Opinion
5:22-CV-00379-M
05-10-2024
James Ray, Jr., Plaintiff, v. State of North Carolina, et al., Defendants.
MEMORANDUM & RECOMMENDATION
ROBERT T. NUMBERS, II UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
James Ray, Jr., sued three police officers for wrongs that allegedly occurred during an incident on his property which resulted in his arrest. One defendant, P.J. Howard, has moved to dismiss the claims against him. Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 16. Ray has not opposed the motion. But the court finds that Howard has not shown entitlement to relief at this point. So the court should deny the motion to dismiss.
I. Background
In September 2019, Ray called police to his house for help with a domestic disturbance. During the incident, Ray was arrested-and later, jailed-for an alleged assault on a female. According to Ray, Cary Police Officer J.H. Hanak trespassed onto Ray's property, assaulted him, and arrested him without probable cause in the presence of officers P.J. Howard and W.T. Spencer. See Compl. at 2, D.E. 1-1; Attach. to Compl. at 3, D.E. 1-2. After the arrest, Ray claims that he was found not guilty in state court. Attach. to Compl. at 3. He also alleges that, in finding him not guilty, the judge ruled that there was not probable cause for his arrest. Id.
Ray's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleges violations of the Fourth Amendment for unlawful detention and arrest by Cary Police Officers Hanak, Howard, and W.T. Spencer. Attach. to Compl. at 1-2. Ray seeks $3,370,500 in damages. Id. at 3.
After screening Ray's Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court dismissed some named defendants and his claim under 18 U.S.C. § 241. See Order, D.E. 6; Order & Mem. & Recommendation, D.E. 4.
Howard moves the court to dismiss the action against him. Mot. to Dismiss, D.E. 16. He claims that the Complaint insufficiently alleges that officers lacked probable cause to arrest Ray.
II. Discussion
Under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). Therefore, while a court must accept all factual allegations contained in a complaint as true, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. (citation omitted).
After Iqbal, a court considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) must subject a complaint to a two-part test. First, the court must identify the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth because they are conclusory or a mere formulaic recitation of the elements of a claim. Id. at 679. Then, taking the remaining factual allegations as true, the court must determine whether the complaint “plausibly suggest[s] an entitlement to relief.” Id. If, after conducting this two-part analysis, “the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not shown-that the pleader is entitled to relief” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if a party fails to show that it is entitled to relief, the court must dismiss its deficient claims.
Along with the allegations on the day of his arrest, the Complaint also states that an officer assaulted Ray in July 2019 after he called for help with a domestic violence issue with his family. Attach. to Compl at 3. Ray filed an internal affairs complaint with Cary Police Department. Id. A few weeks later when he again called police for help with another domestic incident, officers arrested him. Id. Dismissal of the charge because of a lack of probable cause followed a year later. Id.
So Ray claims that officers arrested him without a warrant or probable cause. Id. at 4. This court found that Ray's allegations that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they detained and arrested him without probable cause could proceed. See D.E. 4, 6.
The Fourth Amendment protects members of the public from unreasonable seizures by government officials. U.S. Const. amend IV. To prevail on a false arrest claim under §1983, a plaintiff must prove “the defendant (1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.” Evans v. Chalmers, 703 F.3d 636, 647 (4th Cir. 2012).
The Fourth Amendment applies to state actors through the Fourteenth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961).
When a plaintiff alleges that a law enforcement officer violated their Fourth Amendment rights by unlawfully arresting them, that plaintiff must establish that their arrest was not supported by probable cause. See Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 627 (4th Cir. 2007). In considering whether probable cause supported a particular arrest, a court must “examine the events leading up to the arrest and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2018) (quotations omitted). Meeting the probable cause standard “is not a high bar” and “requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.” Id. at 57 (quotation omitted).
Howard correctly notes that because a complaint survives frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. §1915 does not insulate it from a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329 (1989). Yet the undersigned finds that the complaint here offers enough facts to survive Howard's challenge.
