Ravindranathan v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ

8 Citing cases

  1. George Mason Univ. v. Malik

    296 Va. 289 (Va. 2018)   Cited 4 times
    Concerning eligibility and admissibility under a separate statute containing the equivalent deference standard accorded under § 22.1-87

    Though the ultimate decision "presents a question not of fact but of law," Virginia Commonwealth Univ. v. Su, 283 Va. 446, 452, 722 S.E.2d 561 (2012), the circuit court, sitting in an appellate capacity, does not conduct a plenary de novo review — one which "negates the prior proceeding" and in which the court reweighs the evidence anew, as a circuit court does on appeal from a general district court, see, e.g., Baker v. Elmendorf, 271 Va. 474, 479, 628 S.E.2d 358 (2006). We emphasized this point in Ravindranathan v. Virginia Commonwealth University by holding that "[t]he circuit court correctly [*296] refused to reweigh the evidence" and "limited its review to 'whether the decision reached by the institution could reasonably be said, on the basis of the record, not to be arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to the law.'" 258 Va. 269, 274, 519 S.E.2d 618 (1999) (citation omitted). Our holding in Su came to the same conclusion based on the same analysis: "Because it cannot be reasonably said on the administrative record that [the institution's] decision denying [the student's] application for in-state tuition benefits was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law, we reverse the circuit court's judgment and enter final judgment for [the institution]."

  2. Virginia Commonwealth Univ. v. Zhuo Cheng Su

    283 Va. 446 (Va. 2012)   Cited 3 times
    Defining “arbitrary”

    This Court has twice before reviewed a circuit court's judgment on a student's appeal from an in-state tuition eligibility decision by an institution of higher education. George Mason University v. Floyd, 275 Va. 32, 654 S.E.2d 556 (2008); Ravindranathan v. Virginia Commonwealth University, 258 Va. 269, 519 S.E.2d 618 (1999). In both cases, we used language in our opinions indicating that we review such a judgment under the highly deferential “plainly wrong” standard.

  3. George Mason University v. Floyd

    275 Va. 32 (Va. 2008)   Cited 6 times
    Finding similar acts to be "auxiliary to fulfilling [the student's] educational objectives or . . . routinely performed by temporary residents"

    This Court has addressed a university's determination pursuant to Code § 23-7.4 once before. In Ravindranathan v. Virginia Commonwealth University, 258 Va. 269, 519 S.E.2d 618 (1999), an "out-of-state" medical student filed an application requesting in-state tuition charges at a state-affiliated university. In her application, the student stated that she intended to remain indefinitely in Virginia based primarily upon her boyfriend's plan to settle in the Commonwealth, and that this intent was further demonstrated by the fact that she was registered to vote in Virginia, possessed a Virginia driver's license, owned a car registered in Virginia, had checking and savings accounts with financial institutions in Virginia, filed a Virginia state resident income tax return the year preceding her application, and had not filed state income tax returns in any other state for three years after filing her application.

  4. George Mason University v. Floyd

    Record No. 062603 (Va. Ct. App. Jan. 11, 2008)

    This Court has addressed a university's determination pursuant to Code § 23-7.4 once before. In Ravindranathan v. Virginia Commonwealth University, 258 Va. 269, 519 S.E.2d 618 (1999), an "out-of-state" medical student filed an application requesting in-state tuition charges at a state-affiliated university. In her application, the student stated that she intended to remain indefinitely in Virginia based primarily upon her boyfriend's plan to settle in the Commonwealth, and that this intent was further demonstrated by the fact that she was registered to vote in Virginia, possessed a Virginia driver's license, owned a car registered in Virginia, had checking and savings accounts with financial institutions in Virginia, filed a Virginia state resident income tax return the year preceding her application, and had not filed state income tax returns in any other state for three years after filing her application.

