Opinion
CV 124-132
08-22-2024
KATHY REAVES, Plaintiff, v. ZIKIAH BLACKWELL; MARY ELIZABETH DAVIS; CARLTON KNOWLTON; MICHAEL CODY GUINED; JAMIE L. WILSON, JR.; SELENA BLAKENSHIP; JESSICA NORRIS; MAKEBA CLARK; WENDY EDWARDS; RICHARD WOODS; HENRY COUNTY BOE; CLAYTON COUNTY BOE; S.C. STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION; and CLARKE COUNTY BOE, Defendants.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BRIAN K. EPPS, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis (“IFP”) in the above-captioned case. Because she is proceeding IFP, Plaintiff's complaint must be screened to protect potential defendants. See Phillips v. Mashburn, 746 F.2d 782, 785 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam).
I. Screening the Complaint
A. Background
On August 13, 2024, Plaintiff filed the latest in an extensive list of federal cases filed in both Georgia and South Carolina containing substantially similar claims as the instant suit arising out of the issuance of a Georgia arrest warrant, her later arrest in South Carolina, and subsequent denial of employment based on her inability to pass a background check because of her arrest on the allegedly improper warrant issued in Georgia. See, e.g., Reaves v. Washington, et al., No. 4:23-CV-3847, doc. no. 8 (D.S.C. Aug. 8, 2023) (collecting cases), adopted by doc. no. 25 (D.S.C. Jan. 25, 2024) (recognizing case as twelfth concerning Georgia warrant and South Carolina arrest and imposing filing restrictions in District of South Carolina), attached hereto as Exhibit A; Reaves v. Guined, et al., No. 1:23-cv-00778, doc. no. 88 (N.D.Ga. July 25, 2024) (identifying six cases filed in Northern District of Georgia and imposing filing restrictions in that District), attached hereto as Exhibit B. The instant case is the fifth case filed in the Southern District of Georgia, with the most recent cases - including this one - apparently aimed at attempting to circumvent the above-noted filing restrictions in other courts. See Reaves v. Blanchard, CV 124-083 (S.D. Ga. June 3, 2024); Reaves et al. v. Kyler, et al., CV 124-065 (S.D. Ga. May 9, 2024); Reaves v. Hucko, CV 123-148 (S.D. Ga. Oct. 6, 2023); Reaves v. Foster, CV 121-120 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 11, 2021).
B. Discussion
1. Legal Standard for Screening
The complaint or any portion thereof may be dismissed if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune to such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). A claim is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). “Failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is governed by the same standard as dismissal for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).” Wilkerson v. H & S, Inc., 366 Fed.Appx. 49, 51 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997)).
To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action,'” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement' possessing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).
Finally, the Court affords a liberal construction to a pro se litigant's pleadings, holding them to a more lenient standard than those drafted by an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). However, this liberal construction does not mean that the Court has a duty to re-write the complaint. Bilal v. Geo Care, LLC, 981 F.3d 903, 911 (11th Cir. 2020); Snow v. DirecTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 1320 (11th Cir. 2006).
2. Plaintiff's Case Should Be Dismissed
This Court is familiar with Plaintiff. As explained above, she has filed five cases in this District based on the circumstances and subsequent consequences of the warrant issued by the Richmond County Magistrate Court. Notably, Plaintiff filed this case in the Augusta Division of this District even though thirteen of the fourteen named Defendants are located outside of the Southern District and the vast majority of events about which Plaintiff complains also occurred outside this District. The lone Defendant with ties to this District, Zikiah Blackwell, a deputy clerk for the Richmond County Magistrate's Office, is alleged to have improperly issued an arrest warrant on December 21, 2020, (doc. no. 1, pp. 7, 16), a date falling well outside the two-year statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim filed in Georgia.
