Opinion
# 2012-038-101 Claim No. 112145
03-21-2012
RASCOE v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Case information
UID: 2012-038-101 Claimant(s): RONALD RASCOE Claimant short name: RASCOE Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 112145 Motion number(s): Cross-motion number(s): Judge: W. BROOKS DeBOW Claimant's attorney: RONALD RASCOE, Pro se ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, Attorney General Defendant's attorney: of the State of New York By: Douglas R. Kemp, Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: March 21, 2012 City: Albany Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
Claimant, an individual incarcerated in a State correctional facility, filed this claim alleging that he was assaulted by another inmate at Upstate Correctional Facility (CF) on November 13, 2005. The trial of this claim was conducted by videoconference on December 15, 2011, with the parties appearing at Upstate Correctional Facility (CF) in Malone, New York and the Court sitting in Saratoga Springs, New York. Claimant offered his own testimony; defendant called Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS)Lieutenant Matthew Tolman and DOCCS Correction Officer (CO) Robert Clintsman. Claimant offered three documents into evidence, all of which were received in evidence. Defendant did not proffer any documents. After listening to the witnesses's testimony and observing their demeanor as they testified, and upon consideration of that evidence, all of the other evidence received at trial, the parties' post-trial submissions, and the applicable law, the Court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. FACTS
DOCCS was known at the time of the events in the claim as the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS).
On November 13, 2005, claimant, an inmate housed at Upstate CF, was lined up with three other inmates in a single file along a wall in the hallway outside of the doorway to the Upstate CF Special Housing Unit (SHU) visit room when he was assaulted by another inmate. At that time, the inmates were in the process of being returned to their cells from visits. Following a visit, inmates were taken to a "strip booth"and searched for contraband, then placed in restraints, and then taken out into the hallway where they would be lined up into groups of six for escort by two correction officers back to their cells. At the time of the assault, the four inmates who were awaiting escort were restrained with handcuffs that were attached to belts around their waists. Inmate Terry Golden, who was the first in the line, extricated one of his hands from the handcuffs and punched claimant in the face, causing him to fall to the ground and suffer injuries to his mouth and the back of his head.
Unless otherwise noted, all quotations are to the digital audio recording of the trial.
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No evidence was offered as to how Golden managed to escape his handcuffs. Claimant testified that he did not see how Golden did so, and that it happened "very fast." Lt. Tolman, who was a sergeant at the time and who was supervising the inmates in the hallway, testified that he was standing "back to the side" such that the inmates were facing away from him and that he "caught a little vision out of the side of [his] eye" of Golden stepping out of line, and saw him take a swinging motion and strike claimant in the side of the face with a closed fist. Lt. Tolman testified that after taking Golden to "medical" after the assault, he observed scrapes and bruises on Golden's wrist, and further testified that it appeared that Golden was "pretty well determined" to get his hands out of the handcuffs. CO Clintsman, who was an escort officer on the day of the assault, testified that he believed that he had applied the handcuffs to Golden the day of the assault, but that he could not be "real sure" as the event took place six years prior to his testimony. Lt. Tolman and CO Clintsman both testified that, according to DOCCS procedures, handcuffs are generally applied to inmates wrists with the correction officer using a finger as a "spacer" between the inmate's wrist and the cuffs, so that the handcuffs are tight enough to restrain, but not too tight so as to be uncomfortable for the inmate. In a memorandum to Lt. Tolman, written two weeks after the attack, CO Clintsman reported that he had applied Golden's handcuffs with one finger between the handcuffs and Golden's wrists (see Claimant's Exhibit 3).
Claimant testified that at the time of the incident, there was a total of six correction officers and three sergeants in the hallway with the inmates. However, Lt. Tolman testified that he was the only sergeant present at the time of the assault. Further, while Lt. Tolman was not sure how many other correction officers were present in the hallway at the time of the assault, he believes that three correction officers were approaching his position at the time of the assault, and that correction officers were coming and going into the visit room area prior to the assault. CO Clintsman testified that he was not present in the hallway at the time of the attack. CO Clintsman further testified that two correction officers were required to escort six inmates between the visit room and their cells, but there was no evidence as to whether a certain number of correction officers were required to be present in the hallway while the inmates were awaiting escort back to their cells.
The evidence demonstrates that claimant had no prior altercations with Golden, that he had made no prior complaints about Golden, and that Golden was not on his "separatee list." Lt. Tolman testified that if there had been a prior incident between claimant and Golden, they would not have been allowed to be in the hallway together "for their own safety and the safety of everyone else." Golden's disciplinary record, received into evidence as claimant's exhibit 2, establishes that between April 2001 and the date of the assault, he had been found guilty of "violent conduct" or "fighting" on at least eleven occasions, including one incident in October 2001 for which he was found guilty of assault on an inmate. Further, Golden was found guilty of making threats during three of those incidents, as well as during four other incidents. As noted above, Upstate CF is a maximum security facility that Lt. Tolman described as a "maxi max" facility that houses the "worst of the worst" inmates, and that all of the inmates at Upstate CF may be prone to violence. DISCUSSION
Claimant argues that there was a high risk of an inmate-on-inmate assault due to the nature of the Upstate CF population, and that defendant was specifically aware of Golden's tendency for violence. He further contends that defendant's agents were at fault for allowing Golden to escape from his handcuffs and in allowing him to assault another inmate. Defendant argues that Golden's attack on claimant was unforeseeable, that the assault occurred despite the fact that Golden was properly shackled and in the presence of an adequate number of correction officers, and that there was no evidence of any procedures that were not followed.
