See Plaza del Lago Townhomes Ass’n, Inc. v. Highwood Builders, LLC, 148 P.3d 367, 371 (Colo. App. 2006) (concluding that a defendant “appear[s] in the action” when he communicates with the court in a manner that demonstrates that he is aware of the proceedings and intends to participate in them). Thus, LBC and Wells Fargo were “parties in default for failure to appear,” and service of the C.R.C.P. 60 motion was not required. Compare Realty World-Range Realty, Ltd. v. Prochaska, 691 P.2d 761, 763 (Colo. App. 1984) (rejecting the defendants’ due process argument because, after being served with the complaint, they “did not make contact with the court prior to the entry of judgment against them), with F & S Constr. Co. v. Christlieb, 166 Colo. 67, 70, 441 P.2d 656, 657-58 (1968) (due process violation where the defendant had no actual notice of the suit, promptly filed a motion to set aside default, and presented a meritorious defense), and Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Fiocca, 35 Colo. App. 306, 308, 532 P.2d 57, 58-59 (1975) (due process violation where defendants had appeared in the case and indicated a clear intent to defend). ¶10 LBC and Wells Fargo nonetheless argue that (1) they were not “in default” because they believed that the case had been dismissed or, alternatively, (2) Dickinson’s reinstatement motion constituted “new or additional claims for relief,” which must be served on defaulted defendants under C.R.C.P. 5(a).
See Plaza del Lago Townhomes Ass'n, Inc. v. Highwood Builders, LLC, 148 P.3d 367, 371 (Colo.App.2006) (concluding that a defendant “appear[s] in the action” when he communicates with the court in a manner that demonstrates that he is aware of the proceedings and intends to participate in them). Thus, LBC and Wells Fargo were “parties in default for failure to appear,” and service of the C.R.C.P. 60 motion was not required. Compare Realty World–Range Realty, Ltd. v. Prochaska, 691 P.2d 761, 763 (Colo.App.1984) (rejecting the defendants' due process argument because, after being served with the complaint, they “did not make contact with the court prior to the entry of judgment against them”), with F & S Constr. Co. v. Christlieb, 166 Colo. 67, 70, 441 P.2d 656, 657–58 (1968) (due process violation where the defendant had no actual notice of the suit, promptly filed a motion to set aside default, and presented a meritorious defense), and Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Fiocca, 35 Colo.App. 306, 308, 532 P.2d 57, 58–59 (1975) (due process violation where defendants had appeared in the case and indicated a clear intent to defend).¶ 10 LBC and Wells Fargo nonetheless argue that (1) they were not “in default” because they believed that the case had been dismissed or, alternatively, (2) Dickinson's reinstatement motion constituted “new or additional claims for relief,” which must be served on defaulted defendants under C.R.C.P. 5(a).
See Plaza del Lago Townhomes Ass’n, Inc. v. Highwood Builders, LLC, 148 P.3d 367, 371 (Colo. App. 2006) (concluding that a defendant “appear[s] in the action” when he communicates with the court in a manner that demonstrates that he is aware of the proceedings and intends to participate in them). Thus, LBC and Wells Fargo were “parties in default for failure to appear,” and service of the C.R.C.P. 60 motion was not required. Compare Realty World-Range Realty, Ltd. v. Prochaska, 691 P.2d 761, 763 (Colo. App. 1984) (rejecting the defendants’ due process argument because, after being served with the complaint, they “did not make contact with the court prior to the entry of judgment against them), with F & S Constr. Co. v. Christlieb, 166 Colo. 67, 70, 441 P.2d 656, 657-58 (1968) (due process violation where the defendant had no actual notice of the suit, promptly filed a motion to set aside default, and presented a meritorious defense), and Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Fiocca, 35 Colo. App. 306, 308, 532 P.2d 57, 58-59 (1975) (due process violation where defendants had appeared in the case and indicated a clear intent to defend). ¶10 LBC and Wells Fargo nonetheless argue that (1) they were not “in default” because they believed that the case had been dismissed or, alternatively, (2) Dickinson’s reinstatement motion constituted “new or additional claims for relief,” which must be served on defaulted defendants under C.R.C.P. 5(a).
See Plaza del Lago Townhomes Ass’n, Inc. v. Highwood Builders, LLC, 148 P.3d 367, 371 (Colo. App. 2006) (concluding that a defendant “appear[s] in the action” when he communicates with the court in a manner that demonstrates that he is aware of the proceedings and intends to participate in them). Thus, LBC and Wells Fargo were “parties in default for failure to appear,” and service of the C.R.C.P. 60 motion was not required. Compare Realty World-Range Realty, Ltd. v. Prochaska, 691 P.2d 761, 763 (Colo. App. 1984) (rejecting the defendants’ due process argument because, after being served with the complaint, they “did not make contact with the court prior to the entry of judgment against them), with F & S Constr. Co. v. Christlieb, 166 Colo. 67, 70, 441 P.2d 656, 657-58 (1968) (due process violation where the defendant had no actual notice of the suit, promptly filed a motion to set aside default, and presented a meritorious defense), and Bankers Union Life Ins. Co. v. Fiocca, 35 Colo. App. 306, 308, 532 P.2d 57, 58-59 (1975) (due process violation where defendants had appeared in the case and indicated a clear intent to defend). ¶10 LBC and Wells Fargo nonetheless argue that (1) they were not “in default” because they believed that the case had been dismissed or, alternatively, (2) Dickinson’s reinstatement motion constituted “new or additional claims for relief,” which must be served on defaulted defendants under C.R.C.P. 5(a).
To be entitled to notice, however, it is essential that the defendant have somehow communicated with the court. Realty World-Range Realty, Ltd. v. Prochaska, 691 P.2d 761, 763 (Colo.App. 1984) (concluding that the defendants were not entitled to notice when they did not make any contact with the court prior to the entry of default); Carls Constr., Inc. v. Gigliotti, 40 Colo.App. 535, 536, 577 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (1978) (holding that the defendant sufficiently appeared and triggered the notice requirements by filing a letter with the trial court). A plaintiffs knowledge that a defendant intends to defend a lawsuit is, by itself, insufficient to constitute an "appearance" under C.R.C.P. 55(b).
C.R.C.P. 6(b) governs the enlargement of time and states that when an act is required or allowed to be done within a specified time, if cause is shown, the court in its discretion may order the time enlarged, provided that the request is made before the expiration of the "period originally prescribed." C.R.C.P. 6(b)(1); see Realty World-Range Realty, Ltd. v. Prochaska, 691 P.2d 761 (Colo.App. 1984). As relevant here, the "period originally prescribed" is set forth in C.R.M. 7(a)(1), which states:
Plaintiff's motion for default was the application for judgment within the meaning of this section. See Realty World-Range Realty, Ltd. v. Prochaska, 691 P.2d 761 (Colo.App. 1984). This motion was mailed on October 4, and defendant does not contend that service was improper.