Opinion
Case No. 1:99-CV-719
October 16, 2000
OPINION
This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] ("Motion") pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c) and alternatively pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed against each and all Defendants because Plaintiff fails to state a legal basis for her claims. The Court denies in part and grants in part Defendants' Motion.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff originally filed a Complaint alleging the following pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) false imprisonment, (2) malicious prosecution, (3) abuse of process, and (4) retaliation. In addition, Plaintiff alleged a violation of her First Amendment rights and a violation of her equal protection rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Plaintiff also alleged that Defendants violated Michigan state laws pertaining to false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process.
Plaintiff's Version
Plaintiff's Complaint stems from an incident that took place on January 19, 1999, when Plaintiff was driving in Ionia, Michigan, with her son, Dale Robinson, in the passenger seat. Officer Phil Wolters pulled Plaintiff's car over and approached Plaintiff. When Plaintiff asked why she had been pulled over, Officer Wolters asked Plaintiff about her passenger. (Robinson dep. at 26). Plaintiff asked what relevance this had with her being pulled over, and her son then identified himself. (Ray dep. at 69).
All depositions will be cited by the deponent's name and a page number. For example, cites to Plaintiff Ray's deposition will be Ray dep. at __.
Officer Wolters asked Plaintiff for identification and proof of insurance, which she provided, and then checked her information and ran a warrant check on Dale Robinson. (Ray dep. at 70; Wolters dep. at 20). Officer Wolters saw that there was an outstanding warrant for Dale's failure to appear. Officer Wolters then told Plaintiff there was a bench warrant for Dale's arrest. When asked why the warrant had been issued, Officer Wolters stated that he did not know and Dale would find out at the station. (Robinson dep. at 41). Officer Wolters then returned Plaintiff's identification.
Sometime during this interaction, Officer Stahl arrived and stood at the passenger door of Plaintiff's car. Officer Wolters asked Dale to get out of the car, and Officer Stahl patted Dale Robinson down, asking him if he had any weapons, needles, or contraband. Officer Stahl then handcuffed Dale. (Robinson dep. at 42-43). Officer Wolters asked Dale if he could search the car, and Dale responded that it was not his car, and Officer Wolters would have to ask his mother. (Robinson dep. at 43). Officer Wolters then walked to the open passenger door and asked for permission to search the car. (Ray dep. at 85). Plaintiff refused permission and claims that Officer Wolters responded, "Why not? Because you have crack or guns in the car?" Officer Wolters again asked for permission to search the car and stated "Well you must have crack or guns in the car if you won't let me search it." Plaintiff told Officer Wolters that she had an "expectation of privacy" in her car. (Ray dep. at 85-86)
Dale became upset, and Officer Stahl told Officer Wolters to take Dale to the squad car. (Ray dep. at 87-88). Plaintiff yelled to Dale, "Don't worry, I am going to go file a complaint against them." (Ray dep. at 88). Officer Wolters claimed he did not hear Plaintiff say this. (Wolters dep. at 28). Officers Stahl and Wolters walked Dale to the car, and Officer Wolters put Dale in the back seat. (Robinson dep. at 45). Officers Wolters and Stahl then spoke with each other while standing between the police car and Plaintiff's car . . . (Ray dep. at 89).
While the two officers were speaking, Plaintiff exited her car, walked around the back of it past the officers, shut her passenger door, walked back past the officers and got into her car. Plaintiff started her car and slowly pulled away. (Ray dep. at 89). Neither officer told Plaintiff to stay, nor did they yell after her when she left. The officers did not turn on their sirens, gesture to her, or attempt to follow her. (Wolters dep. at 29-30; Stahl dep. at 22-23). Plaintiff drove to the Public Safety Department and filed a complaint against Officer Wolters. Plaintiff told Sergeant Klein that she did not like the way she was treated and was upset because Officer Wolters would not tell her why her son was being arrested. She also complained about the repeated remarks concerning crack and guns. (Ray dep. at 91-97).
