Opinion
C/A 3:22-4108-MGL-PJG
12-21-2022
Lorenzo J. Ramsey, Plaintiff, v. South Carolina Department of Social Services; Sumter County Sheriff's Office; Sumter County Chamber of Commerce; Sumter School District 2 Office; Steven B. Suchomski; Lacy Kruszeski; LaRonda Alford; Lauron Taylor Stukes; Trevor C. Brown, Sumter County Sheriff; Angela R. Taylor, Chamber of Commerce Judge; William Wright, Sumter School District Office Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PAIGE J. GOSSETT, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Lorenzo J. Ramsey, proceeding pro se, brings this civil action. This matter is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.) for initial review pursuant to established local procedure. By order dated December 8, 2022, the court provided Plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint to correct deficiencies identified by the court that would warrant summary dismissal of the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on December 16, 2022. (ECF No. 10.) Having reviewed the Amended Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the court concludes the Amended Complaint still fails to establish that the court has subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this case should be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
Plaintiff paid the filing fee in this case.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed the original Complaint on a standard form provided by the court. Plaintiff indicated that the court has jurisdiction in this case because it is brought pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and the jurisdictional amount in controversy is $11,700,000. In a section of the complaint form asking Plaintiff to provide a short statement of his claim, Plaintiff cited to 18 U.S.C. § 242 (criminal penalties for deprivation of rights), and he provided a range of dates-from February 25, 2022 to present day. In a section of the complaint form asking Plaintiff to state what relief he seeks, Plaintiff stated that the “basic credit amount is 9,251,600” and “they stole what belongs to me; return my children.” (Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4.)
In the Amended Complaint, also written on a standard complaint form, in the section asking Plaintiff to explain the basis for the court's jurisdiction in this case, Plaintiff lists numerous federal criminal statutes and every amendment to the United States Constitution. Plaintiff claims the South Carolina Department of Social Services “kidnapped my children, lie trespass, and try to manipulate.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 4.) Plaintiff claims the Sumter County Sheriff “assaulted kidnapped, lie too” and the Sumter County Chamber of Commerce “belittle me, hindered my investigation, proceed without my consent and refusing they offer.” (Id.) Plaintiff further claims the Sumter County School District 2 “deny access to my kid and me, allow false documents, ignore me.” (Id.) In the section asking Plaintiff to explain his injuries and the relief he seeks, Plaintiff lists “body ache and soreness” and for relief, he asks to “get my kids back to me,” “independent to be inserted and separated from democracy and they body of government,” and damages. (Id. at 5.)
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Amended Complaint. The court possesses the inherent authority to review a pro se complaint to ensure that subject matter jurisdiction exists and that a case is not frivolous, even if the complaint is not subject to the prescreening provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1989) (“Section 1915(d) . . . authorizes courts to dismiss a ‘frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision.”); Ross v. Baron, 493 Fed.Appx. 405, 406 (4th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (“[F]rivolous complaints are subject to dismissal pursuant to the inherent authority of the court, even when the filing fee has been paid . . . [and] because a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an obviously frivolous complaint, dismissal prior to service of process is permitted.”) (citations omitted); see also Fitzgerald v. First E. Seventh Street Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing fee[.]”); Ricketts v. Midwest Nat'l Bank, 874 F.2d 1177, 1181 (7th Cir. 1989) (“[A] district court's obligation to review its own jurisdiction is a matter that must be raised sua sponte, and it exists independent of the ‘defenses' a party might either make or waive under the Federal Rules.”); Franklin v. State of Or., State Welfare Div., 662 F.2d 1337, 1342 (9th Cir. 1981) (providing a judge may dismiss an action sua sponte for lack of subject matter jurisdiction without issuing a summons or following other procedural requirements).
To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the plaintiff must do more than make mere conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
This court is required to liberally construe pro se complaints, which are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for “all civil actions”).
B. Analysis
The court finds that despite Plaintiff's having availed himself of the opportunity to cure the deficiencies previously identified by the court, this case should nonetheless be summarily dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “constrained to exercise only the authority conferred by Article III of the Constitution and affirmatively granted by federal statute.” In re Bulldog Trucking, Inc., 147 F.3d 347, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, a federal court is required, sua sponte, to determine if a valid basis for its jurisdiction exists, “and to dismiss the action if no such ground appears.” Id. at 352; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.”). Although the absence of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time during the case, determining jurisdiction at the outset of the litigation is the most efficient procedure. Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654 (4th Cir. 1999).
There is no presumption that a federal court has jurisdiction over a case, Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir. 1999), and a plaintiff must allege facts essential to show jurisdiction in his pleadings. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); see also Dracos v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 762 F.2d 348, 350 (4th Cir. 1985) (“[P]laintiffs must affirmatively plead the jurisdiction of the federal court.”). To this end, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(1) requires that the complaint provide “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction[.]”
The two most commonly recognized and utilized bases for federal court jurisdiction are (1) “federal question” under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and (2) “diversity of citizenship” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. First, federal question jurisdiction requires the plaintiff to show that the case is one “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiff lists numerous federal criminal statutes and amendments to the United States Constitution, but Plaintiff provides no explanation as to how those statutes and amendments apply to his case. See Burgess v. Charlottesville Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 477 F.2d 40, 43-44 (4th Cir. 1973) (“[T]he mere assertion in a pleading that the case is one involving the construction or application of the federal laws does not authorize the District Court to entertain the suit[,] nor does federal jurisdiction attach on the bare assertion that a federal right or law has been infringed or violated or that the suit takes its origin in the laws of the United States.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8 (requiring that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”'); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (stating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 does not require detailed factual allegations, but it requires more than a plain accusation that the defendant unlawfully harmed the plaintiff, devoid of factual support). Even liberally construing the pleading in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, Plaintiff fails to provide enough facts that could support a claim that any of the defendants violated Plaintiff's rights. See Holloway v. Pagan River Dockside Seafood, Inc., 669 F.3d 448, 452-53 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that where the alleged federal claim is “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of [the United States Supreme Court], or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy,” subject matter jurisdiction does not exist over that claim) (citing Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998)). Therefore, federal question jurisdiction does not exist in this case.
Second, the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), requires complete diversity of parties and an amount in controversy in excess of $75,000. Complete diversity of parties in a case means that no party on one side may be a citizen of the same state as any party on the other side. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372-74 nn. 13-16 (1978). In absence of diversity of citizenship, the amount in controversy is irrelevant. Here, all the parties in this case appear to be citizens of South Carolina. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 10 at 2-3.) Therefore, diversity jurisdiction does not exist in this case.
III. Conclusion
There being no apparent basis of federal jurisdiction over this matter, the court recommends that this case be summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).