Opinion
No. 4-131 / 03-1206
May 14, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Dale B. Hagen, Judge.
Cristie Rasmussen appeals the dismissal of her petition for relief from domestic abuse and the quashing of a protective order. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Carrie O'Connor of Iowa Legal Aid, Des Moines, for appellant.
Beverly Wild of Beverly Wild Law Office, P.C., Guthrie Center, for appellee.
Heard by Mahan, P.J., and Zimmer and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Cristie Rasmussen appeals the dismissal of her petition for relief from domestic abuse and the quashing of a protective order. She claims the district court abused its discretion. We reverse and remand
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A petition for relief from domestic abuse was filed by Cristie Rasmussen on November 8, 2002. A temporary protective order against Gary Rasmussen was entered and hearing was set for November 19, 2002. On that date, the hearing was continued until May 16, 2003, with the temporary protective order remaining in effect.
May 16, 2003, was a court service day. The attorneys for Cristie and Gary agreed the limited amount of time available on this date was not sufficient to fully try their case. A written motion to continue was filed by Cristie asserting the time constraints of a court service day were too restrictive for a hearing. The motion to continue was neither based upon the availability of the parties, nor predicated upon a need of more time for preparation.
The district court issued a calendar entry order sustaining the motion to continue. The hearing for the protective order was continued to June 27, 2003, which was another court service day. In addition, the order limited the hearing to one-half hour in length. Each party was allowed to testify and call one witness on his or her behalf.
At the hearing on June 27, 2003, Cristie orally renewed her motion to continue to a non-court service day. Again, her grounds for continuance were a lack of adequate time to present her case. The motion was overruled. At the conclusion of the hearing, a calendar entry order dismissed the petition and quashed the temporary protective order.
II. Standard of Review.
The standard of review for denial of a motion for continuance is an abuse of discretion. Bell v. Iowa Dist. Court, 494 N.W.2d 729, 731 (Iowa Ct.App. 1992). A court abuses its discretion when its decision is made on grounds or for reasons which are clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Bayles, 551 N.W.2d 600, 604 (Iowa 1996).
III. Abuse of Discretion.
Cristie claims the district court erred in refusing to continue the hearing to a non-court service day, in limiting the number of witnesses, and in originally restricting the hearing to one-half hour. We agree.
The actual hearing lasted approximately one hour.
Generally, the course and conduct of a trial are not regulated by statute or rule, but are instead within the discretion of the trial judge. In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). No explicit rule creates such authority; rather, it is recognized as an inherent power of a judge. Id. Trial judges are authorized to impose reasonable time limits on a trial. Id. (citing United States v. Hildebrand, 928 F. Supp. 841, 844-845 (N.D. Iowa 1996)). Yet, in the midst of such judicial autonomy, a trial court should impose time limits only when necessary. In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d at 68 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1995)).
Due process principles constrain the discretion of trial judges to manage trials. In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d at 67. Litigants are required to be given a fair opportunity to resolve their disputes. Id. The degree of constraint a trial court may exercise is dependent upon principles of due process which include the consideration of the public and private interests involved, the administrative burden implicated, the risk of erroneous decision due to the nature of the hearing involved and the value of any additional safeguards. Id. (citing In re Marriage of Seyler, 559 N.W.2d 7, 9 (Iowa 1997)); see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2413, 65 L.Ed.2d 424, 434 (1980).
The public and private interest in protecting people from domestic abuse is substantial. See Bartsch v. Bartsch, 636 N.W.2d 3, 9 (Iowa 2001) (noting the state's interest in protecting against domestic abuse is equal to, if not greater than, its interest in actions determining child custody or terminating parental rights). We conclude there is a public and private interest to be served in a proper resolution of this dispute.
The administrative burden to the trial court depends on the nature of the proceedings. In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d at 67. The increased burdens on our courts vary from district to district and even from judge to judge. Id. The problem of administrative burden "cannot be painted with a brush so broad as to support the imposition of time limits as a matter of course." Id. The administrative history involved in a particular case is a significant consideration. Id. Both parties to this matter agreed the hearing needed to be continued to a date that allowed a greater amount of time to resolve the issue. The administrative burden to the trial court to reschedule the hearing for a non-court service day was minimal.
The risk of erroneous decision making based on stringent time limitations is also a significant consideration. Arbitrary and inflexible time limits are a serious threat to due process principles. Id. at 68. "Thus, judges must not sacrifice their primary goal of justice by rigidly adhering to time limits in the name of efficiency." Id. (citing General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1509 (9th Cir. 1995)). In this case, upon the written motion of the plaintiff, the judge continued the May 16, 2003, hearing to July 27, 2003. The court was aware that both parties believed they needed more time. With its decision to continue the matter to another court service day, the court did not place the parties in a better position. Instead, the court merely delayed the hearing. A time limit of one-half hour was originally imposed, and the parties were limited to one additional witness each. The quality of decision making suffers when important evidence has been excluded from consideration as the result of time limits. In re Mariage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d at 68.