The cases include Reaves et al v. Henry Cnty. Bd. of Educ., Civ. Action No. 1:22-cv-04764-LMM (N.D.Ga.); Reaves v. Knowlton, Civ. Action No. 1:22-cv-04765-LMM (N.D.Ga.); Reaves v. Clayton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., Civ. Action No. I:23-CV-OIO82-LMM (N.D.Ga.); Reaves v. Nat'l Law Enforcement, Civ. Action No. 1:23-cv-02836-LMM (N.D.Ga.); and Reaves v. S.C. Ins. Rsrv. Fund, Civ. Action No. 1:24-cv-00352-LMM-JEM (N.D.Ga.).
Plaintiff has also attempted to improperly remove two cases to federal court, both of which were remanded. See DGBJSH Family Props., LLC v. Reaves, CV 119-113, doc. no. 19 (S.D. Ga. Sept. 4, 2019); State of Ga. et al. v. Reaves, et al., CV 119-070, doc. no. 9 (S.D. Ga. May 29, 2019), adopted by doc. no. 15 (S.D. Ga. July 10, 2019). A third case related to Plaintiff's former employment in the Richmond County, Georgia school system was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. See Reaves v. Medlin et al., CV 119-029, doc. no. 5 (S.D. Ga. May 7, 2019), adopted by doc. no. 7 (S.D. Ga. June 7, 2019).
A court may take judicial “notice of another court's order . . . for the limited purpose of recognizing the ‘judicial act' that the order represents.” United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11th Cir. 1994). --------- --------- Notes:
State law controls the length of the statute of limitations period in § 1983 actions. Abreu-Velez v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 248 Fed.Appx. 116, 117 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Lawson v. Glover, 957 F.2d 801, 803 (11th Cir. 1987). In Georgia, such claims for injuries to the person must be brought within two years of their accrual. Richards v. Cobb Cnty., Ga., 487 Fed.Appx. 556, 557 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam); Williams v. City of Atlanta, 794 F.2d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1986); O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33. Although state law determines the applicable statute of limitations period for claims under § 1983, federal law determines the date of accrual. See Brown v. Ga. Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 335 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 2003); Rozar v. Mullis, 85 F.3d 556, 561 (11th Cir. 1996). Under § 1983, a claim accrues when “the facts which would support a cause of action are apparent or should be apparent to a person with a reasonably prudent regard for his rights.” Brown, 335 F.3d at 1261 (quoting Rozar, 85 F.3d at 561-62). Plaintiff has previously conceded she knew about the warrant in July of 2021, when she had an employment offer revoked in Athens, Georgia. See Reaves v. Hucko, CV 123-148, doc. no. 8, pp. 22-23.
Moreover, this Court previously decided Plaintiff had no claim against Defendant Blackwell based on Plaintiff's allegations regarding conspiracy, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Due Process, or conducting an improper investigation / issuing a warrant “outside of Georgia statutory authority” and that Defendant Blackwell has judicial immunity to the extent she was acting in a judicial capacity and within her subject matter jurisdiction when issuing the arrest warrant. Reaves v. Hucko, CV 123-148, doc. no. 29, pp. 7-12, adopted by doc. no. 32. With the remainder of Plaintiff's allegations related to activity outside of the Southern District of Georgia, venue in this Court is improper. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).
Given that venue is improper in this District, the Court “shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a); see also Pinson v. Rumsfeld, 192 Fed.Appx. 811, 817 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (“[T]he decision whether to transfer a case is left to the sound discretion of the district court and is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.” (citation omitted).) As described above, Plaintiff has filed over twenty cases related to the events underlying the current complaint and had filing restrictions imposed in two other Districts where the case might possibly be transferred. Thus, the Court concludes it would not be in the interest of justice to transfer and instead recommends dismissal and, as described below, the imposition of filing restrictions in the Southern District of Georgia. See Martin v. Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App., 506 U.S. 1, 3 (1992) (per curiam) (“Every paper filed with the Clerk of this Court, no matter how repetitious or frivolous, requires some portion of the institution's limited resources. A part of the Court's responsibility is to see that these resources are allocated in a way that promotes the interests of justice.” (citation omitted)); see also Moore v. Brown, No. 3:22cv02311, 2022 WL 18108679, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2022) (citing Daker v. Ward, 999 F.3d 1300, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 2021) and collecting cases for proposition that cases involving same or substantially similar claims against many of same defendants subject to dismissal as malicious), adopted by 2023 WL 35215 (N.D.Ga. Jan. 4, 2023).
