The fact that Tylitzki was able to hold a job for nearly twenty-seven years prior to 1980 does not demonstrate that Tylitzki's alcoholism was controllable in 1985, when he claims he became disabled. The Secretary cites Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1988) and Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1987) for the proposition that long-standing impairments that have not previously precluded work are presumed not disabling unless there is evidence of deterioration. Those cases do not support such a presumption.

When making an adverse credibility finding, an ALJ may rely on evidence that a claimant worked for a number of years with a long-standing impairment that has not changed. Gregory v. Bowen, 844 F.2d 664, 666-67 (9th Cir. 1988); see also Tylitzki, 999 F.2d at 1414, Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). There is no presumption that long-standing impairments that have not previously precluded work are not disabling unless there is evidence of deterioration.

This Court "may not affirm [the Administration's] decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of supporting evidence, but must also consider evidence that detracts from [the Administration's] conclusion." Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and quotations omitted); see Lingenfelter v. Astrue, 504 F.3d 1028 (9th Cir. 2007) (same). However, the Court cannot disturb findings supported by substantial evidence, even though there may exist other evidence supporting Plaintiff's claim.

Petitioner's contention that the obsolescence of his skills in the telecommunications field renders him incapable of performing his past work is "contrary to express statutory provisions." Ray v.Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1987). In Ray, the Ninth Circuit expressly adopted the Seventh Circuit's holding in Wallschlaeger v. Schweiker, 705 F.2d 191, 196 (7th Cir. 1983), that "atrophy of skills does not prevent one from performing past work for disability purposes."

The ALJ's finding that Streepy can perform the past relevant work of an insurance agent is also supported by substantial evidence. A vocational expert testified that a person with Streepy's characteristics and RFC can perform that work, see Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1155 (2019), and for purposes of a disability determination, the obsolescence of Streepy's skills in the insurance business does not prevent him from performing that work, see Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that "atrophy of skills does not prevent one from performing past work for disability purposes"); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). The ALJ properly followed the relevant regulations in determining that Streepy's mental impairments were nonsevere, and substantial evidence supports that finding, including reports of Streepy's daily activities, as well as medical reports and lay-person testimony.

We also conclude that the ALJ did not err by failing to take into account that Chadwick's skills were allegedly outdated in determining that he could perform his past relevant work. "Obsolescence of skills" is not to be considered in determining whether a claimant can perform past relevant work. SeeRay v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.1987). Moreover, the Social Security Act requires that inability to engage in substantial gainful employment must be by reason of some " 'medically determinable physical or mental impairment....' " Id. (quoting 42 U.S. C.§ 423(d)(1)(A)).

However, the fact that he lost his licenses, alone, does not establish an inability to return to his past relevant work. See Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that through a course of study, plaintiff could regain the skills necessary to be reinstated as a licensed practicing accountant, as “atrophy of skills does not prevent one from performing past work for disability purposes”); see also Whitney v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-30-EPG, 2017 WL 1356034, *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017) (finding that ALJ properly determined that claimant could perform past relevant work as a bus driver because she could take “affirmative steps to reactivate her [commercial] driver's license”). Instead, Plaintiff would need to show that his impairments preclude him from obtaining his license.

This Court "may not affirm [the Commissioner's] decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of support evidence, but must also consider evidence that detracts from [the Commissioner's] conclusion." Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, the Court cannot disturb findings supported by substantial evidence, even though there may exist other evidence supporting Plaintiff's claim.

This Court "may not affirm [the Commissioner's] decision simply by isolating a specific quantum of support evidence, but must also consider evidence that detracts from [the Commissioner's] conclusion." Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 915 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). However, the Court cannot disturb findings supported by substantial evidence, even though there may exist other evidence supporting Plaintiff's claim.

v-1359-LO-MSN, 2018 WL 4610651, *11 (E.D. Va. Aug. 31, 2018) (report and recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 4609941 (E.D. Va. Sept. 24, 2018)) ("Plaintiff argues that merely because he let a [real estate] license expire that he is disabled. But that is not true. . . . [T]here is no dispute that Plaintiff's medically determinable physical or mental impairments did not impact his ability to be a real estate agent."); Whitney v. Berryhill, No. 1:16-cv-30-EPG, 2017 WL 1356034, *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2017) (finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that plaintiff was able to return to her past relevant work as a bus driver because, even with her alleged impairments, plaintiff could take affirmative steps to reactivate her commercial driver's license, which plaintiff had failed to maintain due to "a simple failure to maintain her skills and credentials," rather than due to "an inability to meet the physical and mental requirements of the bus driver position"); see also Ray v. Bowen, 813 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's finding that through a course of study, plaintiff could regain the skills necessary to be reinstated as a licensed practicing accountant, as "atrophy of skills does not prevent one from performing past work for disability purposes"). Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work and was, therefore, not disabled.