Opinion
Civil Action 4:22-cv-0318-TLW-TER
01-27-2023
KATHY REAVES, a/k/a Kathy Juanita Reaves, Plaintiff, v. CHARLES MICHAEL DICKENS, CO CARTEZ FOSTER, DANIEL HUCKSO, THOMAS SCOTT WILKERSON, REGINA CROLLEY, KEVIN THOMAS, LARRY McNEILL, PATRICK DEAN BLANCHARD, and OFFICER SUTTON, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
This action arises out of the issuance of a warrant in Georgia and Plaintiff's subsequent arrest in South Carolina. Presently before the court are a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 81) filed by Defendants Blanchard, Huckso, and Sutton, Sutton's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 89), Blanchard's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 90), Huckso's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 91), and Foster's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 172). Because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, she was advised pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to Defendants' motions could result in the motions being granted and her claims dismissed. After requesting an extension of time, Plaintiff filed her Response (ECF No. 120) to Defendants' Motions. All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02 (B)(2)(e), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
Other motions are pending and will be addressed by separate Report and Recommendation or Order, as appropriate.
II. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is voluminous at over 100 pages and at times repetitive. (ECF No. 23). Plaintiff's allegations appear to be capable of separation into three events and three sets of defendants-Georgia law enforcement, South Carolina law enforcement, and educational defendants.At issue here are Plaintiff's allegations against Richmond County, Georgia law enforcement officers and/or employees Foster, Blanchard, Huckso, and Sutton. Plaintiff alleges that Richmond County Sheriff's Office (RCSO) deputy Cordero Foster took a case report over the phone on November 17, 2020, allegedly from Plaintiff's daughter, Siobhan Reaves, that Plaintiff used her daughter's identity to put a light bill in Plaintiff's name. The report alleges the daughter had not given permission and was not staying at that location. ECF No. 23-1, ¶ 28. Plaintiff alleges that RCSO corporal Patrick Blanchard reviewed the case report taken by Deputy Foster. Id. at ¶ 2, 29. With regard to Michael Huckso, Plaintiff alleges that he is the RCSO investigator who investigated the report. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that Sutton works in RCSO's Records Bureau and told Plaintiff that the case report was falsely reported as a warrant so Plaintiff would come to the Sheriff's Office. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff alleges that the Richmond County Sheriff's Office reported the warrant to the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Id. ¶ 4.
All of Plaintiff's claims against the educational defendants have been dismissed.
In November 2021, Plaintiff alleges she was pulled over for a minor traffic violation in South Carolina by Defendant Dickens, a SCHP officer. (ECF No. 23 at 6). Plaintiff alleges she was taken to a county detention center due to the record of a Georgia warrant and placed on a hold for the warrant to be faxed and for Georgia to extradite Plaintiff. (ECF No. 23 at 6-7). However, Plaintiff alleges Georgia never faxed the warrant and never came to exercise their hold; thus, Plaintiff was released. (ECF No. 23 at 7).
Many claims and Defendants have already been dismissed from this action following initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The following claims remain pending as to the Defendants addressed in this Report and Recommendation:
Plaintiff alleges malicious prosecution and/or false arrest as to Defendants Foster, Blanchard, Huckso, and Sutton from the Richmond County Sheriff Office in Georgia. Plaintiff alleges Foster took the report that was later erroneously entered as a warrant. (ECF No. 23 at 3, 10, 13-15). Plaintiff alleges Blanchard reviewed the report. (ECF No. 23 at 18-19, 42). Plaintiff alleges due to running close in time to the criminal statute of limitations, Defendants Foster, Huckso, and Blanchard upgraded the charge or “falsely reported” a case report as a felony warrant. (ECF No. 23 at 49, 63, 57-58). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Huckso was the investigator of the case report about the power bill and the report did not specify whether there was any evidence of the allegations. (ECF No. 23 at 19, 47-48). Plaintiff alleges Defendant Sutton is in charge of the Georgia records and spoke with Plaintiff in July 2021 where Sutton allegedly told Plaintiff that the case report was “reported as a felony warrant to force Plaintiff to come in to talk to the RCSO about a matter unknown to Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 23 at 22).
