And although presidential electors are not federal officials, they exercise a federal function. See Ray v. Blair , 343 U.S. 214, 224, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952) ("The presidential electors exercise a federal function in balloting for President and Vice-President but they are not federal officers or agents any more than the state elector who votes for congressmen."). Even if that were not the case, the political subdivision standing doctrine does not apply to state officials.

This Court upheld such a pledge requirement decades ago, rejecting the argument that the Constitution "demands absolute freedom for the elector to vote his own choice." Ray v. Blair , 343 U.S. 214, 228, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952).

Id. at 8. The State argues that Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 72 S. Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952), McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35, 13 S. Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892), and Burroughs support its position. ¶28 The issue in Ray, 343 U.S. at 217-18, 72 S.Ct. 654, was whether a state statute requiring electors to pledge their votes to a specific party candidate was unconstitutional.

Hamilton's statements in Federalist No. 68 are informative on the meaning intended by the framers of the Constitution in Article II, § 1. Indeed, his statements reflect the notion that "[t]he electoral college was designed by men who did not want the election of the President to be left to the people." Gray v. Sanders , 372 U.S. 368, 377 n.8, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963) ; accord Ray v. Blair , 343 U.S. 214, 225 n. 16, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952) (" ‘Doubtless it was supposed that the electors would exercise a reasonable independence and fair judgment in the selection of the Chief Executive....’ " (quoting McPherson v. Blacker , 146 U.S. 1, 36, 13 S.Ct. 3, 36 L.Ed. 869 (1892) )). Elections Code §§ 6906 and 18002, which together compel California electors to vote for predefined candidates on pain of criminal punishment, cannot be neatly reconciled with the duties Hamilton attributed to the Electoral College in Federalist No. 68, one of which was the privilege to analyze and deliberate on the choice of the office of the President. And in turn, the statutes appear not only contrary to Article II, § 1, but render the implications of that section superfluous as to the votes of California electors.At the same time, there is an equally viable counter-argument under which Elections Code §§ 6906 and 18002 pass constitutional scrutiny.

(See TRO/PI Mot. at 4–10.) For instance, Plaintiffs acknowledge that the Supreme Court has held that "requiring electors to sign a pledge to certain candidates was valid and constitutional" (id. at 4 (citing Ray v. Blair , 343 U.S. 214, 220–21, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952) )), but they contend that Ray supports the conclusion that Washington's law exceeds constitutional bounds by violating " ‘an assumed constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art. II, § 1, to vote as he may choose in the [E]lectoral [C]ollege’ " (id. at 5 (quoting Ray , 343 U.S. at 229, 72 S.Ct. 654 ); see also TRO/PI Mot. at 9 (arguing that "Washington's binding statute ... violate[s] the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because [it] unconstitutionally dilute[s] and debase[s] the weight of Washington's electors' votes")). Washington has no law precluding Plaintiffs from voting as they choose—and having those votes counted—in the Electoral College.

Additionally, Kucinich has a choice of whether to associate with TDP. See Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 230, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952) ("A candidacy in the primary is a voluntary act of the applicant. He is not barred, discriminatorily, from participating but should he choose to associate the party requires that he must comply with the rules of the party.").

Id. (quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 221 (1952)).

Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 683-84, 92 S.Ct. 1332, 1337, 31 L.Ed.2d 593 (1972) (upholding the constitutionality of a Massachusetts loyalty oath to "uphold and defend the Constitution" and "oppose the overthrow of the government . . . by force, violence or by any illegal or unconstitutional method"). Appellants' claimed denial of associational rights is controlled by Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952). In Ray, the chairman of the Alabama Democratic Party Executive Committee refused to certify Blair as a candidate for presidential elector in the Democratic primary after Blair refused to sign an oath that he would "aid and support the nominees of the National Convention of the Democratic Party for President and Vice-President of the United States.

See Ely v. Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 114-15, 91 S.Ct. 1803, 29 L.Ed.2d 352 (1971); Note, Presidential Nominating Conventions: Party Rules, State Law and the Constitution, 62 Geo. L.J. 1621, 1636-37 n. 73 (1974). This concern with timing might explain the decision in Irish and the reason the Court cited it. The other citations were to cases involving "internal party affairs" as that is defined herein, i. e. the citations to Lynch and Smith, see note 7 supra and to Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 72 S.Ct. 654, 96 L.Ed. 894 (1952), see note 47 infra, and to what many believe is the first "political question" case, Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849), in which the Supreme Court was asked to determine which of two competing governments in the state of Rhode Island was legitimate. In Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 95 S.Ct. 541, 545-46 n. 4, 42 L.Ed.2d 595 (1975) the Court expressly declined to comment on the state action and justiciability issues.

Consequently, states and political parties may, for example, require that potential electors take a pledge to vote for the party's nominee if ultimately selected as an elector. Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 231 (1952). Blair did leave open the question Abdurrahman raises: whether the enforcement of such a pledge is constitutional.