Ray's pro se complaint is subject “to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se plaintiff's allegations, it “cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts.” Johnson v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 867 F.Supp.2d 766, 776 (E.D. N.C. 2011).
Howard challenges the sufficiency of the complaint, arguing that its allegations are inadequate to support Ray's claims. It fails to identify which officer arrested Ray. And he claims that the complaint offers no allegations that explain whether there was a lack of probable cause for Ray's arrest.
The fact that a defendant is not convicted of a crime does not establish that officers lacked probable cause to make an arrest. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 36 (1979) (“The validity of the arrest does not depend on whether the suspect actually committed a crime” because “the kinds and degree of proof and the procedural requirements necessary for a conviction are not prerequisites to a valid arrest.”); Decina v. Horry Cnty. Police Dep't, 555 F.Supp.3d 716, 730 (D.S.C. 2021) (dismissal of charge did not negate a finding of probable cause to arrest). So Howard claims that Ray must cite additional facts to support a lack of probable cause.
The undersigned cannot agree. The complaint does not only rely on the dismissed charge. It alleges that a North Carolina judge dismissed the charge because “there was no probable cause.” D.E. 1-2 at 3. In light of the liberal construction given to pro se pleadings, this statement can be read to allege that there was a lack of probable cause to pursue the assault charge against Ray from its inception. See, e.g., Miller v. Prince George's Cnty., 475 F.3d 621, 630 (4th Cir. 2007) (“A plaintiff's allegations that police seized him pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a claim alleging that a seizure was violative of the Fourth Amendment.”); Torres v. Ball, No. 1:19-CV-94-FDW, 2019 WL 4491522, at *2 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 18, 2019) (complaint that alleged illegal stop, search, and arrest, where charges were later dismissed, stated a plausible § 1983 claim); Evans v. Griffin, No. 7:13-CV-127-FL, 2014 WL 3921356 (E.D.N.C Aug. 11, 2014) (allowing § 1983 wrongful arrest claims against officer to proceed after magistrate dismissed charges for lack of probable cause).
The court assumes the veracity of this claim as alleged in the Complaint.
At this stage, the court need not conclusively determine whether probable cause existed for Ray's arrest. See Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he purpose of Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of a complaint and not to resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.”). The Complaint plausibly alleges enough facts to move forward. See McCormick v. Graham, et al., No. 5:22-CT-3020-M, 2022 WL 18134843, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Dec. 15, 2022) (allowing § 1983 claims against individual officers for false arrest to proceed where arrest warrants dismissed for lack of probable cause); Quarles v. Weeks, No. 1:16-CV-304, 2017 WL 9513018, at *4 (W.D. N.C. July 6, 2017) (“[P]laintiff's allegations that police seized him ‘pursuant to legal process that was not supported by probable cause and that the criminal proceedings terminated in his favor are sufficient to state a . . . claim alleging a seizure that was violative of the Fourth Amendment.'”) (quotations omitted), adopted, 2017 WL 4326351 (W.D. N.C. Sept. 29, 2017).
Mindful of the leeway afforded to pro se litigants, the undersigned finds that the complaint sets forth sufficient allegations supporting Ray's claims. So Howard's motion to dismiss lacks merit and should be denied.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned recommends that the court deny Howard's Motion to Dismiss. D.E. 16.
The Clerk of Court must serve a copy of this Memorandum and Recommendation (“M&R”) on each party who has appeared. Any party may file a written objection to the M&R within 14 days from the date the Clerk serves it on them. The objection must specifically note the portion of the M&R that the party objects to and the reasons for their objection. Any other party may respond to the objection within 14 days from the date the objecting party serves it on them. The district judge will review the objection and make their own determination about the matter that is the subject of the objection. If a party does not file a timely written objection, the party will have forfeited their ability to have the M&R (or a later decision based on the M&R) reviewed by the Court of Appeals.