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As stated above, at issue in this Report and Recommendation are the motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Blanchard, Huckso, Sutton, and Foster. Defendants Huckso, Blanton, and Sutton first filed a joint Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 81) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff failed to state a claim against them. These Defendants then each filed separate, but essentially identical, Motions to Dismiss (ECF Nos. 89, 90, 91), pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue as well as Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Foster, who was served later, also filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 172) pursuant to Rule 12(b)(3) for improper venue as well as Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
Due to the subsequent filings of the individual motions to dismiss, this Motion (ECF No. 81) is MOOT.
Rule 12(b)(3) provides that a party may raise the defense of “improper venue” by motion seeking dismissal of claims for relief before filing a responsive pleading. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3). “Whether venue is ‘wrong' or ‘improper' depends exclusively on whether the court in which the case was brought satisfies the requirements of federal venue laws[.]” Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S. 49, 55 (2013). “When a defendant objects to venue under Rule 12(b)(3), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that venue is proper.” Ameristone Tile, LLC v. Ceramic Consulting Corp., Inc., 966 F.Supp.2d 604, 616 (D.S.C. 2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the plaintiff is required “to make only a prima facie showing of proper venue in order to survive a motion to dismiss.” Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., Ltd., 675 F.3d 355, 366 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Mitrano v. Hawes, 377 F.3d 402, 405 (4th Cir. 2004)). “In assessing whether there has been a prima facie venue showing, [the court] view[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. Moreover, “[o]n a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(3), the court is permitted to consider evidence outside the pleadings.” Id. at 365-66. To grant a motion under Rule 12(b)(3), the court must find that venue is improper. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3).
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion examines whether Plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted. The United States Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Expounding on its decision in Twombly, the United States Supreme Court stated in Iqbal:
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require “detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.”
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 677-78 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 556, 557, 570) (citations omitted); see also Bass v. Dupont, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir.2003).
IV. DISCUSSION
As set forth above, Defendants Blanchard, Huckso, Sutton, and Foster are employees of the Richmond County, Georgia sheriff's office. Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants involve actions they took in Georgia. Namely, the investigation of a call made to the RCSO, the drafting of a case report as a result of that call and investigation, and the erroneous reporting of that case report as a felony warrant for fraud to the NCIC. These Defendants argue that venue is not proper as to the claims alleged against them. Title 28, United States Code, Section 1391 governs venue for all civil actions brought in federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a)(1). Subsection (b) provides,
Venue in general.--A civil action may be brought in-
(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action
is situated; or
(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
“In considering § 1391(b)(2), venue will be proper only if a substantial part of the events giving rise to Plaintiff's claims ... occurred in South Carolina, or if a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated in South Carolina.” Flexible Techs., Inc. v. SharkNinja Operating LLC, No. 8:17-CV-00117-DCC, 2018 WL 1175043, at *5 (D.S.C. Feb. 14, 2018) (emphasis in original). “The test for determining venue under § 1391(b) is not the defendant's ‘contacts' with a particular district, but rather the location of those ‘events or omissions giving rise to the claim.' ” Id. (quoting Cottman Transmission Sys., Inc. v. Martino, 36 F.3d 291, 294 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Zike, LLC v. Catalfumo, No. 6:11-1841-TMC, 2012 WL 12867973, at *3 (D.S.C. Feb. 29, 2012) (“ ‘The statutory standard for venue focuses not on whether a defendant has made a deliberate contact-a factor in the analysis ofpersonal jurisdiction-but on the location where events occurred.' ”) (quoting MTGLQ Inv'rs, L.P. v. Guire, 286 F.Supp.2d 561, 565 (D. Md. 2003)). Plaintiff bears the burden to establish that venue is proper as to each claim and as to each defendant. Magic Toyota, Inc. v. Southeast Toyota Distributors, Inc., 784 F.Supp. 306, 316 (D.S.C. 1992); see also Walker v. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, No. 1:11-CV-1195-AWI-SKO, 2012 WL 1424495, *1 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (“When there are multiple parties and/or multiple claims in an action, the plaintiff must establish that venue is proper as to each defendant and as to each claim.”); Collins v. Doe, No. H-10-2882, 2012 WL 1414246, *3 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“In actions involving multiple defendants and multiple claims, the plaintiff must establish that venue is proper as to each defendant and as to each claim.”). Venue must be proper as to each party, and the fact that a claim for some of the claimants or against some of the defendants arose in a particular district does not make the district proper for all parties as to whom the claim arose elsewhere. See Stone #1 v. Annucci, No. 20-CV-1326 (RA), 2021 WL 4463033, at *13(citing Wright & Miller, 14D Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3807 (4th ed.)).
