Opinion
3:23-4008-MGL-PJG
08-21-2023
Lorenzo J. Ramsey, Plaintiff, v. Angela R. Taylor; Steven B. Sochomski; Zendolyn S. Green; Lisa Kee; John Keffer; Charles Blair; Cameron P. Prescott; Trevor C. Brown; Ralph W. Canty; Lacy Kruzeski; Paula Messier, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Paige J. Gossett, United States Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff Lorenzo J. Ramsey, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes this action should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed this action on a standard complaint form provided by the court. Plaintiff lists numerous federal laws as the basis for the court's jurisdiction, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, “tax laws,” several joint resolutions of the House of Representatives, and numerous Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 3.) In a section of the complaint form asking for a short and plain statement of Plaintiff's claim, Plaintiff states that the defendants are “working in the private kidnap [sic], false/altered documents, committed perjury[,] defrauding the government.” (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges that the State of South Carolina and other public entities are “running organized crime for kickback.” (Id.) Plaintiff indicates he seeks damages in this action. In previous cases filed with this court, Plaintiff sued related defendants and raised claims about the State of South Carolina placing his children in foster care. See C/A No. 3:22-4108; C/A No. 0:22-4644.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint. The Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “is frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court concludes that this case should be summarily dismissed as frivolous. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (providing that a claim is frivolous if “it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact”) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)); see also Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to summary dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court[.] . . . In addition, because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”). Most fundamentally, it appears Plaintiff is raising the same issues he raised in his previous two cases filed with this court, without correcting the deficiencies in those complains identified by the court's orders summarily dismissing those cases. Thus, this case appears to be duplicative. See Cottle v. Bell, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000) (“Because district courts are not required to entertain duplicative or redundant lawsuits, they may dismiss such suits as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e).”) (citing Aziz v. Burrows, 976 F.2d 1158, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)); see also McWilliams v. State of Colo., 121 F.3d 573, 574 (10th Cir. 1997) (“ ‘Repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action' may be dismissed under § 1915 as frivolous or malicious.”) (quoting Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir.1988)).
To the extent Plaintiff seeks to raise new claims in this case, he fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff lists numerous federal laws, but he does not provide any facts about the named defendants that could plausibly show that the federal laws listed were violated. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support); see also Langford v. Joyner, 62 F.4th 122, 126 (4th Cir. 2023) (“[W]e do not require a complaint to contain detailed factual allegations. But we do require sufficient facts to allow the court to infer liability as to each defendant. This is baked into Rule 8's requirement that the complaint ‘show' the plaintiff is entitled to relief.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff does not use complete sentences or provide any information that would allow the court to determine what this case is about, why Plaintiff named each defendant, or how the federal laws apply to Plaintiff. Therefore, the court concludes that this case is frivolous and should be dismissed.
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, the court recommends that this case be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 901 Richland Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).