The case was then appealed to this Court, which remanded the cause to the district court for further findings. Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366 (7th Cir. 1987). Upon remand the district court entered additional findings of fact and conclusions of law in favor of REDI (appealed here in our No. 89-2427).

This presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to Plaintiffs to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the expressed or implied terms of the contract show an intention that the copyright should remain with Scourby. See Murray, 566 F.2d at 1311; Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1987). As Plaintiffs have met this burden, the Court finds that Scourby remained the author and copyright owner of the sound recordings.

By specifying a limitation on ownership solely against the federal government, the Copyright Act implies that states and their subdivisions are not excluded from protection under the Act. See Bldg. Officials Code Adm. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 735-36 (1st Cir. 1980) ("Works of state governments are therefore left available for copyright protection by the state or the individual author. . . ."); Nat'l Conf. of Bar Exam'rs v. Multistate Legal Studies, Inc., 495 F.Supp. 34, 35 (N.D.Ill. 1980), aff'd, 692 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1982); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.06[A], at 5-81 n. 1 (2001); cf. Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating that, under the Copyright Act of 1909 "work-for-hire" doctrine, the county, which contracted for the production of tax maps, was presumed to be the copyright owner (rather than the creator of the maps)). Thus, Suffolk County may own a copyright under the Copyright Act.

1 Nimmer § 5.03[B] at 5-46 (citing Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 374 (7th Cir. 1987)). The district court concluded that in suggesting that Magnuson create a new corporation for the purpose of owning the film, Bruce indicated his intent to transfer his rights to Imagination.

This is a prerequisite to raising a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel; to ask us to consider such claims collectively is inappropriate. See Fed.R.App.P. 28(a); Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 376 n. 11 (7th Cir. 1987) (generic contentions of error unsupported by legal argument will not be considered on appeal). Gregory's appellate counsel has singled out trial counsel's failure to ask for a limiting instruction on Clayton's testimony as the sole instance of ineffective assistance of counsel meritorious enough to pursue on appeal.

The burden of proof is on the independent contractor to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that such a contrary agreement was reached. Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1987); Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686, 60 S.Ct. 891, 84 L.Ed. 1029 (1940). A. Were the Works "Made For Hire"?

"An appellant's argument is to be made in its opening, not its reply, brief." Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 376 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1987) (emphasis original). In any event, the defendants' discussion of these claims in their reply brief in no way constitutes an argument that would support reversal; defendants simply note, in response to Arcor's brief, that they did not waive any challenge to these claims by failure to object at trial.

Although the district court did not memorialize its Rule 54(b) certification with a separate Rule 58 document, this court nonetheless has jurisdiction over this appeal, as the district court's opinion and order was otherwise an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell, Co., 809 F.2d 366, 370 n. 4 (7th Cir. 1987). I.

Parol evidence establishing the original intent between the contracting parties may be admitted. Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 376 (7th Cir. 1987); Fox v. Inter-State Assurance Co., 84 Ill.App.3d 512, 515, 39 Ill.Dec. 894, 897, 405 N.E.2d 873, 876 (1980). Such evidence can include restrictive comments on checks.

That point was made over and over again until in 1976 a district judge could matter-of-factly dispose of an argument based on the undisputed "independent contractor" status of the seller by holding that the independent contractor was a copyright "employee." See Goldman-Morgen, Inc. v. Dan Brechner Co., 411 F. Supp. 382, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); see also Real Estate Data, Inc. v. Sidwell Co., 809 F.2d 366, 371 (7th Cir. 1987) (summarizing "work for hire" cases under 1909 Act; independent contractor were statutory "employees"). The copyright "employment" cases Nimmer cites as agency law equivalents go far beyond "employment" in the agency law sense.