Opinion
October 10, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Suffolk County (Tanenbaum, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.
Since the plaintiff sustained its initial burden of demonstrating its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (see, Marine Midland Bank v. Freedom Rd. Realty Assocs., 203 A.D.2d 538; LBV Prop. v. Greenport Dev. Co., 188 A.D.2d 588, 589), the defendant Neal Mandel was required to allege facts in opposition which, if true, would constitute a meritorious defense (see, Nassau Trust Co. v. Montrose Concrete Prods. Corp., 56 N.Y.2d 175, 182; Naugatuck Sav. Bank v. Gross, 214 A.D.2d 549). Accepting Neal Mandel's proof as true, and giving him the benefit of every favorable inference (see, Pellicane v. Norstar Bank, 213 A.D.2d 610; Marine Midland Bank v. Malmstrom, 186 A.D.2d 722, 723), he has successfully established the existence of factual issues warranting a plenary trial. Unlike those cases in which this Court has rejected a mortgagor's conclusory allegations in opposition to a foreclosing mortgagee's motion for summary judgment (see, Naugatuck Sav. Bank v. Gross, supra; Gemilas Chesed Kehilath Jakov Papa v. Oberlander, 212 A.D.2d 574; Marine Midland Bank v. Freedom Rd. Realty Assocs., 203 A.D.2d 538; City of New York v. Grosfeld Realty Co., 173 A.D.2d 436; Flintkote Co. v. Bert Bar Holding Corp., 114 A.D.2d 400), Neal Mandel's allegations are factually specific and are neither bare nor unsubstantiated (see, e.g., Pellicane v. Norstar Bank, supra; Bank of N.Y. v. Midland Ave. Dev., 193 A.D.2d 641). Mangano, P.J., Balletta, Pizzuto and Santucci, JJ., concur.