeding "WHICH WOULD HAVE SHOWN BIAS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE'S WITNESSES." Because Redmond was not a juvenile when he was arrested, indicted, or tried, the district court had jurisdiction over these proceedings. Consequently, we overrule Redmond's first two points of error. We further find that Redmond's third point of error on appeal is not preserved. As a result, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. The District Court Had Jurisdiction Because Redmond Was Not a Juvenile
The juvenile court has "exclusive original jurisdiction" over "proceedings in all cases involving the delinquent conduct . . . engaged in by a person who was a child within the meaning of" the Juvenile Justice Code, located in Title 3 of the Texas Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.04(a) (West Supp. 2017). Only after the State files a petition requesting waiver and transfer may the juvenile court discretionarily transfer a case to district court for criminal proceedings. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(b) (West 2014). However, the term "child" means
a person who is:TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2) (West Supp. 2017). Generally, juvenile courts maintain jurisdiction over a child who has turned eighteen years old only to transfer the case to the criminal district court or dismiss the case. In re N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554, 556 (Tex. 1999) (concluding that jurisdiction in the juvenile court did not include jurisdiction to adjudicate an eighteen-year-old defendant). Moreover, if a defendant is arrested and charged with an offense after he becomes an adult, he is no longer a child within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Code. Ex parte Morgan, 595 S.W.2d 128, 129-30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (en banc); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.02(2). In such a circumstance, jurisdiction in the district court is proper. Morgan, 595 S.W.2d at 130; see Ex parte Thomas, 739 S.W.2d 363, 365-66 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc) (citing Moore v. McCotter, 781 F.2d 1089, 1092 (5th Cir. 1986)).
(A) ten years of age or older and under 17 years of age; or
(B) seventeen years of age or older and under 18 years of age who is alleged or found to have engaged in delinquent conduct or conduct indicating a need for supervision as a result of acts committed before becoming 17 years of age.
Redmond's first two points of error are predicated on the mistaken assertion that he was considered to be a juvenile in front of the juvenile court. Because Redmond was twenty years old when he was arrested, he was not a juvenile within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Code. Accordingly, the district court had jurisdiction over the proceedings against Redmond. In light of these findings, we overrule Redmond's first and second points of error.
II. Redmond Did Not Preserve His Third Point of Error
In his last point of error, Redmond argues that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment rights when it excluded records from the juvenile proceedings at trial. Redmond further argues that the records were admissible to demonstrate the bias of witnesses who testified at trial that the offense occurred in 2014, instead of 2012 as previously represented to the juvenile court. We find that Redmond did not preserve his last point of error.
Rule 33.1(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a complaint is not preserved for appeal unless it was made to the trial court "by a timely request . . . stat[ing] the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the context." TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a)(1). As stated in Resendez v. State,
Although there are no technical considerations or forms of words required to preserve an error for appeal, a party must be specific enough so as to "let the trial judge know what he wants, why he thinks himself entitled to it, and do so clearly enough for the judge to understand him at a time when the trial court is in a proper position to do something about it." The parties, not the judge, are responsible for the correct application of evidentiary rules; in order to preserve a complaint for appeal, the complaining party must have done everything necessary to bring the relevant evidentiary rule and its precise and proper application to the trial court's attention.Resendez v. State, 306 S.W.3d 308, 312-13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (footnotes and citations omitted). This concept of "party responsibility" means that "it is not enough to tell the judge that evidence is admissible." Reyna v. State, 168 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "The proponent, if he is the losing party on appeal, must have told the judge why the evidence was admissible." Id. Where the basis for admission of evidence is not clearly articulated, the losing party must "suffer on appeal the consequences of his insufficiently specific offer." Id. at 179 (citation omitted).
. . . .
[W]hen the context shows that a party failed to effectively communicate his argument, then the error will be deemed forfeited on appeal.
When Redmond offered records of the juvenile proceedings at trial, he argued only that the information was relevant to show that "the [S]tate itself contended that Mr. Redmond was a juvenile." The State objected to the documents on the grounds that they were irrelevant and could confuse the jury. The trial court offered Redmond several opportunities to explain why he believed the records should be admitted. Omitted from Redmond's explanations were the Sixth Amendment issues and argument related to bias that he now raises on appeal for the first time. Because the appellate arguments contained within Redmond's third point of error were never brought to the trial court's attention, they were not preserved. Accordingly, we overrule Redmond's last point of error.
III. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Bailey C. Moseley
Justice Date Submitted: December 21, 2017
Date Decided: December 22, 2017 Do Not Publish