"Having assumed physical custody of inmates, who cannot protect and defend themselves in the same way as those at liberty can, the State owes a duty of care to safeguard inmates, even from attacks by fellow inmates" (Sanchez v State of New York, 99 NY2d 247, 252-253 [2002]). However, the State is not an insurer of the safety of inmates (id. at 253), and, as pertinent here, the scope of the State's duty of care is limited to providing only "reasonable protection against foreseeable risks of attack by other prisoners" (Sebastiano v State of New York, 112 AD2d 562, 564 [3d Dept 1985]; see Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 253; Flaherty v State of New York, 296 NY 342 [1947]; Dizak v State of New York, 124 AD2d 329 [3d Dept 1986]). Foreseeability rests upon a determination of what the State actually knew, as well as what it should have reasonably known about the risk of an attack on claimant (see Sanchez, at 254; Vasquez v State of New York, 68 AD3d 1275, 1276 [3d Dept 2009]).
Some of the circumstances that may demonstrate the foreseeability of an inmate-on-inmate assault include where defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the claimant was specifically at risk of being attacked, that the assailant was prone to perpetrate attacks, or that the facility's expertise, prior experience, or its policies and practices demonstrate defendant's awareness that a particular class of inmates or a particular facility location have a risk of attack (see Sanchez, at 254-255; Vasquez, at 1276; Littlejohn v State of New York, 218 AD2d 833 [3d Dept 1995]; Colon v State of New York, 209 AD2d 842, 843-844 [3d Dept 1994]; Evans v State of New York, 11 Misc 3d 1065[A], *6 [Ct Cl 2006]). Here, the evidence at trial demonstrated that in the four and one-half years preceding his assault of claimant, Golden's disciplinary history included numerous administrative convictions for fighting, violent conduct, threats and weapons, including an assault on another inmate and an assault on staff, which "place[d] the State on notice of an increased likelihood of an assault" by Golden (Colon, at 844; see Littlejohn, supra; cf. Dizak v State of New York, 124 AD2d 329 [3d Dept 1986]). Thus, in light of Golden's established disciplinary record, the Court finds that the risk of an attack by Golden under the circumstances in which it occurred was reasonably foreseeable, and that defendant owed a duty of care to protect claimant.
The inquiry thus proceeds to whether defendant breached its duty of care by failing to act in a reasonable manner with respect to protecting claimant from assault by another inmate. In this regard, claimant asserts that the State was at fault in allowing Golden to get out of his handcuffs and in allowing Golden to assault him despite the presence of correction officers. The evidence at trial, however, does not establish that the State was negligent in either of these respects.
The evidence clearly establishes that Golden somehow extricated his hand from the handcuffs, so defendant may be held liable if its agents were negligent in their application of the handcuffs. There was no testimonial evidence addressed to the manner in which the handcuffs were applied, as neither claimant nor Lt. Tolman saw how Golden escaped from the handcuffs, CO Clintsman did not recall at trial whether it was he who had applied the handcuffs to Golden, and Golden was not called to testify at trial. The only evidence relative to the application of the handcuffs is CO Clintsman's memorandum that the handcuffs were applied utilizing a finger as a spacer, in accordance with DOCCS standards. Inasmuch as there is evidence that the handcuffs were properly applied, and there is no evidence to the contrary, the evidence does not permit the Court to make a finding as to how Golden was able to free his hand or to conclude that defendant's agents were negligent in applying Golden's handcuffs. To the extent that Golden's escape from the handcuffs might have been enabled by poor maintenance of the handcuffs, no such evidence was adduced at trial.
As for the level of supervision in the hallway at the time of the assault, the evidence establishes that while Lt. Tolman was the only correction officer that was continually supervising the four inmates in the hallway, there were correction officers who were in the close vicinity before and during the attack. Claimant cites no DOCCS regulations, rules or policies or other penological standards that were violated by the staffing levels in the hallway at the time of the assault. Indeed, the only evidence of required staffing levels was in the form of testimony by CO Clintsman that two correction officers were required to escort six inmates back to their cells. Finally, there was no evidence that Lt. Tolman was absent from the immediate vicinity of the assault, that he was not vigilant at that moment, or that he was in any way negligent in the manner of his supervision of the inmates. Thus, the evidence does not establish that defendant was negligent in failing to provide adequate supervision in the hallway the day of the attack.
Finally, to the extent that claimant argued at trial that DOCCS maintains a four-step procedure for securing and escorting inmates between the visit room and the return to their cells and that some element of those procedures was violated, that argument is not supported by the proof adduced at trial. The evidence does not demonstrate that inmate Golden was not searched and shackled in accordance with DOCCS procedures, nor was there any evidence that defendant's agents failed to adequately supervise the inmates who were awaiting escort back to their cells. While Lt. Tolman may not have noticed any suspicious behavior prior to the attack on claimant, claimant testified that the attack happened suddenly, and claimant further acknowledged that the State's duty of care to protect inmates does not require it to engage in "unremitting surveillance" (see Sanchez, 99 NY2d at 256). In sum, while the Court certainly understands claimant's desire to hold someone accountable for injuries he sustained in this sudden and unprovoked attack, the evidence simply does not establish that defendant was negligent in the performance of its duty to supervise inmate Golden and safeguard claimant. CONCLUSION
The Court finds in favor of defendant. Any motions not previously ruled upon are hereby DENIED. The Chief Clerk is directed to enter judgment in favor of defendant, dismissing the claim.
March 21, 2012
Albany, New York
W. BROOKS DeBOW
Judge of the Court of Claims