Opinion
No. 05-01-01178-CR.
Opinion Issued January 17, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH, Tex.R.App.P. 47.
Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 1, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F00-36098-IH. REVERSED and REMANDED.
Before Justices MORRIS, JAMES and FITZGERALD.
OPINION
A jury convicted appellant Larry D. Ransom of recklessly or negligently causing bodily injury to a child. The indictment alleged one prior conviction for the offense of retaliation. At the punishment phase of the trial, the trial judge admonished appellant and instructed the jury that the applicable punishment range was two to twenty years' confinement and a fine of up to $10,000. Appellant pleaded true to the enhancement offense, and the jury sentenced appellant to seven years' confinement. The trial court's judgment also included a requirement that appellant register as a sex offender under chapter 62 of the code of criminal procedure. In two issues, appellant contends the trial court erred by imposing a sentence outside the applicable punishment range for his offense and by requiring him to register as a sex offender. The State concedes error in both issues. The offense of recklessly or negligently causing bodily injury to a child is a state jail felony. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 22.04(f) (Vernon Supp. 2003). The punishment range for a state jail felony is 180 days' to two years' confinement in a state jail and a fine of up to $10,000. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.35(a)-(b) (Vernon 1994). A state jail felony conviction may be enhanced upon proof of prior conviction of a felony listed in article 42.12, section 3(g) of the code of criminal procedure, or use of a deadly weapon. Id. at § 12.35(c). Retaliation is not an offense listed in article 42.12, section 3(g), and there was no allegation that appellant used a deadly weapon. Appellant's sentence, therefore, was outside the punishment range for the offense he committed and is void. See Levy v. State, 818 S.W.2d 801, 802 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). We agree with the State and appellant that the trial court erred. We sustain appellant's first issue. The trial court's judgment also requires appellant to register as a sex offender. Injury to a child, however, is not an offense that requires sex offender registration. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.01(5) (Vernon Supp. 2003). Again, we agree with the State and appellant that the trial court erred in imposing the requirement on appellant. We sustain appellant's second issue. We reverse the trial court's judgment and remand this cause to the trial court for a new punishment hearing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.29(b) (Vernon Supp. 2003). We instruct the trial court to remove, in its new judgment, the requirement that appellant register as a sex offender.