ΒΆ 29 Accordingly, it is necessary to vacate the District Court's February 15, 2008 Final Judgment and remand this case to that court for entry of an order, which complies with Rule 52(a), on Schenk's motion for summary judgment on Andersen's tort claims and Schenk's defenses to those claims. See e.g. Ravalli County Bank v. Gasvoda, 253 Mont. 399, 402, 833 P.2d 1042, 1044 (1992) ("The District Court did not adhere to Rule 52(a), M.R.Civ.P., when it failed to specify the grounds for the summary judgment ruling with sufficient particularity. Therefore, we remand this case to the District Court with instructions to proceed in accordance with this opinion.").
Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. The initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party. Ravalli County Bank v. Gasvoda (1992), 253 Mont. 399, 401, 833 P.2d 1042, 1043. Once the moving party has met that burden, the party opposing summary judgment must establish that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516, 521, 760 P.2d 51, 54. Any inference that can reasonably be drawn from the offered proof must be evaluated in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.
Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. The initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact lies with the moving party. Ravalli County Bank v. Gasvoda (1992), 253 Mont. 399, 401, 833 P.2d 1042, 1043. Once the moving party has met that burden, the party opposing summary judgment must establish that genuine issues of material fact exist. Peschel v. Jones (1988), 232 Mont. 516, 521, 760 P.2d 51, 54. Conclusory or speculative statements are insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Simmons v. Jenkins (1988), 230 Mont. 429, 432, 750 P.2d 1067, 1069.