Opinion
C/A 9:22-cv-02642-BHH-MHC
05-23-2023
Aquavious Ray, Plaintiff, v. Cpl. Hopkins, Warden Williams, A/W Roberson, Capt. Tutt, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Molly H. Cherry United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Aquavious Ray filed this action, pro se, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 26. After the Court issued an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible consequences if he failed to adequately respond to Defendants' Motion, Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition to the Motion. ECF No. 33. Defendants filed a Reply. ECF No. 34. The Motion is ripe for review.
All pretrial proceedings in this case were referred to the undersigned pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.). Because the Motion is dispositive, this Report and Recommendation is entered for review by the District Judge.
A. Background
Plaintiff is an inmate at the Evans Correctional Institution of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC).
1. Current Lawsuit
In his Amended Complaint, he alleges claims concerning an incident at the McCormick Correctional Institution on August 2, 2019. Specifically, Plaintiff states that he brings his claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for “failure to protect and keep inmate safe[,] failure to secure cell and dorm doors[,] failure to get [Plaintiff] proper care after incident[, and] failure to do security rounds.” ECF No. 11 at 4. Plaintiff alleges that he was attacked by several masked offenders on August 2, 2019. Id. at 5. He claims that he was tied down, blindfolded, and beaten severely. Id. He alleges that these unknown persons used plyers to pull out four of his teeth. Id. at 6. Plaintiff asserts that “lots of people” saw what happened but no one rescued him. Id. at 5. He also claims he did not receive proper medical care after the incident because he allegedly was not taken to the hospital and the only care he received was being bandaged up and having his vital signs monitored. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff requests monetary damages for his pain and suffering (including for his alleged post-traumatic stress disorder) and that his dental bills be “covered” so that he can get implants for his four missing teeth. Id. at 6.
2. Prior Lawsuit
Plaintiff previously brought an action against the same Defendants he has named in this lawsuit: Defendants Williams, Robertson, Tutt, and Hopkins, alleging claims concerning the same alleged attack on August 2, 2019. See Ray v. Williams, No. 9:20-cv-03337-BHH-MHC.Specifically, in the prior lawsuit, Plaintiff claimed that on August 2, 2019, a group of inmates attacked him in his cell and pulled several of his teeth with pliers. Ray v. Williams, No.: 9:2003337-BHH-MHC, ECF No. 1 at 6. He also alleged in the prior lawsuit that Defendants failed to have doors locked and failed to perform security checks. Id. at 5.
He also named SCDC employees Captain Terry, Swann, Nurse O., and William Ackerman as Defendants in that action.
Defendants settled the prior lawsuit with Plaintiff, and Plaintiff executed a Release of All Claims (“Release”). ECF No. 26-4. The Release states that Plaintiff agrees to dismiss Defendants and the South Carolina Department of Corrections:
their heirs, successors and assigns, current and former employees, current and former elected officials, attorneys, or agents, and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations, or partnerships, whether herein named or referred to or not, and who, together with the above-named, may be liable to AQUAVIOUS JUJUAN RAY, of and from any and all claims (whether in tort and/or contract), demands, debts, rights, actions, causes of action, damages, costs, loss of service, medical expenses, and expenses and compensation of whatsoever nature, now existing or which may hereafter occur, and all known and unknown, foreseen and unforeseen, bodily injuries and the consequences arising out of the incarceration of AQUAVIOUS JUJUAN RAY in the South Carolina Department of Corrections and specifically including but not limited to an incident which occurred on August 2, 2019 at McCormick Correctional Institution .....Id. at 1-2. In addition, Plaintiff and Defendants signed and filed a Stipulation of Dismissal with prejudice, dismissing the prior lawsuit. Ray v. Williams, No.: 9:20-03337-BHH-MHC, ECF No. 62.
B. Standard of Review
Defendants move to dismiss the Amended Complaint pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF No. 26. Although Defendants do not identify under which subsection of Rule 12 they are proceeding, the undersigned interprets the Motion as being made pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) and (b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
1. Rule 12(b)(1) Standard
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) represents a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 507 (2006). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenge is raised to the factual basis for subject matter jurisdiction, the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction is on the plaintiff.” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991). In deciding such a motion, “the district court may regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.” In re KBR, Inc., Burn Pit Litig., 744 F.3d 326, 333 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). When determining whether subject matter jurisdiction is present, the court applies the standard applicable to motions for summary judgment where the nonmoving party must set forth specific facts beyond the pleadings to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Richmond, 945 F.2d at 768 (citing Trentacosta v. Frontier Pacific Aircraft Indus., 813 F.2d 1553, 1559 (9th Cir. 1987)). “The moving party should prevail only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Id.
2. Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint.” Williams v. Preiss-Wal Pat III, LLC, 17 F.Supp.3d 528, 531 (D.S.C. 2014) (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)); see Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of [affirmative] defenses.”). Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant will have “fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he facts alleged ‘must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level' and must provide ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Robinson v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 551 F.3d 218, 222 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). This plausibility standard is not analogous to a “probability requirement,” rather “it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
3. Pro Se Filings
Additionally, pro se filings are to be “liberally construed” and a pro se complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This “[l]iberal construction of the pleadings is particularly appropriate where, as here, there is a pro se complaint raising civil rights issues.” Smith v. Smith, 589 F.3d 736, 738 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 173 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting “we are obliged to construe [a complaint's] allegations liberally and with the intent of doing justice”). However, the Court “need not accept the [plaintiff's] legal conclusions drawn from the facts, nor need it accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.” Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem'l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
C. Discussion
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff: (1) filed a previous action based upon the same facts against the same defendants that was settled and dismissed with prejudice; and (2) filed this lawsuit outside the applicable statute of limitations. ECF No. 26-1. Plaintiff does not dispute that he settled his prior case, nor that the case was dismissed with prejudice, but he claims that the amount paid was not sufficient to compensate for his injuries. ECF No. 33. Plaintiff does not address the statute of limitations. See id.
1. Settlement: Accord and Satisfaction
Defendants first argue the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, which is a “method of discharging and terminating an existing right and constitutes a perfect defense in an action for enforcement of the previous claim.” Cruthirds v. Lacey, No. 5:14-CV-00260-BR, 2017 WL 3754764, at *3 (E.D. N.C. Aug. 30, 2017) (quoting ABB Daimler-Benz Transp., Inc. v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 14 F.Supp.2d 75, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). The Fourth Circuit has held that “compromise and settlement . . . is a subset of the larger class of ‘accord and satisfaction.'” Id. (quoting Piver v. Pender Cty. Bd. of Educ., 835 F.2d 1076, 1083 n.3 (4th Cir. 1987)). To establish the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction, a defendant must prove three elements: (1) a bona fide dispute between the parties; (2) a mutual agreement between the parties to accept something other than what is due to resolve the dispute; and (3) a performance by the parties of that agreement. Id. (citing Parker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 900 F.2d 772, 776 (4th Cir. 1990)); see also Linda Mc Company, Inc. v Shore, 653 S.E.2d 279, 284 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“An accord and satisfaction occurs when there is: (1) an agreement to accept in discharge of an obligation something different from that which the creditor is claiming or is entitled to receive: and (2) a payment of consideration expressed in the new agreement.”). The burden of proof is on the party asserting the defense to prove that all the elements that constitute a valid accord and satisfaction have been met. Cruthirds, 2017 WL 3754764, at *3 (citing Parker, 900 F.2d at 777).
Here, Defendants have shown that Plaintiff previously filed an action complaining of the same incident and alleging the same facts as asserted in this case. See Ray v. Williams, No. 9: 20-cv-03337-BHH-MHC. Defendants settled the prior action with Plaintiff. It is undisputed that Defendants paid to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff received, the sum of Six Thousand Five Hundred and No/100 Dollars ($6,500.00) in exchange for a full release of all claims against Defendants and settlement of the prior lawsuit.
The settlement check was made payable to Plaintiff's mother, Pauline Hull, pursuant to Plaintiff's request. ECF No. 26-5.
Plaintiff does not dispute that he agreed to settle the matter, nor that he was paid the amount upon which the parties had agreed. He does not dispute, either, that he agreed to release Defendants from all claims. Instead, Plaintiff argues now that $6,500.00 was not enough money to compensate him for the incident and his injuries. ECF No. 33. However, having second thoughts about the results of a settlement agreement does not by itself invalidate the agreement. See Young v. FDIC, 103 F.3d 1180, 1195 (4th Cir. 1997) (citing Petty v. Timken Corp., 849 F.2d 130, 133 (4th Cir. 1988)). Here, Plaintiff agreed to settle and completed the settlement of his prior action, which alleged claims against the same Defendants in this action arising out of the same incident. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted, and Plaintiff's present lawsuit be dismissed based on accord and satisfaction.
