Opinion
No. 4:02-CV-056-Y
June 20, 2002
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
I. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS A.NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Jeffrey O. Ready, Reg. No. 27588-086, is a federal prisoner incarcerated at the Federal Medical Center in Fort Worth, Texas.
The Respondent is L.E. Fleming, Warden of the Federal Medical Center.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
All of the following information was found in Fleming's motion to dismiss with attached exhibit, which is a declaration from Ready's case manager, and the documentary exhibits attached to Ready's petition. (Docket Entry Nos. 1, 10.)
On June 18, 1998, Ready was convicted in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington on June 18, 1998 for the offense of bank fraud. 18 U.S.C. § 2, 1344. The District Court sentenced Ready to 30 months' incarceration with a 5-year supervised release term. Ready currently has a projected release date of April 30, 2003.
On August 10, 2001, Ready wrote to Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon indicating that he was wrongfully housed with maximum security inmates because he was a minimum security inmate. He also stated that he had witnessed a violent act and feared for his life. He requested a transfer to a Federal Prison Camp in either Oregon or California. Fleming, in response, told Senator Wyden that because the trial court recommended that Ready participate in a mental health assessment and treatment program, he was properly at the Federal Medical Center, which houses inmates of all security levels. He further stated that Ready was offered protective custody, but he elected to remain in the general prison population. Ready then began pursuing his administrative remedies. He first submitted an informal request for administrative remedy on September 24, 2001, challenging the fact that he was housed too far from home and with maximum security inmates without a valid psychological-management variable. He requested removal of the management variable and transfer to a minimum security facility within 500 miles of his home. On October 4, 2001, a staff member indicated that Ready was at the Federal Medical Center based on a psychological-management variable imposed by the sentencing trial judge. In response to Ready's subsequent formal request for administrative remedy, Fleming denied Ready's requests:
You were designated to FMC, Fort Worth on April 17, 2001, and are appropriately classified to remain at this facility. Program Statement 5100.07, Security Designation and Custody Classification Manual, dated September 3, 1999, states inmates ordinarily "may be considered for nearer release transfer after serving 18 months within the facility with clear conduct." It is also noted you have a serious criminal record, including a history of escape and resisting arrest.
Based upon this information, your request [for management-variable removal and transfer] is denied.
Ready appealed Fleming's denial to the Regional Director. On December 14, 2001, the Regional Director denied Ready's appeal. Ready then appealed that denial to the Board of National Inmate Appeals. On January 8, 2002, the Administrator of National Inmate Appeals denied the appeal:
Our review reveals [Fleming] and the Regional Director adequately responded to the issues you raised in your appeal. These issues fall within the authority of [Fleming] and [the] Regional Director. . . . As noted in your response from [Fleming] and [the] Regional Director, the security and custody classification system allows staff to exercise professional judgement to ensure all characteristics of an inmate's case are considered when making decisions regarding security and custody classification. Management Variables provide a means for staff to document the basis for assigning an inmate to an institution which is not consistent with the security level assigned to the Custody Classification Form.
Our records indicate that your Unit Team will continue to monitor your case. As indicated in your response from (Fleming], you will be considered for a transfer in November 2002, provided you maintain clear conduct. At this time, unit staff will thoroughly assess your adjustment, program participation, security needs and appropriateness for camp placement.
Ready then filed the instant habeas corpus petition with supporting documentary exhibits in this court on January 25, 2002. In response to the petition, Fleming has filed a motion to dismiss with supporting brief, asserting that the petition should be dismissed because Ready has failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted.
On August 28, 2001, Ready filed a civil-rights complaint in this court requesting money damages. On November 13, 2001, the complaint was dismissed for want of prosecution because Ready had failed to pay the required filing fee. Ready v. Fleming, No. 4:01-CV-734-Y (N.D. Tex. Nov. 13, 2001).
On March 21, 2002, Ready completed his mental health treatment plan, and his management variable expired. On April 11, 2002, Ready was approved for supervision by the Probation Office in Oregon. The approval is contingent upon Ready being accepted in a halfway house in Oregon. Ready's case manager has prepared the documents for a halfway-house placement.