3. Proposed Filing Restrictions
In Plaintiff s case dismissed in this Court on July 16, 2024, the Court warned Plaintiff that if she continued her abusive filings in the Southern District, the Court would not hesitate to enact filing restrictions in the Southern District. See CV 124-065, doc. no. 14, p. 2. That time has come. The Court should no longer tolerate Plaintiff's frivolous and vexatious filings, as they impair the Court's ability to adjudicate the legitimate claims of other litigants. Accordingly, should the presiding District Judge agree, the Court recommends imposition of the following restrictions upon all of Plaintiff's pro se filings the Clerk of Court receives from Plaintiff after entry of a final order on this Report and Recommendation.
a. As to any of Plaintiff s future filings,the Clerk SHALL open a single miscellaneous file for tracking purposes, and, upon receipt of any filing from Plaintiff, forward the filing to the presiding judge, who will determine whether the filing has any arguable merit. Only if the filing alleges a plausible claim for relief will the Court allow it to be filed. Any filings that fail to do so will be DISMISSED without any further judicial action after THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date the Clerk receives the filing unless the Court orders otherwise. This automatic dismissal of insubstantial claims “will reduce the burden of paper-moving and explanation-writing, conserving a little judicial time for litigants who deserve attention.” Alexander v. United States, 121 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 1997). Thus, although the Court will read and consider all of Plaintiff's future filings, it will not necessarily enter an order addressing each one. If no order is forthcoming, then THIRTY (30) DAYS after the filing's receipt, the Clerk
SHALL, without awaiting any further direction, notify Plaintiff her case has been dismissed without prejudice.
b. The Clerk SHALL NOT docket any further filings in this case. The Clerk also SHALL NOT DOCKET any further filings in a case dismissed pursuant to the directive above except for a notice of appeal. The originals of all such filings shall be returned to Plaintiff. If Plaintiff files a notice of appeal, the Clerk SHALL forward a copy of this Order, the notice of appeal, and the dismissed complaint to the Eleventh Circuit. Plaintiff SHALL remain responsible for appellate fling fees, or she may move the Court to grant IFP status on appeal.
c. To ensure Plaintiff's future filings are properly consolidated for review, the Clerk SHALL personally advise each deputy clerk of the Court's ruling in this case and develop a procedure for ensuring that all future complaints filed by Plaintiff are immediately assigned and forwarded to the presiding district judge in this case, regardless of which divisional clerk's office receives and dockets the papers.
d. Plaintiff may file a motion to modify or rescind the imposition of these restrictions NO EARLIER THAN ONE (1) YEAR from the date of this Order.
e. These filing restrictions do not apply to any criminal or civil case in which Plaintiff is named as a defendant or to any proper application for a writ of habeas corpus.
f A copy of this Order SHALL be forwarded to each judicial officer in this District.
The Court defines “filings” to include motions, papers, letters, complaints, or any other documents Plaintiff seeks to file with the Court.
II. Conclusion
As this case does not belong in the Southern District and a transfer would not be in the interest of justice, the Court REPORTS and RECOMMENDS Plaintiff's complaint be DISMISSED, the filing restrictions set forth herein be imposed on Plaintiff's future filings in this District, and this civil action be CLOSED.
ORDER
LEIGH MARTIN MAY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the court on the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (“R&R”). Dkt. No. [82]. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the Court reviews a Magistrate Judge's R&R for clear error if no objections are filed. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). If a party files objections, however, the district court must review de novo any part of the Magistrate Judge's disposition that is the subject of a proper objection. Id.
I. Motions for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff filed two responses to the Report and Recommendation, which the Clerk construed as objections. Dkt. Nos. [84, 85]. However, Plaintiff stated in response to the Report and Recommendation that she in fact has no objections. Dkt. No. [85] at 19-20. Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court has reviewed the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation for clear error in any of the recommendations adverse to Plaintiff. The Court finds none. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. [82], as its opinion: Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. [40], is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. [54], is DENIED.
