Opinion
Civil Action 3:22-cv-0732-TLW-TER
05-10-2022
KATHY JUANITA REAVES, Plaintiff, v. KATHRYN M. CREWS, Individually and Professionally; CATHY HAZELWOOD, Individually and Professionally; and STATE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Thomas E. Rogers, III, United States Magistrate Judge
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, who is proceeding pro se in this matter, originally filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina. Defendants removed it to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, asserting that this court has federal-question jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Numerous motions from both Plaintiff and Defendants are currently pending, including Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 19). All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e), DSC. This report and recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed this action on September 2, 2021, in the Court of Common Pleas for Richland County, South Carolina. Compl. (ECF No. 1-3). Prior to service on Defendants, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint (ECF No. 1-6) on September 14, 2021. On October 7, 2021, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 1-8) the Amended Complaint. Plaintiff then filed two Motions to Amend-one to add a claim for false arrest, and the other to add two new Defendants, IDENTIGO and IDEMNIA. Motion to Amend (ECF No. 1-9); Motion to Add Defendants (ECF No. 1-10). While the motions were pending, Plaintiff served Defendants with discovery requests. Pl. Int. and Req. for Prod. (ECF No. 1-16). Therefore, Defendants filed a Motion to Stay Discovery (ECF No. 1-17) on February 23, 2022. Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 1-18) to the Motion to Stay on March 2, 2022. Thereafter, citing representations made by Plaintiff in her Response, Defendants removed the action to this Court on March 7, 2022. Notice of Removal (ECF No. 1).
III. ALLEGATIONS
The Amended Complaint (ECF No. 1-6) filed by Plaintiff on September 14, 2021, is the operative pleading in this action. Though Plaintiff subsequently filed two motions to amend the Amended Complaint, the state court took no actions on those motions and they remained pending at the time Defendants removed the action to this court. In the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that “[t]his action is brought pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act, also known as S.C. Code § 15-78-10, SC Code § 59-25-115 (2012), SC Code § 1-13-10 also known as the South Carolina Human Affairs Law, SC Code § 41-7-10, and interference with Contractual and Business Relations.” Am. Compl. ¶ 4 (ECF No. 1-6).
Plaintiff alleges that she was extended an offer of employment with the Jasper County School District in Georgia on August 4, 2021, contingent upon passing a background check. Am. Compl. ¶ 13. Thereafter, she received a call from Defendant Crews, a South Carolina teacher certification processing coordinator, informing her that the processing of her teacher certification was on hold due to information on her background check received from SLED and the FBI indicating that she had an outstanding felony warrant for fraud out of Richmond County, Georgia. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 14. Plaintiff told Crews there was no outstanding warrant and any such information coming from the Richmond County Sheriff's Department was an error, but Crew ignored Plaintiff's information and treated her like a criminal. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15-16. Defendant Hazelwood, attorney for the State Department of Education, also failed to accept the information provided by Plaintiff refuting the alleged warrant. Am. Compl. ¶ 18. Plaintiff alleges that because Defendants have failed to do their due diligence to determine the validity of the information they received regarding the outstanding warrant, she has not been able to work as a teacher. Am. Compl. ¶ 23.
The enumerated causes of action include (1) South Carolina Tort Claims Act, (2) municipal and supervisory liability, (3) conspiracy, (4) constitutional tort, (5) negligent hiring and retention, (6) respondeat superior, (7) S.C. Code § 1-13-10 discrimination, (8) S.C. Code § 59-25-115 criminal records checks and fingerprinting requirements, (9) S.C. Code § 41-7-70 interference with the right to work, and (10) breach of contract and tortious interference with contractual and business relations.
IV. DISCUSSION
“We begin with the undergirding principle that federal courts, unlike most state courts, are courts of limited jurisdiction, created by Congress with specified jurisdictional requirements and limitations. Accordingly, a party seeking to adjudicate a matter in federal court must allege and, when challenged, must demonstrate the federal court's jurisdiction over the matter. If a plaintiff files suit in state court and the defendant seeks to adjudicate the matter in federal court through removal, it is the defendant who carries the burden of alleging in his notice of removal and, if challenged, demonstrating the court's jurisdiction over the matter.” Strawn v. AT&T Mobility, 530 F.3d 293, 296 (4th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). As stated above, numerous motions, filed by all parties, are pending, most of which were filed prior to Plaintiff filing the present motion to remand. However, because issues of removal and remand go to the very heart of whether this court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action, the court must satisfy itself on the jurisdictional question prior to addressing any other motions. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (“The requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature and limits of the judicial power of the United States' and is ‘inflexible and without exception.'”).
Plaintiff argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these claims. She asserts that this is a state action under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Indeed, as set forth above, all of the claims alleged in the Amended Complaint are state law claims. There is no mention of federal law in the Amended Complaint. However, Defendants removed the action to this court based upon representations made by Plaintiff in a response to their Motion to Stay that this case involves civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988, as well as claims under 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States. See Pl. Resp. to Mot. to Stay ¶¶ 1, 9, 12, 51, 52-59, 61-76, 94, 115, 135 (ECF No. 1-18). Nevertheless, none of these claims are included in the Amended Complaint which is the operative pleading in this case.
