It is, no doubt, the general rule that injunction will not lie to restrain mere trespasses on land, and this for the simple reason that an action at law will ordinarily afford an ample and adequate remedy for the wrong. ( Mechanics' Foundry v. Ryall, 75 Cal. 601, [17 P. 703]; California Nav. Co. v. Union Transp. Co., 122 Cal. 641, [55 P. 591]; Randall v. Freed, 154 Cal. 299, [ 97 P. 669].) And, on like grounds, it is not the usual practice of courts of equity to issue injunctions for the purpose of restoring land to a claimant out of possession — in other words, to permit an injunction suit to be substituted for an action of ejectment.
We note, moreover, that none of the authorities cited by plaintiff stand for the proposition that an injunction must issue in all nuisance cases, but hold, rather, that injunctive relief is permissible in such cases regardless of the availability of other remedies. (See, e.g., City County of San Francisco v. Buckman, supra, 111 Cal. 25, 30-31; Boise City v. Sinsel, supra, 241 P.2d 173, 178; see also People v. Stafford Packing Co., 193 Cal. 719, 728 [ 227 P. 485]; Randall v. Freed, 154 Cal. 299, 302 [ 97 P. 669]; 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1966 rev. ed.) pp. 896-899; 36 Cal.Jur.2d, Nuisances, §§ 51, 77.) In California, one remedy available to plaintiff to remove an encroachment is self-help followed by an action against the owner of the encroachment for the reasonable costs of its removal.
Where no exception is taken or noted to the ruling of a trial court in accordance with the provision of section 646 of the Code of Civil Procedure, when a jury trial is granted, such order, not being within the list of orders which are deemed to have been excepted to under section 647 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not reviewable on appeal from the judgment. ( Randall v. Freed, 154 Cal. 299, 301 [ 97 P. 669].) [2] Second: Was the judgment contrary to law in that it allowed defendants to retain the money paid them in error?
[2] The defendants' next point is that the plaintiff's allegations do not show its injury was irreparable. They cite and rely on Randall v. Freed, 154 Cal. 299 [ 97 P. 669]. But in that case the counterclaim under attack did not allege the facts.
It must be conceded that as far as the allegations of irreparable injury are concerned that the allegations contained in the complaint are mere conclusions. To be sufficient, facts should be stated showing how and why injury would result. ( Randall v. Freed, 154 Cal. 299 [ 97 P. 669]; Willis v. Lauridson, 161 Cal. 106 [ 118 P. 530].) Concerning the question of waste, we find a different situation.
The other points urged by defendant all concern the admission of evidence, and the simple and complete answer is that no objection having been made at the trial to the admission of such evidence, defendant cannot now be heard to complain. (Code Civ. Proc., sec. 646; Randall v. Freed, 154 Cal. 299, [ 97 P. 669]; Bullard v. Stone, 67 Cal. 477, [8 P. 17]; Roper v. McFadden, 48 Cal. 346.) The judgment is affirmed.