II. Motions for Filing Restrictions
Defendants, in contrast, have requested that the Court freshly consider their request that the Court enjoin Plaintiff from filing any new lawsuits or initiating administrative investigations without first obtaining leave from this Court. Dkt. No. [86] at 3. The Court has done so and finds that not only has Plaintiff sorely tested the limits of the allowances the Court affords to pro se plaintiffs, 1 but she has also sent numerous abusive emails to Defendants and their law firm threatening “a plethora of lawsuits,” including action against Defendants' counsel and paralegals and further action reasserting claims that were or should have been brought in the present action. See, e.g., Dkt. No. [43] at 11-12, 15-16; Dkt. No. [69] at 6, 12, 14, 17, 19, 21-22, 25, 26, 28-29. These emails, together with Plaintiff's many lawsuits and excessive filings in those lawsuits, demonstrate that Plaintiff intends to make future frivolous and vexatious filings. The Court finds that further action is required to head off execution of that plan.
“Access to the courts is unquestionably a right of considerable constitutional significance,” though it “is neither absolute nor unconditional.” Miller v. Donald, 541 F.3d 1091, 1096 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation marks omitted). Sometimes, “[c]onditions and restrictions on [a] person's access are necessary to preserve the judicial resource for all other persons” because “[f]rivolous and vexatious law suits,” like those Plaintiff presses, “threaten the availability of a well-functioning judiciary to all litigants.” Id.; accord Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1072 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc) (“Every lawsuit filed, no matter how frivolous or repetitious, requires the investment of court time, whether the complaint is reviewed initially by a law clerk, a staff attorney, a magistrate [judge], or the [district] judge.”); Debose v. United States, No. 22-13380, 2024 WL 489699, at *1 (11th Cir. Feb. 8, 2024) (“[A] court has a responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others and a litigant can be severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief.” (quotation marks omitted)).
Consequently, the Court will not accept Plaintiff's future filings for immediate docketing but will instead screen them and determine whether to authorize their filing. This will ensure that frivolous complaints are not docketed as civil actions. These restrictions will avoid further waste of judicial resources. Thus, the Court REJECTS the Magistrate Judge's determination that filing restrictions are not warranted and will GRANT the motions as to future filings in this district.
The Court declines, however, to impose restrictions on requests for investigations or filings in any other district or institution, as the Court cannot say with any confidence that Plaintiff does not have non-frivolous claims elsewhere or that the Court's intrusion on another court's or other institution's management of its own cases would be welcome. Defendants can present a copy of this Order to any Court or other institution where Plaintiff initiates a proceeding perceived as frivolous or vexatious. 2
Accordingly, the Court imposes the following RESTRICTIONS on all pro se filings the Clerk receives from Plaintiff after the entry of this Order: (1) the Clerk shall open a miscellaneous (MI) action for each pro se complaint received from Plaintiff and submit the complaint to the undersigned for review; (2) the Court will review the complaint and determine whether it states a plausible claim for relief or otherwise should be docketed as a new civil action; (3) the Court will issue an order either allowing creation of a new civil action or closing the miscellaneous action without creating a civil action; (4) the Clerk shall not docket any further filings in the miscellaneous action except a notice of appeal, which, if filed, shall be processed in the normal course.
Similarly, the Clerk shall not docket any further filings in any of Plaintiff s existing cases except a notice of appeal, which, if filed, shall also be processed in the normal course. Whenever the Court receives a prohibited filing in an existing case, the Clerk shall note on the docket that the prohibited filing has been received and retain the filing in the case correspondence file.
The Clerk SHALL impose the aforementioned restrictions upon any pro se filing made by Plaintiff Kathy Reaves.
III. Conclusion
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. [82], is ACCEPTED IN PART AND REJECTED IN PART. Defendants' motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. [40], is GRANTED, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. [54], is DENIED. The motions for injunctive relief, Dkt. Nos. [43, 49, 69], are GRANTED as to Plaintiff's future filings in this District and are otherwise DENIED. Plaintiff Kathy Reaves is RESTRICTED from filing in this Court, as set out in Part II above.
This action is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendants and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.