The Amended Complaint does include a cause of action entitled “Constitutional Tort.” Am. Compl. p. 10. However, the allegations contained within that cause of action specifically state “Defendants, acting under color of state law, violated Plaintiff's rights pursuant to the South Carolina Tort Claims Act of the South Carolina Code of Law.” Am. Compl. ¶ 44. Thus, Plaintiff specifically references state law with respect to this claim. Her use of the phrase “under color of state law” is insufficient to give rise to a federal cause of action. See, e.g., Vince's Crab House, Inc. v. Olszewski, No. JKB-20-2218, 2020 WL 5569744 (D. Md. Sept. 17, 2020) (noting that “passing references to the federal legal construct of ‘official capacity'” do not state a claim under federal law).
Removal is proper when a “civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441. District courts have original jurisdiction of “civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To determine if an action arises under federal law, courts apply the well-pleaded complaint rule, which “provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Rosciszewski v. Arete Assocs., Inc., 1 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). As stated above, there are no federal causes of action or even any reference to federal law in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, and Defendants do not argue as much. Rather, they argue that it became apparent when Plaintiff filed her Response to the Motion to Stay on March 2, 2022, that Plaintiff intended to pursue claims arising under federal law. The pertinent statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446, states
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c), if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Although not explicitly argued by Defendants, they appear to rely on the “other paper” portion of this statute in maintaining that Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Stay made clear that this case had become removable. The District Court for the District of Maryland has addressed, and rejected, such an argument. In Vince's Crab House, Inc. v. Olszewski, No. JKB-20-2218, 2020 WL 5569744 (D. Md. Sept. 17, 2020), the Complaint identified the Maryland Tort Claims Act as the vehicle through which the Plaintiff sought redress and did not “on its face” state a claim under federal law. Id. at *2. The question before the court was whether a letter sent from the plaintiff's counsel to defendant's counsel stating that the plaintiff had asserted a federal action under § 1983 was “other paper” establishing the court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3). Id. The court distinguished the applicability of “other paper” in cases asserting diversity jurisdiction as opposed to federal question jurisdiction:
To be sure, in certain instances, receipt of a clarifying letter can be understood to notify a Defendant that an ambiguous pleading states a federal claim pursuant to § 1446(b)(3). See Addo v. Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co., 230 F.3d 759 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding that letter constituted “other paper” establishing diversity jurisdiction). However, typically “when courts look to ‘other paper' to ascertain removability, courts are clarifying that diversity jurisdiction has been established.” Eggert v. Britton, 223 Fed.Appx. 394, 397 (5th Cir. 2007). “Extrinsic documents will rarely, if ever, affect a federal court's subject matter jurisdiction in federal question cases because the jurisdictional inquiry is normally limited to the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.” Dougherty v. Cerra, 987 F.Supp.2d 721, 729 (S.D. W.Va. 2013). “For this reason, the ‘other paper' doctrine has little application in federal question cases.” Id. (citing Eggert, 223 Fed.Appx. at 397).Id. at *3. The court concluded that the letter did not create federal claim where none had been pled and, thus, the court lacked jurisdiction and remand was necessary. Id. (citing Blanding v. Bradley, Civ. No. SAG-14-337, 2014 WL 1514675 (D. Md. Apr. 15, 2014) (concluding that “[d]ocuments that are extrinsic to the complaint are viewed as irrelevant in federal question cases[,]” and therefore the plaintiff's representations in his discovery response could not create a federal claim where none had been pled)). Likewise, for the same reasons, Plaintiff's Response to the Motion to Stay cannot create federal question jurisdiction where there are no federal claims alleged in the Amended Complaint, which is the operative pleading in this action. Even if the Response could be construed as a motion to amend the complaint, the case would not become removable until leave was granted by the state court to amend the complaint. See Quillin v. Simon, No. 3:20-CV-3063-CMC-SVH, 2021 WL 1589274, at *2 (D.S.C. Apr. 22, 2021) (holding that a case does not become removable based upon federal question jurisdiction until the state court grants a pending motion to amend the complaint and the amended complaint with new federal claims is filed). The state court took no such action. In sum, Plaintiff's “intent” to raise federal claims in this action is insufficient to make this case removable to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446. There are currently no federal claims pending in this action and, thus, remand is appropriate.
The court noted that the complaint made “passing references to the federal legal construct of ‘official capacity'” but otherwise mentioned no federal law or federal rights subject to enforcement under § 1983. Id.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, it is recommended that Plaintiff's Motion to Remand (ECF No. 19) be granted and this case be remanded to the Richland County Court of Common Pleas.
This court lacks jurisdiction to address any of the other motions pending in this action.