Rankin v. Cranford

Full title: DELBERT L. RANKIN, Plaintiff, v. OFFICER JOHN CRANFORD, Statesville Police…

Court: United States District Court, W.D. North Carolina, Statesville Division

Date published: Apr 14, 2005

No. 5:03CV99-2-V (W.D.N.C. Apr. 14, 2005)

Opinion

No. 5:03CV99-2-V.

April 14, 2005

ORDER

RICHARD VOORHEES, District Judge

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on initial review of the plaintiff's civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed July 31, 2003 and amended August 25, 2004 (documents ## 1 and 3); on defendant Sills "Motion To Dismiss" (document #13), filed September 16, 2004; and on a "Motion To Dismiss" by defendants Collier, Butler and Martin (document #16), filed September 20, 2004.

Upon careful consideration by the Court, for the reasons set forth in the defendants' supporting Memoranda, and for the further reasons stated herein, the defendants' Motions to Dismiss will be granted; and the plaintiff's Complaint will bedismissed in its entirety.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This lawsuit appears to have been filed on the basis of, at least to some extent, facts arising in connection with the plaintiff's 1999 State court arrest, prosecution and conviction for the charges of possession with intent to sell and controlled substance (crack cocaine) and maintaining a dwelling for the sale of controlled substances. Although the plaintiff has submitted his Complaint with numerous exhibits attached thereto, his claims are barely decipherable. Indeed, as best the Court can determine, the plaintiff believes that the above-named defendants somehow conspired to violate his constitutional rights.

That is, it seems to the Court that the plaintiff is complaining that defendants Cranford and Johnson, the officers who conducted the investigation of his drug case in 1999, violated his rights by having investigated him in the first place, and by having planted evidence against him, including some drugs which were found in the curtilage of his home on an occasion. The plaintiff also seems to be complaining that defendants Martin and Butler violated his rights during his trial when they introduced into evidence a shotgun which also was the subject of an unrelated charge, and which charge subsequently was dismissed by the State. Presumably — although he did not say so — the plaintiff believes that Judge Collier violated his rights by having allowed the defendants to introduce that shotgun into evidence. In addition, the plaintiff seems to be complaining that defendant Sills violated his rights by maintaining records in his prison file which set forth the false information that he had outstanding criminal charges pending against him. Last, the plaintiff seems to be complaining that defendant Darty, one of his former attorneys, conspired to violate his rights by "help[ing to] plot this conspiracy."

As a result of the foregoing matters, the plaintiff claims that he has suffered "incarceration, stress and loss of rest. . . ." By way of relief, the plaintiff is requesting "11.3 million dollars" in damages, along with "dated[,] accurate documents that show and state [the] illegal activity of Iredell County Officials that are aware of their positions and authority to make an individual a[n] habitual offender by slander of his criminal records[.]" Suffice it to say, however, the plaintiff's allegations all fail as a matter of law.

II. ANALYSIS

1. Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss

A motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) can be granted when "it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of [the subject] claim." McNair v. Lend Lease Trucks, Inc., 95 F.3d 325, 328 (4^th Cir. 1996) (en banc),citing Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4^th Cir. 1989; and Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4^th Cir. 1969).

In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the non-conclusory allegations of the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, assuming such allegations to be true. See, e.g., Hishon v. King Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4^th Cir. 1993);and Martin Marietta v. Int'l Tel. Satellite, 991 F.2d 94, 97 (4^th Cir. 1992). In this context, although the court must assume that the non-conclusory factual allegations are true, it need not assume that the plaintiff "can prove facts that [are] not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . law in ways that have not been alleged." Estate Constr. Co. v. Miller Smith Holding Co., 14 F.3d 213, 221 (4^th Cir. 1994), quoting Associate Gen. Contractors v. California State council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). See also Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (in determining whether a complaint is subject to dismissal as factually frivolous, a district court is not required to "accept without question the truth of plaintiff's allegations," but rather is permitted to apply common sense, reject the fantastic, and take into account judicially noticeable facts.").