  5. Kesarkol Veng v. George Mason University

    CL-2011-4712 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jul. 7, 2011)

    The court may not reweigh the evidence. Ravindranathan v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 258 Va. 269, 274, 519 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1999).2. Determination of Eligibility for In-State Tuition

  6. Bergmann v. Board of Regents

    167 Md. App. 237 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006)   Cited 8 times
    Reviewing a university determination using established principles governing judicial review of administrative agencies

    nistrative adjudications. See Webster v. State Bd. of Regents, 123 Ariz. 363, 599 P.2d 816, 818 (Ct.App. 1979) (to overturn a university's tuition domicile decision, "the trial court must find that the agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or has abused its discretion"); Allen v. Scherer, 452 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983) (when evidence regarding tuition domicile "could reasonably have given rise to two different inferences, the inference chosen by the agency must be sustained even though the court might have chosen a different inference"); Peck v. Univ. Residence Comm. of Kansas State Univ., 248 Kan. 450, 807 P.2d 652, 660 (1991) (judicial review of tuition domicile decision is limited to determining whether the decision was "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious"); Norman v. Cameron, 127 N.C.App. 44, 488 S.E.2d 297, 300, review denied, 347 N.C. 398, 347 N.D. 401, 494 S.E.2d 416 (N.C. 1997) (tuition domicile decision must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence); Ravindranathan v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 258 Va. 269, 519 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1999) (university's denial of in-state tuition was supported by substantial evidence and was not unreasonable). These courts and litigants proceeded under their respective state APAs. The Students have cited no cases, in or out of Maryland, that support their contention that a jury should resolve the factual disputes relevant to this tuition decision.

  7. Brie-Anna Cunningham v. George Mason University

    Case No. CL-2010-16724 (Va. Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 2011)

    Id. The words "on the basis of the record" and "only" reflect the Legislature's intent to limit the court's involvement to evaluating the record before it and ensuring that the institution reached its decision via proper principles. Furthermore, circuit courts—as well as the Supreme Court—seem to suggest, without stating so directly, that additional evidence is not permitted under §23-7.4:3. See, e.g., Ravindrathan v. Va. Commonwealth Univ., 258 Va. 269, 274, 519 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1999) (holding that the circuit court in Richmond was correct in refusing to reweigh the evidence presented at the administrative proceeding); Wittich v. George Mason Univ., 75 Va. Cir. Ct. 311, 314 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 3, 2008); O'Shea v. George Mason Univ., 2007 Va. Cir. LEXIS 327, *10 (Va. Cir. Ct. July 13, 2007) ("[i]t is not the function of this court to serve as a super-member of GMU's Domicile Appeals Conirriittee and weigh the factors that argue for and against O'Shea's application. . . . Rather, this court's sole function is to determine 'whether the decision reached by the institution could reasonably be said, on the basis of the record, not to be arbitrary, capricious or otherwise contrary to law.'"); Rizzo v. Commonwealth Univ., 54 Va. Cir. 216, 217 (Va. Cir. Ct. Dec. 7, 2000); Sharma v. Commonwealth Univ., 53 Va. Cir. 348, 350 (Va. Cir. Ct. Oct. 5, 2000).

  8. Lipman v. Rutgers-State University of N.J

    329 N.J. Super. 433 (App. Div. 2000)   Cited 11 times
    Explaining that "the applicable regulations and Rutgers policies required Lipman to prove he was domiciled in New Jersey"

    l court must find that the agency has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or has abused its discretion");Allen v. Scherer, 452 N.E.2d 1031, 1035 (Ind.Ct.App. 1983) (deciding that where the findings on resident tuition "could reasonably have given rise to two different inferences, the inference chosen by the agency must be sustained even though the court might have chosen a different inference"); Peck v. University Residence Committee of Kansas State Univ., 807 P.2d 652, 660 (Kan. 1991) (limiting court's review to whether the residence decision was "unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious"); Norman v. Cameron, 488 S.E.2d 297, 300 (N.C.Ct.App.), review denied, 494 S.E.2d 416 (N.C. 1997) (concluding that university's residence based tuition decision must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence); Frame v. Residency Appeals Comm. of Utah State Univ., 675 P.2d 1157, 1165 (Utah 1983) (declaring university's resident based tuition determination subject to arbitrary and capricious standard);Ravindranathan v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 519 S.E.2d 618, 620 (Va. 1999) (finding university's denial of in-state tuition was supported by evidence and was not unreasonable). We recognize that "[d]omicile is a relation which the law creates between an individual and a particular locality or country."