In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that venue is proper in this district because this is where Plaintiff was arrested, she is a permanent resident of South Carolina, and a substantial part of the events giving rise to this action occurred within this district. ECF No. 23, ¶ 16. Although Plaintiff has filed more than one response in opposition to these Defendants' motions, see ECF Nos. 120, 153, 181, 182, she argues only that South Carolina is the proper venue because the arrest occurred in South Carolina. However, as stated above, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that venue is proper as to each Defendant and each claim. As employees of the RCSO, all of the actions Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Huckson, Blanchard, Sutton, and Foster took occurred in Georgia; namely, the investigation of a call made to the RCSO regarding Plaintiff's alleged use of false information to establish power at a Georgia address, the drafting of a case report as a result of that call and investigation, and the erroneous reporting of that case report as a felony warrant for fraud to the NCIC. This is the extent of the allegations of wrong-doing against these Defendants. Thus, a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims against them did not occur within this district. Therefore, venue is not proper as to Defendants Huckso, Blanchard, Sutton, and Foster.
“If venue is proper for some defendants but improper for others, the district court has wide discretion,” including “retain[ing] the case as to those defendants who have been properly sued there and sever and transfer the portion of the case for those defendants for whom venue is improper or dismiss the action as to those defendants.” 14D Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3827. The decision whether to transfer or dismiss a case is committed to the sound discretion of the district court. United States v. Espinoza, 641 F.2d 153, 162 (4th Cir.1981). “Under the plain language of § 1406(a), dismissal-and not transfer-is the default disposition of a case filed in an improper venue.” EmeryAllen, LLC v. MaxLite Inc., No. 2:20-CV-4332-RMG, 2021 WL 2111159, at *6 (D.S.C. May 25, 2021). Here, Defendants request dismissal of the claims against them. As noted, Plaintiff has only addressed the venue argument in passing, and has not requested transfer in lieu of dismissal. See id. (“As dismissal is the default disposition of a case filed in the improper venue, and as Plaintiff has not requested that this matter be transferred if the Court finds venue improper, the Court dismisses this action without prejudice.”). In a separate action involving some of these same Defendants, see Reaves v. Richmond County Sheriff's Office, No. 4:22-1806-TLW-TER, the undersigned noted that dismissal instead of transfer was proper as Plaintiff has already attempted to bring claims against some of these same Defendants in the Southern District of Georgia and those actions were dismissed. See Reaves v. Foster, Hucko, et. Al, No. 1:21-cv-120-JRH-BKE (S.D. Ga.). Likewise, for the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants Huckso, Blanton, Sutton, and Foster be dismissed without prejudice for improper venue.
If Plaintiff would be prevented from refiling her claims against the Georgia Defendants in the proper venue, transfer of only the claims against those Defendants would be proper. However, Plaintiff “has not identified any procedural bar that would prevent [her] from refiling [her case] in a proper forum.” See AvePoint, Inc. v. Knickerbocker, No. 7:19CV00739, 2020 WL 908124, at *3 (W.D. Va. Feb. 25, 2020) (citing Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 465, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962) (citing to the loss of “a substantial part of [plaintiff's] cause of action under the statute of limitations” as “a typical example of the problem [Congress] sought to [avoid]” in enacting § 1406(a))). The court notes that a cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the prosecution ends. See McDonough v. Smith, 139 S.Ct. 2149, 2160 (2019).
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Sutton's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 89), Blanchard's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 90), Huckso's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 91), and Foster's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 172) be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(3) and the claims against these Defendants be dismissed without prejudice.
The parties are directed to the important notice on the following page.