Sergeant Klein radioed the officers to tell them about the complaint lodged against Officer Wolters. Sergeant Klein instructed the two officers to come in and see him about the complaint. Sergeant Klein asked Officer Wolters about the reason for the search, the reason for not telling Plaintiff and Dale why Dale was being arrested, and the crack or guns remarks. (Klein dep. at 27; Wolters dep. at 34-36). During this conversation, Officer Wolters did not mention seeking the arrest of Plaintiff for leaving the scene, nor did he mention that Plaintiff prevented the search of the car by driving off. (Klein dep. at 41). Sergeant Klein later discussed the matter informally with Officer Stahl but did not ask Officer Stahl about Officer Wolters' comments accusing Plaintiff of having crack or guns in her car. (Klein dep. at 30). Sergeant Klein sent Plaintiff a response stating her claims had no merit. (Klein dep. at 39).
Officer Wolters wrote up a police report about the stop and requested a warrant from Prosecutor Gail Benda. Benda testified that she understood that Plaintiff was told by the officers to remain at the scene for the search of her car. Benda also believed that the officers were putting Dale Robinson in the police car when Plaintiff left. (Benda dep. at 15, 48). Benda had a copy of Sergeant Klein's letter report regarding Plaintiff's complaint. Benda authorized the warrant on January 26, 1999, and Officer Wolters went before a magistrate on February 18, 1999, to obtain issuance of the warrant.
That same day, Officer Wolters went to Plaintiff's house to arrest her. At that time, Plaintiff was at work in the county park and outside the city's jurisdiction. (Ray dep. at 43). Officer Wolters enlisted the help of two county deputies who told Plaintiff they had a warrant for her arrest. (Ray dep. at 36). Plaintiff asked one of the deputies why she was being arrested. The deputy responded that it was because she resisted and obstructed an officer. The deputies handcuffed Plaintiff and marched her down the sidewalk. (Ray dep. at 36).
The district court bound Plaintiff over for trial, and Plaintiff's attorney filed a Motion to Quash. After a hearing on the Motion to Quash, the Circuit Court Judge quashed the information because "the facts are quite clear that there was no criminal intent." (Motion to Quash Transcript at 14-15).
Defendants' Version
The Defendants' version of facts are largely the same with a few additions and variations. Officer Wolters testified that he had prior knowledge of an arrest warrant for Dale Robinson, and he had recognized Dale in Plaintiff's car. (Wolters dep. at 16). While Officer Wolters checked on a warrant for Dale Robinson, he noticed Dale moving around in Plaintiff's car. (Wolters dep. at 26-27). After verifying the warrant, Officer Wolters asked Dale to get out of the car. After Dale was patted down, arrested, and handcuffed, Officer Wolters asked Dale if he had any weapons or drugs in the car. (Wolters dep. at 17-22). Officer Wolters asked Plaintiff if he could search the car, and she became upset. Officer Wolters claims Dale became agitated, so the officers walked him to the police car. (Wolters dep. at 27-28).
When questioned by Sergeant Klein as to why he did not tell Dale why he had an outstanding warrant, Officer Wolters said that he told Dale the warrant was for failure to appear. (Klein dep. at 27). Officer Wolters also claims that he told Sergeant Klein that he and Officer Stahl wanted to search the vehicle but Plaintiff had left. When asked about the alleged guns or crack comments, Officer Wolters told Sergeant Klein about his experience with an undercover drug team involving Dale, and stated that he asked the question "matter of factly." (Klein dep. at 28).
VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
In her Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment], Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the following Counts : (1) § 1983 abuse of process claim, (2) § 1981 violations of equal protection rights claim, and (3) the claims based on state law against the City of Ionia. The remaining Counts are: (1) violating her Fourth Amendment rights under § 1983 via false arrest and imprisonment, malicious prosecution and retaliation, (2) First Amendment violations, (3) Constitutional rights violation under § 1983 against the City of Ionia, and (4) state law tort claims of false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process.
Because Plaintiff did not file a notice of dismissal before Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, nor did she file a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties, the Court must order the dismissal of these counts. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1), (2). The Court so orders a dismissal without prejudice.
LEGAL STANDARDS Rule 12(c)
Rule 12(c) provides that: "[a]fter the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings." When a motion for judgment on the pleadings essentially challenges the legal basis of the complaint, the motion may also be treated under the standards for motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Moxley v. Vernot, 555 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.Ohio 1982); Amersbach v. City of Cleveland, 598 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1979). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint may be dismissed "only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." The complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and its well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. However, the Court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Morgan, 829 F.2d at 12 (citations omitted).
