While a tank barge owned by United States Steel Corporation was being repaired at a dry dock owned by Hillman Barge Construction Company, appellant's employer, Rao sustained an injury and thereafter brought this action under the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688, and joined a claim for unseaworthiness. A jury found that in performing the duties of a helper to a paint sprayer in the dry dock repair yards, appellant did not qualify as a "seaman" under the Jones Act. The district court, 326 F. Supp. 1091, thereafter entered judgment on the Jones Act count and granted appellee's motion to dismiss the unseaworthiness count. After careful consideration of the many contentions appellant raises in this appeal, we are persuaded no reversible error was committed and, accordingly, we will affirm.

Similarly, to the extent Seville wishes to challenge Mr. Kusmick's bias, it is permitted to do so on cross-examination at trial. Rao v. Hillman Barge & Const. Co., 326 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (W.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 467 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1972) (finding "an opponent may cross-examine an expert on matter of credibility, interest or bias"). Accordingly, Seville's Motions to disqualify Mr. Kusmick or his reports and declaration are DENIED.

And the opposing party may cross-examine an expert on matters of credibility, interest, or bias. Rao v. Hillman Barge Construction Co., 326 F. Supp. 1091 (W.D.Pa. 1971), aff'd 467 F.2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1972). Although many questions which seemed to be based on the article were propounded to plaintiffs' expert, all that he answered were of a preliminary nature — that is, how research is carried on and reported, whether basic research methods have recently changed, and what procedures are used to examine tissue specimens.