D. ISSUES
Ready argues that holding him in a maximum security facility on an invalid management variable is detrimental to his transition into the community and is cruelly keeping him away from his family. He further argues that his continued confinement at the Federal Medical Center is a result of retaliation based on his contact with Senator Wyden. He requests (1) immediate transfer to a Federal Prison Camp closer to home, (2) removal of the management variable, and (3) a six-month placement in an Oregon or Washington halfway house.
E. DISCUSSION
First, Ready's claim regarding the management variable should be dismissed as moot. The psychological-management variable expired; thus, there is no longer a case or controversy regarding this claim. See Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Bailey v. Southerland, 821 F.2d 277, 278 (5th Cir. 1987).
Turning to Ready's claims that he has been denied transfer to a Federal Prison Camp, it is well settled that under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the Bureau of Prisons may direct confinement in any available facility and may transfer a prisoner from one facility to another at any time. State and federal prisoners generally enjoy no constitutional right to placement in a particular penal institution. Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Brown-Bey v. United States, 720 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1983). Thus, the Attorney General has the power to direct the place of a prisoner's confinement and the authority "to transfer federal prisoners from one place of confinement to another at any time for any reason whatsoever or for no reason at all." Brown-Bey, 720 F.2d at 470. Ready does not have a constitutional right to designation at any particular institution. Moore v. United States Att'y Gen., 473 F.2d 1375, 1376 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam).
Regarding Ready's claim that he should be placed in a halfway house, the specific statute involved provides:
The Bureau of Prisons shall, to the extent practicable, assure that a prisoner serving a term of imprisonment spends a reasonable part, not to exceed six months, of the last 10 per centum of the term to be served under conditions that will afford the prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for the prisoner's re-entry into the community. The authority provided by this subsection may be used to place a prisoner in home confinement. . . .18 U.S.C. § 3624(c). The courts have rejected the claim that § 3624(c) creates a protected due process liberty interest, and have held that the statute does not encroach upon the Bureau of Prison's broad discretion and authority to determine where prisoners may be confined during the prerelease period. Prows v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 981 F.2d 466, 469-70 (l0th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 830 (1993); see also United States v. Laughlin, 933 F.2d 786, 789 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Nothing in the language of section 3624(c) mandates that all prisoners pass through a community treatment center en route to free society."). While the statute does employ mandatory language, it relates only to a general guideline to facilitate the prisoner's post-release adjustment through the establishment of some unspecified pre-release conditions. Prows, 981 F.2d at 469. Such interpretation is clearly consistent with the broad administrative discretion delegated to the Bureau of Prisons regarding the placement of prisoners. Brown-Bey, 720 F.2d at 470. Thus, § 3624(c) does not create a constitutionally protected liberty interest, and Ready's halfway-house-placement claim must fail.
Ready next alleges that he is the victim of retaliation at the hands of prison officials based upon his contact with Senator Wyden, resulting in the complete denial of placement in a halfway house or transfer to a Federal Prison Camp closer to home. Certainly, while a prisoner enjoys no constitutional right to remain in or be transferred to a particular institution, prison officials do not have the discretion to punish an inmate for exercising his constitutional rights. Prows, 981 F.2d 466; Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 561-61 (10th Cir. 1990). Ready's conclusory and wholly unsupported allegations that he was the victim of retaliation are, however, insufficient to demonstrate an entitlement to relief. There is absolutely no evidence of record to support the claim. Moreover, the competent evidence of record indicates otherwise. Ready was denied transfer based upon legitimate reasons.
II. RECOMMENDATION
Fleming's motion to dismiss should be granted, and Ready's petition should be dismissed with prejudice.
III. NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file, not merely place in the mail, specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until July 11, 2002. Failure to file specific written objections within the specified time shall bar a de novo determination by the district court of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any unobjected to, proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until July 11, 2002 to serve and file, not merely place in the mail, written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, the response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.