"If on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the [C]ourt, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c).
Rule 56(c)
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, this Court will only consider the narrow question of whether there are "genuine issues as to any material fact and [whether] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A motion for summary judgment requires that the Court view the "`inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.'" Matsushita Electric Ind Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)). The opponent , however, has the burden of showing that a "rational trier of fact [could] find for the non-moving party [or] that there is a `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587. "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of plaintiff's position, [however,] will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
DISCUSSION A. Officer Stahl and Sergeant Klein
In her Complaint, Plaintiff fails to allege any actions taken by Officer Stahl or Sergeant Klein that violated her Fourth Amendment rights. Neither does Plaintiff allege any actions taken by Officer Stahl or Sergeant Klein in her retaliation claim or her First Amendment claim. Thus, Defendants' Motion is granted as to Plaintiff's claims of (1) false arrest, (2) false imprisonment, (3) malicious prosecution, (4) retaliation, (5) First Amendment violations, and (6) all state law claims against Officer Stahl and Sergeant Klein. Similarly, Defendants' Motion is granted as to Plaintiff's Count VII "Violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights by the City of Ionia" against Officers Wolters and Stahl and Sergeant Klein.
Officer Wolters is now referred to as Defendant Wolters, and the City of Ionia is referred to as Defendant City.
B. False Arrest and Imprisonment and Malicious Prosecution Under § 1983
Plaintiff bases her claim charging Defendant Wolters with false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution in violation of § 1983 on her Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law before deprivation of liberty.To make out a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must show that (1) the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law, and (2) the conduct deprived her of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or other laws of the United States. See Valot v. Southeast Local School Board of Education, 107 F.3d 1220,1225 (6th Cir. 1997). Defendant Wolters does not dispute he was acting under color of state law at the time of the alleged incident. The remaining question is whether Defendant Wolters' conduct deprived Plaintiff of rights , privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.
1. False Arrest and Imprisonment
To make out a Constitutional claim of false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, Plaintiff must show no probable cause existed for the arrest. See Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 871 (6th Cir. 1997). Here, Plaintiff was arrested under a warrant based on leaving a traffic stop without permission and obstructing the search of the car's passenger compartment. Plaintiff argues Defendant Wolters did not have probable cause to stop her vehicle or search the car's passenger compartment.
To succeed in a false arrest case, Plaintiff must prove she was arrested by Defendant Wolters, Defendant Wolters intended to arrest her, she was aware of the arrest, the arrest was against her will, and the arrest was unlawful. See Tumbarella v. Kroger, 85 Mich. App. 482 (1971). Plaintiff alleges each of these elements in her complaint.
The Court declines to decide the validity of the stop and arrest and whether Defendant Wolters had the right to search Plaintiff's car as these issues are not before the Court on Defendants' Motion. The Court recognizes an officer's authority to stop a vehicle if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, see Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 81 (6th Cir. 1999), and that the officer must have specific and articulable facts to warrant the stop, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). In this case, Defendant Wolters knew that two weeks prior to the stop, a warrant existed for Dale Robinson's arrest. Of course, if the stop was reasonable and the arrest valid, Defendant Wolters likely had the right to search Dale Robinson, the arrestee, and the area within his control, see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), including the passenger compartment of Plaintiff's car, see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); U.S. v. Myers, 102 F.3d 227, 232 (6th Cir. 1996).
"Probable cause" denotes "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense." Criss v. City of Kent, 867 F.2d 259, 262 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)). "If the circumstances, viewed objectively, support a finding of probable cause, the arresting officer's actual motives are irrelevant." Criss, 867 F.2d at 262. In general, the existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible. See Yancey v. Carroll County, 876 F.2d 1238, 1243 (6th Cir. 1989).
In this case, there is more than one reasonable determination possible. For example, one could reasonably determine that Defendant Wolters intended for Plaintiff to stay at the scene so that he could search her car, and her failure to do so was obstructing and resisting an officer in the performance of his duties. In contrast, one could reasonably determine that Defendant Wolters' actions of giving Plaintiff back her identification and not issuing a ticket reasonably indicated to Plaintiff that she was free to leave. Thus, the existence for probable cause to arrest is a question of fact for the jury, and Defendant Wolters' Motion is denied with respect to that Count. In addition, whether Plaintiff suffered false imprisonment turns on whether she was falsely arrested, and Defendant Wolters' Motion is denied with respect to that Count.
2. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim also depends on whether probable cause existed for her arrest because one of the elements of a malicious prosecution claim is that the person who instituted or maintained the action lacked probable cause. See Matthews v. BCBSM, 456 Mich. 352 (1998). Therefore, Defendant Wolters' Motion is denied with respect to the malicious prosecution claim.
The other elements for a malicious prosecution claim are (1) a criminal prosecution initiated against the defendant, (2) a termination of the criminal proceedings in the defendants' favor, and (3) an action instituted with malice or a purpose other than bringing the offender to justice. See Matthews 456 Mich. 352. Plaintiff has alleged these in her complaint.
C. Qualified Immunity
Defendant Wolters argues in the alternative that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the claims of false arrest and imprisonment and malicious prosecution. Generally, the qualified immunity defense is a legal question to be determined by a trial judge. See Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 1988). A court faced with a qualified immunity question should decide "squarely whether a constitutional claim is presented." Chrisophel v. Kukulinsky, 61 F.3d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1995).
The first question is whether Plaintiff's Complaint states a claim of the "violation of a clearly established law." Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375, 386 (6th Cir. 1994). The second question is whether Plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether Defendant Wolters in fact committed the acts that violated the law. See id. However, "[w]here . . . the legal question of qualified immunity turns upon which version of the facts one accepts, the jury, not the judge, must determine liability." Sova v. City of Mount Pleasant, 142 F.3d 898, 903 (6th Cir. 1998).
A successful § 1983 claimant must show that the defendant knowingly or intentionally violated claimant's Constitutional rights. See id. at 815. Generally, a police officer can be held liable for requesting a warrant allegedly leading to a false arrest if no officer would conclude the warrant should issue; but if "officers of reasonable competence could disagree on this issue, immunity should be recognized." Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). Reasonableness in this context refers to whether a warrant application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause that it renders official belief in its existence unreasonable. See id. at 344-45.
First, Plaintiff's complaint states a claim of the "violation of a clearly established law." A person has a constitutional right under the Fourth Amendment not to be arrested without probable cause, see United States v. McNeal, 955 F.2d 1067, 1071 (1992), and a person also has a right not to be imprisoned based on a false arrest.
Plaintiff has also presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue as to whether Defendant Wolters committed acts that violated the law. This apparently depends on whether Defendant Wolters had probable cause to obtain a warrant and arrest Plaintiff. If Plaintiff is believed, then Defendant Wolters did commit the acts that violated her rights. If Defendant Wolters is believed, he was merely carrying out his duties as a police officer. Therefore, the legal question of qualified immunity turns on which facts are believed, and this is to be decided by the jury. See Sova, 142 F.3d at 903. Thus, Plaintiff's Complaint survives summary judgment notwithstanding Defendant Wolters' qualified immunity defense.
D. Retaliation and First Amendment Claims
Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wolters violated her First Amendment rights when he initiated a lawsuit by obtaining an arrest warrant against her after she filed a complaint.
To establish a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must show that (1) she was engaged in a Constitutionally protected activity; (2) Defendant Wolters' adverse action caused Plaintiff to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part as a response to the exercise of her Constitutional rights. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999).
Generally, a plaintiff has a First Amendment right to criticize public officials. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has stated that a person's freedom to verbally oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is "one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state." Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 461-63 (1987).
In this case, Plaintiff claims to have been criticizing public officials, but Defendant Wolters claims Plaintiff could have been attempting to intimidate the arresting officers because Plaintiff filed the complaint so soon after her son was arrested. Defendant Wolters also claims that obtaining a warrant for Plaintiff's arrest cannot be considered adverse action because the prosecutor made an independent decision to issue the warrant. Defendant Wolters claims that the basis for the warrant was Plaintiff leaving the investigatory stop, whereas the basis for Plaintiffs Complaint was Defendant Wolters' actions at the stop. Plaintiff, however, alleges that Defendant Wolters' actions were adverse because his actions to obtain a warrant were based on her complaint. Plaintiff points to the chronology of events and claims that Defendant Wolters did not institute a prosecution against her until he had received word of her complaint. As these are genuine issues of material fact, Defendant Wolters' Motion is denied with respect to Plaintiff's retaliation claim.