2. Resolution of the claims

First, with regard to the plaintiff's claim — that defendant Darty helped to plot this alleged conspiracy, the Court notes that this defendant is a private attorney who, on these facts, cannot be deemed to be a State actor. Therefore, inasmuch as it is well settled that neither a privately retained counsel, court-appointed counsel, nor a public defender is subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 absent a showing that counsel was acting under "color of law" at the time of the alleged deprivation, this matter must be dismissed against defendant Darty. Hall v. Ouillen, 631 F.2d 1154 (4th Cir. 1980) (affirming dismissal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against court-appointed attorney as lacking "state action" and therefore failing to state a claim); and Deas v. Potts, 547 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1976) (affirming dismissal of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against retained counsel).

Second, to the extent that he has stated a claim for relief against them — a fact of which the Court is not convinced — it is well settled that defendants Collier, Martin and Butler are immune from liability on the plaintiff's allegations. See Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4^th Cir. 1985) (noting that it "has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his [or her] judicial actions.") To be sure, this immunity remains "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly," so long as such actions were not taken in the "clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56 n. 6 (1978).

Likewise, assistant district attorneys are entitled to "absolute immunity for the performance of the prosecutorial functions of their jobs." See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 269 (1993); Imbler v. Pactman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); and Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257 (4^th Cir. 1994),cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1150 (1995). Indeed, "[b]ecause the accurate functioning of the criminal justice system requires that all advocates be afforded wide discretion in the conduct of the trial and the presentation of evidence . . .," the plaintiff's claims against these two defendants cannot prevail. Vosburg v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 884 F.2d 133, 135-36 (4^th Cir. 1989).

Fourth, regarding defendants Cranford and Johnson, it is equally clear that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief as to them. That is, even when accepting as true the non-conclusory portions of the allegations set forth against these defendants, the subject Complaint reflects no more than that these Officers investigated and arrested the plaintiff on charges for which he subsequently was convicted. Thus, the plaintiff's allegations are meritless.

Furthermore, notwithstanding the plaintiff's spurious and unsubstantiated conspiracy allegations, the instant Complaint does not reflect that defendants Cranford and Johnson violated any of his "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); see also Wilson v. Layne, 141 F.3d 111, 114 (4^th Cir. 1999). Therefore, to the extent that the plaintiff can state a claim for relief against these defendants, under the instant circumstances such defendants still would be entitled to dismissal of the plaintiff's claims under the qualified immunity doctrine.

Moreover, it is well-settled that a financial recovery under § 1983 for an "allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render the conviction . . . invalid" is barred unless the plaintiff proves that the "conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged . . . declared invalid by state tribunal . . . or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). Consequently, inasmuch as the plaintiff's allegations are predicated upon his allegedly having been illegally investigated, prosecuted and convicted, such allegations simply are barred.

Last, with regard to the plaintiff's allegations that defendant Sills disseminated false information about him, such claim also must fail. To be sure, although the law is clear that an inmate has a constitutional right to have prejudicial and erroneous information expunged from his prison file, in order to prevail on this claim, such inmate must demonstrate, at least, that the information set forth in his file is false. See Paine v. Baker, 595 F.2d 197, 202 (4^th cir. 1979) (noting three elements of a claim for failure to correct misinformation).

Here, the documents which the plaintiff has submitted tend to demonstrate that as of June 26, 2001, when defendant Sills advised him of the existence of the subject charges, those charges actually were pending against the plaintiff. Indeed, the plaintiff's own exhibits further demonstrate that the subject charges were filed in the year 2000; that in June 2001, defendant Sills wrote the plaintiff and advised that she had received notification of the existence of the subject charges and would note their status in his records; that in or about early 2002, the plaintiff actually attempted to subpoena witnesses to appear on his behalf for a trial of those matters; and that it was not until May 2002 that the charges were resolved by virtue of the State's voluntary dismissal of them. Consequently, the plaintiff's documents tend to foreclose his ability to state a claim against defendant Sills on these allegations.

Based upon the foregoing, then, the Court finds that the instant Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

1. The defendant Sills "Motion To Dismiss" (document #13), filed September 16, 2004 is GRANTED;

2. The "Motion To Dismiss" by defendants Collier, Butler and Martin (document #16), filed September 20, 2004 is GRANTED; and

3. The plaintiff's civil rights Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, filed July 31, 2003 and amended on August 25, 2004 (documents ## 1 and 3) is DISMISSED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.