Summary
holding that a non-claim statute did not preclude a federal government agency from asserting its claim after the running of the limitations period
Summary of this case from City of Rochester v. Marcel A. Payeur, Inc.Opinion
No. 4471.
Argued April 3, 1956.
Decided April 27, 1956.
The provisions of the nonclaim statute (RSA 556:1, 3) that "no action shall be sustained against an executor unless the demand has been exhibited to him within one year after the original grant of administration" do not apply to claims by the federal government.
Hence, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, an agency of the federal government, is not precluded by such statute from presenting its claim against the estate of a deceased person after the expiration of the time limit but prior to the closing of the estate and before the real estate had been sold or conveyed to third parties where the charter of the agency contained no waiver of its immunity from nonclaim statutes.
PETITION, under RSA 556:28 by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred to as RFC) for leave to exhibit its claim and bring suit against the estate of Margaret J. Faulkner of whose will Winthrop Faulkner is the executor.
On October 26, 1951, the RFC loaned $300,000 to the Faulkner Colony Manufacturing Company and received as security mortgages of the company's property and certain guaranty agreements executed by its officers and their wives including said Margaret J. Faulkner. She died June 6, 1953, and the defendant was appointed executor by the probate court on June 19, 1953.
On October 30, 1953, the company went into receivership and on August 11, 1954, the RFC foreclosed its mortgages with a resulting deficiency of about $60,000. On October 11, 1954, it filed this petition asking leave of the Court to exhibit its claim against the estate which had not been prosecuted within the time limited by law.
After hearing the Court (Grant, J.) dismissed the petition and in so doing denied plaintiff's request for a ruling that "the RFC being a governmental agency is not bound by the Statute of Limitations as to the period in which it can file its claim against the estate of Margaret J. Faulkner."
Plaintiff's exception to the Court's denial of that request is the only matter in issue on this appeal.
Howard B. Lane (by brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
Faulkner, Plaut Hanna (Mr. Hanna orally), for the defendant.
Under RSA 556:1, 3, no action shall be sustained against an executor unless the demand has been exhibited to him within one year after the original grant of administration. Laws of this nature are commonly called nonclaim statutes. See anno. 34 A.L.R. (2d) 1004. Their purpose is to secure the orderly and expeditious settlement of estates. Sullivan v. Marshall, 93 N.H. 456, 458.
There is also a deep rooted principle of law that time does not run against the federal or a state government. State v. Stafford Company, 99 N.H. 92, 97; Davis v. Corona Coal Co., 265 U.S. 219; Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126; Keifer Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381. As far at least as the federal government is concerned this same immunity has been held to apply to nonclaim statutes. United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414; Donnally v. Welfare Board, 200 Md. 534; see anno. 34 A.L.R. (2d) 1003, 1005.
The RFC being an agency of the federal government (Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Marcum, 100 F. Supp. 953) enjoys this same privilege unless Congress in creating it has manifested a contrary intention. Lewis v. Moore, 199 F.2d 745. Although its charter contains certain waivers of federal immunity, such as that of freedom from suit, we find no expressed or implied intention to waive immunity from the application of nonclaim statutes to it. Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. McCarthy Bros., 117 F. Supp. 345.
It has been argued by the defendant that some of the language of Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Summerlin, supra, indicates that this immunity should not apply to a claim against the real estate of Margaret J. Faulkner. Even if it were assumed for the sake of argument that the privilege should not apply when the real estate has been sold by the devisees or by the heirs to a third party (Hatch v. Kelly, 63 N.H. 29) or when the period for bringing suit against an estate has expired (RSA 556:5) or the estate has been closed (3 American Law of Property 650) that is not the situation here. The executor was appointed June 19, 1953, and the RFC made a demand on the executor September 13, 1954, and filed this petition on October 11, 1954, and as far as the record shows there has been no conveyance to others nor has the estate been closed. See Hall v. Woodman, 49 N.H. 295, 305.
We conclude therefore that the RFC as an agency of the federal government enjoys in this case immunity from the operation of RSA 556:1, 3.
Exception sustained.
All concurred.