E. Constitutional Rights Claims Against the City of Ionia
Plaintiff claims that the City of Ionia, through its police department's de facto policies, practices and customs, violated her Constitutional rights. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant City "permitted, encouraged, tolerated and ratified a practice of unjustified, unreasonable, and illegal arrests" by its police officers. Plaintiff also alleges that the Defendant City failed to properly supervise, discipline, transfer, counsel or otherwise control police officers who the Defendant City knew or should have known were violating established department policies. Plaintiff claims that the Defendant City has not maintained a system of review for civil rights complaints, including its investigations into such complaints.
To succeed in her § 1983 claim against the Defendant City, Plaintiff must show that the Defendant City was the "moving force of the Constitutional violation." Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). A single incident of unconstitutional activity does not establish an official policy or practice sufficient to render a city liable for damages under § 1983. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823 (1985). Furthermore, inadequate training can be the basis for a § 1983 claim only if it amounted to "deliberate indifference" to a person's rights with whom the city employees come into contact. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. 115, 123 (1992). The Supreme Court has further stated that where a failure to train reflects a "deliberate" or "conscious" choice by the municipality, the failure may be properly thought of as an actionable city "policy." Monell cannot be satisfied by a mere allegation that a training program represents a policy for which the city is responsible. City of Canton, Ohio v Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388-90 (1989).
Police Chief Roger Frazee testified regarding the various department policies Plaintiff questioned. One such Policy is section 5.43 which reads:
Officers shall courteously and promptly record in writing any complaint by a citizen against any member of the Department. Officers may attempt to resolve the complaint, but shall never attempt to dissuade any citizen from lodging a complaint against any member of the Department. Officers shall follow established Departmental procedures for processing complaints.
Frazee also testified that standard operating procedure is not documented. He stated that the people receiving the complaints are expected to "ascertain right from wrong . . . and then recommend discipline or not."
Defendant Klein testified that he investigates citizen complaints by speaking with the citizen. He stated that he takes citizen complaints "very seriously." He also indicated that he interviews all the parties involved, as well as witnesses if available. Defendant Klein stated that based on his conversation with Plaintiff, the focus of his investigation was whether the warrant and arrest was valid and whether the officers had the right to search the car. Furthermore, Defendant Klein testified that Plaintiff did not indicate she thought Defendant Wolters' "crack or gun" remark to be racially derogatory.
Plaintiff testified that she did not say anything to Defendant Klein about her belief that Defendant Wolters' "crack or gun" remark was racially motivated. She also stated that Defendant Klein was respectful.
Based on this testimony and Plaintiff's allegation in her Complaint, Plaintiff has not alleged facts showing that Defendant City violated her Constitutional rights. Plaintiff has testified that she complained about the stop, the arrest, the request to search, and Defendant Wolters' derogatory remarks, and Defendant Klein testified that he investigated each of these complaints. Nothing alleged amounts to a "deliberate indifference" to Plaintiff's rights. Nor do the alleged facts indicate that Defendant City failed to train its employees. Plaintiff has not alleged facts that show Defendant City was the "moving force" of her alleged Constitutional violations. Therefore, Defendant City's Motion as to Plaintiff's Count VII alleging violations of her Constitutional Rights by Defendant City is granted.
F. Plaintiff's Claims Based on State Law
Plaintiff raises the following claims based on state law: false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. Plaintiff attempts to invokes the Court's supplemental jurisdiction.
A District Court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 over a state law claim if the court already has jurisdiction over a substantial federal claim, if the state and federal claims are derived from a common nucleus of operative fact, and if the claims are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). The Court's exercise of pendant jurisdiction is discretionary and includes consideration of such factors as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the litigants. See McLaurin v. Fischer, 768 F.2d 98, 104-05 (6th Cir. 1985). In addition, a federal court exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims is bound to apply the law of the forum state to the same extent as if it were exercising its diversity jurisdiction. See Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 761 (6th Cir. 1998).