The value of additional safeguards in hearings constrained by time limits is a final consideration. Essential and relevant evidence is considered by balancing the probative value against the possibility of prejudice. Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. "The reason for this balancing process helps explain the disfavor courts often express towards the imposition of rigid time limits." In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d at 68 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 610 (3d Cir. 1995)). Time limits must be applied with sufficient flexibility to ensure a fair trial. In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d at 68. The order setting the hearing for one-half hour provided insufficient time for both parties to adequately present their respective cases. This time restriction allowed Cristie only fifteen minutes to present her evidence in a contested domestic abuse case. This amounted to seven and one-half minutes per witness. Our conclusion is not changed by the fact the actual hearing lasted approximately one hour. The attorneys were still working within and burdened by the original time restriction.
In summary, arbitrary and inflexible time limits are disfavored. Id. (citing General Signal Corp. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 66 F.3d 1500, 1508 (9th Cir. 1995)). Accordingly, the application of such standards will support a finding of abuse of discretion, and will require a new trial. In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d at 68 (citing McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104, 115 (7th Cir. 1990)). We conclude that continuing this case to another crowed court service day, originally limiting this contested domestic abuse hearing to one-half hour, and limiting the number of additional witnesses to one per party was an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. We therefore reverse the decision of the district court and remand for a full hearing on this matter.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Eisenhauer, J., concurs; Zimmer, J., dissents.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I do not believe the district court abused its broad discretion by failing to continue this case.
On the date that Cristie filed her petition for relief from domestic abuse, the district court issued a temporary protective order and scheduled a hearing to determine if a permanent order should be entered for November 19, 2002. On the 19th, the parties apparently agreed to continue the hearing for six months. As a result, the district court scheduled what it described as a status hearing for May 16, 2003. (Emphasis added.) The record does not reveal how much time, if any, was allotted for the hearing which was to be held on May 16.
On May 16, 2003, the appellant's counsel filed a motion to continue the hearing. The motion stated that the time allotted for the hearing would "not be sufficient for a full hearing on the matter." The district court granted the motion to continue and reset the hearing to June 27, 2003. The court limited the hearing to one-half hour in length and provided that each party would be allowed to testify and call one additional witness. Between the date of this order and June 27, 2003, the court file shows that neither party objected to the date set, the time allocated for the hearing, or the limitation on witnesses. I find nothing in the record on appeal which shows the district court was informed of any impending difficulty in complying with the limitations contained in its order for continuance until the matter came before the court for hearing on June 27.
Just before the hearing was to commence on June 27, appellant's counsel orally moved to continue the hearing. Counsel stated:
My client is unable to fully put on her case with the time and witness restrictions imposed by the Court's order of May 16 and we would ask that the hearing be continued to a non-court service day to allow her to more fully put on her case.
The oral motion to continue did not disclose the nature of any testimony which counsel believed would be excluded or its importance to the issues in this case. The oral motion to continue is the first reference in the record regarding a request to have the hearing moved to a "non-court service day."
The district court denied the oral motion. However, the court did not rigidly enforce the time limitation included in its order for continuance. As the majority acknowledges, the record reflects that the one-half hour time limit set in the order for continuance was actually extended to nearly an hour. The record further reveals the circumstances surrounding the incident which gave rise to plaintiff's petition were adequately explored. When the hearing concluded, neither party requested the opportunity to present additional evidence and no record was made indicating that any additional evidence was required. I am unconvinced that the record before us on appeal establishes that the district court acted arbitrarily or inflexibly in this case.
I am also unconvinced that Christie has met her burden to show that she suffered prejudice. It is incumbent on the party seeking additional time to present evidence to establish prejudice. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.103( a) (error may not be predicated on the exclusion of evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected and an offer of proof was made or the substance of the excluded evidence was otherwise identified); McKnight v. General Motors Corp. 908 F.2d 104, 115 (7th Cir. 1990) (prejudice required to reverse on account of rigid time limits) ( rev'd on other grounds); Henkel v. R S Bottling Co. 323 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 1982) (ruling excluding evidence will not be reversed unless discretion clearly abused to the prejudice of the complaining party); In re Marriage of Ihle, 577 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa Ct.App. 1998) (we will not presume prejudice when evidence is excluded from trial). On the date the hearing commenced, Cristie's counsel merely stated she was unable to fully put on her client's case because of the time and witness limits imposed. She failed to identify the nature and importance of any evidence which would be excluded, and did not explain how she would be prejudiced as a result. I believe the record falls far short of showing any of the appellant's substantial rights were affected or that she suffered prejudice as the result of the district court's decision to deny her motion to continue.