Plaintiff also argues that “it was supposed to be part of the settlement that [he] received real teeth.” ECF No. 33. There is no reference in the Release regarding “real teeth” nor any evidence otherwise before the Court.
2. Res Judicata
Moreover, Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Under the doctrine of res judicata, “a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action.” Pueschel v. United States, 369 F.3d 345, 354 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981); Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979); Meekins v. United Transp. Union, 946 F.2d 1054, 1057 (4th Cir. 1991)). “By precluding parties in a subsequent proceeding from raising claims that were or could have been raised in a prior proceeding, res judicata encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff signed, and the parties voluntarily filed, a Stipulation of Dismissal with prejudice in the prior lawsuit. See Ray v. Williams, No.: 9:20-03337-BHH-MHC, ECF No. 62. A voluntary stipulation of dismissal with prejudice, such as the one filed in Plaintiff's prior lawsuit, acts as a final adjudication on the merits. Cuttrell v. Ethicon, Inc., No. 2:14-CV-17303, 2020 WL 7034325, at *2 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 30, 2020) (citing Bryant v. V Transp., Inc., 231 F.R.D. 480, 481 (E.D. Va. 2005)). “Dismissal of an action with prejudice is a complete adjudication of the issues presented by the pleadings and is a bar to a further action between the parties.” Saunders v. McAuliffe, No. 3:15CV402, 2016 WL 1071015, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 17, 2016) (quoting Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, Inc., 924 F.2d 530, 534 (4th Cir. 1991)); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1) (“Unless the . . . stipulation [of dismissal signed by all parties] states otherwise, the dismissal is without prejudice.”); Sullivan v. Easco Corp., 662 F.Supp. 1396, 1408 (D. Md. 1987) (explaining that “the stipulation of dismissal with prejudice constitutes a final judgment on the merits for the purpose of res judicata”).
The allegations set forth in the Amended Complaint in this case pertain to the same incident as was alleged in the prior lawsuit that the parties voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. The Amended Complaint involves the same parties and the same core of operative facts as set forth in the prior lawsuit. The Stipulation of Dismissal with prejudice filed in the prior lawsuit was a final judgment on the merits. As such, the present lawsuit is barred by res judicata and may not be relitigated following a stipulated dismissal with prejudice. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted.
3. Statute of Limitations
Finally, Defendants argue that the case should be dismissed because Plaintiff filed this lawsuit outside the applicable statute of limitations. ECF No. 26-1. Plaintiff does not address the statute of limitations argument in his Response. See ECF No. 33.
Plaintiff claims in his Amended Complaint that the incident about which he complains occurred on August 2, 2019. Plaintiff filed this action on August 11, 2022.
The United States Supreme Court held that when Congress has not specifically established a time limitation for a federal cause of action, the settled practice is to adopt a local time limitation for the federal law, if this time limitation is not inconsistent with federal law or policy. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004); Nat'lAdver. Co. v. City of Raleigh, 947 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that since “there is no federal statute of limitations applicable to suits under § 1983, it is the rule that the applicable [statute of limitations] must be borrowed from the analogous state statute of limitations”) (citations omitted). Based on Garcia, the appropriate statute of limitations for actions under § 1983 filed in South Carolina is a three-year statute of limitations. Specifically, borrowing from section 15-3-530 of the South Carolina Code, an action for any injury to the rights or persons of another must be commenced within three years. See S.C. Code Ann. §15-3-530(5) (2022); Timpson by & through Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. Disabilities & Special NeedsBd., 31 F.4th 238, 249 n.18 (4th Cir. 2022) (citing Garcia and S.C. Code Ann. §15-3-530(5) in concluding that § 1983 claims are subject to a three-year statute of limitations).
As set forth in the pleadings, the incident about which Plaintiff complained occurred on August 2, 2019. Although Plaintiff signed his original Complaint with a date of July 19, 2022, the envelope is postmarked August 8, 2022, more than three years after the incident at issue occurred. For this additional reason, the undersigned recommends Defendants' Motion to Dismiss be granted and this action be dismissed.
D. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 26) be GRANTED and that this action be DISMISSED.
The parties are directed to the next page for their rights to file objections to this recommendation.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court Post Office Box 835 Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).