1. False Arrest/Imprisonment
Plaintiff bases her state law claim of false arrest and imprisonment on the same facts as her § 1983 false arrest and imprisonment claim. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Wolten attested and imprisoned her without probable cause or her consent.
In Michigan, liability for false arrest and imprisonment attaches only when the claimant is arrested without probable cause. See Young v. Barker, 158 Mich. App. 709, 405 N.W.2d 395 (1987), lv. den. 429 Mich. 857 (1987). As previously noted, there is more than one reasonable determination of probable cause possible based on the facts of this case. The existence of probable cause to arrest is a question of fact for the jury, and Defendant Wolters' Motion is denied with respect to this Count VIII.
2. Malicious Prosecution
Plaintiff alleges the same facts in her state law claim for malicious prosecution as she does for her § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. To sustain her state law claim for malicious prosecution, Plaintiff must prove that (1) a criminal prosecution was instituted against her by Defendant Wolters, (2) the prosecution was terminated in her favor, (3) Defendant Wolters lacked probable cause for the prosecution, and (4) Defendant Wolters acted from malicious motives. See Matthews v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan, 456 N.W.2d 365, 377-78, 572 N.W.2d 603, 609-10 (1987).
Again, Plaintiff's state law malicious prosecution claim depends on whether probable causes existed for her arrest. As this is a question of fact for the jury, Defendant Wolters' Motion is dismissed with respect to this count.
3. Abuse of Process
In her Response to the Motion, Plaintiff explicitly dismissed her § 1983 abuse of process claim. Plaintiff failed however, to explicitly dismiss her state law abuse of process claim. Plaintiff also failed to address this claim in her response.
To recover under a theory of abuse of process, plaintiffs must plead and prove an ulterior purpose and an act in the use of process that is improper in the regular prosecution of the proceeding.
See Young v. Motor City Apartments, 133 Mich. App. 671, 678, 350 N.W.2d 790, 794 (1984); See Friedman v. Dozorc, 412 Mich. 1, 30, 312 N.W.2d 585, 594 (1981) The Friedman Court concluded that a plaintiff must allege something besides the mere issuance of a summons and complaint because the "action for abuse of process lies for the improper use of process after it has been issued, not for maliciously causing it to issue." 412 Mich. 31, 312 N.W.2d 585. In addition, the pleadings "must allege a use of process for a purpose outside of the intended purpose and must allege with specificity an act which itself corroborates the ulterior motive." Young, 133 Mich. App. at 681, 350 N.W.2d at 795. In Valiance v. Brewbaker, 161 Mich. App. 642, 646, 411 N.W.2d 808, 810 (1987), the court stated that there must be some corroborating act that demonstrates the ulterior purpose. A bad motive alone will not establish an abuse of process. See id. Furthermore, the improper ulterior purpose must be demonstrated by a corroborating act; the mere harboring of bad motives on the part of the actor without any manifestation of those motives will not suffice to establish an abuse of process. See Early Detection Center, P.C. v. New York Life Ins. Co., 157 Mich. App. 618, 629-30, 403 N.W.2d 830, 835 (1986). Plaintiff has alleged that the process was maliciously obtained, and this is not sufficient to assert a state-law abuse of process claim. Therefore, Defendant Wolters' Motion is granted with respect to this count.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is denied in part and granted in part.
In accordance with the Opinion of this date;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] (Dkt. No. 39) is
DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is GRANTED as to Counts I, II, IV, and V against Defendant Stahl.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is GRANTED as to Counts I, II, IV, and V against Defendant Klein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is GRANTED as to Count VII against Defendants Wolters, Stahl, and Klein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is GRANTED as to Count IX against Defendant Stahl.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is GRANTED as to Count IX against Defendant Klein.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is GRANTED as to the Abuse of Process claim in Count IX against Defendant Wolters.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is DENIED as to Counts I, II, IV, and V against Defendant Wolters.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is DENIED as to Count VII against Defendant City of Ionia.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is DENIED as to Count VIII against Defendant Wolters.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Disposition [Judgment] is DENIED as to the Malicious Prosecution in Count IX claim against Defendant Wolters.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Count III Abuse of Process Under § 1983, Count VI Violation of Equal Rights Under § 1981, and Count X Violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights by the City of Ionia based on state law claims are DISMISSED without PREJUDICE.