The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Smith's claim without a hearing because "the record by itself [was] sufficient to establish that counsel's decision" not to call Detective Maupin "was a reasonable tactical choice." Reaves v. United States , 694 A.2d 52, 58-59 (D.C. 1997) ; see Perez v. United States , 968 A.2d 39, 85 (D.C. 2009) ("[T]he decision to call witnesses is a judgment ‘left almost exclusively to counsel.’ " (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. United States , 454 A.2d 822, 825 (D.C. 1983) )).

Strozier cites to a line of cases that appear to have incorrectly interpreted Sykes v. United States , 585 A.2d 1335, 1340 (D.C. 1991), and others as a bright-line rule that the court can deny a hearing for a failure to call witnesses claim if there is no "credible proffer" outside the motion itself. See, e.g. , Reaves v. United States , 694 A.2d 52, 57 n.6 (D.C. 1997) (citing Sykes to require "[m]ore formal proof" than "assert[ing] in the moving papers the substance of the testimony"). Many of these cases are distinguishable, including both Strozier— where the trial court found the claims "vague and conclusory" since the motion contained no information about the potential testimony, 991 A.2d at 786-87—and Sykes —where the court ultimately denied a hearing because the witness proffered in the motion would have had to incriminate herself to provide exculpatory testimony, 585 A.2d at 1340 ; see also Lanton , 779 A.2d at 903 (explaining this distinction).

This is, therefore, not a case "where the credibility of counsel versus the credibility of the defendant is at issue, [and] the court can resolve the conflict only by conducting an evidentiary hearing." Reaves v. United States, 694 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C. 1997). Rather, because this is a case "[w]here the existing record provides an adequate basis for disposing of the motion, the trial court may rule on the motion without holding an evidentiary hearing."

Moreover, even if Ransom's declaration did proffer witnesses whose testimony would have aided the defense, he was obliged to provide an affidavit, declaration, or other credible proffer from the proposed witnesses themselves; and failure to do so, in itself, is a sufficient ground for rejecting without a hearing all allegations of ineffectiveness based on withholding such witnesses. E.g., Lanton v. United States, 779 A.2d 895, 902 (D.C. 2001); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489 (D.C. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1012, 118 S.Ct. 1203, 140 L.Ed.2d 331 (1998); Reaves v. United States, 694 A.2d 52, 57 n. 6 (D.C. 1997). In seeking a new trial, Ransom failed to submit an affidavit or other credible proffer from any of his proposed witnesses, and thus his "witness" argument has no traction.

Perhaps there are good reasons why trial counsel did not call Long's proffered witnesses, but on the existing record, without holding a hearing, the motions judge was not in a position to make such a finding — nor did she profess to do so. See Ginyard v. United States, 816 A.2d 21, 37 (D.C. 2003) ("[W]here the defendant alleges that counsel failed to call a particular witness to testify on the defendant's behalf, counsel may have had valid reasons for not calling the witness, but because the reasons are usually not in the record, an evidentiary hearing is normally required.") (quoting Reaves v. United States, 694 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C. 1997)). See, e.g., Lopez v. United States, 801 A.2d 39, 46 (D.C. 2002); Frederick v. United States, 741 A.2d 427, 439 (D.C. 1999); Williams v. United States, 725 A.2d 455, 460 (D.C. 1999); Matthews v. United States, 629 A.2d 1185, 1194-96 (D.C. 1993); Bruce v. United States, 617 A.2d 986, 997 (D.C. 1992); Gray v. United States, 617 A.2d 521, 524-25 (D.C. 1992); Byrd v. United States, 614 A.2d 25, 30 (D.C. 1992).

Thus, we find no infirmity in the trial judge's decision to deny appellant's § 23-110 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing. Even where, as here, such a motion is based on counsel's failure to pursue a certain course of action, a hearing may be unnecessary if the existing trial record establishes conclusively that the movant is not entitled to relief. See, e.g., Reaves v. United States, 694 A.2d 52, 57-58 (D.C. 1997). The issue before us turns on the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, not on counsel's reasons for not pursuing that claim.

" Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 234 (D.C. 1993); see D.C. Code § 23-110(c) (2001) (hearing is required "[u]nless the motion and files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief"). So, for example, "[i]n almost every instance where the credibility of counsel versus the credibility of the defendant is at issue, the court can resolve the conflict only by conducting an evidentiary hearing." Reaves v. United States, 694 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C. 1997). "Similarly, where the defendant alleges that counsel failed to call a particular witness to testify on the defendant's behalf, counsel may have had valid reasons for not calling the witness, but because the reasons are usually not in the record, an evidentiary hearing is normally required." Id.

they discuss the issue of whether One requires a hearing is required under completelyvery different circumstances. Ssee In re F.G., 576 A.2d 724, 725 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (evidentiary hearing required to suppress show-up identification); and the others discuss what factors would trigger the need for a hearing on § 23-110 collateral attack, see Reaves v. United States, 694 A.2d 52, 57 (D.C. 1997) (discussing when hearing is required on § 23-110 collateral attack); Miller v. United States, 479 A.2d 862, 869 (D.C. 1984) (same). At least one federal appeals court has considered the issue before us under the federal analogue to Devonshire.

However, as Harris did not identify any of these witnesses or provide any affidavits to support either of his contentions, and still has not done so before this court, his claim is vague and conclusory, and the trial court acted properly in denying his motion without a hearing. See Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489 (D.C.) (affirming summary denial of § 23-110 motion because appellant's failure to provide affidavits from any of the alleged witnesses was "itself a sufficient ground to reject without a hearing allegations of ineffectiveness premised on the failure to call them"), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1012 (1998); Reaves v. United States, 694 A.2d 52, 57 n. 6 (D.C. 1997). III.

We note that, at no time, has James filed an affidavit detailing the substance of Carter's testimony. From the record it does not appear that Carter's testimony would support James' alibi defense at the time of the assault, although it would have corroborated Bonita Harper's testimony that James had been at her home earlier in the evening. See Reaves v. United States, 694 A.2d 52, 57 n. 6 (D.C. 1997). James alleges that counsel was also deficient in failing to investigate the crime scene and to order a copy of the preventive detention hearing statement, without elaborating on how these actions, even if we assume that they are advisable, would have impacted his trial. James also argues that defense counsel was deficient in not requesting discovery and filing a suppression motion with respect to the identification by Deborah Walton, Whitmire's neighbor across the street, of James at the crime scene.